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5Foreword
Ethics is of great importance to science and technology. There are many devel-
opments in science and technology that regularly give rise to ethical questions 
in European societies – stem cell research, genetically modified food, human 
enhancement, to name just a few. The intense social debate such developments 
trigger, highlights the importance of high ethics standards for science and 
technology. These standards reflect our adherence to the ethical values and 
fundamental rights, such as human dignity, freedom, democracy, pluralism, 
solidarity, integrity and non-discrimination, on which the EU is founded. 
To underline their importance, these values and rights have been reaffirmed 
at the highest European level with the entry into force on 1 December 2009 
of the Lisbon treaty, which makes explicit reference to the European Charter 
of Fundamental Rights.
High ethics standards also add to the quality of research and increase its likely social impact. They promote research 
integrity and a better alignment of research with social needs and expectations. They support the societal uptake 
of the new products, processes and services that are the result of scientific research, because high ethical standards 
generally merit public trust. This second aspect is equally relevant, as science and technology are vital for addressing 
the many economic, ecological and social challenges that confront us. 
The importance of ethics for science and technology has long been recognised by the European Commission. 
We have stimulated bioethics research, education and ethics review since the early 1990s, and have provided funding 
for numerous international bioethics research projects, networks, conferences and capacity building actions. 
 
This textbook is the result of just one of the projects funded under the Science in Society theme of the Seventh Framework 
Programme and was skilfully produced by a team of specialists in bioethics education from the Centre for Professional 
Ethics at Keele University. The aim of this textbook is to contribute to the infrastructure for ethics deliberation and 
ethics review in Europe – and beyond – by facilitating access to information and education about research ethics. 
Today, the research and ethical issues described in this textbook occur throughout the globe – and research projects 
are increasingly carried out by worldwide consortia of research teams. I am sure, therefore, that the textbook will find 
a wide readership both within and outside Europe.
Jean-Michel Baer
Director for Science, Economy and Society
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Aims and scope
This textbook is designed for use in the training of researchers and research ethics committee members throughout 
Europe and beyond. It is intended to be accessible to scientific and lay readers, including those with no previous expe-
rience of ethical theory and analysis. The book covers key issues in the ethics of research involving human participants, 
including some of the ethical issues associated with new technologies. 
The scope of the textbook is the ethics of scientific research involving human beings. It contains case studies relating 
to a variety of scientific disciplines including biomedical and human life sciences, new technologies and the social sci-
ences. These have been chosen to illustrate and facilitate discussion of key ethical issues, and to give a flavour of the 
range of research settings in which these issues occur. It is of course impossible, even in a fairly large book such as this, 
to include examples of every type of research. However, the ethical problems illustrated by the case studies, and 
the principles that are invoked in the discussions of these problems, are relevant to many different kinds of research; 
and the textbook should equip students to recognise ethical problems and apply the principles in relation to other 
kinds of research that they might encounter either in their own work or as members of research ethics committees. 
Discussion of the ethical issues arising from the case studies is informed by a range of philosophical perspectives and 
concepts introduced in the first chapter. Although the first chapter contains some discussion of the strengths and 
limitations of the various approaches, no attempt is made to reach conclusive judgements about them, and the sub-
sequent discussion does not favour or promote any particular perspective. Similarly, reference will be made to major 
religious views where relevant (for example in relation to research involving human embryos), but without endorsing 
or rejecting any particular view. This approach is based on a recognition that these are matters on which reasonable peo-
ple can (and do) disagree. Nevertheless, an understanding of the key differences between different moral perspectives 
is important for those wishing to engage in debates about practical moral issues. Often, people approaching ethical 
problems from different philosophical perspectives can agree at a practical level about what ought to be done, because 
they share many values though for different underlying reasons. Nevertheless, different philosophical perspectives tend 
to emphasise different factors as being ethically important, so thinking about an ethical issue from a variety of per-
spectives can alert us to considerations that we might have missed had we addressed it from a single perspective. 
When there is disagreement at a practical level, awareness of the philosophical perspectives underlying the competing 
views can help to identify what is at issue between them and to find grounds for agreement or compromise. 
The textbook does not aim to teach students about the law in relation to research, or about regulatory provisions 
relating to the running of research ethics committees. Firstly, these fall outside the book’s Terms of Reference, and secondly, 
although there have been important moves towards harmonisation, for example through the European Union Clinical 
Trials Directive and the Oviedo Convention and its additional protocols, much variation remains, which would make it 
impossible to provide comprehensive coverage in a book aimed at a Europe-wide audience. The Clinical Trials Directive, 
for example, only applies to clinical trials of medicinal products, while the Oviedo Convention remains unsigned and/
or unratified by several European countries. Nevertheless such legislation provides an important point of reference, 
reflecting ethical principles upon which a broad consensus across Europe has been reached. These and other legal 
instruments are therefore referred to where appropriate to illustrate such principles. It is of course important that 
researchers and research ethics committees comply with all relevant laws, and to this end reference is made to resources 
which can guide them in identifying relevant legislation. 
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Structure
The textbook may be thought of as having three parts. The first consists of Chapter 1 and provides a historical and 
philosophical introduction to research ethics. The chapter starts with a discussion of the nature and value of research, 
going on to consider some of the instances of unethical research that have led to the development of the current sys-
tem of ethical review, the key principles and theoretical perspectives that will provide a framework for later discussion 
of particular cases and ethical issues, and the role of research ethics committees. A number of these issues are taken 
up again and explored more critically, in the light of new biotechnological developments and the changing relation-
ship between science and society, in the final two chapters.
The next five chapters form the core of the textbook, each being focused either on a key issue in research ethics or 
a set of closely related ethical issues. Organising the material in this way, rather than by type of research, has two advan-
tages. First, it minimises repetition since each ethical issue arises in many types of research. Second, it maximises the 
book’s relevance to researchers and ethics committee members across a wide range of scientific (and other) fields, 
since the ethical issues can easily be extrapolated to types of research other than those that are used to illustrate them. 
In the experience of the authors, researchers and research ethics committee members, having been introduced to an 
ethical issue in one context, are readily able to suggest further examples from their own experience.
Within this core part of the book, Chapter 2 focuses on consent, considering amongst other things why consent is 
important, what conditions must be met for a participant’s consent to be valid, and what grounds there might be for 
conducting research without the consent of participants. 
Chapter 3 considers the ethical issues raised by research involving vulnerable participants. ‘Vulnerability’ is a concept 
that is widely used in research ethics, but it can mean different things. Sometimes vulnerable participants are under-
stood as those who are unable to give valid consent either due to lack of competence or because of circumstances 
which cast doubt upon its voluntariness. The part of the chapter which deals with this extends the previous chapter’s 
account of what makes a consent valid and what should be done in cases where valid consent cannot be obtained. 
‘Vulnerability’ can also relate to susceptibility to harm or exploitation, and in addressing this Chapter 3 looks ahead 
to the discussions of these issues in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Chapter 4 addresses two issues related to the acquisition or communication of information: privacy and confidenti-
ality. These also relate to consent to the extent that they are about controlling access to our persons and personal 
information, but also concern the harms that can result from disclosure of personal information.
Chapter 5 is about the balancing of harms (or risks) and benefits, both in research generally and in the special case of 
randomised controlled trials. These raise particular issues about whether doctors engaged in research have the same 
duty to benefit their patients that they would have in a clinical setting, and about the use of placebos and controls, 
and the baseline against which assessments of harm should be made. The general part of the chapter includes discus-
sion of the concept of minimal risk and an introduction to the precautionary principle. 
Chapter 6, the last in the core section of the textbook, examines two ways in which research can violate norms of 
distributive justice: by exploiting research participants so that they bear an unfair share of the burdens of research, 
and by excluding certain sections of the population from research in ways that may be discriminatory and deny them 
the benefits that participation can bring. 
The final two chapters address broader concerns that go beyond research itself, including the relationship between 
researchers and society and examples of how new biotechnologies can give rise to ethical issues that both 
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exist independently of the research context and provide challenges to existing modes of ethical review. These chapters 
contain more, and more diverse, cases than the preceding ones, and may be thought of as extension materials to be 
drawn on as appropriate to the context of a particular course. 
More specifically, Chapter 7 introduces and develops several themes involved in understanding the relationship 
between science and society. It considers the range of ways in which the progress and processes of scientific research 
might and should engage with and involve the broader public. The cases in Chapter 7 examine the issues raised by 
transnational research (raising issues about moral differences across cultures), by the prospect of malevolent uses of 
research (raising the issue of dual use), the proper conduct of researchers and the role of social categories in research. 
The general themes relating to science and society raised in Chapter 7 are also raised in Chapter 8, where the case stud-
ies deal more closely with the ethical issues involved in developing biotechnological research. These include the use of 
new technologies in assisted reproduction (raising questions about the use of human embryos in research as well as 
broader questions about human enhancement), the significance of new technology in our understanding of disability, 
nanotechnology (giving rise to a further discussion of the precautionary principles), and genetic and biobanking.
Pedagogical approaches 
This textbook is primarily aimed at people who are responsible for the ethical review of research, or who are them-
selves engaged in research, or preparation for research, that will be subject to ethical approval. These may include: 
members and staff of research ethics committees, researchers, and students undertaking research-oriented degree 
programmes. The book may be used in different ways for and by these different audiences. 
For example, the book as a whole may be used as a core text for research ethics modules within university science 
programmes and research degrees. For use in these academic contexts, the references and further readings will pro-
vide useful sources for students to draw upon in assessed work. Much of the content of this book is informed by the 
authors’ experience in providing short courses (of one, two or three days) to members of research ethics committees 
serving health authorities or universities. For courses of this type individual chapters may be chosen as the basis for 
particular sessions in accordance with the needs and interests of the group being trained. Although the sequence of 
topics has been carefully chosen, and later chapters do sometimes refer back to earlier ones, they are sufficiently 
independent to enable the sequence to be varied in accordance with the trainees’ needs or the trainer’s preferences. 
We would, however, recommend that any audience that is new to research ethics cover the introductory material in 
Chapter 1 before progressing to the more applied topics, since this is intended both to motivate the enterprise of 
research ethics and to provide a framework for subsequent discussion. The book is also suitable for use as a self-study 
resource for those who are interested in research ethics – whether as professional researchers, research participants or 
interested citizens – but do not have access to or time to undertake a formal programme of study.
There is considerable flexibility in the way the book may be used in a teaching or training context. Many of the chapter 
topics could be covered in one or two teaching sessions, and the best configuration (for example a long session includ-
ing an introduction to the material by the teacher and student discussion of case studies, or separate lecture and semi-
nar sessions) may depend on student numbers, the level of the course and institutional requirements. Depending on 
the level of the course and the time available, several topics could easily be spread over a larger number of sessions to 
allow more thorough discussion of the case or to allow students to follow up the references and further readings. Similarly, 
while in the context of an academic course it may be appropriate for students to read the relevant chapters and think 
about the case studies before attending the corresponding class, for those encountering the material on a one-off short 
course the case studies provide a route into discussion of the ethical issues that does not depend upon prior reading. 
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Additional flexibility in the ways this textbook can be used is provided by the “Syllabus on Ethics in Research”, which 
is made available as an addendum to the textbook. The syllabus contains an overview of the content of the textbook 
and ideally will be used in conjunction with it, but it may also be used independently, as a more succinct introduction 
to the issues and case studies discussed in the textbook.
Case studies
The textbook is structured around a series of case studies (between one and four in each chapter; twenty one in total), 
each with a set of questions for students or readers to consider, which are used to raise and illustrate the key ethical 
issues in research, and as a basis for discussion. The case studies are designed to illustrate and provoke reflection on 
particular practical and/or theoretical issues. In some instances they will be perceived as presenting difficult ethical 
dilemmas that motivate the reader to consider the arguments for and against the described piece of research and to 
think about how to weigh up the conflicting values. In other instances the case will elicit a certain intuitive response 
which the reader can then be challenged to defend. 
Many of the case studies are based on real pieces of research, but all are adapted to serve a particular pedagogical 
purpose. The descriptions of the cases are kept relatively brief in order to maintain the reader’s interest and to focus 
attention on the key ethical issues. One challenge for readers will be to identify what additional information they would 
need in order to reach a definitive conclusion in cases where the presented information does not allow them to do so, 
and to identify what is ethically significant about the additional information. This models the task that is faced by 
a research ethics committee in determining what questions to pose to a researcher, and by a researcher in deciding what 
information to include in a submission to a research ethics committee. Those using the book to teach a course may 
wish to encourage discussion of such issues by suggesting alternative ways in which the case descriptions might be elab-
orated and asking students what difference such elaborations would make to their ethical assessments of the research.
Similarly, another option open to research ethics committees is to request changes to the research protocol as a con-
dition for granting ethical approval. Many of the case studies include a question asking readers to think about whether, 
if they consider the research unethical as it stands, there are modifications that could make it acceptable. As with 
requests for further information, this can help readers to think more broadly about the choices available to researchers 
to avoid ethical problems and ways in which ethical demands may compromise scientific quality.
Although the case studies can be used in various ways, ranging from teacher-led discussion to individual study, the 
approach that the authors have found most effective is for students to discuss the cases in small groups of between 
four and six, and then to report back to the larger group for a plenary discussion. This ensures that everybody gets the 
opportunity both to contribute to the discussion and to hear the wider range of views expressed in the larger group. 
Disagreements within or between groups can provide valuable insight into contested principles. However, in order to 
ensure that such disagreements remain productive it can be useful to set appropriate expectations before beginning 
to discuss case studies in a group situation. Disagreement is to be expected but should not be considered personal. 
Rather, it should be welcomed as providing insight into the range of views that are likely to be encountered in a research 
ethics committee context and an opportunity to explore why other people hold the views that they do and to have 
one’s own views challenged. Those who hold views that are unpopular within the group should not be made to 
feel uncomfortable in expressing them, and students should feel able to ‘try out’ controversial views that they do not 
necessarily want to be held to. Students should be encouraged to relate the discussion to examples from their own 
experience, but in some contexts it may be advisable to warn against discussing confidential cases in a way that could 
allow individuals to be recognised by others in the group. 
Chapter 1   Locating ethics in research
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???
In this chapter you will develop an understanding of the nature of ethical decision-making 
and its role in research ethics. You will also acquire an appreciation of the nature of research 
and its regulation. Specifically, you will gain the following: 
•  An understanding of the nature and definition of research and an appreciation of 
the importance of good research.
•  An appreciation of the reasons for conducting ethical review of research and an aware-
ness of some of the international codes of research ethics that have been developed 
in response to scandals and abuses in research.
•  A critical understanding of the main theories and concepts that inform ethical decision-
making, including consequentialism, deontology, respect, dignity, discourse ethics, com-
munitarianism, liberalism, the ethics of care and the four principles approach.
•  An ability to draw on these theories and concepts in order to analyse and evaluate 
particular examples of research. 
•  An appreciation of opposing views on the role of the research ethics committee, and 
of the implications of these views for the evaluation of research.
Learning outcomes
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Introduction
This chapter introduces some central issues concern-
ing the rationale and methods of ethical review, which 
will provide a context and framework for the discus-
sion of more specific ethical issues in subsequent chap-
ters. It begins with a consideration of the nature of 
research, its value, and some of the historical factors 
that have prompted the development of codes of 
research ethics and the system of ethical review. A sin-
gle case study is used to illustrate the types of ethical 
consideration that commonly arise in relation to 
research. These are related to a range of key moral 
frameworks or theories which can provide a broader 
structure for moral deliberation. The final part of the 
chapter discusses the role and legitimacy of ethics 
committees. 
Why research ethics review?
This part of the chapter focuses on the reasons for 
requiring research to be subjected to ethical review. 
It first explores what research is and why we might think 
it is valuable. Some historical cases of unethical research 
are introduced, along with the development of codes 
and laws governing research in response to these 
cases. These cases, along with a variety of other factors, 
provide a broad justification for the ethical regulation 
of research. 
In most countries the majority of research involving 
human participants is now reviewed by a research eth-
ics committee (REC) consisting of both professionals 
and lay people whose role is to assess the ethical 
acceptability of the research and to ensure adequate 
protections for research participants. Within the EU 
this is legally mandatory for all clinical trials, (1) and 
many countries require similar levels of scrutiny for all 
medical research. While there is much research involv-
ing human participants that falls outside these legal 
requirements, many institutions, such as universities, 
professional bodies and funders of research, have 
decided to regulate the research that they control by 
setting up institutional research ethics committees and/
or codes of practice. 
What is research?
Before we can identify the ethical issues that arise in 
research we need to have at least a working account of 
what research is. To readers who are engaged in research 
this question may seem too obvious to need an answer. 
It is simply what we do. However, such a definition is 
needed in order to distinguish research from related 
activities such as audit or journalism, which fall outside 
the scrutiny of research ethics committees, and it is 
surprisingly difficult to find a definition that distin-
guishes satisfactorily between these things. (2) Consider 
the following possible definitions of research: 
•  a systematic investigation to establish facts; 
•  an attempt to find out something in a systematic 
and scientific manner;
•  a systematic investigation designed to develop 
generalisable knowledge; 
•  a focused systematic study undertaken to increase 
new knowledge and understanding;
•  a systematic study directed toward fuller scientific 
knowledge or understanding;
•  the collection of information about a particular 
subject; 
•  an inquiry that involves seeking evidence to increase 
knowledge.
Although these definitions capture elements that are 
common to many types of research, they fail to distin-
guish clearly between research and other activities. For 
example audit and journalism can also involve the 
attempt to generate new knowledge or to discover 
facts. On the other hand research conducted by stu-
dents as part of their training may not generate new 
1.   Directive 2001/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 April 2001 on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and 
Administrative Provisions of the Member States Relating to the Implementation of Good Clinical Practice in the Conduct of Clinical Trials on 
Medicinal Products for Human Use. http://europa.eu/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/l_121/l_12120010501en00340044.pdf
2.  What activities are scrutinised by research ethics committees varies of course from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and local regulations should 
always be followed.
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knowledge but may nevertheless warrant ethical 
review. (This may depend on how ‘new’ is understood. 
Does it mean new to the investigator, to the public or 
to everyone?) Likewise many forms of study, such as 
university-based education, are focused and systematic, 
without being research. 
This is further complicated by the array of different 
research areas and methodologies: there seems little in 
common between the research carried out by a histo-
rian and a biomedical scientist for example. This means 
that even notions that are shared between different 
research disciplines, such as the need for some method-
ology, will be interpreted in significantly different ways.
 
These considerations suggest that we should adopt 
an inclusive working definition of research, such as the 
following:
Research aims to generate (new) information, know-
ledge, understanding, or some other relevant cogni-
tive good, and does so by means of a systematic 
investigation.
While acknowledging that this doesn’t distinguish all 
research from all other human activities, it nonetheless 
appears to describe most activities which are currently 
thought of as research. This working definition is used 
because it seems to capture the important elements of 
the partial definitions above. (3) It is important to note 
that a fundamental aspect of research is uncertainty, in 
relation to the outcome of the research, its potential 
benefits and the risks involved. Because research aims 
at generating new knowledge, uncertainty is unavoid-
able. It is also important to recognise that research 
involving human subjects is carried out in a wide range 
of fields ranging from social sciences, to applied tech-
nology and design, and of course the biomedical sci-
ences. All of these areas of research can raise significant 
and specific ethical challenges.
Why is research important?
When the subject of research ethics arises, the first 
thing many people think of is various scandalous exam-
ples of unethical research. It is important to recognise 
that research is not intrinsically ethically dubious. 
Despite the problems that can occur there are still 
many reasons for holding that research is something to 
be encouraged. Several reasons might be given for view-
ing research as a valuable activity:
•  Research has brought a better quality of life and 
increased welfare. We owe our present standard 
of living to the huge amount of research that has 
made it possible – huge improvements in eco-
nomic efficiency, health care and wellbeing only 
exist because of research, and it is reasonable to 
expect that this will only continue. 
•  Huge numbers of lives have been saved. If we think 
about medical research in particular, huge numbers 
of lives have been saved by medical advances. 
Moreover, advances in our basic understanding 
of nutrition, sanitation and the environment have 
had a profound impact on life expectancy and the 
quality of life.
•  Knowledge may be good for its own sake. Finally, 
even where new knowledge has no real world 
applications we may still think that we are in some 
way enriched by understanding more about our-
selves, the universe we live in and our relationship 
to it.
These reasons support two different arguments in 
favour of doing research, based on different accounts 
of the value of new knowledge. 
The first is an ethical argument that builds upon the 
idea of the knowledge generated by good science (or 
good research more generally) as extrinsically valuable. 
3.  Lisa Bortolotti and Bert Heinrichs, “Delimiting the concept of research: an ethical perspective”, Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 28, no. 3 
(2007): 157-79.
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On this view, research is valuable because of the ben-
efits that the knowledge gained brings to society. 
This  argument suggests that we ought to support 
and carry out research insofar as it has such benefits, 
and this should be weighed against the potential harms 
– intended or accidental – that might occur during 
research or as a result of the knowledge it generates.
The second argument appeals to the idea of knowledge 
as intrinsically valuable, that is, as being valuable in itself 
independently of any further benefits resulting from 
its application. This rests on the notion that there is 
something valuable about understanding ourselves 
and the world around us, even if there is no practical 
application of that knowledge. This second justifica-
tion provides a reason why research without any antic-
ipated applications or direct benefits may nonetheless 
be ethical. 
It is worth considering how these arguments relate to 
the justification of research involving human subjects. 
All research involving human subjects involves costs, 
ranging from the use of participants’ time to the risk 
of harm, and it would be hard to justify this unless 
the research was worthwhile in some way. This raises 
a question about whether research ethics committees 
should have a role in ensuring that research is not just 
ethically sound but also scientifically sound. There is 
some debate about this question, since the operating 
principles for many RECs discourage them from look-
ing at methodology as it is felt that they are not well 
constituted to make this judgement in relation to the 
wide range of projects that they assess. (4) On the other 
hand, given that both of the arguments in favour of 
allowing research depend on the research having some 
chance of successfully reaching its objectives, it would 
seem that research needs to be methodologically 
sound to be ethical – especially when it involves risks 
to the participants. (5) It seems, therefore, that there is 
some reason for research ethics committees to ensure 
that research is methodologically rigorous, but this 
does not necessarily require them to review the qual-
ity of the science themselves, as they can rely on other 
methods of ensuring this, such as requiring independ-
ent peer review reports evaluating the methodology 
of the research project.
Research ethics scandals
In this section we will introduce some famous and 
less-well-known examples of research ethics ‘scandals’, 
and show how these have ultimately led to the estab-
lishment of the present system of independent ethics 
committees reviewing research. It should be noted that 
while the history of research ethics is often assumed to 
have begun with the scandals that took place in Nazi 
Germany, both unethical research and ethical regula-
tion of research preceded those events.
Edward Jenner’s smallpox vaccine, England, 1796
This research involved injecting an eight-year-old child 
with pus from a cowpox infection and then deliberately 
exposing the child to smallpox to establish their 
acquired immunity. While a great step forward in 
the fight against smallpox, the exposure to risk this 
involved for the child would be unlikely to be con-
doned today. (6) 
The Neisser case, Prussia, 1898
Albert Neisser conducted clinical trials on serum ther-
apy in patients with syphilis. This was done by injecting 
serum from patients with syphilis into those who were 
admitted for other reasons, without either informing 
them of the experiment or seeking informed consent. 
When, subsequently, some of these patients contracted 
syphilis Neisser concluded that the vaccination had 
4.  David Hunter, “Bad science equals poor, not necessarily bad, ethics”, in Ethics, Law and Society (Volume 3), Jennifer Gunning and Søren 
Holm, eds. (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007): 61-70. 
5.  Angus Dawson and Steve Yentis, “Contesting the science/ethics distinction in the review of clinical research”, Journal of Medical Ethics 33 
(2007): 165-7.
6. Ernst Wynder, “A corner of history: Jenner and his smallpox vaccine”, Preventive Medicine 3, no. 1 (1974): 173-5.
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failed. This was picked up by newspapers, drawing pub-
lic attention and ultimately leading to the minister 
for religious, educational, and medical affairs issuing 
a directive requiring that all non-therapeutic research 
must have unambiguous consent. This was followed in 
1931 by the German minister of the interior issuing 
Guidelines for New Therapy and Human Experimentation, 
which further emphasised the necessity of considering 
the risks involved in research, and seeking informed 
consent, in particular for non-therapeutic research. (7) 
The Little Albert experiment, United States, 1920
This research aimed to demonstrate the phenomenon 
of human conditioning by conditioning an 11-month-
old infant to fear rats by associating them with fear 
inducing circumstances such as a loud noise. The 
research was conducted without the knowledge or 
consent of Albert’s parents. (8) 
Medical experimentation in Nazi Germany, 1939-45
Experiments carried out on concentration camp pris-
oners included involuntary sterilisation, subjection to 
radiation, freezing to induce hypothermia, infection of 
research subjects with malaria and tuberculosis (TB), 
and many other unethical experiments, conducted 
without the consent of the research subjects, and often 
leading predictably to extreme pain, mutilation and 
death. (9) One difficult and highly controversial ques-
tion arising from this research is whether it is ethical to 
use the results of such experiments in those cases 
where they are considered to be scientifically valid. On 
the one hand not to do so does not help the victims 
and may deprive others who could benefit from the 
application of the knowledge generated. On the other 
hand to use the research seems in some ways to 
endorse the gathering of that data. This, however, is not 
an issue that research ethics committees normally have 
to deal with since they look at research prospectively 
rather than retrospectively. 
These experiments led to the development of the 
Nuremberg Code in 1947, largely as a legal document 
to codify what was unethical about the Nazi research, 
but also as a code for future research. It also strongly 
influenced the development of the World Medical 
Association’s Declaration of Helsinki in 1964, a code 
of  ethics developed by physicians to self-regulate 
the conduct of medical experimentation. 
The Milgram experiments, United States, 1961-63
In these experiments, designed to investigate people’s 
obedience to authority, the research subjects were 
deceived about the nature of the research and led to 
believe that they (in the process of a different experi-
ment) were administering electric shocks to other 
research participants. The aim of the research, which 
turned out to be very distressing for many of the sub-
jects, was to see how far they would be willing to go in 
risking harm to the other research participants. (10) 
Surprisingly, the result was that most people (approxi-
mately 65 %) were willing to continue to the end of the 
experiment, even though had the electric shocks been 
real they would have been seriously endangering the 
other research participant. One observation that might 
be made about this research is that science that is ethi-
cally questionable is not always scientifically weak or 
unimportant, since from this research we learnt that 
people will often obey authorities even if this involves 
behaviour that they would normally judge to be 
unethical, which has important implications for psy-
chology, sociology and governance. 
7.  Jochen Vollmann and Rolf Winau, “Informed consent in human experimentation before the Nuremberg code”, British Medical Journal 313 
(1996): 1445-7.
8. Ben Harris, “Whatever happened to Little Albert?”, American Psychologist 34, no. 2 (1979): 151-60.
9. Vivien Spitz, Doctors from Hell: The Horrific Account of Nazi Experiments on Humans (Boulder, CO: Sentient Publications, 2005).
10.  Stanley Milgram, “Behavioral study of obedience”, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 67 (1963): 371-8.
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Tuskegee syphilis study, United States, 1932-72
This was a clinical study carried out between 1932 and 
1972 in Tuskegee, Alabama, by the US Public Health 
Service. About 400 mostly illiterate African-Americans 
with syphilis were recruited into the study as well as 
two hundred healthy controls. The aim of the study 
was to observe the natural progression of the disease 
when left untreated, and in particular to compare the 
progression of the disease in African-Americans with 
the results of an earlier retrospective study of the dis-
ease in Europeans. The participants were not told that 
they were in a medical trial, and the tests were described 
as “special free treatments”.
At the outset of the trial there was no effective treat-
ment for syphilis. However, by 1947 penicillin had 
become the standard – effective – treatment for syph-
ilis. The researchers blocked the study subjects from 
receiving effective treatment, going so far as to prevent 
the subjects from being conscripted into the armed 
forces since that would have necessitated them being 
treated. At the end of the study only 74 subjects 
remained alive, 40 of their wives had been infected and 
19 children had been born with syphilis, some of which 
might have been prevented if these men had been 
given treatment. (11) The aftermath of Tuskegee led to 
the formalisation of ethics review in America, and was 
also influential on the 1975 revision of the Declaration 
of Helsinki which introduced the requirement for the 
independent review of all research.
This and the other well-known research ethics scandals 
listed above are clearly ethically troublesome, but it is 
important to realise that these high-profile cases form 
only a minority of cases of unethical research. Most 
countries have had public scandals regarding some 
breaches of ethical norms in research, and even in those 
that have not, it is likely that unethical research, at least 
by today’s standards, has been carried out. Not all wor-
ries about research ethics are spectacular big scandals, 
nor is it always the case, even in the examples men-
tioned above, that unethical research involves research-
ers knowingly doing what they believe to be wrong. 
Often researchers are either unaware of the ethical 
implications of their research, or, being aware of them, 
believe that they are outweighed by the positive ben-
efits of their research. Here are two examples recently 
submitted to research ethics committees.
Psychology of depression with eight-year-olds
In this case the researcher wanted to use a questionnaire, 
part of which consisted of the Becks Depression Index, 
with 30 eight-year-old children. The Becks Depression 
Index asks participants to express their agreement or 
disagreement on a scale of 1 to 5 with statements like: 
• I feel like harming myself.
• If I died today no one would notice.
• I think about killing myself.
• There is no point growing up.
• I am useless.
The truly disturbing thing about this research was that 
the researcher was not actually interested in the chil-
dren’s responses to these questions, but included them 
in the questionnaire as a ‘blind’ to conceal the true 
nature of the research from the participants so as to 
avoid knowledge of the researcher’s intentions from 
biasing the results.
Sports science muscle biopsy
For a piece of research on the oxidation of muscle tis-
sue a sports scientist wanted to take pea-sized chunks 
of muscle out of the legs of athletes. The main piece of 
information on the participant information sheet was 
11.  Joseph Brady and Albert Jonsen, “The evolution of regulatory influences on research with human subjects”, in Human Subjects Research 
– A Handbook for Institutional Review Boards, Robert A. Greenwald, Mary Kay Ryan and James E. Mulvihill, eds. (New York: Plenum Press, 
1982): 3-5.
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that this might hurt a bit. No information was given 
about ongoing pain, nor about the possible implica-
tions the removal of muscle might have for athletic 
performance.
In both of these cases the researchers declared that 
there were no ethical issues. Obviously in the first case 
there are clear risks involved in suggesting the notion 
of suicide to eight-year-old children. In the second case, 
while the research was not necessarily problematic, not 
nearly enough information was given to participants to 
allow them to decide for themselves. 
All of these cases provide evidence of the abuses that 
can occur in unregulated research, and the more pub-
lic scandals outlined above have been a dominant driv-
ing force behind the development of ethical codes and 
laws to govern research. (12)
Codes of Ethics and legal constraints
Ethical codes and guidelines are a means of establish-
ing and articulating the values of a particular institu-
tion or society, and the obligations that it expects 
people engaged in certain practices to abide by. Some 
prominent examples of codes and laws which bear on 
researchers’ conduct are listed below.
• The Nuremberg Code. (13)
•  The World Medical Association’s Declaration of 
Helsinki. (14) 
•  The Council for International Organizations of 
Medical Sciences’ (CIOMS) International Ethical 
Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human 
Subjects. (15)
•  The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union. (16) 
•  The European Convention on Human Rights. (17) 
•  The European Union Good Clinical Practice 
Directive. (18)
•  The Convention for the protection of Human Rights 
and dignity of the human being with regard to 
the application of biology and medicine: Convention 
on Human Rights and Biomedicine (The Oviedo 
Convention). (19) 
• The European Union Clinical Trials Directive. (20)
Research ethics as a separate area of concern arose 
with the increasing formalisation of medical research 
in order to address the ethical concerns arising from 
the conduct of research. Historically, the development 
of research ethics has been greatly influenced by exam-
ples of scandals and unethical research such as those 
described in the previous section. 
12.  Some further examples of unethical research can be found in the following: Henry Beecher, “Ethics and clinical research”, New England 
Journal of Medicine 274, no. 24 (1966): 1354-60; Laud Humphreys, Tearoom Trade: Impersonal Sex in Public Places (New York: Aldine, 1975); 
Maurice Pappworth, “Human guinea pigs: a warning”, Twentieth Century 171 (1962): 67-75; Udo Schüklenk, “Introduction to research 
ethics,” Developing World Bioethics 5, no. 1 (2005): 1-13; Philip Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil 
(New York: Random House, 2007).
13.  Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law 10, no. 2 (1949): 181-2.  
http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/nuremberg.html 
14.  World Medical Association, Declaration of Helsinki: ethical principles for research involving human subjects (2008).  
http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/index.html
15.  Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences, International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human 
Subjects (2002). http://www.cioms.ch/frame_guidelines_nov_2002.htm
16.  European Union, The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01).  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/default_en.htm 
17.  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Rome, 4.XI.1950).  
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm
18.  Directive 2005/28/EC of 8 April 2005 laying down principles and detailed guidelines for good clinical practice as regards investigational medic-
inal products for human use, as well as the requirements for authorisation of the manufacturing or importation of such products. 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/pharmaceuticals/eudralex/vol-1/dir_2005_28/dir_2005_28_en.pdf
19.  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (Oviedo, 4.IV.1997). http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/164.htm 
20.  Directive 2001/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 April 2001 on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and 
Administrative Provisions of the Member States Relating to the Implementation of Good Clinical Practice in the Conduct of Clinical Trials on 
Medicinal Products for Human Use. http://europa.eu/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/l_121/l_12120010501en00340044.pdf
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21.  Henry Beecher, “Ethics and clinical research”, New England Journal of Medicine 274, no. 24 (1966): 1354-60; Maurice Pappworth, 
“Human guinea pigs: a warning”, Twentieth Century 171, (1962): 67-75.
22.  A listing of legislation governing research can be found in: Office for Human Research Protections, International Compilation of 
Human Subject Research Protections (Washington: International Activities Program, Office for Human Research Protection, 2009). 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/international/HSPCompilation.pdf. Likewise an outline of the regulation of research in the EU can be 
found in Michael Fuchs, Provision of Support for Producing a European Directory of Local Ethics Committees (LECs) (EC contract 
no. SAS5-CT-2002-30047, 2005). http://ec.europa.eu/research/conferences/2005/recs/pdf/lec_finalreport.pdf 
23.  European Forum for Good Clinical Practice, “The procedure for the ethical review of protocols for clinical research projects in the European 
Union: a report on the structure and function of research ethics committees across Europe”, International Journal of Pharmaceutical 
Medicine 21, no. 1 (2007): 1-113. An updated version of this can be found on the EFGCP website:  
http://www.efgcp.be/html.asp?what=efgcpreport.htm&L1=5&L2=1#report 
24.  For example see http://ec.europa.eu/research/science-society/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.topic&id=36 for a guide to ethics review 
requirements for European Commission funded projects.
25. John Saunders, “Research ethics committees – time for change?”, Clinical Medicine 2 (2002): 534-8.
The norms of modern research ethics were codified 
by the Nuremberg Code in 1947 in response to Nazi 
medical research and further developed by the World 
Medical Association’s Declaration of Helsinki in 1964. 
Concerns about the effectiveness of the existing regu-
lation arose when attention was drawn to various ethi-
cal concerns in ongoing research. (21) These concerns 
led to the 1975 revision of the Declaration of Helsinki, 
which introduced the requirement of a formal inde-
pendent committee review of research protocols. 
Following this pattern, a bewildering array of guidelines 
for research has now been put into place, some of 
which have a merely advisory status, such as CIOMS’ 
International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research 
Involving Human Subjects. Others, such as the World 
Medical Association’s Declaration of Helsinki are bind-
ing on members of particular professions (and most 
professional bodies have published their own guide-
lines). Others have legislative status, for example 
national laws and European laws such as the European 
Union Clinical Trials Directive. (22)
This array of documentation can be bewildering both 
to the researcher and to members of research ethics 
committees, since it can be unclear which documents 
apply to which research and what status each docu-
ment has. This is particularly problematic in cross-
jurisdictional research since local guidelines and laws 
can and do clash with international guidance. Most 
countries in the EU now have substantial guidance 
for the establishment and operation of research ethics 
committees, although there is still significant variation 
between countries. (23) Likewise funding bodies, includ-
ing the European Commission, usually have their own 
requirements and guidance both for researchers and 
research ethics review. (24)
The relationship between codes, ethical practice and 
the law is complex, however, and we should not assume 
that ethical evaluation can simply be a matter of ‘apply-
ing’ codes or laws. This is, firstly, because codes and laws 
are general and thus often fail to provide clear guidance 
in complex specific cases. Often judgement is required, 
and what is legal may depend on the judgement of 
a research ethics committee. Secondly, codes and the 
law are silent about many research practices, aiming to 
rule out certain very unethical behaviours but not to 
give comprehensive ethical advice. Thirdly, the contents 
of particular guidelines may be controversial and/
or contradictory (internally or with other guidelines). 
Finally, of course, even where the law or code is clear it 
may not be ethically correct – for example research 
practices in Nazi Germany may have been legal but 
were clearly immoral.
It is sometimes argued that since unethical research is 
not widespread the present form of regulation consti-
tutes an over-reaction to rare scandalous behaviour in 
the conduct of research. It is felt by some that the reg-
ulation of research treats all researchers as guilty of the 
crimes of a very few. Indeed, there is considerable com-
plaint in the research community about the scrutiny 
their research undergoes and the resources that it 
costs. (25) There is a point here, given the positive ben-
efits of research as discussed earlier. Preventing research 
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26.  This case is based on the controversial trial of PolyHeme in the USA. A discussion of this research can be found in the American Journal 
of Bioethics 6, no. 3 (2006).
from going ahead, or even delaying it, means foregoing 
some of these benefits. Nevertheless, in the light of the 
history of research described above it would be rash to 
think that regulation is now unnecessary. This is partic-
ularly the case because ethical decision-making is com-
plex. Because of this complexity individual researchers 
may not be best placed to decide about the ethical 
issues a research project raises, and instead it may need 
a group of experts, both scientific and ethical, to make 
a good decision. Likewise given the plurality of ethical 
views that exist within any society, a committee deci-
sion can be representative in a fashion that an individ-
ual decision about the ethical legitimacy of a course 
of action cannot. This can be shown by considering 
the possible reactions to the following case.
 Case Study 1.1
Testing of artificial blood product
Your ethics committee has been asked to review 
the following application. (26) Currently ambulances 
can only carry a partial range of blood of the various 
blood types, potentially significantly delaying 
the treatment of critically injured and ill individuals 
until they can be transported to the hospital. 
A replacement for human blood has been devel-
oped by a pharmaceutical company and now needs 
to be tested in the field. This artificial blood is 
blood-type neutral and initial testing with healthy 
volunteers seems to have shown that it is well toler-
ated with minimal adverse reactions. The researchers 
now propose further testing of the artificial blood 
by equipping five local ambulances with the artificial 
blood to be used in emergency care situations. 
In many cases it will not be possible to obtain 
consent from the patients to take part in the 
research because of the urgency of treatment 
and the fact that patients are often unconscious. 
The researchers argue that given the extensive 
laboratory testing the product has already under-
gone the best way to test the usefulness of the 
artificial blood is in a ‘real world’ test. Furthermore 
they make the point that presently some people 
have to forego blood products until they reach 
the hospital in any case. 
Questions
1.  What arguments can the researchers put 
forward in support of their proposal? 
2.  What objections could be raised against 
the proposal?
3.  In your opinion, should this research be 
allowed to proceed in its present form? 
If not, how might it be modified to make 
it more acceptable?
Discussion
This case study provides the basis for exploring a range 
of different ethical considerations relevant to research. 
In considering the questions attached to the case study 
we will identify some of the key ethical issues that arise 
in research. These will then be related to a range of 
moral theories and principles which will give a broader 
context to the moral considerations raised by the case, 
and will provide a framework for further consideration 
of this and other cases. 
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In support of their project the researchers are likely first 
to point out the benefits to future patients if the 
research goes ahead and is successful in demonstrating 
the effectiveness of the artificial blood product. This, 
after all, is the primary reason for carrying out the 
research and could lead to the saving of many lives. 
They may also point out that the research has poten-
tial benefits for the research subjects: the artificial prod-
uct may be safer or more effective than standard 
donated blood. This is particularly the case for subjects 
who have the rarer blood types that are not standardly 
carried in ambulances, as it will enable them to receive 
a transfusion in the ambulance when they would oth-
erwise have to wait until reaching hospital. It might 
also, although more controversially, be argued that 
patients have a duty to participate in research (at least 
if the risks are not too great) since they have benefited 
from the knowledge resulting from the contributions 
of previous research subjects. (27) 
Against this, opponents of the research might argue 
that the risks to research subjects are too great. What 
if the blood replacement product doesn’t work or, 
worse still, some subjects have an allergic reaction to 
the product? Opponents of the research might also 
object to the fact that many participants will be una-
ble to consent. This may in itself be taken as an objec-
tion to the research (perhaps because researching on 
people without their consent is considered a violation 
of their rights) and may also make it harder to justify 
subjecting research participants to risk. Even in the 
cases where consent can be obtained, there may be 
concerns about the quality of the consent, given that 
it takes place in an emergency situation where the 
potential subjects may not have a viable option other 
than to consent, given the limited range of blood prod-
ucts that ambulances presently carry, and where there 
is likely to be little time for explanations or deliberation. 
Concerns about the medical risks faced by participants 
and the absence of consent may be exacerbated by 
the thought that we are dealing with research partici-
pants who are vulnerable, as a result of their medical 
condition, and at risk of being exploited or used as 
means to other peoples’ ends (for example those of the 
researchers or of future patients). Finally, some people 
may be concerned about the motivation of the phar-
maceutical company involved in the research: are 
they just in it for the money, and if so, does this give us 
reason to be sceptical about the claimed benefits of 
the research and is it likely to affect the way in which 
the trial is conducted?
We have seen that there are plausible arguments for 
and against this particular piece of research. However, 
simply listing the arguments does not resolve whether 
the research should go ahead. One way of moving 
towards a decision is to examine the strength of the 
competing arguments. For example, in response to the 
concern about risks faced by the subjects it can be 
pointed out both that there may be counterbalancing 
benefits for the same subjects, and that, given the 
extensive lab testing and prior testing with healthy 
volunteers that the artificial blood product has under-
gone, we may have some reason to think that it will be 
relatively safe. 
It may also be that relatively minor modifications to 
the design of the research could remove some of the 
objections. For example, if the ambulances could be 
modified to carry both artificial and donated blood 
this could enable patients to opt out of the research 
without being disadvantaged. Likewise, if allergic reac-
tions are a possibility then the ambulance staff could 
be briefed and treatments for possible allergic reactions 
could be stocked in the ambulance. 
In response to concerns about the absence of consent 
it might be pointed out that this is rarely sought for 
emergency treatment given the urgency of the situa-
tion, so maybe we could apply a similar practice to this 
research given its therapeutic aims. Perhaps also, as an 
alternative to individual consent, we could consult 
widely with the community, and adopt some form of 
community consent. If it is possible to carry both types 
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of blood in the ambulances we could insist that the 
artificial blood be given only to those who consent, or, 
if consent is not obtainable, to those who would nor-
mally receive no transfusion before reaching hospital 
due to having a rare blood type.
Even after critiquing the arguments in this way we may 
be left with plausible arguments on both sides and it 
may not be obvious how to weigh these up. In order 
to resolve the question of whether the research should 
go ahead we need to understand better the bases for 
the various arguments and how they fit within more 
general ethical frameworks. One way of doing this is 
to identify different types of argument that are charac-
teristic of different approaches to ethics. In particular 
we might notice that many of the arguments for and 
against the research are about the consequences, or 
effects, of the research: the benefits or risks to partici-
pants or future patients, for example. Other arguments 
– mainly arguments against the research such as those 
concerned with consent and violations of rights – 
might better be seen as expressing constraints on 
research – limits to what it is permissible to do even in 
the successful pursuit of worthwhile aims. This distinc-
tion corresponds to the distinction between two of 
the most common types of ethical framework, to be 
examined alongside others in the following section. 
Ethical frameworks
Consequentialism
In the discussion of the case study, several of the argu-
ments focused on the expected or possible conse-
quences of the research. These included potential 
benefits to the research participants and to the wider 
society, and risks to the participants. One way to assess 
this research would be to weigh up the potential ben-
efits and risks, so as to determine whether, overall, 
the consequences are likely to be good or bad. 
This approach to ethical decision-making is known as 
consequentialism. (28) The key feature of all consequen-
tialist theories is that they take the morality of an action 
to be determined entirely by its consequences. Different 
consequentialist theories have different accounts of 
what kinds of consequence we should seek to pro-
mote, but one of the most influential forms is utilitari-
anism. This holds that our sole duty is to maximise 
utility, where this is understood as the happiness or 
welfare of all the individuals affected by the action. Thus, 
in the artificial blood case, the research should go ahead 
if, taking account of all the risks and benefits, this is 
likely to produce more utility than not going ahead. 
Utilitarianism would also tell us that if there are steps 
that we can take to reduce the potential harms without 
foregoing equivalent benefits then we should do so.
However, the case study also illustrates some objections 
to a purely consequentialist approach to ethical deci-
sion-making. One objection is that while consequences 
do seem to be an important factor in ethical delibera-
tion, consequentialist approaches treat them as the only 
relevant factor. One of the ethical concerns raised about 
this case was that individual consent would not be 
sought in all cases. To a consequentialist this would only 
matter if the absence of consent had bad consequences 
(for example if it led to a public outcry or if it resulted 
in participants who would have refused consent being 
included in the trial and suffering harm as a result). Many 
people think, however, that consent is important even 
if it does not have any such consequences. 
Another objection to consequentialism is that the 
focus on overall consequences can lead to a neglect of 
the interests of individuals. Suppose we could be sure 
that the research would be successful and would lead 
to the saving of many lives in the future, but also that 
it would involve the deaths of ten participants. Leaving 
aside any secondary consequences (such as loss of 
public support for research) a consequentialist might 
think that the sacrifice is worth the benefits, whereas 
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most people would consider that unconscionable. 
As with consent, there might be secondary conse-
quences that would lead the consequentialist to a view 
more in line with most people’s moral instincts, but 
to critics this would still show a failure to recognise 
the basic moral rights of individuals.
A common view of many critics is that consequential-
ism correctly identifies consequences as an important 
factor in determining whether an action (or piece of 
research) is ethically permissible, but that a concern 
with consequences needs to be supplemented by other 
principles and in particular by principles constraining 
what it is permissible to do even in pursuit of good 
consequences.
Duty-based ethics
In response to these concerns a rule-based or duty-
based approach to ethics is often suggested as an alter-
native to consequentialism. In the case study, the ethical 
concerns that are not well accounted for by consequen-
tialism might be better explained in terms of duties, 
for example to respect the wishes of individuals (by 
obtaining consent before involving them in research) 
or avoid harming them (by not sacrificing their lives or 
important interests for the good of others). These rules 
or duties can be thought of as placing constraints on 
the ways in which we may treat people.
There is a wide variety of duty-based approaches to eth-
ics, but what they share is the view that the rightness or 
wrongness of actions is not determined solely by their 
consequences but instead is determined by the nature 
of the action itself. These are also referred to as ‘deon-
tological’ approaches. (29) An example of a deontologi-
cal approach to ethics that will be familiar to many 
people is the Ten Commandments. This is a set of rules, 
identifying certain types of action as ones which we 
have a duty to perform or refrain from irrespective of 
their consequences. In this case the duties are usually 
seen as absolute, so that breaking them can never be 
morally justified regardless of the consequences. Other 
deontological approaches hold that we have prima facie 
or ‘defeasible’ duties, which can be overridden by suffi-
ciently weighty considerations. What distinguishes these 
views from consequentialism, however, is that the rules 
or duties matter in themselves, so that deciding what 
we should do is not simply a matter of weighing up the 
consequences. A variety of duty-based approaches will 
be explored below.
One way of expressing the concerns raised about the 
research in the case study is that it involves using peo-
ple as a means to an end. This can clearly be seen in the 
case where we imagined the lives of ten participants 
being sacrificed to save a larger number of future 
patients. The idea that we should not treat people 
solely as means is associated with the deontological 
theory of Kant.
Kant’s primary insight was to associate reason and con-
sistency with ethics. For the most part Kant thought 
we already knew the right things to do; we simply failed 
to do them. Kant thought of this as a kind of inconsist-
ency: we expect the world to live by one rule, while we 
live by a less strict one. For example, it is easy to be 
annoyed by someone else behaving in a rude or incon-
siderate fashion when driving, but it is also easy to do 
this ourselves, “just this once”, or “because I’m in a real 
hurry”. What Kant ultimately thought was that moral-
ity can be derived from reason via a requirement for 
consistency. This is important because, for morality to 
function as we expect it to, it needs to be based on 
claims that have universal appeal and motivation. Kant 
distinguished two different sorts of imperatives, hypo-
thetical imperatives and categorical imperatives. 
Hypothetical imperatives have the form:
 if you want x then you need to do y.
For example:
  if you want your research to be ethical you need 
to obtain consent. 
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The problem with this type of claim as a basis for moral 
action is that it only motivates someone if they want x; 
so in our example if the researcher did not care about 
being ethical then the claim would fail to motivate 
them to seek consent. 
Categorical imperatives, in contrast, are imperatives 
that all rational agents should recognise and be moti-
vated by. Kant built his moral theory out of categorical 
imperatives, derived from reason, and in particular from 
the notion of consistency: 
  1st formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative: 
Act only according to that maxim whereby you 
can at the same time will that it should become 
a universal law.
From this notion of consistency Kant derived the idea 
of respecting people as persons or respecting their 
dignity. (30) 
  2nd formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative: 
Act only in such a way that you always treat 
humanity, whether in your own person or in the 
person of any other, never simply as a means, but 
always at the same time as an end. 
To treat someone as a mere means would be to behave 
towards them as if they were just a tool to you, a means 
to achieving your own goals. To treat them as an end 
is to treat their own goals as important and in general 
to treat them with the respect that is due to a rational, 
autonomous agent. 
Another influential deontological approach is the human 
rights approach. (31) The basic idea here is that there is 
something special that ought to be respected and 
treated appropriately about every human being. Like dig-
nity-based approaches, this approach is based on the 
notion that there is something morally important about 
being human, and that this moral importance gives rise 
both to certain claims on others and to certain freedoms, 
so each human has a set of rights that may not be vio-
lated. Rights can be based on claims about the nature of 
persons (natural rights) but they might also be estab-
lished by agreement, laws or treaties (contractual rights). 
So, for example, many of the international treaties and 
EU laws we discussed earlier establish various rights for 
research participants. 
Rights imply that other people have duties to respect 
those rights, and different types of rights establish dif-
ferent types of duties. A commonly drawn distinction 
is between positive and negative rights. If someone has 
a positive right to something then either all or some 
others have an obligation to ensure that the person gets 
the thing they have a right to. In contrast if someone 
has a negative right to something then others have 
no duty to provide it, only a duty not to interfere with 
the person getting their right fulfilled. For example, 
if someone has a positive right to life then the state 
might be obliged to do various things to protect this 
right such as providing food and shelter. However, if the 
right to life is conceptualised in negative terms then the 
state (at least as far as the right to life is concerned) 
does not have a duty to provide the person with the 
things that they need to continue living, but only to 
refrain from killing them. Rights are often related to the 
welfare of individuals and so can be linked to conse-
quentialism, although in contrast to consequentialism 
they tend to protect the individual’s interests against 
being sacrificed for the good of the group even if this 
produces less overall utility. 
Deontological concerns could underwrite several of 
the arguments discussed in relation to the case study. 
For example, Kantian concerns for respect for persons 
might ground our concerns about the lack of consent. 
Similarly, dignity might arise as a concern in relation to 
using research participants as means to others’ ends, 
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particularly in view of the vulnerability of the research 
participants in this case and their inability to protect 
their own dignity through a standard consent process. 
Human rights might play a role if we think that people 
have a right not to be used as subjects of experimen-
tation without consent.
A common objection to absolutist deontological 
approaches to ethics is that they are very inflexible. 
While informed consent, for example, is very impor-
tant, given the possibility of very significant benefit to 
the participants, we might want to be more flexible 
than an absolutist approach would allow. Another 
problem with absolutist approaches is what to do 
when different rights or duties come into conflict. 
One response to these problems is to adopt a different 
type of deontological approach, where the rules can be 
traded off against each other (a prima facie or defeasi-
bilist approach). This approach will be explored later 
in this chapter.
Some have argued that the general approach adopted 
by Kantian and consequentialist approaches of focus-
ing on actions as the locus for moral evaluation is mis-
taken and that we need to view morality in a different 
way. Two such approaches will be briefly outlined below.
Virtue Ethics
Virtue ethics is an approach that addresses ethical 
issues in terms of the character of the agent carrying 
out the action. (32) Virtue ethical concerns might be 
raised if we think about the character of the research-
ers or the motive they have for carrying out the 
research. For example, the concern about the motiva-
tion of the company financing the research might be 
seen in these terms. But the other concerns could be 
captured in virtue terms by thinking about how a vir-
tuous agent would act. 
The essence of virtue ethics is that character is the pri-
mary object of ethical appraisal, and actions are judged 
according to what they tell us about the agent’s char-
acter. We might, for example, think that respectfulness 
is a virtue, and this might underwrite several of the 
objections that were raised to the research in the case 
study. Likewise, we might think that beneficence is 
a virtue and this might provide a reason to support 
the research because of its potential benefits. Virtue is 
considered to be important because it leads to ‘eudai-
monia’, or flourishing. So the basic idea is that the vir-
tues are those character traits that lead to human 
flourishing, and the vices are those character traits that 
destroy human flourishing. 
As with the previous two ethical frameworks, virtue 
ethics faces serious objections. One is that there can be 
competing accounts of what counts as human flour-
ishing and thus competing accounts of virtue. Another 
objection is that virtue ethics does not provide us 
with a clear account of what we ought to do: it tells 
what sort of person we ought to be, but not how to 
act in particular situations. One response to this is that 
the complaint is unfair, since we should not expect 
an ethics of character to tell us about our actions. 
We might for example take the central insights of vir-
tue ethics and incorporate them into another theory 
in order to evaluate both character and actions.
Others have defended virtue ethics from the charge 
that it is not action-guiding by appealing to the use of 
moral exemplars. If I am not fully virtuous I may be able 
to decide how to act by emulating someone I believe 
to be more virtuous than me; by trying to do what they 
would do in the situation. So, for example, we might 
think: “what would Gandhi do?”
This response might be too quick though. How do you 
know who is virtuous unless you yourself are virtuous? 
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And even those we think of as virtuous in some con-
texts may not be virtuous in others (for example, some 
people believe that the way Gandhi treated his wife was 
neglectful). Finally it is difficult to identify moral exem-
plars in the context of research ethics; to do this we 
would arguably need to have fairly settled intuitions 
about what the right actions would be.
Ethics of care
Another non-action-focused approach to ethics is 
known as the ethics of care. (33) This starts from a criti-
cism of views like consequentialism and deontology, 
which take ethical obligations to be impartial and uni-
versal, arguing that these rely on an unrealistic view of 
individuals as autonomous, self-sufficient beings, and 
that instead we ought to see people as social beings, 
nested within a complex set of relationships. The eth-
ics of care concentrates on these relationships and the 
emotions such as sympathy and solidarity that tend 
to go with them. Because the ethics of care focuses 
on receptivity to the needs and desires of particular 
people to whom we stand in particular relationships it 
tends to see moral judgements as highly contextual 
rather than deriving from general rules. Historically, the 
ethics of care has been associated with feminist think-
ers and has been said to reflect the ways in which 
women and girls think about ethical issues, but its focus 
is broader than simply gender relationships and some 
feminists have criticised this view as reinforcing stereo-
types about women as the ‘caring sex’. 
Someone approaching research ethics from the per-
spective of the ethics of care might focus on the rela-
tionship between the researcher and the research 
participants (although in the research in the case study 
the relationship would be minimal). On the question 
of whether people taking part in research should be 
termed ‘subjects’ or ‘participants’, those with an ethics 
of care perspective might argue that ‘participants’ is 
a richer term that encourages the participants being 
seen by the researcher as people to be engaged with, 
not merely resources for research. Although a Kantian 
might make a similar point, their focus would be slightly 
different: the ethics of care theorist would focus on the 
researcher and research participant’s relationship while 
the Kantian would focus on the researcher’s action. 
As with virtue ethics, though, we might be concerned 
about this as the basis for the entirety of our moral 
decision-making. While there is a strong case for think-
ing that both character and relationships are morally 
relevant, there appear to be equally strong grounds 
for thinking that actions and activities are morally 
relevant, and not just insofar as they affect character 
or relationships.
Dealing with moral difference
We have introduced four of the most common 
approaches to ethical decision-making, but it seems that 
in at least some cases they will lead us towards different 
answers. For example, in the case study it seems likely 
that a consequentialist will be inclined to approve the 
research because overall the benefits outweigh the risks, 
whereas a deontologist might reject it because enroll-
ing research subjects without consent might either vio-
late their rights or the researchers’ duty to treat people 
with respect, and a virtue ethicist might go either way, 
depending on what they understand the relevant vir-
tues to be. Given a population with diverse moral views 
this creates an obvious problem for ethical decision-
making especially when, as in the context of research 
ethics, we are making ethical decisions on behalf of 
society. This is the problem of moral difference. 
Moral differences exist not only between the major 
ethical frameworks described above, but within each 
of them. As we saw above, there are different accounts 
of the consequences we should promote, the rights and 
duties we should respect and the virtues we should 
cultivate. This raises a general question about the 
authority and mandate of research ethics committees: 
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what gives a committee the authority to decide what 
others can do and on what basis should it make its 
decision? We will return to this issue towards the end 
of this chapter and again in Chapter 7.
How should we respond to the problem of pluralism? 
We will quickly review and reject two initial responses 
before exploring some more promising options.
•  We might adopt one ethical approach and reject 
the others. This might mean trying to develop 
a  version of the preferred approach that can 
overcome the objections raised against it and 
providing arguments for its superiority over other 
approaches. However, given that all the approaches 
combine elements of plausibility with serious dif-
ficulties, and that philosophers have been grap-
pling with these problems for hundreds of years, 
we are unlikely to reach a consensus in the near 
future. To impose one approach in the face 
of ongoing disagreement and in the absence of 
compelling arguments would arguably be both 
disrespectful to those taking a different view and 
harmful to the authority and legitimacy of the 
research governance process.
•  Alternatively we might give up on a search for 
answers to ethical problems. If we are unable 
to come up with arguments that can command 
general agreement, perhaps that is because there 
are no answers to be found. One difficulty with this 
approach is that it conflicts with our sense that it 
matters what we think about ethical questions, 
that people can be mistaken about such questions 
and that it makes sense for us to protest when 
someone is doing something unethical. 
Both of these responses to ethical pluralism seem dif-
ficult to defend in the context of research ethics, given 
the extent of moral disagreement in society and likely 
to be found around the table at an ethics committee 
meeting. The first approach is likely to end up with 
a deadlock between members of the committee hold-
ing different views, and if there happened to be con-
sensus within the committee this would give rise to 
concerns about its representativeness and hence about 
the legitimacy of its decisions. The second approach 
threatens to undermine the rationale for having the 
ethical review of research in the first place.
Instead we need a coherent account of how to find 
an accommodation between several different ethical 
views, in essence a political approach to handling moral 
differences. We will return to this issue in Chapter 7, 
but for now we can identify some further moral frame-
works which aim to explain how we can arrive at 
shared moral judgements in societies characterised 
by moral difference. 
Discourse Ethics
Discourse ethics, at least as it was articulated by 
Habermas, claims to provide a universal account of our 
moral obligations that all ought to agree with. (34) 
It does this by focusing on the normative commitments 
that engaging in dialogue imposes on the participants 
in that dialogue. As such, the moral claims made by 
discourse ethics are situationally dependent and 
emerge as a consensus from discourse about the situ-
ation at hand.
Habermas claims that:
 Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or 
could meet) with the approval of all affected in their 
capacity as participants in a practical discourse. (35)
 
On this account, the appropriate moral norms can 
only be established through dialogue under fair con-
ditions in which all viewpoints are heard and taken 
seriously. The norms that govern this discourse dis-
courage disingenuous debating techniques, irrele-
vancy and inappropriate claims of priority for particular 
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viewpoints. This provides a means of coping with the 
plurality of moral views. 
Two concerns might be raised for discourse ethics as 
a way forward for research ethics. The first is that we 
would need to establish what count as fair conditions 
of discourse, but this itself might be subject to disa-
greement. Habermas claims that the conditions of fair 
discourse emerge from the nature of communication 
itself, but there is still the possibility of disagreement 
about what this entails. The second is that discourse 
does not always come to a single clear resolution that 
is consistent with past decisions, so there still might 
be uncertainty in what the committee should decide, 
and researchers might find it hard to predict what kinds 
of research the ethics committee will approve.
It is difficult to know without actually having the dis-
course what practical conclusions would emerge 
regarding the research in the case study. However, since 
discourse ethicists believe that there are important 
norms within communicative transactions, and that 
these norms must be respected, it is likely that they 
would raise concerns about the consent process and 
the difficulties it faces.
Principlism
A framework that is very widely used in bioethics, and 
medical ethics in particular, is called ‘principlism’, or the 
‘four principles approach’. This approach, popularised 
by Tom Beauchamp and James F. Childress (36) devel-
oped out of the Belmont report, an American report on 
the ethical conduct of research published in 1979. (37) 
The four principles are:
•  respect for autonomy (the obligation to respect deci-
sion-making capacities of autonomous persons); 
•  non-maleficence (the obligation to avoid causing 
harm); 
•  beneficence (the obligation to provide benefits and 
to balance benefits against risks); 
•  justice (the obligation of fairness in the distribution 
of benefits and risks).
 
These are to be viewed as defeasible, or prima facie prin-
ciples. If only one principle applies in a situation then 
we should act on it but if two or more apply, and sug-
gest different courses of action, then some will be over-
ridden by others. 
Principlism claims to provide a response to moral plu-
ralism by basing moral decision-making on principles 
which can be supported by people with different ethi-
cal perspectives. For example, we have already seen how 
respect for autonomy is central to Kantian ethics and 
reflected in the requirement to treat others as ends in 
themselves. Many consequentialists would also endorse 
the principle of respect for autonomy. This is because, 
given that people have special insight into their own 
preferences, they are generally better judges of their own 
interests than other people are; thus, if you want to 
make people better off you should generally let them 
choose what to do rather than dictating to them.
The principles themselves are supposed to capture 
what is intuitively plausible about both consequential-
ist and deontological approaches, and to cover the full 
range of moral concerns. Sometimes these principles 
will come into conflict (for example, in the case study 
the principle of beneficence may support the proposed 
research while the principles of non-maleficence and 
respect for autonomy may oppose it in its current 
form). In some cases the conflict may be removed by 
a more careful ‘specification’ of the principles, which 
might lead us to conclude, for example, that the prin-
ciple of respect for autonomy does not apply when the 
subjects lack competence (for more on competence 
see Chapter 3). When a conflict between principles 
cannot be avoided in this way we simply balance the 
principles against each other, using our judgement to 
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assess which principle is most important in the partic-
ular circumstances under consideration. 
However, critics allege that it is difficult to determine 
what answer the four principles approach gives to 
any particular ethical problem – making it a difficult 
approach to apply. To see the strength of this objec-
tion, consider that each of the arguments for and 
against the artificial blood research could be supported 
by one of the four principles; this still leaves us with the 
problem of how to weigh up the competing consider-
ations. Lacking any particular formula for the resolution 
of such conflicts, different people may come to differ-
ent judgements. It is therefore not clear that principlism 
solves the problem of pluralism. Likewise there is a ques-
tion of whether the four principles really do capture the 
entirety of moral concerns, or whether they highlight 
a particular subset of concerns. (38)
Liberalism
A popular view in the light of the plurality of different 
ethical concerns is to claim that the government ought 
to aim, as far as possible, to be neutral between differ-
ent ethical views or ‘conceptions of the good’. (39) This 
view generally leads to a focus on not interfering with 
the life choices of people unless their choices are liable 
to bring about harm to others. This is known as the 
‘harm principle’ and is most famously formulated by 
John Stuart Mill as follows:
The sole end for which mankind are warranted, indi-
vidually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty 
of action of any of their number, is self-protection. 
That the only purpose for which power can be right-
fully exercised over any member of a civilized com-
munity, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. 
His own good, either physical or moral, is not suffi-
cient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled 
to do or forbear because it will be better for him 
to do so, because it will make him happier, because, 
in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or 
even right… The only part of the conduct of anyone, 
for which he is amenable to society, is that which 
concerns others. In the part which merely concerns 
himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over 
himself, over his own body and mind, the individual 
is sovereign. (40)
 This leads to a strong emphasis on individual autonomy 
and decision-making. In the context of research ethics 
this would lead the research ethics committee to adopt 
a strongly non-paternalistic role. The ethics committee 
would see its role as being to ensure that participants 
are fully informed, and after that it would be up to them 
to decide what risks they are prepared to take. 
The research in the case study presents a difficulty here, 
in that many subjects are not in a position to decide 
for themselves whether to participate. In light of this 
they might insist that only participants who are in 
a position to consent can be enrolled in the trial. Note 
that for liberals an appeal to the potential benefit for 
the participant is not likely to be compelling because 
the harm principle (and more generally the liberal’s anti-
paternalistic stance) implies that people should not be 
forced to do things for their own good. 
Communitarianism
Some authors have claimed that liberalism’s emphasis 
on individual choice makes for an impoverished view of 
the individual which fails to recognise the extent to 
which people’s values and sense of identity depend on 
the communities to which they belong. (41) Instead it is 
claimed that, due to the ‘embeddedness’ of people 
within culture and society, decisions should focus on 
what maintains the community rather than what serves 
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the wants of individuals. This position is known as 
communitarianism. 
In contrast to liberalism, communitarians will allow 
consensual activities to be prohibited where they 
threaten the values of the community, even where 
there is no identifiable harm to individuals other than 
disapproval, offence or disgust. The justification for this 
interference is that once individuals are properly con-
ceptualised as part of their community rather than sep-
arate objects, it becomes apparent that interfering with 
their liberty in these cases is actually in their best inter-
ests because their interests are dependent on the flour-
ishing of the community. 
In relation to research ethics, a communitarian is likely 
to question the view that individual consent is either 
necessary or sufficient to allow research to proceed. 
For example, if a piece of research might be thought of 
as undermining community values, a communitarian 
might think that it should be forbidden even if the 
individuals involved are consenting. In the case we 
are discussing, communitarians might insist on some 
form of community consultation and then allow 
the research to go ahead because of its potential ben-
efits to the community despite the inability to seek 
individual consent.
As we have elaborated in this section, there are many 
different approaches to ethical issues generally and in 
research. Importantly, each of these approaches focuses 
on a different range of concerns and highlights different 
ethical issues. One conclusion we can draw from this is 
that sometimes important ethical issues may be missed 
or sidelined if we just stick to a single approach to ethi-
cal decision-making. When thinking about ethical issues 
in research it is useful to consider them from the per-
spective of several different ethical approaches. (42) 
This is one advantage of having a committee to review 
research, since inevitably different members of the 
committee will have different ethical approaches and 
so will focus on different ethical issues arising from the 
research that they are reviewing.
The role and legitimacy of research 
ethics committees
In the first section of this chapter a case was made for 
the regulation of research. Given the preceding discus-
sion of moral decision-making it might now be asked 
what role research ethics committees ought to play in 
this regulation? 
The European Union Clinical Trials Directive defines 
a research ethics committee as: 
 an independent body in a Member State, consisting 
of healthcare professionals and nonmedical mem-
bers, whose responsibility it is to protect the rights, 
safety and wellbeing of human subjects involved in 
a trial and to provide public assurance of that pro-
tection, by, among other things, expressing an opin-
ion on the trial protocol, the suitability of the 
investigators and the adequacy of facilities, and on 
the methods and documents to be used to inform 
trial subjects and obtain their informed consent. (43) 
This of course only applies to committees governed 
by that directive, but many other committees follow 
similar lines. Nonetheless this remit is a broad one and 
a significant amount of discretion exists for research 
ethics committees to interpret their role.
There are three main models of a research ethics com-
mittee’s role:
(i)  To protect and support the autonomy of prospec-
tive and existing research subjects/participants. (44) 
As noted earlier this is a broadly liberal approach.
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(ii)  To protect the welfare of prospective and existing 
research subjects/participants. This, in contrast, 
might be based on consequentialist grounds. 
(iii)  To balance a number of relevant moral consider-
ations when considering research proposals, 
including that of respect for autonomy and the 
protection and advancement of welfare. (45) The 
sort of approach exemplified by the four princi-
ples approach might support this view.
Each of these models will generate different sorts of 
conclusions about research proposals and different 
approaches to assessing them. 
There are arguments for adopting any of these 
approaches, but in the light of the discussion above, 
the third position seems most defensible. As noted ear-
lier, there is significant and widespread disagreement 
among reasonable people about moral claims. Given 
this, and the uncertainty that is necessarily involved in 
research, it is important to adopt a stance that allows 
at least the consideration of a wide range of arguments, 
even if some are ultimately rejected.
This is further buttressed by a consideration of the role 
of research ethics committees in society. Research eth-
ics committees are not (typically) private organisations, 
they are instead public representatives. Their authority 
comes from the government, and they make ethical 
decisions on behalf of the public. As such, they need to 
be able to represent and take into account the differ-
ent moral positions held by members of society. While 
the neutrality between moral positions that liberalism 
offers is tempting, it seems sometimes inappropriate 
for an ethics committee precisely because its mandate 
is to make moral decisions. While in principle neutrality 
between different moral claims is desirable in a public 
body, strict adherence to neutrality in cases of contro-
versy would be likely to limit a committee too much. 
Given this, a pluralistic approach to moral decision-
making is required. 
A final challenge might be raised to the approach we 
have developed thus far in this chapter: what should 
a research ethics committee do if some of its members 
have a religious or personal moral objection to some 
aspect of the research under consideration? Suppose, for 
example, that in the case study the blood was derived 
from a process that relied on human embryos being 
destroyed to create stem cells. Or suppose the artificial 
blood was derived from pigs or cows. Many research 
ethics committees will have at least one member who 
would object to this on the grounds of their personal 
moral commitments, and in some contexts this may 
be the majority view. So should they present this as an 
objection to allowing the research to go ahead? 
It is important that these objections are presented 
so  that they can be considered by the committee. 
However, they should not be presented as trump cards 
ruling out the possibility of compromise and reasona-
ble agreement. Part of the role of an ethics committee 
is to provide a forum for a compromise and reasonable 
debate between different viewpoints that a simple 
opinion poll cannot capture. This relies on members 
expressing their own views. It also requires a commit-
tee that functions in a deliberative fashion, and which 
welcomes discussion and consideration of potential 
ethical challenges.
So the role of a research ethics committee is to regu-
late the ethical conduct of research. Primarily this 
involves the review of research proposals before 
research is carried out, though it may also involve some 
role in monitoring the conduct of research and decid-
ing what should be done if something goes wrong. 
Often the research ethics committee will require 
changes to projects or make recommendations before 
they allow them to proceed. In making such judge-
ments committees should bear in mind that over-
burdensome and interventionist ethical review can itself 
be unethical insofar as it prevents or delays worthwhile 
and ethical research. RECs might also consider it part 
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of their role to give constructive advice to researchers, 
promoting and encouraging good quality and ethical 
research.
For individual members of research ethics committees 
this means reading through the applications thor-
oughly and making sure that any potential ethical issues 
identified by them are raised in discussion with the full 
committee. It also means a commitment to approach-
ing the process as one of discussion and deliberation. 
Besides their primary duty of the ethical review of 
research, research ethics committees often have other 
responsibilities related to their role as regulators of 
research. As noted above this may involve monitoring 
research, which can be carried out in a variety of ways 
such as requiring reports at regular intervals or at the 
end of a project, or even in some cases by carrying out 
ad hoc inspections or audits of research. Likewise, they 
are typically notified of adverse reactions and may have 
the responsibility of deciding whether a trial ought to 
be terminated or continued in the light of these reac-
tions. These roles are typically remit-dependent and 
vary from country to country. (46)
Research ethics committees might also have obligations 
to be vigilant for signs of fraud and scientific miscon-
duct. (47) However, their powers to detect departures 
from an approved protocol are likely to be limited and 
resource dependent. Often scientific misconduct 
occurs after research has been conducted, and it would 
be rare for a research ethics committee to have any 
powers to intervene at that stage.
Research ethics committees are constituted and oper-
ate in a variety of different ways. However, there are sev-
eral principles that are generally followed to ensure that 
they can effectively do the task they are assigned. These 
principles include: some measure of independence so 
they can avoid serious conflicts of interest (this need 
not be institutional independence but might instead 
be achieved by the presence of lay members), some 
measure of both ethical and scientific expertise so that 
they can spot ethical issues and understand the proto-
cols they are considering, and some degree of diversity 
so that they represent the public and can approach 
applications from different perspectives. 
Conclusions
In this chapter we first explored the nature and value of 
research and the reasons why it is regulated in the way 
that it presently is. This led to a discussion of the case 
study and an introduction to ethical principles and 
theories. We did not conclude that any particular 
approach to moral decision-making was superior, but 
did recognise that there are significant challenges to tak-
ing any particular approach to moral decision-making 
as comprehensive, due to the existence of significantly 
different, plausible accounts of morality. In the face of 
this, and given the nature of a research ethics commit-
tee as a public decision-making body, a  pluralistic 
approach that takes account of arguments from many 
different ethical perspectives was championed.
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Learning outcomes
In this chapter, you will develop your understanding of the nature and importance of 
valid consent in research ethics. Specifically, you will gain the following:
•  An increased knowledge of the important role that consent plays in research ethics.
•  An awareness of the ways in which the requirement for valid consent follows from 
other fundamental moral concepts such as autonomy, dignity, harm-avoidance, and 
respect for persons.
•  An appreciation of the definition of valid consent: specifically the tripartite definition 
in terms of competence/capacity, adequate information, and voluntariness.
•  An increased knowledge of key ethical issues relating to information-giving: e.g. how 
much should research participants routinely be told?
•  An awareness of key ethical issues relating to voluntariness in research: e.g. when 
(if ever) do inducements render participation involuntary?
•  An understanding of the issue of when, or whether, research without consent 
(on competent adults) is ethically acceptable: e.g. in cases where the methodology 
requires covert surveillance and/or deception.
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Introduction
Central to this chapter is the consideration of three 
examples. However, before proceeding to look at these 
case studies, we need to provide some background 
information about consent. In particular, we will explain: 
•  the role of consent in some of the leading interna-
tional documents on research ethics; 
•  the way in which the requirement for valid consent 
relates to some of the more fundamental ethical 
requirements outlined in Chapter 1; and 
•  the definition of valid consent.
The pre-eminence of consent in 
international codes and declarations
There is near universal agreement that informed con-
sent is of the first importance in research ethics, espe-
cially (although by no means exclusively) in biomedical 
research. Here are some examples of official statements 
that support this view.
•  Article Seven of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, a United Nations treaty, 
states that: “No one shall be subjected to torture 
or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. In particular, no one shall be sub-
jected without his free consent to medical or sci-
entific experimentation.” (1)
•  Article Three of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union (the ‘right to the integrity of the 
person’) states that: “In the fields of medicine and 
biology, the following must be respected… the free 
and informed consent of the person concerned, 
according to the procedures laid down by law…” (2)
•  The World Medical Association’s Declaration of 
Helsinki states that: “In any research on human 
beings, each potential subject must be adequately 
informed of the aims, methods, sources of funding, 
any possible conflicts of interest, institutional affili-
ations of the researcher, the anticipated benefits 
and potential risks of the study and the discomfort 
it may entail. The subject should be informed of the 
right to abstain from participation in the study or 
to withdraw consent to participate at any time 
without reprisal. After ensuring that the subject has 
understood the information, the physician should 
then obtain the subject’s freely-given informed 
consent, preferably in writing. If the consent can-
not be obtained in writing, the non-written consent 
must be formally documented and witnessed.” (3) 
•  Article Five of the Council of Europe’s Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity with 
regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine 
states that: “An intervention in the health field 
may only be carried out after the person con-
cerned has given free and informed consent to it. 
This person shall beforehand be given appropriate 
information as to the purpose and nature of the 
intervention as well as on its consequences and 
risks. The person concerned may freely withdraw 
consent at any time.” (4) 
•  The International Sociological Association’s (ISA) 
Code of Ethics states that: “The consent of research 
subjects and informants should be obtained in 
advance. Covert research should be avoided in 
principle, unless it is the only method by which 
information can be gathered, and/or when access 
to the usual sources of information is obstructed 
by those in power.” (5) 
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This list of official statements about consent is by no 
means definitive or exhaustive, and the documents 
mentioned differ in status. For example, the Declaration 
of Helsinki and the ISA Code of Ethics are the statements 
of professional associations, whereas some of the other 
proclamations are treaties that many countries have 
signed up to and hence (at least in many states) these 
will have direct or indirect legal force. Our primary 
interest here, however, is in the ethics of research, not 
in the precise legal status of these statements, and they 
are mentioned here just to illustrate the pre-eminence 
of the idea of free and informed consent.
It should also be noted here that the International 
Sociological Association’s statement about the need 
for consent appears rather more qualified than the ear-
lier ones, suggesting perhaps that the requirement for 
consent in social research is rather less stringent than 
that in biomedical research, especially where the latter 
involves some form of experimentation.
How consent may follow from more 
fundamental moral principles
The practical principle that research on competent 
adults should only proceed with their informed consent 
arguably follows from several of the more fundamental 
principles introduced in Chapter 1. These include:
• respect for autonomy;
• respect for dignity;
• respect for persons.
Arguably, each of these three ‘respect principles’ gen-
erates a duty of non-interference, meaning that it 
would be wrong to do something to an autonomous 
person’s body without his or her valid consent, whether 
this be for medical treatment, research, or any other 
purpose. This requirement may also apply (although 
perhaps less clearly and powerfully) to acquiring 
information about and/or observing an autonomous 
person. Similarly, one might claim that doing things to 
a person’s body and/or observing the person without 
consent is (at least in some cases) a failure to respect 
the person’s dignity.
The extension of non-interference rights to non-
observation rights takes us to the idea of privacy, which 
is dealt with in Chapter 4. At this point, it is simply 
worth noting that there is a close connection between 
consent and privacy: that invasion of privacy is neces-
sarily non-consensual. Thus, if I invited some people to 
observe me, then I could not (having validly consented) 
reasonably complain, when they did observe me, that 
my privacy had been invaded.
There is an interesting debate concerning whether the 
same is true of dignity and of respect for persons. One 
view is that any action at all could be consistent with 
these principles provided that a sufficiently robust valid 
consent had been obtained from the people affected. 
An alternative view is that some types of action are an 
affront to human dignity even if they are fully consen-
sual: ‘dwarf tossing’ and ‘sex work’ are amongst the con-
tested cases. (6) Consider, for example, the famous 
French case of Manuel Wackenheim. Wackenheim was 
a (so-called) dwarf who (until a ban was imposed, 
partly on the grounds that his job was contrary to 
human dignity) made a living from being ‘tossed’ by 
customers in bars and nightclubs. This ‘tossing’ formed 
part of a dwarf throwing competition – a sport “in 
which the aim of the competitors is to fling a dwarf 
over the furthest distance possible”. (7) Wackenheim 
appeared keen to pursue his chosen career and did 
not welcome the ban on dwarf throwing, saying “this 
spectacle is my life; I want to be allowed to do what 
I want”. So the question that this raises is: assuming that 
his consent to be ‘tossed’ is free and informed, ought we 
nonetheless to view the act of ‘dwarf tossing’ as incon-
sistent with human dignity? We should also bear in 
mind, though, that dignity is not the only possible moral 
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consideration in such cases (or indeed in research eth-
ics) and that ‘dwarf tossing’ could be objectionable on 
grounds other than dignity. For example, it may be too 
dangerous, or it may incite other people to ‘toss’ short 
people against their wills.
Another interesting issue, one that will come up dur-
ing the case study discussions, is the question of 
whether respect for autonomy creates an absolute 
requirement for consent, or rather one that can some-
times be overridden: for example, where there are 
strong grounds for undertaking covert surveillance. 
This could be for reasons of national security or crime 
prevention, or (more relevantly for our purposes) in 
order to gather important research data that could not 
otherwise be obtained. Similarly, there are interesting 
questions (again, ones that will come up during the 
case study discussions) about whether a person’s 
autonomy creates duties that extend beyond death 
(for example, in relation to burial preferences or the 
desire to have one’s body used in biomedical research 
or for organ transplantation). The latter are dealt with 
in Case Study 2.2.
As well as being justified by reference to respect 
for autonomy, the idea that valid consent is a require-
ment for ethical research is backed up by the principle 
of non-maleficence (introduced in Chapter 1). The 
thought here is that, since most prospective research 
subjects have an understandable concern to protect 
their own interests, requiring informed consent makes 
it less likely that they will be subjected to excessive risk 
by researchers. Furthermore, some of the harm and 
risk associated with research depends on people’s 
preferences. For instance, some people might be 
scared of going into hospitals and, for these people, 
hospital-based research would be more harmful and 
unpleasant than for others; conversely, other people 
might find participating in hospital-based research 
interesting and rewarding and, for these people, the 
psychological risks would be correspondingly smaller. 
So, since people are generally well-acquainted with 
their own likes and dislikes, the informed consent proc-
ess protects them from taking part in research that 
would be especially difficult or unpleasant for them, 
given their personal preferences.
The tripartite definition 
of ‘valid consent’
In most cases (although perhaps not universally – see 
Case Study 2.3 below) getting consent from any 
human participants is a necessary part of conducting 
research ethically. However, just getting people to say 
‘yes’ to participation is rarely enough. The consent must 
also be of a sufficiently high quality: it must be valid. 
Thus, consents based on inadequate or inaccurate 
information, or resulting from coercion, or made by 
people unable to understand what they are signing up 
to, will not suffice, and research utilising such consents 
will be ethically flawed.
While there are various different definitions of ‘valid con-
sent’ (also known as ‘free and informed consent’) in cir-
culation, most of these amount to the view that valid 





Valid consent requires adequate information. Thus, for 
each piece of research we need to ask what the pro-
spective research subjects should be told and how 
they should be told it. As regards the quantity of infor-
mation, one commonly appealed-to standard is what 
a reasonable person would need to know or want to 
know in order to decide whether to participate. Using 
this criterion, researchers would usually be obliged to 
disclose (amongst other things) any significant risks, 
the purpose of the research, any financial interests (e.g. 
do they receive a fee for each person recruited?), and 
the source of any external research funding (because 
people might, for example, object to helping certain 
companies or governments). But we would not nec-
essarily be obliged to disclose everything about the 
research (if that is even a possibility). Indeed, excessive 
information provision can lead to what is sometimes 
called ‘information overload’, meaning that people are 
less likely to be able to absorb and understand the 
information provided.
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There are also issues concerning the quality of infor-
mation provided. Questions that arise here include 
the following:
•  If participant information sheets are to be used, are 
these written in a style that the research subjects 
will understand or do they contain too much tech-
nical language? 
•  What if some prospective participants speak a dif-
ferent language from the majority population – will 
translations be on hand? 
•  Will prospective participants be given an opportu-
nity to go away and think about the decision to 
take part and an opportunity to ask questions and 
to consult independent sources of information 
(perhaps third party books or websites)?
Clearly, there will be a lot of variation between differ-
ent types of research. For example, whereas the deci-
sion to take part in a toxicity trial for a new drug may 
require considerable deliberation and information, 
answering a few survey questions about one’s attitude 
to shopping usually will not. Similarly, whereas it is often 
appropriate to use a formal information sheet and to 
get participants to sign a consent form, this will not 
work (or would be excessively bureaucratic) for some 
kinds of research. In these cases, valid consent will still 
normally be required but it will need to be transacted 
and evidenced in ways other than documentation.
Voluntariness
Valid consent must be voluntary (or free). In practice, 
this means that the consent must not result from coer-
cion, manipulation, or undue inducements.
Coercion is the use of threats. So consent would not be 
valid if the participants were threatened (or thought 
that they were being threatened) with violence or other 
substantial penalties for not taking part in the research. 
While there have been some extreme cases of this kind 
in the history of research (see Chapter 1), the coercion 
that we may encounter in contemporary European 
research is likely to take a more subtle form. It is also 
worth bearing in mind that people may believe that 
they are being coerced even when they are not; and 
that merely perceived coercion can be as much of 
a threat to voluntariness as the real thing. For exam-
ple, people might believe that if they do not agree to 
take part in research carried out by their doctor, man-
ager, nurse, lecturer, or supervisor, this will be disad-
vantageous in future dealings with this individual. 
So extra care needs to be taken when the researcher 
is in a position of power over the research participant. 
Such relationships can inadvertently create the impres-
sion of coercion; and indeed they can present research-
ers with opportunities for actually coercing people into 
taking part.
Ways of dealing with this include:
•  not letting doctors/nurses/lecturers do research on 
their own patients/students (although this may 
prevent potentially valuable research from taking 
place, in some cases research that may benefit 
patients/students);
•  ensuring that the consent process is done via an 
impartial intermediary, and avoiding situations in 
which the ‘powerful’ researcher directly asks the 
‘powerless’ person to consent to be in a study;
•  making clear in information leaflets that a decision 
not to participate will not adversely affect the pro-
spective research subject’s access to services, and 
that research subjects are free to leave the study 
at any time without penalty.
Manipulation sometimes, but not always, involves 
deception. Cases in which manipulation is deceptive 
are more properly considered under the previous sub-
heading, ‘Information’, so we will focus here on non-
deceptive manipulation.
What is it to manipulate without deceiving? This is 
a difficult question in philosophical psychology and 
we can only scratch the surface here. One important 
and relevant feature of manipulation (although not 
something that is unique to manipulation) is that it 
seeks to alter people’s behaviour by influencing them 
in ways that somehow bypass rational agency; rather 
than influencing them through reason and argument, 
we (typically through some ‘sleight of hand’) seek to 
change their mind by appealing (consciously or oth-
erwise) to non-autonomous and/or non-rational parts 
of the person.
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Possible examples of (non-deceptive) manipulation are 
as follows:
•  charity advertisements that use emotive music and 
imagery (e.g. pictures of sick children) and claim 
that “for x cents a day you could save little baby 
Olivia and thousands like her”;
•  graphic images on cigarette packets to discourage 
smoking;
•  use of smells (e.g. coffee & fresh bread) to encour-
age purchasing;
•  use of sexual attraction or desire to sell things or 
influence behaviour.
Note that (arguably at least) manipulation is not always 
wrong (e.g. using sexually explicit images to improve 
public health may be justifiable). It does, however, at 
least raise a question about the validity of any consent 
arising from it.
How does this apply to research? Well, one thing that 
can happen is that the benefits of the research are 
described (e.g. in information sheets) in factually cor-
rect but manipulative terms. For example, the research-
ers might claim that participation could help to save 
children’s lives, that their research subjects are heroes, 
or they might use images of sexy young research assist-
ants. While these methods may not involve lying, they 
do involve manipulating people and therefore reduce 
the quality of any consent given.
Inducements are monetary or other rewards for partici-
pation in research. These are not always wrong or prob-
lematic; however, they may invalidate a consent either 
if the rewards are excessively high, or if they target 
‘desperate’ populations. In the former case, the worry 
is that, above a certain level, inducements to take part 
in research act rather like the manipulation outlined 
above and alter people’s behaviour by influencing them 
in ways that somehow bypass rational agency. It is then 
almost as if the reward becomes too attractive for them 
to resist. In addition, in cases where the research is 
potentially dangerous or painful, there may be a worry 
about inducing people to do what would otherwise 
go against their better judgement. The concern about 
‘desperate’ populations takes a fundamentally similar 
form. If, for example, we offer much needed (and oth-
erwise unavailable) medical treatment to someone in 
exchange for research participation, it may be argued 
that this offer is too attractive for them to resist – and 
conversely that not participating is too awful for them 
to tolerate. (8) 
In defence of inducements, however, the following 
points are sometimes made: (9) 
•  There are lots of areas of life (notably employment 
and shopping) where modifying people’s behaviour 
through monetary reward is thought to be unprob-
lematic. So why should research be any different?
•  Researchers themselves normally get paid for doing 
the research so why should the research subjects 
remain unrewarded?
•  There are many occupations where people get 
paid, or paid extra, for undertaking especially dan-
gerous work (e.g. diving, military, mining). Why 
should research be any different?
•  Rewarding research subjects is often good for 
them, especially if they really do need the money 
or the medical treatment that is on offer.
•  If research participants are paid too little (or not 
paid at all) would this not be a form of exploita-
tion, or a case of unjust underpayment?
Competence
The third element of valid consent is competence. 
Does the person giving the consent have sufficient 
mental competence or capacity to understand and 
retain relevant information about the research, and to 
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communicate his or her views on the research? If not 
then the consent may not be valid. Competence, and 
research on people who are not competent, will not 
be discussed in detail in this chapter. These matters, 
along with the broader issue of vulnerability, are the 
subject of Chapter 3.
Before turning to the first case study, it is worth noting 
briefly that some people have criticised standard 
research ethics (and indeed bioethics generally) for 
being overly preoccupied by valid consent and by the 
underpinning principle of respect for autonomy. (10)
 
 Case Study 2.1
 Spaceflight simulation study 
on healthy female volunteers
A proposed International Space Agency (ISA) 
research project aims to gather preliminary infor-
mation about how women’s bodies would cope 
with prolonged periods of time in spacecraft. Since 
most astronauts to date have been men, very little 
information on this exists and, given the prospect 
of long-range space missions involving both sexes, 
the ISA believes that this research is vitally impor-
tant for the design of future spacecraft and space 
travel protocols.
In an experiment simulating certain aspects of 
weightlessness, 50 healthy female volunteers, 
recruited via advertisements in women’s fashion 
and lifestyle magazines, will be paid EUR 200 per 
day (plus expenses and free food) to spend up to 
four months on a specially designed bed which is 
tilted backwards at a six degree angle. The volunteers 
will also be awarded a terminal bonus payment of 
EUR 20 000 provided that they manage to complete 
the study (i.e. if they stay for the full four months).
During the experiment (and afterwards, in follow 
up sessions) numerous medical checks will be 
carried out. Furthermore, subjects’ behaviour 
will be continuously monitored by video feed. 
Participants will be largely isolated from the outside 
world and allowed only occasional contact with 
friends and family via email or telephone. No visits 
will be permitted. They will, however, be given 
access to personal entertainment devices.
Physical side-effects of participation are likely to 
include: swollen face, blocked nose, severe aches, 
muscle wastage, constipation, sores, and loss of 
bone mass. Participants are also likely to encounter 
psychological problems resulting from boredom 
and lack of exercise. All of the abovementioned 
restrictions and risks will be fully disclosed in 
advance to prospective volunteers, who will be 
provided with written information and individual 
counselling, and will undergo thorough psychological 
assessments. Counselling and psychological assess-
ment will also be made available to the women 
during and after the experiment.
In order to enter the study, the women must be:
(a)  competent adults aged between 20 and 40 
(because this is the age group most likely to be 
recruited for space missions);
(b)  in good general health, mentally and physically 
– and moderately, but not exceptionally, fit;
(c)  not significantly over/under weight;
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(d)  non-smokers (because smoking is not possible 
in space and withdrawal symptoms may 
contaminate the results of the experiment if 
addicted smokers were used);
(e)  childless (because of the welfare of the child, 
and possible psychological harm to mothers);
(f)  single (because of the welfare of the partner, 
and because of possible psychological harm to 
women who are separated from their partners);
(g)  not pregnant, and willing to undergo a preg-
nancy test before the start of the study 
(because of concerns about foetal damage).
They must also promise to do their best to avoid 
pregnancy for 3 years after participation in the 
experiment ends.
The experimental design has been subjected 
to extensive scientific peer review and graded 
‘excellent’ for its methodology.
Questions
1.  Is the research important enough to justify 
subjecting these women to the discomfort, 
inconvenience, and risk described?
2.  Do you have any concerns about the quality 
of the women’s consents? If so, what are these?
3.  Is it possible for a woman validly to consent 
to be in this study?
4.  Do you have any other ethical worries about, 
or objections to, this research (that is, apart 
from those to do with consent)?
Discussion
Before turning to the questions about consent that are 
the main concern of this chapter, we need first to ask 
whether the research described in the case study is 
important enough to justify subjecting these women 
to the discomfort, inconvenience and risk described. We 
must consider the various harms and risks involved, and 
think about whether the research is sufficiently good 
and important (both in terms of potential benefits and 
methodological reliability) to justify subjecting people 
to these harms and risks. We are told in this case study 
that the methodology is excellent and has been the sub-
ject of extensive scientific peer review, that there is a lack 
of information about women in space, and that this 
information may be very important for future space 
missions. It might be argued then that the Space Agency 
is trying to advance the long-term interests of human-
kind, and indeed contributing to sex equality, by con-
ducting research that will help us safely to involve more 
women in the space programme. Thus there does seem 
to be a prima facie case for doing the research. 
What about the harms and risks though? Are these 
excessive? One might have concerns about the physi-
cal side-effects of participation and about whether, psy-
chologically, the experience of being in a space research 
centre for four months is too much to bear. We need 
to ask two questions at this point. First, given the 
potential benefits mentioned above, are the risks that 
participants are asked to undertake proportionate (rel-
ative to these benefits)? Second, has the research been 
designed such that the harms and risks have been min-
imised (so that they are as low as they can be without 
compromising the scientific quality of the project)?
As regards the first question, since the experimental 
design has been subjected to extensive scientific peer 
review and graded ‘excellent’ for its methodology, there 
are no (or few) methodological worries. The issue, then, 
is the level of expected benefit. In order to have a well-
worked-out view on this we would need more infor-
mation about some rather big questions such as the 
importance of space exploration to the future of 
humankind and human knowledge, for (other things 
being equal) the more important space exploration is, 
the more justifiable this research will be. So, given the 
case as described, we probably cannot say with any cer-
tainty what the likely benefits are. And this is often the 
case with research: it is hard to say what exactly the 
benefits of the project will be.
Turning to the question of whether the harms and risks 
have been minimised, the researchers would probably 
want to point us to the extensive medical testing 
involved and to the fact that counselling and psycho-
logical assessment is available during and after the 
experiment. Given that the experimental design has 
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been subjected to extensive scientific peer review and 
graded ‘excellent’, we must assume that the number of 
women involved is not excessive, but is sufficient to 
generate statistically significant results. And finally the 
researchers might draw our attention to the exclusion 
criteria for trial participation, which require entrants to 
have good mental and physical health. Overall then, 
there does seem to be good reason for thinking that 
the level of harm and risk has been minimised.
We can now move on to ask what concerns we might 
have about the quality of the women’s consent. On the 
face of it at least, it appears that prospective partici-
pants will get a reasonable amount of information. The 
restrictions and risks will be fully disclosed in advance 
and people will be provided with written information 
and individual counselling. In addition, one of the cri-
teria for inclusion in the experiment is that the person 
must be a competent adult aged 20-40. Hence (think-
ing back to the tripartite definition of valid consent 
offered above) it looks as if the competence and infor-
mation requirements will be satisfied in this case.
That just leaves us with the question of voluntariness 
to consider, and one of the main concerns here will be 
the overall level of payment. Participants stand to gain 
over EUR 40 000 in total if they complete the study, 
which would be a lot of money for most people. Hence, 
we must ask whether this constitutes an undue induce-
ment, whether such a reward would incite the women 
to take risks against their better judgement, and 
whether (for some women at least) a reward on this 
scale would be somehow ‘irresistible’. In addition, there 
might be special worries about the fact that around 
half the total payment is a terminal bonus of EUR 20 000. 
As was suggested earlier, one important feature of vol-
untary research participation is that people are allowed 
to leave the study at any time without being penalised. 
But in this project, one might see the prospect of los-
ing the terminal bonus as akin to a (coercive) threat, 
especially for women nearing the end of the study who 
feel that they cannot take any more, but who equally 
do not want to lose EUR 20 000 just because they have 
departed a few days early. So we need to ask whether 
the women are really free to leave the study at any time 
given that they stand to suffer very considerably finan-
cially if they do not stay for the whole time requested.
A further question relating to the payment is how the 
subjects are recruited and which populations are tar-
geted. If, for example, the researchers were targeting 
economically disadvantaged countries or populations 
then we might ask whether such people are capable 
of freely consenting to take part, given their financial 
desperation and the extreme attractiveness to them 
of EUR 40 000. But, against this, one might argue that 
it would be perverse to exclude poor people, since 
these are the very people who need the money most, 
and excluding them would make them worse off 
financially than they could otherwise have been. Also, 
we would not generally be hostile to offering such 
people well-paid jobs, so (again) – why is research 
participation any different?
So how should we resolve the question of voluntari-
ness in this case? The size of the terminal bonus is 
indeed an issue and one that may infringe the women’s 
right to leave at any time, since the withholding of 
it may be seen as a de facto punishment for leaving. 
Against that, though, the researchers may argue two 
things. First, that it is an offer (of benefit) rather than 
a threat (of harm), and so not coercive. And second, 
that a strong financial incentive to stay until the end is 
justified in this case for scientific reasons; for if more 
than a handful of the women were to leave the experi-
ment early then either the results would be invalidated 
(in which case vast amounts of effort and expense 
would have been squandered, including notably the 
efforts of the other research subjects) or it would be 
necessary to recruit even more women to the experi-
ment, thus increasing the overall level of harm and risk 
to the research subject community.
Another aspect of the voluntariness issue concerns 
the target population. All we know based on the case 
description is that the study will be advertised in wom-
en’s fashion and lifestyle magazines. If the core reader-
ship of those magazines in question were (for example) 
an economically disadvantaged group then it may be 
argued that a vulnerable population is being targeted: 
specifically one that would find financial inducements 
hard to resist. (See Chapter 3 for a more detailed dis-
cussion of vulnerability.) However, based on what is in 
the case description, there is no reason to think that 
this would be a problem here.
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Question 4 asks us to consider whether we should have 
any other ethical worries about, or objections to, this 
research. One issue to consider is whether it is reason-
able and proportionate to ask women to try to avoid 
pregnancy for three years after the study. Given that one 
of the inclusion criteria is childlessness, this could be 
a major sacrifice for a woman in her thirties. Also, are 
the inclusion/exclusion criteria fair? For example, mar-
ried women (and their equivalents) and women with 
children are excluded. The researchers seek to justify this 
by reference to the interests of partners and children, 
but is this sufficient and are the interests of third parties 
any of the researchers’ business? An additional issue is 
that we may (depending on our political views) regard 
women (or more plausibly some women) as a vulner-
able research population on account of sex discrimi-
nation and of the oppression of women by men. 
Furthermore, it might be argued that the ‘gender dimen-
sion’ of this case means that a different perspective, such 
as the ethics of care discussed in Chapter 1, is appropri-
ate. Rather than focusing mainly on consent, an ethics 
of care approach might, for example, place greater 
emphasis on the relationships between the researchers 
and the women, or indeed on the participants’ attitudes 
and feelings towards those brave women who may in 
future undertake astronautical missions.
 Case Study 2.2
Police and rescue research 
using cadavers
The European Institute of Police and Rescue 
Research has a long-running, internationally 
renowned research programme that seeks to 
discover which police and rescue training methods 
work best.
One part of this programme aims to discover 
whether training using real human cadavers is more 
effective than the alternatives in certain areas of police 
and rescue work. For instance, there is a growing 
(although still controversial) body of evidence 
suggesting that using real corpses (to represent 
the victims of terrorist bombings or other disasters) 
is the best way to teach people anti-terrorist and 
‘catastrophic situation’ techniques.
One of the Institute’s experiments is as follows. 
One group of trainees is instructed to search 
clothed corpses for objects such as diaries, mobile 
phones, jewellery and keys to ensure that they are 
properly documented. Trainees are then asked 
to strip the bodies to look for scarring and other 
distinctive marks that could aid identification. 
A second group of trainees goes through a similar 
process, but using realistic mannequins instead 
of actual bodies. A third receives classroom-based 
training only. The different groups’ performances 
are later tested and comparatively evaluated using 
a well-established proprietary assessment tool. 
(The methodology of this experiment has been 
subjected to external peer review and accepted.)
Other similar experiments use corpses to assess 
different search training techniques. These involve, 
amongst other things, human body parts being 
buried and then searched for by trainees.
The corpses used by the Institute come from the 
nearby University Hospital. Prior to their deaths, 
all of the deceased persons involved gave general 
consent, in writing, for the use of their bodies for 
“research, training and education”.
Questions
1.  Ethically, does it matter that the consent given 
by the deceased persons was rather general 
and that they may not have known that their 
bodies would, or could, be used in the study 
described above? Would it have been morally 
better to give them more detail?
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2.  If valid consent was given by the deceased 
persons for their bodies to be used in this 
research would that allay all of your concerns 
about the research? Or would there be residual 
worries about using bodies in this way?
3.  What sort of consent to take part in the trial 
(if any) ought the researchers to seek from 
the trainees?
4.  Ought relatives of the deceased persons to be 
involved at all and, if so, at what stage and how?
Discussion
Although it concerns deceased persons, this case study 
raises a more general issue about valid consent (that 
posed in Question 1): how much information must the 
consenter be given and how specific must consent be in 
order for it to be valid? In this case, the worry is both that 
the consent given was not sufficiently specific and that 
the consenter may have been harbouring a false belief: 
namely, that his or her body would be used by the hos-
pital for medical research (and not mutilated and used 
for rescue personnel training). So, one might argue that 
the consent given is invalid because it is insufficiently 
detailed and/or based on a false belief. Against that, 
would it have been morally better to ask the dying per-
son if their body could be used in this particular trial, and 
risk causing distress? Again, this is not a point that applies 
just to the dead: especially in a medical setting, disclo-
sure of information can be distressing even when it does 
not involve death. For example, describing in graphic 
detail what will happen during surgery could seriously 
distress some people and put them off having the sur-
gery even if it would ultimately be beneficial.
Even if valid consent was given by the deceased per-
sons for their bodies to be used in this research there 
may still be some ethical concerns. One such concern 
relates to the idea of dignity. Earlier on, we mentioned 
two views about the relationship between dignity and 
consent. One of these is that, provided that truly valid 
consent is in place, nothing falling under that consent 
can be an affront to human dignity. A reason for sup-
porting this kind of view is that what really matters is 
respecting the person, and provided that we obtain the 
person’s free and informed consent before doing what 
we do, then that is showing (sufficient) respect. On the 
other hand, some people deny this and assert that 
there are certain types of act that would be an affront 
to human dignity even if there was full consent. The 
mutilation of bodies could be an example of this.
Other concerns are that the community would be 
shocked and offended if it found out what was hap-
pening to the bodies. This may be bad both intrinsically 
and because it may erode the community’s commit-
ment to and trust in medicine and science (including 
their willingness to be involved in future research 
projects). Other concerns centre on people’s religious 
sensibilities; some religious groups take very seriously 
the ways in which dead bodies are dealt with. Finally, 
we would need to be assured that the researchers were 
complying with any relevant national (and local) laws 
concerning the disposal of corpses (for example, envi-
ronmental, and health and safety regulations).
A third set of issues concerns the consent of the trainees 
themselves. What is at issue here is not so much their 
consent to be trained (which presumably is implicit in 
their career choice), but rather whether an additional 
consent is required for participation in this educational 
experiment. In favour of the view that no additional con-
sent is required, one might argue that what is happening 
to them in the research is, in practical terms, no different 
from what would (or could) have happened to them 
outside the context of research. In particular, they may 
have been randomly allocated to a particular training col-
lege with a certain training method without necessarily 
having much say in the matter. Also, it should be noted 
that there are some potential benefits here. There are pos-
sible collective benefits to members of the police service, 
whose training may become more evidence-based and 
more effective; and there are possible individual benefits 
to the trainees in this study who will be exposed to dead 
bodies for the first time in a controlled training situation 
rather than during an actual emergency (which could 
be much worse). Against this, it may be pointed out 
both that the research is likely to involve some additional 
observation of the trainees and that there is a difference 
between the randomness of everyday life and systematic 
randomisation as part of a controlled trial.
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Finally, there is the question of whether relatives of the 
deceased persons should be involved and, if so, in what 
ways. We should start off by noting that this is some-
thing that will sometimes be determined by national 
laws: for example, there are some legal systems that 
give a lot of weight to relatives’ wishes in relation to 
organ donation and the like, and others that put more 
emphasis either on the public good or on the known 
wishes of the deceased. While there is arguably a prima 
facie moral obligation to obey the law (or at least those 
laws that have been arrived at through a legitimate 
process) our concern here is with ethics rather than 
law as such, so what are the moral considerations? 
While, intuitively, people may think that relatives 
should have a role here, there are at least two impor-
tant reasons not to consult them about the use to 
which the dead bodies are put. The first is a desire to 
avoid distressing and upsetting the relatives by mak-
ing them confront the prospect of their loved ones’ 
bodies being used in this way. That is not to say that 
there is necessarily anything wrong with the proposed 
use of the bodies; the point is rather that this is some-
thing that most of us (especially those recently 
bereaved) would prefer not to think about or to imag-
ine in any detail. Secondly, one might argue that if valid 
consent from the dead person is in place (something 
that we have of course questioned in this particular 
case), then to allow a relative to override or veto this 
would be a failure to respect the autonomy of the 
deceased person. Very similar issues to this arise in the 
case of therapeutic organ donation from cadavers: 
i.e. where consent has been given by the dead person 
should we allow relatives to override this and to pre-
vent donation from going ahead?
There are some parallels here with research on non-
competent living adults (specifically the question of 
what the proper role of relatives in the consent proc-
ess is). These issues are dealt with in more detail in 
Chapter 3.
Further related issues about biobanks and human tis-
sue banking are dealt with during the discussion of 
Case Study 8.4, which concerns a large research project 
looking at the genetics of cardiovascular disease.
 Case Study 2.3
Covert surveillance of health 
care professionals
Studies have shown that many health care profes-
sionals in hospital settings do not wash their hands 
correctly or as often as they should. This is believed 
to cause infection and illness in a number (possibly 
a very large number) of patients. A large international 
project is proposed to evaluate different methods 
of generating better hand hygiene. These methods 
include:
(a)   warning health care professionals that they 
might be the subjects of covert video or other 
surveillance;
(b)   sending health care professionals on a training 
course about hand washing;
(c)  installing additional hand washing troughs;
(d)   offering alcohol-based hand rub facilities as 
an alternative to conventional hand washing;
(e)   installing ‘extreme signage’ in staff washing 
areas and toilets (e.g. comparing non-washers 
to murderers & showing ghastly images of 
infected wounds).
In general terms, the proposed study will proceed 
as follows:
•  Covert surveillance will be used to establish 
hand-washing-frequency baselines for a large 
number of sites.
•  (a) to (e) (above) will then be trialled at 
selected sites.
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•  Covert surveillance will be used to assess 
the effectiveness or otherwise of (a) to (e).
•  At no point will the consent of health care 
professionals or patients be sought because this 
would, it is argued, invalidate the study.
•  The researchers will seek to anonymise the data 
collected as far as possible by (e.g.) pixelising 
(digitally obscuring) name badges and faces, 
and by removing date and place information 
from video files. They will not feed back 
information about individual misconduct 
(e.g. inadequate hand washing) to hospital 
managers but do reserve the right to report 
serious criminal activity.
Questions
1.  What are the arguments in favour of carrying 
out this research without the observed persons’ 
consents? Are these arguments ultimately 
successful?
2.  Can you think of any ways of modifying this 
research so that consent could be obtained?
3.  Would it be ethically better or worse if 
the people observed were told about their 
unwitting ‘participation’ afterwards?
Discussion
Most of Chapter 2 so far has been about the nature and 
scope of valid consent. We have asked (for example) 
whether a particular form or type of consent is suffi-
cient. Case Study 2.3, however, raises a very different 
issue: under what circumstances (if any) is non-consen-
sual observational research on competent adults (spe-
cifically, in this case, that involving covert surveillance 
and/or deception) ethically acceptable?
 
Let us start to consider this by asking how the research-
ers in Case Study 2.3 might seek ethically to justify this 
research? Those arguing for covert or deceptive research 
generally claim that it is acceptable by appealing to 
the  following considerations, or by saying that it is 
acceptable if the following conditions are met.
First, for non-consensual observational research to be 
justified, the research must be worth doing; it must be 
sufficiently important in its aims to justify overriding the 
usual requirement for valid consent. In Case Study 2.3, 
the researchers may claim that their research is poten-
tially very good for public health and potentially life-
saving, since many thousands of people become infected 
each year as a result of inadequate hand hygiene. If the 
research is successful, it could make a substantial con-
tribution towards reducing these levels of infection, by 
providing hospital managers with information about the 
most effective ways of encouraging good hand washing 
practices. The research in Case Study 2.3 then appears 
to fare quite well in this respect; it does look like a poten-
tially important and useful piece of research. If, however, 
the research was driven only by the curiosity of academ-
ics and had no (or very few) potential practical benefits 
then perhaps we would and should be more reluctant 
to see it as ethically justified.
The second important part of the researchers’ justifi-
cation will be that the project cannot, for methodo-
logical reasons, be done without covert observation. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, this is one of many instances 
in which methodological questions impact on the ethics 
of the research.
In Case Study 2.3, the researchers may say that if the 
health care professionals were aware that they were 
being observed then they would change their hand 
washing behaviour, thus invalidating the study. The 
researchers would need to make this case by convinc-
ing us both that their proposed methodology works 
and that there are no better alternatives (in particular, 
that there are no alternative methods that would 
allow us to obtain the same information without covert 
surveillance). When assessing research proposals it is 
important not to accept researchers’ claims about such 
issues uncritically. Thus, in this case, we may (for exam-
ple) want to think carefully about the extent to which 
knowing that they were being observed really would 
affect the health care professionals’ behaviour (since 
there is some evidence that people become accus-
tomed to being observed after a while and revert to 
their normal behaviour patterns). Thinking about this 
case from the perspective of a research ethics committee, 
47
C H A P T E R  2  C O N S E N T
we should (where practicable) consider not just the 
researchers’ testimony but also some form of expert 
independent scientific peer review, which would pro-
vide us with a judgement both on the overall quality 
of the research methodology and with a view on 
whether covert surveillance is really required in order 
to answer these research questions. 
Thirdly, the researchers would need to convince us that 
their proposed surveillance will not substantially harm (or 
expose to risk) the research subjects. In Case Study 2.3, 
the researchers could claim that harm and risk will be 
minimal because: (i) the research subjects will not find 
out about the research, (ii) anonymisation will be used 
(as far as possible) thereby reducing the risk of personal 
information or embarrassing images being revealed, 
and (iii) (with the exception of serious criminal activ-
ity) there will be no reporting of bad behaviour to the 
management. In order to decide whether the research 
is ethically acceptable we would need to critically assess 
each of these claims (i) to (iii).
Regarding (i) we might raise the possibility of people 
finding out about the research by accident, or when it 
is published or reported. In addition, we might ask 
whether it is desirable to inform research subjects after 
the project has taken place: that is, to tell them, after 
the event, that they have been observed and possibly 
even to give them the opportunity retrospectively to 
consent (or to have their information withdrawn) at 
that stage. Debriefing in this way is sometimes thought 
to be morally preferable to trying to keep the research 
secret forever. But, against this, it may be argued that 
some research subjects will be angry and upset if they 
are told, and hence that there is a harm-based justifica-
tion for not telling them at any stage. Perhaps there is 
also a distinction to be drawn here between experimen-
tal research that involves deception (for example, some 
psychology experiments involve misleading the sub-
jects about what is being tested, because knowledge of 
the exact nature of the research would alter people’s 
behaviour) and cases of covert surveillance in which 
the subjects have no idea that they are being observed. 
In the former case, some kind of debriefing may be ben-
eficial and interesting and it will come as no surprise to 
the participants to hear that they were being observed, 
since they did after all sign up to be in an experiment 
of some sort. But observing people completely una-
wares raises different issues because in these cases peo-
ple will often be shocked and upset on discovering that 
they have been observed.
Fourthly, the researchers would need to assure us that 
the extent to which personal data would be gathered 
and stored was kept to a minimum or was proportion-
ate; what this means is that they should only be acquir-
ing personal data inasmuch as this is necessary to 
answer the research questions that they have set them-
selves. Thus, the researchers might seek to justify their 
project in this respect by pointing out that they will 
seek to anonymise the data collected as far as possible 
by pixelising (digitally obscuring) name badges and 
faces, and by removing date and place information 
from video files.
Some other issues are raised by this case.
One is that researchers and those evaluating research 
need to be aware of any relevant national laws cover-
ing covert surveillance of other human beings. In some 
jurisdictions this may be outlawed. In others, it is 
licensed and controlled.
Another is – does it matter whether the place observed 
is regarded as a public space and whether it is some-
where where people would generally expect to be 
observed? Arguably, covert surveillance in places where 
people would reasonably expect to be observed rou-
tinely (for example, by passers-by) is less ethically prob-
lematic than similar forms of observation in places 
that people would normally expect to be private. This 
is explored later, in Case Study 4.1 (Observational 
research in an accident and emergency department).
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Chapter 3    Vulnerable and 
non-competent subjects
50
E U R O P E A N  T E X T B O O K  O N  E T H I C S  I N  R E S E A R C H
Learning outcomes
In this chapter you will develop an understanding of the ethical issues that are raised 
by research involving vulnerable and/or non-competent subjects. Specifically, you will 
gain the following:
•  An understanding of what is meant by ‘vulnerability’ in a research ethics context, 
and why research involving vulnerable subjects may require special consideration 
by research ethics committees.
•  An appreciation of the reasons for carrying out research on vulnerable and non- 
competent subjects.
•  An awareness of the challenges involved in carrying out ethical research involving three 
main types of vulnerable subject: non-competent adults, the dying, and children. 
•  An understanding of the issues involved in assessing competence. 
•  An increased knowledge of how ethical issues relating to vulnerable subjects arise 
in research. 
•  An awareness of how issues concerning vulnerable subjects relate to other concepts 
and issues in research ethics, particularly consent. 
•  An understanding of what additional procedures and safeguards should be fol-
lowed to protect the interests and welfare of subjects where the consent process 
is compromised. 
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3.  Robert E. Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable: A Re-Analysis of Our Social Responsibilities (London and Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1985): 110.
Introduction
In the first two chapters of this book we have seen how 
research ethics has at its foundations an emphasis on 
protecting the welfare of research subjects (and also 
researchers) and on safeguarding other important con-
cerns such as respect for autonomy, rights and personal 
dignity. In Chapter 2, discussion centred upon how 
obtaining valid consent from subjects to participate in 
research is one important way in which we can meet 
these ethical requirements. There will, however, be situ-
ations where researchers wish to carry out research on 
subjects who lack the competence needed to give valid 
consent or for whom additional safeguards may need 
to be taken to protect their welfare, dignity and rights. 
It is in cases such as these that research subjects are 
considered to be vulnerable and extra care needs to be 
taken if research involving them is to proceed ethically. 
This chapter examines some of the specific ethical 
issues that are raised by research involving vulnerable 
subjects. These include the identification of subjects as 
vulnerable, the reasons that might justify carrying out 
research on vulnerable people, and (if we do allow such 
research to take place) the additional measures that 
might be needed for such research to be ethical. The 
case studies in this chapter highlight many of the key 
issues surrounding the use of both vulnerable adults 
and children in research. One area that will be a partic-
ular focus of concern is the status of subjects who are 
considered vulnerable because they are non-competent 
(or lack the capacity to consent), although, as we shall 
see, not all vulnerable subjects lack competence. 
What is vulnerability?
Before we can examine the ethical challenges the issue 
of vulnerability raises in research, we need to give an 
account of what vulnerability is. For only when we have 
a good idea of what it is that makes someone vulner-
able in research will we be in a position to properly 
consider what sorts of ethical problems this raises and 
how to address them. Although it seems that there 
should be a straightforward answer to this question, 
determining who counts as a vulnerable subject in 
research is not an easy task.
 
One way of addressing the meaning of ‘vulnerability’ is 
to examine the way it is used in research ethics codes 
and guidelines or in established literature. Many codes 
of conduct for research, such as the Declaration of 
Helsinki, refer to the need for researchers to consider 
and offer special protection to vulnerable subjects. (1) 
However, this does not help us to understand what 
vulnerability is. One of the most explicit accounts is 
that of the Council for International Organizations of 
Medical Sciences, which defines vulnerable persons as 
“those who are relatively (or absolutely) incapable of 
protecting their own interests”. (2) Other authors on the 
topic, such as Goodin, see vulnerability in somewhat 
different terms involving power balance and responsi-
bility. Goodin sees vulnerability as being “under threat 
of harm”, (3) a threat that often arises because of 
a power imbalance between an individual and those 
who are able to cause them harm. Although there is no 
settled account in the literature, the frequent references 
to vulnerability establish this as an important – if chal-
lenging – issue in research ethics. 
In our everyday language we use the term ‘vulnerable’ 
to describe people who are subject to an unusually high 
risk of harm. However, not all situations in which peo-
ple are subject to increased risks of harm are cases of 
vulnerability, as the following example illustrates. 
Suppose I am visited by friends who have heavy colds 
and am therefore at increased risk, compared to the 
general population, of catching a cold myself. Although 
I would be exposed to a risk of harm by my friends’ visit, 
this would not make me a vulnerable person in the 
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substantial ethical sense intended when we speak of 
vulnerable research subjects. I am not vulnerable in this 
sense, because the risk I face is no greater than would 
be experienced by an average person in the same situ-
ation. I have freely chosen to see my friends, and hav-
ing done so face the same risk as others making that 
choice. Now imagine that, instead of being in good 
health, I have been receiving chemotherapy as part of 
my cancer treatment and as a result have a compro-
mised immune system. Under these circumstances 
I would certainly be vulnerable if visited by the same 
friends. I would require additional measures to protect 
myself because my weak immune system makes the 
risk of harm much greater. If I am also confined to a hos-
pital bed, I may need someone else to intervene on my 
behalf to prevent the friends from visiting me, because 
I could not do so myself. In both cases the threat I am 
exposed to is the same – the cold virus – but in the 
second case the likelihood and severity of the harm 
I might receive are higher, and my ability to protect 
myself from the harm is lower, and it is this that makes 
me vulnerable. 
It is also important when considering the nature of vul-
nerability not to lose sight of its ethical importance. 
This special ethical significance implies that certain 
ethical responsibilities arise out of the power imbal-
ance that the vulnerable are often subject to, which 
leads Goodin to claim that, “If one party is in a posi-
tion of particular vulnerability or dependency on 
another, the other has strong responsibilities to pro-
tect the dependent”. (4) This ethical responsibility to 
protect the vulnerable arises from a number of more 
fundamental ethical duties. For example, protecting 
the vulnerable can be seen as a particular application 
of the principle of respect for autonomy (for example 
in cases where people have difficulty in expressing or 
acting on their desires and preferences), the principle 
of non-maleficence (where the person is less able than 
others to protect themselves from harm), or the prin-
ciple of justice. Exploitation (which will be considered 
in Chapter 6), is a form of injustice particularly closely 
connected with vulnerability in that it involves using 
another’s weakness to further one’s own goals. The key 
elements in all these cases are that the vulnerable 
person is at higher risk of harm or exploitation than 
others would be in a similar situation and/or is less 
able than others to protect themselves from harm or 
exploitation. (5)
While these elements can provide the basis for a satis-
factory working definition of ‘vulnerability’, a further 
clarification is required for our purposes. The problem 
is that such a definition could include almost all 
research subjects simply in virtue of the risks of research 
participation and the imbalance of power between 
subjects and researchers (resulting from, amongst 
other things, differences in knowledge and access to 
information). There is a sense in which we might want 
to endorse this conclusion, seeing the general vulner-
ability of research subjects as the reason for having 
a system of ethical review of research. However, if we 
wish to use the concept of vulnerability to pick out 
a subset of research subjects for whom additional safe-
guards are required, its definition needs to be further 
qualified. To do this, we should view vulnerable sub-
jects as those whose particular susceptibility to harm 
and exploitation and inability to protect their own 
interests results from factors over and above those 
resulting from the research setting itself. 
Part of understanding and applying the concept of 
vulnerability will therefore be to consider what addi-
tional factors might make a research subject vulnerable. 
Three main areas stand out as indications of subjects’ 
vulnerability:
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1.  Subjects who lack competence will be unable to 
protect their interests by choosing to give or with-
hold consent (as discussed in Chapter 2). 
2.  If the voluntariness of the subjects’ consent is com-
promised, this may similarly prevent them from 
choosing to give or withhold consent in a way that 
would protect their interests.
3.  The physical (or psychological) condition of some 
subjects leaves them especially liable to harm, for 
example as a result of frailty through age, disability, 
or illness. 
Members of different groups may be considered vul-
nerable for one or more of these reasons; for example, 
young children probably fall under all three headings 
due to their lack of physical, mental and emotional 
maturity. In other cases, it is less clear whether individ-
uals or members of particular groups might be vulner-
able for any of these reasons. For example, unconscious 
subjects such as comatose patients might be thought 
to lack competence and voluntariness because of 
their current condition but may also have indicated 
their willingness to participate in research through an 
advance statement made prior to their loss of con-
sciousness, so making the ethical status of their inclu-
sion in research more difficult to ascertain. Moreover, 
whilst these three areas are the most prominent con-
cerns, people may be vulnerable for less obvious reasons. 
For example, vulnerability due to power imbalances 
can arise when research subjects belong to particular 
(especially minority or disadvantaged) social groups. 
Such subjects may in some circumstances feel threat-
ened or coerced into taking part. This does not, of 
course, mean that every member of a minority group 
will be vulnerable in this way, but rather indicates 
that some factors can be less clear or easy to deter-
mine when assessing the vulnerability of a potential 
research subject.
Rather than trying to provide examples of all of the 
many possible factors that can make research subjects 
vulnerable, the rest of this chapter will use three case 
studies to explore key aspects of vulnerability in 
research. In thinking about these cases we should con-
sider which groups or individuals might be considered 
vulnerable and why; whether there is sufficient justifi-
cation for including vulnerable subjects in the types of 
research described; and, if it is acceptable to conduct 
the research using vulnerable subjects, what sorts of 
measures might be appropriate to protect these sub-
jects from harm or exploitation. The ability of subjects 
to provide valid consent is an issue in all three cases, 
but each case also presents other reasons for thinking 
that some of the subjects might be vulnerable.
 Case Study 3.1
Research involving adults 
with terminal illness
Dr Abbott, an oncologist at a major teaching 
hospital, has been asked to put forward a number 
of her patients for participation in a clinical trial 
of a new cancer treatment. 
Mr Day is a terminally ill patient with a type of 
cancer suitable for participation in this trial. Mr Day 
is incredibly keen to participate and volunteers at 
the first opportunity. When asked to explain his 
eagerness during the recruitment process, he says 
that God has sent him this opportunity, that the 
treatment (which he’s “read all about on the inter-
net”) is a “wonder drug”, that it will save his life, 
and that (if entered into the trial) he expects 
to be “completely cured” in time for Christmas 
(less than 6 months away).
Mr Day’s health carers all think that his views of 
the trial are extremely over-optimistic. What’s more, 
his views persist in spite of the fact that he’s been 
told on a number of occasions that: 
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(a)  the experimental treatment isn’t expected 
to prolong his life by more than a few months 
(although it may have quality of life benefits 
too); 
(b)  this expected benefit can’t be predicted with 
any certainty; 
(c)  the chances of his being “completely cured” 
by it, or anything else, are close to zero.
When confronted with this information, Mr Day 
just says things like “you’re just being cautious and 
covering your backs” or “you lack faith”.
Dr Abbott thinks that participation in the trial might 
benefit Mr Day psychologically, alongside any direct 
clinical benefits, by sustaining his hopes and expec-
tations, and (conversely) that not permitting him 
to take part would be psychologically damaging. 
She also thinks that the fact that he’s very keen to 
take part should be taken seriously and that not 
to do so would be a failure to respect his autonomy. 
But, on the other hand, Dr Abbott is not sure whether 
Mr Day is capable of supplying valid consent, since 
he appears unable or unwilling to grasp the true 
nature of his situation and of the trial.
Questions
1.  What are the main ethical issues that this 
research raises?
2.  Is Mr Day in a position to give valid consent 
to take part in the trial? 
3.  Would denying Mr Day a chance to participate 
in the trial be a failure to respect his autonomy? 
What is the relationship between irrational 
beliefs and autonomous decision-making?
4.  Should the fact that Mr Day’s seemingly 
irrational beliefs have a religious basis be 
a matter for special attention in assessing 
his vulnerability?
5.  Would entering Mr Day into the trial be 
exploiting his vulnerability?
6.  Are there any alternatives to Mr Day offering 
consent or any additional safeguards that 
should be in place to protect his welfare?
Vulnerable adults in research
Question 1 draws attention to general ethical issues of 
harm and benefit raised by the case, but alongside 
them there are other features of the case which raise 
the question of whether Mr Day should be considered 
a vulnerable participant. Even if Mr Day is vulnerable, 
this does not necessarily mean that it is unethical to 
enter him into the research. Research into conditions 
which, by their nature, make the potential research sub-
jects vulnerable can be extremely important (for exam-
ple, research into dementia, childhood diseases, or 
terminal illness), and it may be permissible to recruit 
vulnerable subjects provided their interests can be 
adequately protected. 
In this case study, it is proposed to test a new treatment 
for terminally ill cancer patients. Although the benefits 
cannot be predicted with any certainty and there is 
a negligible chance of the treatment effecting a com-
plete cure, there is the potential for increased life span 
and better quality of life. Such improvements may make 
a substantial difference to the lives of terminally ill peo-
ple. There are no anticipated harms associated with the 
treatment, although it is possible that some patients 
will see no or little benefit, which may have some psy-
chological or emotional impact on them, and that 
some will experience unexpected side effects. 
As with any proposed research involving human sub-
jects, we need not only to weigh up benefits against 
risks, but also to ask whether the proposed research 
would violate ethical principles such as respect for 
autonomy and dignity. Consideration of these issues 
will draw our attention to aspects of the case that are 
connected with the question of vulnerability. 
Competence to consent
In determining whether Mr Day is vulnerable in ways that 
should exclude him from participation in the research 
or require special protective measures, two issues in 
particular stand out. Firstly, there are the concerns of 
Dr Abbott, Mr Day's health care professional, regarding 
his competence to consent to participate in such a trial. 
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Secondly, there is the context of the trial itself, which 
necessarily involves terminally ill patients. Both of these 
potentially affect Mr Day’s ability to give valid consent, 
and to determine for himself whether or not to partici-
pate in the trial, as raised by Questions 2 and 3.
The concerns voiced by Dr Abbot about Mr Day’s 
capacity, or competence, to give valid consent arise 
from his seeming inability to grasp the nature of the 
trial. Competence is important in research ethics 
because, as discussed in Chapter 2, it is one of the three 
vital elements of valid consent (the others being ade-
quate information and voluntariness). One reason con-
sent is important is that it enables people to protect 
themselves by choosing whether or not to participate 
in a piece of research. If a person lacks competence, 
they are vulnerable because of their inability to protect 
themselves in this way. People who are incompetent 
may not make fully autonomous decisions and may not 
be able to judge whether participation is in their best 
interests. This means that additional care is needed to 
protect the welfare of non-competent individuals, 
because they cannot do so adequately themselves. 
There is no universally accepted account of what com-
petence is, but it is generally considered to involve 
a number of capacities or abilities. (6) For our purposes 
competence can be defined as the ability to understand 
relevant information, to evaluate that information and 
make a reasoned decision, to decide without undue 
influence, and to communicate consent or refusal.
Competence is generally taken to be decision-relative, 
so a person may be competent to make decisions 
about some aspects of their lives but not others. (7) For 
example, a person may be competent to decide what 
medical treatment they wish to undergo while at the 
same time not competent to manage their own finan-
cial affairs. Even within one area of decision-making, 
such as decisions about participation in research, there 
is an element of decision-relativity because a person 
may be capable of validly consenting to participation 
in some kinds of research but not others. This might 
depend, for example, upon the complexity of the facts 
about the research that the person needs to under-
stand in order to make a reasoned decision about 
whether or not to participate. The thought behind this 
view is that because competence is primarily about 
understanding and evaluating information, the greater 
the complexity of information, the greater the cogni-
tive capacities required to understand and evaluate it. 
Research that is straightforward and easy to understand 
can be validly consented to by a wide range of people, 
while fewer people will qualify as competent to con-
sent to research that (for example) involves more com-
plex procedures and greater requirements to weigh up 
probabilities of risk and benefit. 
On the view just described, competence is ‘complex-
ity-relative’. (8) There is also a view (although this is more 
contentious) that competence is ‘risk-relative’. On this 
view, the level of understanding required to qualify as 
competent to make a decision depends upon the level 
of risk involved, so that a decision that involves little 
risk will require a lower level of understanding than one 
that involves more serious risks. (9)
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Supporters of the risk-relative conception of compe-
tence argue that setting a low threshold of competence 
in cases where the level of risk is minimal allows sig-
nificant respect for the autonomy of individuals, even 
if they are not fully autonomous; and if the competence 
assessment is faulty, little harm will be done. For cases 
that involve greater risk, the threshold level of compe-
tence should be set higher because the potential for 
harm is much greater. (10) 
Debate over these two conceptions of competence 
continues. Although it is not clear why the standard of 
competence itself should be related to risk rather than 
to the complexity of the decision, it is certainly the case 
that assessments of competence take on a greater 
importance for decisions involving greater risk. It would 
therefore be prudent to take the level of risk into 
account in deciding when and how to assess subjects’ 
competence. 
A wide range of factors can impair or prevent compe-
tence. It is therefore an essential part of any researcher’s 
recruitment process to assess the competence of 
potential participants where there is reason to think 
that they may lack the capacity to give valid consent. 
That being said, it is usual to presume competence 
unless there is good reason to doubt it. To do other-
wise could involve huge costs in assessing the compe-
tence of all potential research subjects, which could 
render much valuable research unviable, and could 
prove insulting to many subjects. 
Irrational beliefs
Dr Abbot’s concern about entering Mr Day into her 
trial relates directly to Question 2, because it raises the 
issue of whether Mr Day has the level of competence 
necessary to validly consent to participate in the trial. 
Mr Day’s competence is placed in question by the 
strong belief he expresses that participation will result 
in him recovering from his terminal condition, a belief 
that seems almost certain to be false and to lack any 
rational basis. 
Are Mr Day’s apparently unreasonable beliefs and his 
unwillingness to engage with his health carers’ advice 
about the likely outcomes of the trial indications of an 
inability to adequately understand and evaluate the 
information relating to the trial? They provide sufficient 
reason to question whether Mr Day is competent to 
consent to take part in the research. However, these 
indications do not necessarily mean that Mr Day actu-
ally is incompetent to consent. 
One thing to bear in mind here is that the fact that cer-
tain beliefs are unusual or extreme is not necessarily 
inconsistent with their being autonomously and ration-
ally held. What is at issue is whether the seemingly irra-
tional or unusual views expressed by a potential subject 
are unreasonable due to a failure of understanding, 
or whether they are the entirely reasonable attitudes 
of an individual with a particular faith or belief system. 
It is crucial in order to answer Questions 3 and 4 that 
an attempt is made to distinguish between the two. 
Failure to respect the views of an individual where they 
are the result of strongly held sincere beliefs such as reli-
gious faith may be a failure to respect that person’s 
autonomy and may result in the unfair exclusion of 
competent individuals from research. The possession 
of views considered unusual or eccentric by medical 
or research staff, or the wider population, is not neces-
sarily a sign of irrationality or incompetence. The value 
judgements or religious beliefs of research subjects are 
not, in themselves, an issue for assessments of compe-
tence. One might indeed argue, in response to Question 
4, that moral and religious views should be treated with 
special respect and tolerance, because of the impor-
tance that they have to individuals. However, it can 
be extremely difficult in cases such as Mr Day’s, to 
disentangle such views from failures of understanding 
or reasoning about the research and its implications.
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Delusion, mania and other forms of mental illness can 
result in incompetence by interfering with beliefs about 
the information provided concerning the research or 
with the decisions that are associated with the evalua-
tion of the information. This is the underlying concern 
of Dr Abbott in this case. What is at stake is whether 
Mr Day actually holds false beliefs about his prospects in 
the trial and, therefore, fails to properly understand the 
research. The difficulty is to determine whether what he 
says is, for example, an expression of his hopes, which 
have a religious foundation, a psychological mechanism 
to protect himself from what he really knows to be true 
in relation to his terminal illness, or a reflection of or an 
attempt to cover up the fact that he doesn’t understand 
the nature of the trial. If it were either of the first two 
reasons – an expression of his hopes or a form of psy-
chological protection – Mr Day should not be consid-
ered incompetent. If it is the third reason – that he lacks 
a genuine understanding of relevant aspects of the 
research – then no matter how sincere his beliefs, 
Mr  Day cannot be said to have exhibited sufficient 
understanding of the trial for his consent to be valid.
Terminal illness and vulnerability 
Having a terminal illness may not by itself make a per-
son vulnerable as a research subject, but it does open 
up a number of ways in which they can become vul-
nerable. It is likely that diagnosis of a terminal illness will 
have a significant psychological effect on a person, lead-
ing to stress, depression, anxiety and other psychologi-
cal conditions that may temporarily impact upon 
a person’s ability to make clear and rational choices. 
Such conditions have to be taken into account along-
side other concerns about a person’s competence to 
consent. The inclusion of terminally ill people in 
research brings in other factors that can make such sub-
jects vulnerable to exploitation, as suggested by 
Question 5. Given the psychological state a terminal 
diagnosis can create, such people may be more open 
to pressure than others. Alternatively, their desire for 
a cure or an increased lifespan may be so great that they 
jump at any perceived chance, without properly con-
sidering whether participation is in their interests. All 
of these elements need to be taken into account when 
seeking consent from terminally ill subjects. 
An important issue that arises in relation to Question 5 
is whether a lack of options – in terms of an available 
cure or further life-prolonging treatment – might com-
promise the voluntariness of a participant’s consent. 
The concern here is that if a person’s only possible hope 
for extending their life is an experimental treatment, this 
leaves them with no acceptable alternative other than 
to participate in the trial. The voluntariness of their 
consent may therefore be compromised. This makes 
the situation similar to one in which ‘undue’ induce-
ments are offered – as discussed in Chapter 2 – with the 
inducement in this case being a seemingly irresistible 
offer of a chance to prolong life. We should, however, be 
cautious about concluding that voluntary consent is 
impossible in such circumstances as this would also make 
it impossible for patients to consent validly to life-saving 
treatment in many non-research settings. The question 
of how such concerns about voluntariness relate to 
exploitation will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
There are many reasons why it might not be in some-
one’s interests to participate in research, even if that 
research may prolong or improve their life. For exam-
ple, the chances of success may be low whilst the nature 
of the intervention may be very unpleasant, such as 
intensive chemotherapy. A person diagnosed with 
a terminal illness may prefer the quality and length of 
life expected outside the trial to an extended but lower 
quality life. Alternatively, a person may wish to avoid 
any indignity they see as being part of a research trial 
in their dying days. However, the concern is that many 
subjects will simply see the rewards as so great that they 
will consent without giving due consideration to the 
disadvantages.
It is entirely possible for a person to choose voluntarily 
to participate in research in the context of terminal ill-
ness, despite the extremely strong incentive that the 
possibility of extension of life presents, not least 
because it is in many cases a rational choice that is 
strongly in the interest of the research participant. 
So the prospect of a life-prolonging treatment does not 
necessarily lead to vulnerability by compromising vol-
untariness, although it may do so where it exerts a ‘con-
trolling influence’ (i.e. one that bypasses rational 
deliberation) over the patient’s decision. 
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We also need to consider ways in which terminal illness 
could make a patient like Mr Day vulnerable even with-
out undermining competence. Being terminally ill 
could make a research participant vulnerable by 
increasing the likelihood or potential severity of harms 
that they might suffer due to their physical condition. 
Even with the fully autonomous, valid consent of such 
a terminally ill patient, it is questionable whether they 
should be recruited into research that poses a signifi-
cantly greater risk of harm to them than it would to 
other subjects who could be recruited. It should also 
be remembered that the risks of harm may need to be 
balanced against the potential benefits of participation 
in research. However, balancing harms and benefits may 
be significantly more difficult for terminally ill patients 
than for others. In particular, even if they are not at risk 
of greater physical harm than others, the harms that 
they are subject to may take on a more serious aspect, 
as they may blight a person’s limited remaining time, 
with little opportunity for compensation or balancing 
benefits. Psychological and social side-effects of treat-
ment, such as reduced cognitive function or disrupted 
ability to communicate may similarly take on a greater 
significance at the end of life. 
Another aspect of terminal illness that may be associ-
ated with vulnerability concerns hope. For a person 
seeking full recovery, such as Mr Day, it may be very 
hard to keep hope of cure in check throughout the 
research process. For some research participants, their 
rational or public understanding of the likely outcomes 
that the research is working towards may be at odds 
with their secret and non-rational hopes of a cure. 
Mr Day may be vocalising the suppressed thoughts of 
many research participants for whom the options for 
successful treatment or cure have been exhausted. 
Regardless of whether or not it compromises their 
competence to consent, hope that a terminally ill per-
son may feel despite their acceptance of facts that 
ought to undermine it, makes them vulnerable. 
Participants harbouring unrealistic hopes may feel dev-
astated by the failure of a research intervention to 
effect cure, or they may feel cheated (perhaps by fate, 
rather than by the researchers themselves) if they are 
randomised to a placebo arm. (11) These feelings may 
occur in spite of a participant’s understanding and 
acceptance of the trial design and its stated expected 
outcomes. The difficulty that research participants may 
experience in aligning their expectations to the likely 
outcomes of the research should be clearly recognised 
by researchers, and factored into discussions with par-
ticipants and their families. 
These considerations do not vary in kind from those 
involved in ethical scrutiny of many types of research, 
but the potential vulnerability of research participants 
in this context makes it appropriate for researchers to 
be especially cognisant of these issues and to ensure 
that the interests of terminally ill research participants 
are safeguarded.
Concern that involvement in research may endanger 
vulnerable participants may lead some to doubt the 
ethical acceptability of all research involving potentially 
vulnerable individuals. But there are good reasons relat-
ing to the interests of vulnerable groups to support the 
execution of carefully constructed and ethically sound 
research involving vulnerable individuals. Some research 
questions can only be answered if tested in the context 
of conditions associated with vulnerability, and the 
opportunity to improve treatment and further the 
understanding of issues that arise in those contexts will 
be severely limited without research. Should a terminally 
ill patient expect to receive substantial benefit from 
participating in a trial then their inclusion might be 
warranted even if they are at more risk than other par-
ticipants. It is also important to allow for the possibility 
of altruistic research participation in the context of 
terminal illness. For some people, participation in 
research from which they do not expect to benefit 
personally might present an opportunity to end their 
lives in a positive manner, expressing through their 
actions important values that provide for them a sense 
of meaning and hope. Although the potential for vul-
nerability makes it particularly important to present 
research sensitively and approach the information-
giving and consent process with care, it is not in itself 
grounds for ruling research participation out. 
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Question 6 raises the issue of what alternatives to con-
sent or additional safeguards might be put in place to 
protect the welfare of Mr Day if he is judged to lack 
competence. 
One possible response is to exclude him from the trial 
altogether. This response would resolve concerns about 
exploitation of Mr Day’s vulnerability as well as avoid-
ing harm that Mr Day may subsequently experience if 
enrolment in the trial does not lead to his cure. It is 
important to note that excluding Mr Day does not rep-
resent an ethically neutral response to concerns about 
his competence, but rather (given that Mr Day meets 
the clinical criteria for inclusion and the trial is not over-
subscribed) expresses a view that Mr Day is not com-
petent to give valid consent. Even if there are doubts 
about Mr Day’s competence that are not able to be 
fully resolved by further discussions with him, exclusion 
may be unduly harsh. If participation in this research 
presents the best likelihood of improving the outcome 
for Mr Day, there are welfare-related reasons to include 
him in the trial. Although it is possible that Mr Day 
will experience trauma if the trial fails to deliver the 
fulfilment of his unrealistic hopes, it is at least equally 
likely that exclusion from the trial will traumatise 
Mr Day. So exclusion is not a costless option in terms 
of Mr Day’s welfare or his autonomy.
One possible response in cases of borderline incompe-
tence is to allow participation on the basis of consent, 
but with caveats designed to maximise participant 
understanding. This approach involves the provision of 
additional help to understand the issues that should 
inform their decision. This may take the form of one-
on-one sessions between the researcher and the par-
ticipant, the use of DVDs, web-based materials or 
written leaflets or exercise sheets. In this case, however, 
Mr Day may not be receptive to further efforts to 
ensure understanding, since he does not consider his 
understanding of the research to be problematic. The 
fact that Mr Day has disclosed unrealistic views of the 
research outcomes makes it appropriate for the 
researcher (or person overseeing the consent process) 
to invest time in building a constructive and frank dia-
logue with Mr Day which is aimed at ensuring that his 
understanding of the research is realistic. This is the case 
even if Mr Day does not recognise the importance of 
this process. Ultimately it is the researcher and not the 
participant who is responsible for ensuring that the par-
ticipant has an appropriate understanding of the aims 
and design of the trial. 
Another response to Mr Day’s uncertain competence 
is to accord his decision the status of ‘assent’ rather than 
consent, and to make a decision about his inclusion 
on the basis of a discrete assessment of his welfare. 
The fact that Mr Day wants to participate is taken as 
a reason in favour of participation, but it does not have 
the decision-determining quality of a valid consent. 
The concept of assent and dissent is examined in the 
discussion of Case Study 3.2 below.
Including a participant like Mr Day in a trial despite 
unresolved concerns about the quality of his consent 
may be permissible on welfare grounds. How ought the 
interests of Mr Day to be assessed? One option would 
be to refer to a person or body of persons that is inde-
pendent from the research (to ensure that the interests 
of the research or the researchers do not dominate the 
decision) such as an ethics committee. Another would 
be to refer to Mr Day’s closest family (to gain further 
insight into Mr Day’s belief structures, communication 
habits, and to find out about the support that he will 
have as the research progresses). If consultation of 
a third party is sought, it should be clear what its pur-
pose is. Is the researcher seeking another opinion, which 
she will then weigh up along with her own views and 
those of Mr Day, or is she devolving decision-making 
authority to the consulted party? If it is the latter, it 
needs to be very clear why their decision is to be pre-
ferred to that of Mr Day or the researcher. It is also 
important to consider how a decision against inclusion 
would be presented to Mr Day.
Cases such as that of Mr Day engage many of our con-
cerns about autonomy and welfare in the research con-
text. In some cases, this sort of vulnerability concern 
will be adequately addressed through additional 
investment in communication between researchers 
and research participants. When research involves par-
ticipants who are clearly not competent, good com-
munication alone will not be sufficient. A case of this 
sort is considered next. 
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  Case Study 3.2
Research into the role of carers 
for Alzheimer’s patients
The increasing number of people diagnosed with 
Alzheimer’s disease has led to a significant growth 
in the number of people needed to care for them. 
Researchers want to find out how people with 
Alzheimer’s relate to their carers, and the impact this 
has on both patients and carers. The initial aim of 
the research is to identify the challenges that carers 
most often face as well as the aspects of care that 
do most to enhance or reduce the welfare of people 
with Alzheimer’s. The researchers believe that 
answering these questions is vital if they are 
to develop better training and support systems 
for carers. 
Researchers plan to carry out observational 
research on the daily activities of carers as they go 
about their normal duties caring for Alzheimer’s 
patients. The observations will be carried out in 
a number of different institutions where people 
with Alzheimer’s disease are cared for, such as 
nursing homes, psychiatric hospitals, and respite 
centres. Researchers also want to distribute 
questionnaires to carers and, where possible, 
patients to find out their responses to a number 
of central issues, such as:
•  Which aspects of working with people with 
Alzheimer’s disease do carers find easy and 
which aspects do they find difficult or stressful? 
and:
•  Which aspects of the carers’ approach do most 
to enhance or harm the welfare of people with 
Alzheimer’s?
The researchers are aware that the patients 
involved in the research will have varying levels of 
competence. Consent will be sought from all carers 
involved in the research, as well as the institutions 
in which the observations are taking place. Every 
effort will be made to gain consent from each patient. 
Where a patient is not competent to consent, proxy 
consent will be sought from the most appropriate 
third party. 
Questions
1.  What are the main benefits that might arise 
from this research proposal?
2.  What are the ethical problems with this 
research proposal? In particular, is it ethical 
to conduct the research on those patients 
with Alzheimer’s who are incompetent and 
cannot consent?
3.  What additional efforts should be made to 
increase the understanding about the research 
for those with Alzheimer’s? Do you think such 
efforts could have a negative effect on the 
patients?
4.  Should any additional safeguards be put in 
place to protect the welfare of research sub-
jects who are unable to give valid consent?
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12.  This is similar to, and has similar limitations to, the use of anonymisation to avoid breaches of confidentiality, which will be discussed 
in Chapter 4.
Vulnerability and cognitive impairment 
The research proposed in the case study offers the pros-
pect of significant benefits for both people with 
Alzheimer’s disease and their carers. The carers stand 
to gain from better training and support in their roles, 
and this in turn will enhance the welfare of the patients 
they care for. Moreover, the research may have both 
immediate and longer term benefits. The identification 
of aspects of care that are beneficial or detrimental to 
the welfare of patients or carers will have an immedi-
ate impact upon their welfare if the results are made 
available to carers and to the organisations that provide 
the care, and used to improve training. If this know-
ledge is used more widely to develop and implement 
improved approaches to caring for people with 
Alzheimer’s, future patients and future carers will also 
stand to benefit. 
However, ethical concerns arise because of the inclu-
sion of potentially vulnerable people with Alzheimer’s 
disease in the research. In general, great care should be 
taken to determine the level of competence of subjects 
who have conditions that can cause cognitive impair-
ment. These include not only Alzheimer’s disease and 
other forms of dementia but also conditions such as 
stroke, brain tumour, mental illness, delusional states 
and head injury. People diagnosed with any of these 
conditions may be unable to understand, retain and 
evaluate the relevant information, or to make and com-
municate a decision based upon it. Within each con-
dition there may be a wide variation in cognitive ability, 
so that although not everyone diagnosed with these 
conditions will be cognitively impaired to such a degree 
that they cannot consent, competence will have to be 
established in each case, and extra provision made in 
certain cases to assist their understanding. 
There are also ethical concerns relating to the effects of 
the research on the carers. The Case Study does not 
specify whether the carers who will be involved in the 
research are employees of the institution in which the 
research will take place, members of the patients’ 
families, volunteers, or a mixture of these. If they are 
paid carers then concerns might arise about the uses 
that their employer might make of information 
acquired through the research, for example to discipline 
staff or assess their performance. These concerns might 
be addressed by providing the employer with the 
results of the research only in the form of generalised 
findings and recommendations without reference to 
individual carers, (12) but whether or not this approach 
is taken it will be important for the researchers to define 
how the information they acquire will be communi-
cated and used, and for the carers to be informed about 
this before consenting to participate. If the carers are 
members of patients’ families, then they might them-
selves be vulnerable, for example psychologically and 
emotionally, due to the impact of the deterioration of 
a loved one or the stresses of being an unpaid carer. For 
carers in any of these groups the observation may give 
rise to privacy concerns, and this will be an issue to be 
addressed by the researchers. Participants should be 
informed about the circumstances in which informa-
tion identifying individual carers will be supplied to the 
relevant authorities in the case of abusive, dangerous 
or criminal behaviour being observed or disclosed. 
Issues about privacy and disclosure will be addressed 
further in Chapter 4. The remaining discussion of this 
case, however, will focus on ethical issues relating to the 
involvement of Alzheimer’s patients, and particularly 
on issues to do with competence and consent.
In the case study it is almost certain that some of the 
people with Alzheimer’s disease whom the researchers 
propose to study will be unable to give valid consent, 
either because they lack competence due to impaired 
cognitive ability or because their condition undermines 
their ability to consent voluntarily. Although many 
Alzheimer’s patients will also be elderly and therefore 
potentially physically vulnerable, the risk of harm to the 
vulnerable group is low, because the research is largely 
observational and involves no change to patients’ 
daily care. There may, nevertheless, be some risk of 
patients becoming distressed or of the quality of care 
being adversely affected by the presence of observers. 
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(The carers may also feel uncomfortable about being 
observed and have concerns about how the observa-
tions and assessments of their practice might be used 
by their managers. A similar issue about observation in 
the workplace will be discussed in relation to privacy in 
Chapter 4.) There is also a serious concern about the 
privacy and the dignity of those being cared for. 
Observers in a care setting may witness behaviours and 
aspects of care that are of a deeply intimate nature and 
which the cared-for person would not have exposed to 
observational research prior to the onset of Alzheimer’s. 
Even where the risk of harm is low, we normally expect 
researchers to obtain the consent of participants. 
However, many of the patients in this study will be una-
ble to give valid consent. As dementia in Alzheimer’s 
patients is often progressive and results in a gradual 
decline of cognitive function, there will be many grada-
tions of ability and understanding. Patients may range 
from still competent through borderline competent to 
non-competent. The likelihood of a gradual decline in 
competence makes lengthy studies more problematic, 
since consent given at the outset of the research may 
not endure if that person later becomes incompetent. 
Alzheimer’s may also result in fluctuations of compe-
tence and episodic lucidity, where a person is fully 
autonomous and competent some of the time but not 
at other times. The concern here is that a subject may 
consent to participate in the research during a lucid 
phase but enter a non-competent phase before the 
research has ended. 
In cases such as these, the loss of autonomy and com-
petence, either permanently or periodically, generates 
a level of vulnerability for the subjects, as they may lose 
their ability to protect their own interests. It may there-
fore be appropriate for researchers to undertake periodic 
reassessments of subjects’ competence, especially in 
longer studies. Once a subject has become incompetent, 
they require safeguards similar to subjects who lacked 
competence from the outset. Consent given before 
becoming incompetent is significant in that it provides 
an indication that the subject judged the trial not 
to involve excessive risk or exploitation. However, while 
a competent subject can continue to protect their 
interests by choosing to remain in or withdraw from 
the trial, a subject who has lost competence cannot be 
relied upon to make this judgement. Nevertheless, clear 
indications of distress and unwillingness to continue 
should be taken seriously, even if the subject initially 
consented. 
Inclusion of non-competent subjects
A central ethical concern in this case, raised by Question 
2, is whether it is ethical to include non-competent and 
other vulnerable subjects in research, and, if so, in what 
types of research? 
When considering this question, it might seem that the 
simplest approach would be to adopt a blanket policy 
of excluding anyone judged to be vulnerable or unable 
to give valid consent from participating in research. 
Although this will be discussed in Chapter 6, it is worth 
noting that such wide-reaching policies of exclusion 
could have seriously detrimental consequences for soci-
ety, and especially for those with conditions that result 
in vulnerability or loss of competence, by depriving us 
of important knowledge about those conditions.
This is reflected in the widespread recognition in rele-
vant codes, guidelines and laws (13) that it is permissible 
to undertake research involving subjects who are 
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unable to consent provided that it is methodologically 
necessary to use such subjects and that the research is 
likely either to benefit the subjects themselves or to 
benefit others with the same competence-undermin-
ing condition while imposing no more than minimal 
risk (14) on the subjects. (Other conditions frequently 
required are that assent should be sought and dissent 
respected, and that consent from a legally authorised 
representative of the subject should be sought – the 
latter will only be possible where legal provision for this 
exists within the relevant jurisdiction.) 
We have seen that in the case study there is a likelihood 
of benefit both to the non-competent subjects and to 
future patients with the same condition. It might be 
questioned whether it is really necessary to include the 
Alzheimer’s patients as research participants in order to 
obtain these benefits, given that the research is predom-
inantly about the activities of the carers. However, since 
the activities in question involve interaction with patients 
it would be impossible to carry out the observational 
part of the research without also observing the patients, 
and, given that one of the key aims of the research is to 
ascertain the effects of the carers’ actions on the patients, 
it is unlikely that similar results could be obtained with-
out the involvement of the Alzheimer’s patients. 
Safeguards for vulnerable 
and non-competent subjects 
Questions 3 and 4 prompt us to consider what meas-
ures might be taken to protect non-competent sub-
jects who are to be included in a trial. 
Improving the quality of consent
Question 3 raises the issue of how to deal with those 
subjects whose decline in health has placed them at 
or  just below the threshold level of competence. 
Ascertaining why a person is not competent can facili-
tate attempts to improve the quality of consent that 
they can give, in particular in those cases where some 
additional help needs to be given to aid their under-
standing of the research. For example, those with early 
onset Alzheimer’s may have difficulty concentrating, 
learning new facts, remembering and processing them. 
Attempts to improve their understanding and reten-
tion of the relevant information may lead to them 
being able to give valid consent, or, failing that, at least 
result in an improved standard of deliberation that 
would allow researchers to form a better picture of 
their wishes and preferences. 
However, there are limitations on such an approach. 
Whilst attempting to enhance the autonomous deci-
sion-making ability of a dementia patient is important, 
care also needs to be taken that this does not lead to 
unnecessarily stressful and harmful interactions with 
the subjects. Forcing dementia patients to confront 
aspects of their mental state in an attempt to make 
them better understand the research may be extremely 
distressing to those involved. On the other hand, over-
simplification of the proposed research may be taken 
by some as an affront to their dignity. This means that 
any attempt to improve the quality of consent through 
improving the patients’ understanding should be han-
dled sensitively so as to avoid harming them or failing 
to respect whatever degree of autonomy they retain 
before the research even begins. 
Alternatives to consent
Another means of providing an additional safeguard 
for an incompetent subject’s welfare is to consider alter-
natives to the standard consent processes. This might 
be through:
(i)  gaining their assent or requiring the absence of 
dissent if the subject is capable; 
(ii)  the use of a proxy to make decisions on their behalf; 
or
(iii)  relying on an advance statement, where one has 
been prepared. 
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The first of these, assent, was first raised as an issue 
in  relation to the competence of Mr  Day in Case 
Study 3.1, where his competence to provide valid con-
sent was brought into question. Although assent is not 
meant as a substitute for valid consent, it is designed to 
support a range of ethical safeguards, from providing 
an additional layer of protection by indicating what 
a subject’s interests are, to respecting the autonomy of 
an individual to the extent they possess it, to respect-
ing their dignity as a human being rather than treating 
them purely as a means to the researcher’s own ends. 
We can define assent and dissent as follows:
a form of agreement/disagreement that assumes 
a lower standard of information assimilation, volun-
tariness, and decision-making than that of consent. 
The purpose of assent/dissent is to respect a limited 
or developing autonomy.
Assent (or dissent) can be given by a person whose 
competence is impaired in such a way that they can-
not give valid consent (or refusal) but which is sufficient 
to allow them to grasp something of the nature of 
the  proposed research and to communicate their 
preferences. 
Assent is not a substitute for valid consent, but it does 
achieve a form of safeguard similar to valid consent, 
although to a lesser degree. Assent in response to the 
presentation of an opportunity to participate in 
research may provide the best possible indication of 
the desires and preferences of a person who is not 
competent to give valid consent. Seeking assent and, 
importantly, respecting dissent, is a way in which we 
can respect (limited) autonomy. Although a person 
may be unable to make fully autonomous decisions, 
that does not mean they have no level of autonomy to 
be respected. Engaging with subjects and obtaining 
assent or dissent is therefore a way to respect an ele-
ment of autonomy and to help preserve something of 
the dignity that attaches to decision-making. 
Assent or dissent can also inform assessments of best 
interests. The satisfaction of preferences is likely to form 
one element of best interests and so, to the extent 
that satisfying preferences does not conflict with other 
central interests (whatever those might be), we have 
a reason to respect assent or dissent. It is often thought 
that particular attention should be paid to any dissent 
that an incompetent participant exhibits to the 
research. As safeguarding the participant’s welfare is 
paramount, any indications of dissent should be 
treated seriously in order to prevent them experienc-
ing any further harm, perceived or actual.
There may be situations in which a non-competent 
person’s assent or dissent to a piece of research appears 
to be at odds with their overall best interests. This may 
occur, for example, when a very young child refuses 
an injection that is part of a research intervention that 
represents the only chance of a cure for a serious con-
dition. In a case such as this, it may be appropriate to 
override the child’s dissent in pursuit of their overall 
best interests. But in many other cases, the extent to 
which the prospective participant’s interests will be 
advanced by participation will be uncertain enough 
that their assent or dissent will carry great, and in some 
cases, determining, weight. 
As with consent, assent is not achieved in a single 
instance but over the duration of the research. The epi-
sodic nature of conditions such as Alzheimer’s makes 
it very likely that participants will respond differently 
to  the research at different times. It is important 
to monitor signs of distress and unwillingness to con-
tinue throughout the research period. Such signs are 
clear indications of dissent, even in cases where the 
subject was initially able to provide valid consent to 
the research.
Let us consider the role of assent in relation to Case 3.2. 
The proposed research is likely to involve many people 
who are incompetent because of the degree of their 
dementia but who are still sufficiently able to grasp 
something about the proposed research to assent or 
dissent to participate. This research is unlikely to yield 
sufficiently tangible benefits to the particular individu-
als involved to provide interest-related grounds to over-
ride dissent. Therefore, the dissent of prospective 
participants should be respected. Dissent may be 
expressed when the research is initially presented, or 
at some point during the period of observation. If a par-
ticipant who initially assented (or even consented) 
to involvement in the research later rescinds that, the 
65
C H A P T E R  3  V U L N E R A B L E  A N D  N O N  C O M P E T E N T  S U B J E C T S
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distress that is likely to follow from continued observa-
tion, along with the (partial) autonomy-respecting 
function of assent, dictate that observation should 
be discontinued. Because of the episodic nature of 
Alzheimer’s, it may be appropriate to re-seek assent 
at a later time, but great care should be taken to avoid 
pestering or causing continued distress.
In this case, questions may arise about the status of the 
assent of some participants with respect to their likely 
pre-Alzheimer’s wishes. The onset of Alzheimer’s often 
brings quite radical changes to a person’s behaviour 
and preferences and sometimes these are of a kind 
that loved ones believe the person would have previ-
ously disapproved or been ashamed of. People with 
Alzheimer’s may also require help and care of a very 
revealing and intimate nature, and this may give rise to 
worries about the extent to which assent to an obser-
vational study can protect the ongoing interests in 
dignity and privacy that participants may possess. 
One response to these concerns would be to say that 
if the participants do not feel that their privacy is 
wrongly invaded by the research, their view should be 
respected, thus allowing participation. Another 
response is to hold that, even if participants do not 
currently feel motivated by a wish to protect their pri-
vacy, the likelihood that they would previously have 
refused to participate in research of this type should 
override current assent to participate. How much pri-
ority should prior wishes, or informed guesses about 
prior wishes, have when considering the participation 
of a person with Alzheimer’s in research? This is a ques-
tion that leads into complex philosophical debates 
about identity and autonomy, but it is one that should 
be afforded some consideration in the context of 
research of the type presented in Case 3.2. (15)
Family members are likely to have views about (a) 
whether a prospective participant would have given 
consent to participate in research of this type prior to 
the onset of Alzheimer’s and (b) whether they should 
participate now. In the face of doubt about the moral 
weight of a participant’s assent, or if no indication of 
assent or dissent can be obtained from the prospective 
participant, one option is to seek consent elsewhere.
An alternative where valid consent from the participant 
cannot be obtained is for a legally appointed represent-
ative, sometimes called a ‘proxy’, to make decisions on 
behalf of the incompetent subject. As a proxy is usually 
appointed by the subject prior to their becoming 
incompetent, or else is often someone with a close 
relationship to the subject, they can use their know-
ledge of the subject to promote any preferences and 
interests that they believe the subject has. Such proxy 
consent may be adequate to allow an incompetent 
subject to participate in certain elements of invasive 
research carrying more than a minimal risk (that is 
greater risk than would be experienced from per-
forming day-to-day activities). The thought behind 
this is that the greater the risk, the greater the safe-
guards to protect a subject from research not in their 
interests. As a proxy is seen to provide a greater insight 
into what is in the best interests of the subject than 
the researchers can determine by themselves, proxy 
consent introduces an additional safeguard in cases 
where the subject faces more than a minimal risk.
However, there may be some concern with such an 
approach in Case Study 3.2, as the carers may be the 
ones best placed to provide proxy consent for the 
dementia sufferers. Although, on the face of it, carers 
are often highly aware of a patient’s condition and 
preferences, making them a seemingly good choice as 
a proxy, in Case Study 3.2 this might be problematic. 
Given that the research aims to benefit the carers as 
much as the Alzheimer’s patients, there might be a per-
ceived conflict of interests between their caring role 
and their role as a proxy. A carer might be keen to have 
an opportunity to participate but might only be able 
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to do so with the participation of the person they are 
caring for, making them potentially more likely to give 
proxy consent to participate. (16) 
Another possible way of dealing with consent issues is 
the use of advance directives (sometimes known as 
‘advance statements’). These are statements made by 
people when they are competent about how they wish 
to be treated in the future if they become incompe-
tent. Such directives are seen as particularly useful for 
people with progressive conditions, such as dementia, 
where they are aware that their competence will 
become impaired in the future. A person, knowing they 
will eventually become incompetent, could decide 
whether or not they would like to be entered into 
research trials related to improving their condition and 
record that desire in an advance statement. As the 
statement is made when the person is competent, 
it may be seen as the next best thing to valid consent. 
However, advance statements are still quite limited 
devices for recording a person’s wishes. They may be 
limited in scope because they are vague or only cover 
specific situations. Moreover, unless they were con-
structed with a specific research trial in mind, where 
the still-competent subject had been able to review all 
of the relevant information and make a judgement 
about their future participation, an advance statement 
would fall far short of the normal standards of valid 
consent. Advance statements are therefore perhaps 
better understood as indicators of the wishes and 
preferences of an individual before they became 
incompetent. Whether such wishes are still considered 
accurate by the time they are acted upon is a question 
that is open to a great deal of debate. (17) 
Despite all of the alternatives available where valid 
consent cannot be obtained, there will be cases where 
none of them are applicable or where they are still 
not considered sufficient grounds to enter someone 
into a research trial. Given that consent as a means 
of protecting the welfare of a subject no longer has 
a central role, in order to include such vulnerable sub-
jects in research other measures must also be taken 
into  account to minimise risk and safeguard them 
from harm. 
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  Case Study 3.3
Research into treatments for 
behavioural disorders in children
Professor Helsinki, a world famous psychiatrist 
specialising in the treatment of children, wants to 
comparatively evaluate four different treatments 
for a rare behavioural disorder called RBDC. RBDC, 
which involves occasional bouts of abusive and 
violent behaviour and episodes of severe paranoia, 
is most prevalent in children aged between 11 and 
15, but 14 % of cases occur in young adults, and 
a further 6 % of cases are in people aged over 25.
All of the treatments that Professor Helsinki wants 
to test are ‘standard’ insofar as each has been used 
in clinical practice in the recent past. However, 
the evidential basis for each one is minimal (at least 
specifically in relation to RBDC) and none is proven 
to work.
In general terms, the options for trial are:
(a)  a widely used pharmaceutical product;
(b)  a programme of anger management and 
relaxation exercises;
(c)  group therapy;
(d)  cognitive behavioural therapy.
Professor Helsinki wants to enter almost all of his 
patients with RBDC (all of whom are younger than 
16) into the study and to randomly allocate them 
into one of the above options. He proposes to do 
this without telling them or their parents/guardians 
and, hence, without prior consent for participation 
in the research (although the parents/guardians will 
be informed after the trial). Consent for the partic-
ular therapies offered will be obtained as normal, 
but the patients and their parents will not be told 
about the existence of the study or about the 
randomisation process. 
Professor Helsinki’s grounds for the non-disclosure 
policy include:
(i)  that disclosure to patients or parents would 
undermine the scientific validity of the study 
by affecting the behaviour and mental states 
of the research subjects;
(ii)  that disclosure would harm the research 
subjects by upsetting them and/or exacerbat-
ing their paranoia (e.g. the idea of being 
‘experimented on’ and ‘watched’ would be 
highly disturbing to many of these young 
people);
(iii)  that disclosure would make it impossible 
to recruit research subjects;
(iv)  that most people with RBDC lack the capacity 
to validly consent owing to the nature of 
the illness;
(v)  that this important research will benefit 
sufferers from RBDC and may even benefit 
the research subjects themselves;
(vi)  that his patients could have (‘randomly’) 
received any of the treatment options in 
ordinary clinical practice depending on, for 
example, where they happen to live and that 
Helsinki’s research is just a more systematic 
and scientifically valuable version of what 
would have happened anyway.
Questions
1.  What are the possible benefits that this 
research proposal raises?
2.  What are the ethical problems with this 
research proposal? In particular, is it ethical 
to conduct the research without obtaining 
the consent of either the children participating 
in the trial or that of their parents/guardians? 
3.  Do Professor Helsinki’s grounds for non-disclosure 
justify him carrying out the trial without consent? 
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4.  Are there any additional safeguards that should 
be put in place to protect the welfare of the 
research subjects if they are unable to give valid 
consent to participate?
The use of children in research
Up to this point, we have only considered vulnerable 
and incompetent adults in research. Case Study 3.3 
prompts us to consider to what extent the ethical con-
siderations applying to vulnerable and incompetent 
adults also apply to children, and whether any addi-
tional issues are raised by the participation of children 
in research. The use of children in research is a sensitive 
issue which has received special attention in several 
research ethics codes and regulations. (18) Like some 
of the adults featured in the previous case studies, 
children may (depending on their age and maturity) 
be considered vulnerable because of limited under-
standing and a resulting incapacity to give valid con-
sent, dependence on others (leading to possible lack 
of voluntariness in the making of certain decisions 
and susceptibility to exploitation and certain kinds of 
harm), and physical or psychological frailty leading to 
increased risk of harm from certain research activities. 
Factors that may require children to be treated differ-
ently from vulnerable and incompetent adults include 
the role of parents and guardians, and the fact that – in 
contrast to the participants with dementia in Case 
Study 3.2 – children can be generally be expected to 
develop rather than decline in maturity and under-
standing. Although children are commonly viewed 
as a vulnerable group in relation to research, the fact 
that they mature at different rates means that we can-
not assume that someone who is legally a minor is 
necessarily incompetent or vulnerable; thus, even in 
a jurisdiction in which a minor’s consent is not legally 
recognised or required, there may be a moral require-
ment to obtain consent from an older child who is 
capable of understanding the risks and benefits of 
participation.
As with adults who are unable to consent, one justifi-
cation for including children in research is that they 
individually stand to benefit from participation, and 
another is that their participation is necessary in order 
to obtain knowledge that will benefit others in the 
same vulnerable group. In response to Question 1, we 
may note that the proposed research takes the form 
of a therapeutic study in which all of the participants 
will receive treatment for their condition. As all of the 
treatments being used are considered ‘standard’ and 
there is no obvious indication which one is best, all 
those in the study stand to benefit insofar as they are 
being treated. (19) However, since the participants can 
expect to receive one of these treatments whether or 
not they participate in the trial, and given that they will 
be allocated to treatment arms randomly, it is not clear 
that there is any additional benefit resulting from their 
participation. 
There are potential benefits for all those suffering from 
the behavioural disorder RBDC, because the results of 
the research should indicate which, if any, of the stand-
ard treatments is associated with the best outcome 
overall, and it may reveal further information about the 
effect of individual interventions on particular sub-
groups of the research population. The results of the 
research should mean that only treatments that do 
have a sound basis are provided in the future. Even if 
the results of the research indicate that there is no good 
basis for any of the ‘standard’ treatments, this will still 
allow specialists to seek alternative treatments rather 
than administering apparently useless treatments, 
which may be at best a waste of health care resources 
69
C H A P T E R  3  V U L N E R A B L E  A N D  N O N  C O M P E T E N T  S U B J E C T S
or, at worst, harmful to patients. On the assumption 
that RBCD is a chronic condition and that Professor 
Helsinki is able to rapidly apply the results of the study 
to his own practice, the research participants may be 
able to benefit alongside others suffering from the con-
dition. Again, however, this does not indicate any addi-
tional benefit resulting from participation in the study.
Question 2 asks us to consider whether the research 
raises any ethical problems. One immediate concern is 
whether the study actually requires minors as subjects 
or could be carried out using competent adults instead. 
The research proposed by Professor Helsinki concerns 
a behavioural disorder, which, we are told, is most prev-
alent in children aged between 11 and 15. However, 
this might not fully justify the research being carried 
out on children, since 14 % of cases occur in young 
adults, and a further 6 % in people aged over 25. 
So, although the condition occurs predominantly in 
children, perhaps there are enough adult cases for these 
to be the focus of the research. Thus, some additional 
justification is needed for carrying out the research on 
minors under the age of 16. The fact that all Professor 
Helsinki’s patients are under 16 is not itself an adequate 
justification, as the research could be carried out at 
other clinics. Even if all those adults with the behav-
ioural disorder were in some way vulnerable due to, 
for example, their competence being impaired, there 
might still be a preference for using them in the 
research on the grounds that their greater physical, 
mental and emotional development might make them 
less susceptible to harm. For a similar reason, older chil-
dren are generally preferred to younger children as 
research subjects, as the younger the child, the less 
likely they are to be able to protect their own interests 
and the more susceptible they are likely to be to phys-
ical, mental and emotional harms. 
There may, however, still be sufficient reason for the 
research to go ahead with children as subjects. In par-
ticular it is increasingly recognised that there is reason 
to include children when researching treatments for 
non-age-specific medical conditions, in order to under-
stand how the treatments will function in children. 
As a child’s developing mind might respond very dif-
ferently to an adult’s, a case might be made on meth-
odological grounds for the use of child subjects. 
Children and consent
Questions 2 and 3 also raise a specific concern about 
Professor Helsinki’s proposal not to gain consent for 
participation in the research from either the children 
or their parents, nor to inform them in advance that 
they are involved in a trial.
Some of the reasons given by Professor Helsinki for 
not seeking consent are general arguments unrelated 
either to the age or the competence of the subjects. 
For example he puts forward a methodological jus-
tification of the kind discussed in Chapter 2 (see Case 
Study 2.3, Covert surveillance of health care profes-
sionals). The central argument is that, because this is 
a behavioural study, knowledge of the research would 
alter the behaviour of the subjects. In order to assess 
this argument we would have to weigh the plausibility 
of the methodological claim and the importance of 
the research against the absence of consent and the 
possibility of harm. In this case, as noted above, it is 
not clear that there are any direct benefits to research 
subjects to enter into the balance. 
This methodological argument might in this case be 
supported by another of Professor Helsinki’s general 
arguments: that because the research involves an inves-
tigation into the comparative merits of standard treat-
ments it therefore is unlikely to expose the children 
to any greater risk than in the normal course of their 
treatment.
Some of the other reasons given by Professor Helsinki 
are more complex, however, and require a more 
detailed consideration of the involvement of children. 
In particular, the case raises the issue of the status of 
consent in relation to children in research. Although 
ethical concerns for obtaining consent where possible 
from children should be similar to adults (in line with 
the child’s capacity to consent), a number of child-
specific ethical concerns also arise. In general, it is worth 
remembering that when dealing with children in 
research, the following factors can influence the con-
sent process markedly:
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•  a greater likelihood of deference and the existence 
of a power imbalance, making voluntariness an 
issue;
•  the need to communicate in a manner compre-
hensible to the participants (for example, by pro-
viding child-oriented information sheets);
•  the need to check comprehension, especially 
understanding the significance of longer-term risks;
•  a child’s varying level of understanding particularly 
over the course of a lengthy study.
Therefore, although obtaining consent from children in 
research can be challenging, there is still an expectation 
that provisions are made for it wherever possible. So, 
for the research to be ethical there would have to be 
good grounds for foregoing the consent process. Many 
of the reasons for allowing research to proceed without 
the valid consent of the subjects that were discussed 
in Chapter 2 are also applicable in this case as well. 
Two major factors need consideration:
•  the range of gradations of competence;
•  the relationship of third parties, such as parents, in 
providing consent to participate in research on 
behalf of the child. 
The first of these factors is illustrative of why not all chil-
dren should be treated as having identical levels of 
autonomy even if they are the same age. Children tend 
to acquire competence gradually and at different rates 
so that some of the children in the study will be mature 
enough to meet the criteria for competence while oth-
ers will not. Also, some of the child populations that 
research will seek to involve may, by virtue of their 
extensive experience of medical interventions and 
treatments for chronic or severe acute conditions, 
exhibit much greater levels of competence than would 
generally be associated with their age group. (20) Even 
where, as minors, competent children are not legally 
allowed to give consent to participate without the 
additional consent of a parent or guardian, (21) it is still 
an ethical requirement to ensure consent is obtained 
wherever possible. This means that all children would 
have to be assessed for their levels of competence 
before being recruited into a research trial. Even given 
that, in this case, Professor Helsinki has indicated that 
most people with the behavioural disorder being stud-
ied lack the capacity to consent, this does not neces-
sarily mean that all those in the research trial will be 
incompetent. Furthermore, even where a subject is not 
competent to give fully valid consent, just as in the case 
of adults, other elements of consent, such as informa-
tion provision, are still relevant. Hence (if this can be 
done without jeopardising the study methodologically) 
children should be informed of the risks and benefits 
of the research in a manner suitable to their capacity 
and maturity and, where possible, their assent sought.
Seeking the assent of a child to participate in research 
is a way of respecting their developing autonomy, 
as well as being a useful means of indicating whether 
a child will not cooperate with the research because of 
any fears the child may have. If fears do exist and can 
be uncovered as part of the process of explaining and 
exploring a research opportunity with a child, those 
fears can then be openly addressed and dealt with. 
Requiring assent therefore acts as another means to 
protecting the interests of the child.
However, many significant decisions involving children 
are often thought, with good reason, also to require the 
consent of a suitable third party. This is usually a par-
ent or guardian of the child, who already has a number 
of rights and responsibilities towards the child. The less 
mature a child is in terms of their autonomy, the more 
important it is that those charged with safeguarding 
their best interests have the opportunity to do so. 
By not seeking the consent of – or even informing – 
the parents of the children about the research, the con-
cern is raised that Professor Helsinki is disregarding 
the protective function that requiring parental consent 
has. He may also be violating the parents’ moral rights 
regarding what happens to their own children.
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However, if Professor Helsinki were to inform all parties 
– both children and parents – that research is taking 
place, not only would he place the results of the 
research in jeopardy by potentially altering the behav-
iour of the subjects and those who have a strong influ-
ence upon them, he may also encounter the following 
difficult ethical issue. A child, although not fully auton-
omous, who is mature enough to be able to compre-
hend the nature of the research and to express an 
opinion might indicate strong dissent to participation 
in the trial. Moreover, this might be the case even where 
the child’s parents consent to the child’s participation. 
Cases in which parents support their child’s enrolment 
in a piece of research that the child is unwilling to be 
involved in raise general issues about parental authority. 
In the discussion of Case Study 3.2, it was suggested 
that any expressions of dissent from participants ought 
to be taken seriously and result in the cessation of 
observation. But it is not at all uncommon for parents 
to cajole their children into activities, including research 
participation, from which they dissent. Not only is this 
practice widespread, but in some cases, it might be 
viewed as an essential part of the parental role. Parents 
who routinely accepted a small child’s refusal to brush 
her teeth, for example, would generally be considered 
to be in breach of their duty of care. It is in a child’s best 
interests to maintain the health of her teeth, even if she 
dissents from this view. Although there is a desire, 
where possible, to respect the wishes of all vulnerable 
subjects who are not fully autonomous, it is clear that 
the best interests of a child are not always served by 
simple capitulation to their dissent.
 
Can participation in research ever be so strongly in the 
interests of children that their dissent to participate 
should be overridden? In some instances of therapeu-
tic research in which a potentially useful treatment is 
unavailable outside the trial and conventional treat-
ment options are limited and/or ineffective, this may 
be the case. What about research that is not character-
ised by a likelihood of therapeutic benefit for the par-
ticipants? It may be in the broader interests of children 
to learn what it is to contribute to an important project 
that one does not benefit from directly, even if this is 
at some cost, in terms of discomfort or inconvenience, 
to oneself. Parents may be keen to expose their children 
to such activity, even if it involves some overriding of 
their stated preferences. Should we accept that parents 
may sometimes have to coax, bribe or even force their 
children into participation in research? Can this be 
justified by reference to the children’s best interests?
It is disputable whether children do have an interest in 
contributing to projects that do not benefit them 
directly, and, if they do, whether participating in 
research that they dissent from is an ethically legitimate 
way of advancing this interest. Given this, it is advisable 
that researchers defer to some extent to parents 
(or those with decision-making authority) to weigh up 
the interests of their children. Some forms of parental 
coaxing and encouragement are morally acceptable, 
especially when the children involved are young and 
not able to fully understand and evaluate the reasons 
in favour of participation. As children’s ability to 
understand and evaluate this information increases, 
so  does the moral weight that attaches to their 
assent and dissent. Thus parental coaxing and encour-
agement become more morally problematic when 
directed at a child who exhibits reasonably high levels 
of understanding.
If the only potential advancement of a child’s interests 
that a research proposal offers relates to social interests 
in contributing to valuable projects, it will be particu-
larly important that the risks associated with research 
participation are limited to ‘no more than minimal’ 
levels. If children express significant levels of distress 
during participation, it may be appropriate for their 
participation to be suspended, even if parents do not 
request this. It is always preferable to obtain assent from 
participants, and research involving children will typi-
cally require careful and ongoing attempts to secure 
the assent of children as well as the valid consent of 
someone with parental authority.
How do these thoughts play out in relation to Case 
Study 3.3? One of the reasons that Professor Helsinki 
cites for not seeking consent or assent for inclusion 
in the research is that consent or assent from either 
parents or children is unlikely to be forthcoming. Further-
more, he says that knowledge of inclusion in research 
(if not inclusion itself) would be likely to be against 
the interests of the participants, due to the tendency 
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of people with RBDC to experience paranoia and fear 
of observation. The difficulty that Professor Helsinki 
predicts in recruiting to the trial under conditions of 
full disclosure and consent reflects the fact that partic-
ipation in this research is likely to be against partici-
pant’s interests, if they are aware of it. The potential for 
harm to the participant and the destruction of trust 
that discovery of the research would involve are not, 
in this case, offset by benefits to the participant. Other 
potential benefits that may accrue from the research 
are not identifiable or certain enough to justify over-
riding the interests of the participants. Parental consent 
for participation in this trial appears to be a moral 
requirement, and given the slim chances that the 
research will serve the interests of the child, proceed-
ing without the assent of minor participants would also 
be highly morally problematic.
There will also be cases of research involving children 
that raise the issue of whether the consent of a com-
petent child by itself is sufficient to allow them to par-
ticipate in the research or whether such consent always 
needs to be supplemented by the consent of the par-
ent or legal guardian. One situation where this might 
arise is where the revealing of the research to third 
parties, such as parents, could exacerbate the potential 
harms and risks that a child subject might face. This 
may be the case, for example, in research into the sex-
ual attitudes of teenage children. If participants, 
although able to understand the research and able to 
express an opinion, are not deemed able to provide 
valid consent by themselves solely on the grounds that 
they are legal minors, the parent or guardian’s consent 
would have to be sought. But revealing the nature of 
the research to these third parties may be harmful if it 
reveals personal facts about the child’s behaviour that 
they would not otherwise reveal to their parents. Here, 
the child’s vulnerability to subsequent harms would 
be potentially greater if confidentiality was breached 
by seeking third party consent. This means there is an 
important ethical question as to whether such research 
may ever proceed. The two central ethical concerns of 
seeking consent and protecting the welfare of the sub-
ject seem to be in direct conflict. As research into such 
topics can be extremely important, exceptions are 
often made for more mature children who do not wish 
to involve their parents, provided they have sufficient 
maturity to understand the nature, purpose and likely 
outcome of the proposed research, and so long as the 
research is seen as directly beneficial to them or not 
deemed harmful.
Safeguarding children’s welfare 
in research 
Question 4 asks whether any additional safeguards 
are needed for the young research subjects. We have 
already considered the role of assent/dissent and 
parental decision-making in protecting the welfare of 
children.
In all cases of research involving vulnerable subjects, 
both adults and children, matters of privacy, anonym-
ity and confidentiality are likely to be particularly 
important and sensitive. Although these issues are of 
general importance in research ethics, as will be dis-
cussed in more detail in Chapter 4, they take on a spe-
cial importance when dealing with vulnerable subjects. 
If subjects are unable to protect their own interests 
adequately in the controlled environment of the 
research setting, then the possibility of the dissemina-
tion of information relating to them that might extend 
beyond the research context can have an even greater 
potential to cause harm. 
Confidentiality is important and information-sharing 
should be proportionate to the risk of harm. However, 
the primary concern is still the safety of children and 
young people. Sometimes research can reveal facts 
about a child that would not have been known previ-
ously. Where reasonable concerns arise in the course 
of research that children are at risk of abuse or neglect, 
then an appropriate person or authority must be 
informed promptly when that is in the child’s best 
interests.
In all cases of vulnerable subjects, safeguards to mini-
mise any inconvenience, intrusion, embarrassment, 
coercion or distress should be written into the research 
protocol. In addition to these general safeguards, 
when  dealing with children in research, additional 
measures are advisable to make allowance for their 
particular needs.
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22.   Although subjects should still be informed afterwards when they have recovered, in line with the requirements of non-consensual research 
discussed in Chapter 2.
It is not only the welfare of the subjects that needs to 
be taken into account. The status of the researcher can 
also be an issue, both in terms of the child’s needs and 
the protection of the researcher themselves. An exam-
ple of concern for the child’s needs would be to con-
sider the sex of the interviewer carrying out the 
research in appropriate cases, such as research involv-
ing children who have been abused or suffered neglect 
at the hands of either men or women. An example 
of protecting the researchers themselves would be 
to ensure that interviewing of children is either under-
taken by two researchers or in areas where the 
researcher and child are not entirely alone, to protect 
the researcher from false accusations as well as the child 
from inappropriate behaviour by the researcher.
Further issues
This chapter has focused on only a small number of 
cases of research involving vulnerable people and has 
not sought to cover all possible kinds of vulnerability. 
Vulnerability can be generated by a wide variety of fac-
tors including physical or mental disability, age (old or 
young), membership of a discriminated-against group, 
a relative lack of control over one’s choices (as experi-
enced, for instance, in the context of imprisonment) or 
being a victim of crime. It can also arise in cases where 
the power imbalance between researchers (or those 
encouraging the research) and the subjects is very great. 
In many of these cases, the general ethical concerns 
relating to vulnerability will be applicable. However, it 
is worth briefly discussing a few additional concerns 
that are raised by particular types of research on the 
vulnerable.
One important group of non-competent subjects (as 
seen in Case Study 1.1, Testing of artificial blood prod-
uct) comprises patients requiring emergency treat-
ment, particularly when such patients are unconscious 
or temporarily mentally incapacitated (for example, 
following a road traffic accident). The requirement to 
engage in research to improve emergency treatment is 
extremely compelling. However, these unconscious 
patients are extremely vulnerable (both by virtue of 
their inability to resist research and treatment, and their 
need of urgent intervention). Where emergency treat-
ment is required, the very act of informing people 
about the research and asking for their agreement 
(even where this is possible) to participate could place 
people in danger by delaying treatment. Where the aim 
of the trial is therapeutic and the subjects stand to gain 
a great deal, their entry into such research trials appears 
to be both in their best interests and the interests of 
society at large. As consent is not possible because 
of the nature of the research, provided subjects are 
receiving treatment that is in their best interests then 
this kind of research (with appropriate hospital and 
research ethics committee approval) may be ethically 
acceptable. (22)
A final group for consideration consists of research sub-
jects who are vulnerable because they are engaged in 
some form of illegal activity, where the purpose of the 
research itself is to investigate the illegal activity in ques-
tion. This research could cover areas such as drug addic-
tion, illegal immigration and prostitution. A better 
understanding of these sorts of issues can be extremely 
beneficial to society in terms of prevention and safety, 
as well as leading to improved services, conditions, and 
treatment of the subjects. However, it also raises wel-
fare concerns for both subjects and researchers. 
While confidentiality is important in research ethics 
and should normally be maintained, researchers need 
to be aware of their legal standing in relation to discov-
ering or witnessing illegal activity. For, depending upon 
the specific laws of the country in question, the 
researcher may be required to reveal information they 
have gathered to a court if ordered to do so. Also (again 
depending on the relevant national laws) discovery of 
illegal activity that places a third party at risk of harm 
may place a legal duty upon the researcher to inform 
the authorities. Hence, being a purely impartial observer 
may not always be possible for the researcher. Should, 
for example, the case of an asylum seeker be officially 
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investigated, researchers may find themselves having 
to testify against a subject who revealed their illegal 
immigration status to the researcher in good faith to 
assist with the research. The impact that simply carry-
ing out research in these areas may have on individual 
subjects should be carefully scrutinised before the 
research takes place in order to minimise risks of these 
kinds, and research subjects should not be allowed to 
form (or persist with) the belief that strict confidenti-
ality is in place unless the researcher is certain that this 
really can be maintained.
It should also be considered to what extent research 
into illegal activity encourages the illegal activity itself 
or places the researcher or the subject at risk of harm. 
For example, research might exacerbate an illegal activ-
ity if the researcher offered incentives, particularly finan-
cial inducements, to subjects. This may well lead to an 
increase in that activity in order to gain further incen-
tives. Furthermore, the act of engaging with criminal 
activity and of recruiting subjects may itself place both 
the researcher and subjects in danger if, for example, 
the researcher is seen to be a potential informer to 
the authorities. Organised crime in areas such as pros-
titution (for example) could make this a real risk if 
something such as the health of sex workers was being 
researched.
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Learning outcomes
In this chapter you will develop an understanding of the nature of privacy and confiden-
tiality and their role in research ethics. Specifically, you will gain the following:
•  An understanding of the definition of both concepts that will allow you to grasp what 
privacy is and what confidentiality is.
•  An appreciation of the ethical importance of privacy and confidentiality in research.
•  An awareness of the main challenges to maintaining privacy and confidentiality in 
research, including those imposed by methodological demands such as covert 
observation.
•  An increased knowledge of how ethical issues relating to privacy and confidentiality 
may arise in research.
•  An understanding of additional areas of concern in research where matters of privacy 
and confidentiality may be ethical issues, such as the use of databases and research 
relating to the deceased. 
•  An awareness of how issues of privacy and confidentiality relate to other concepts 
and issues in research ethics. 
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1.   For example, the Oveido Convention, Article 10, contains various protocols in relation to privacy and biomedical research. See: Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine (Oviedo, 4.IV.1997). http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/164.htm
2.   The classic early reference to privacy as being importantly demarked from other areas of life is found in Aristotle’s Politics, c. 350 BCE. 
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.html
3.   For example, the difficulty of defining privacy is explicitly stated at the outset in a number of key modern discussions, such as James 
Michael, Privacy and Human Rights (Dartmouth: UNESCO Publishing, 1994) and the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and 
Privacy International, Privacy and Human Rights Report 2006 (2007). http://www.worldlii.org/int/journals/EPICPrivHR/2006/
4.   This view is often attributed to the great nineteenth century liberal philosopher John Stuart Mill in his essay On Liberty. (London: Longman, 
Roberts & Green, 1869; bartleby.com, 1999). http://www.bartleby.com/130/
5.   This specific turn of phrase was used in the famous paper by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy”, Harvard Law 
Review 4 (1890): 193-220.
Introduction
This chapter explores two important and related issues 
in research ethics: privacy and confidentiality. These are 
often seen in legal terms, with researchers being sub-
ject to constraints under various pieces of national 
and international legislation, (1) as well as research eth-
ics guidelines and professional codes. However, there 
are good reasons to take privacy and confidentiality 
seriously, independently of their legal status, and in 
some cases researchers may have ethical duties that go 
beyond what is legally required. In order to understand 
how we can make ethical judgements about privacy 
and confidentiality concerns when they arise in 
research, this chapter will draw on the ethical theories 
and principles covered in the previous chapters. 
The first task will be to consider the definitions of these 
two key concepts and the reasons for their ethical sig-
nificance. Subsequent discussion will relate to two case 
studies. The first is primarily concerned with privacy, in 
the context of observational research in a hospital 
Accident and Emergency unit. The second is about 
genetic research and also raises issues about both pri-
vacy but is primarily designed to focus attention on 
issues of confidentiality. Discussion of these case stud-
ies will consider the challenges to maintaining privacy 
and confidentiality in research, strategies for reconcil-
ing respect for privacy and confidentiality with the 
needs of research, and whether it is ever justified to 
override privacy and confidentiality because of other 
important considerations in research. 
What are privacy and confidentiality?
Privacy and confidentiality are closely related, with 
privacy historically being considered the more basic 
interest. (2) Although, as we shall see, confidentiality 
is distinguished from privacy and has its own ethical 
justifications, its value stems primarily from the relation 
it has to privacy. This means that a good understanding 
of the nature of privacy is important not only in itself 
but also in order to adequately distinguish and under-
stand confidentiality. There are, however, divergent 
views about what privacy is, its scope, and the circum-
stances under which it should be protected. (3)
Privacy
The basic distinction between public actions for which 
one can be held accountable to society, and private 
actions where one is accountable only to oneself, has 
been maintained in liberal ethical and political thought 
as a fundamental right. The grounding for such a right 
is often based on the view that it promotes individual 
welfare and that society should only intervene in an 
individual’s life in order to protect other people from 
harm. (4) This early liberal conception has formed the 
basis of much subsequent discussion, lending itself to 
a predominant view that privacy is based on some sort 
of ‘right to be let alone’, (5) so that privacy protection is 
frequently seen as a way of drawing a line defining how 
far society or government can intrude into a person’s 
affairs. However, the extent of this ‘right to be let alone’, 
in terms of the various aspects of people’s lives that it 
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6.  This approach of control over information as primary to privacy has been argued for by e.g. William Parent, “Privacy, Morality and the Law”, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (1983): 269-88 and as the central defining feature of privacy by James Rachels, “Why Privacy Is Important”, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 4, no. 4 (1975): 323-33.
7.  United Nations, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html 
8.  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Rome, 4.XI.1950).  
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm
9.  Report of the Committee on Privacy and Related Matters, Chairman David Calcutt QC, 1990, Cmnd. 1102, London: HMSO, at 7.
applies to and the grounds that can justify third par-
ties, such as government or media, in encroaching into 
these aspects, is highly contentious and can vary mark-
edly across societies and cultures. 
Another, more contemporary approach to the defini-
tion of privacy is that it is primarily about the protec-
tion of personal information. This view of privacy gives 
substantial weight to modern concerns such as data 
protection, whereby privacy is seen not only as prevent-
ing others from gaining information about ourselves 
that we would not wish them to have, but also as sup-
porting a general desire to maintain control over infor-
mation about ourselves that is stored elsewhere, such 
as on computer files. (6)
Alongside these ethical and political debates about 
the nature of privacy there have also been attempts to 
formalise the concept and to create general agreement 
as to its nature and importance so that it can function 
as a legal concept. In this regard, the modern privacy 
benchmark at an international level can be found in 
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which 
specifically protects territorial and communications 
privacy. Article 12 states:
No one should be subjected to arbitrary interference 
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, 
nor to attacks on his honour or reputation. Everyone 
has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interferences or attacks. (7) 
This right has been further enshrined in the European 
Convention on Human Rights, Article 8: 
1.  Everybody has the right to respect for his private 
and family life, his home and his correspondence. 
2.  There shall be no interference by a public authority 
with the exercise of this right except such as is in 
accordance with the law and is necessary in a dem-
ocratic society in the interests of national security, 
public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, or for the pro-
tection of the rights and freedoms of others. (8) 
However, although such documents serve as a useful 
reference point, identifying the areas of life to which the 
concept of privacy is typically applied (and in the case 
of the European Convention the kinds of consideration 
that might justify overriding the right to privacy) they 
do not fully define either the scope of the right or the 
kinds of intrusion that would constitute a violation 
of the right. The difficulty in constructing a compre-
hensive definition of privacy led the Calcutt Privacy 
Committee in the United Kingdom to report that: 
“nowhere have we found a wholly satisfactory statutory 
definition of privacy”. The committee’s own definition 
of privacy as “The right of the individual to be protected 
against intrusion into his personal life or affairs, or those 
of his family, by direct physical means or by publication 
of information” (9) acknowledges that privacy can relate 
both to physical interference and to the exposure of 
personal information, but leaves open the question of 
how precisely we might understand these. Given the 
difficulty of pinning down a precise definition of privacy 
that will be entirely uncontentious, it will be helpful 
instead to think of privacy as relating to a cluster of 
interests, allowing the following form of definition.
Privacy is the protection of:
•  control over information about oneself;
•  control over access to oneself, both physical and 
mental; and
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10.  This kind of approach to privacy as being driven by a combination of factors is taken by Judith DeCew, In Pursuit of Privacy: Law, Ethics, 
and the Rise of Technology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997). See also Bernard Gert, Charles Culver, & K. Danner Clouser, Bioethics: 
a return to fundamentals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), Chapter 8.
•  control over one’s ability to make important deci-
sions about family and lifestyle in order to be self 
expressive and to develop varied relationships. (10) 
These three elements are widely considered to be the 
most important aspects of privacy because of the way 
that breaches in these areas may affect us. Threats of 
information leaks, threats to our control over our bod-
ies, and threats to our ability to make our own choices 
about our lifestyles and activities all make us vulnerable 
and fearful of being taken advantage of by others. 
As well as these concerns about the effects that breaches 
of privacy may have on human welfare, the requirement 
to protect privacy also has a basis in principle-based and 
rights-based ethical theories. By protecting our control 
over these aspects of our lives, privacy provides the basis 
of certain fundamental aspects of autonomy and 
human dignity, for example, freedom from scrutiny, 
prejudice, pressure to conform, exploitation, and the 
judgement of others all help an individual to live their 
life freely in a manner of their own choosing. 
There is more to understanding privacy than just hav-
ing a definition. It is also necessary to consider what the 
scope of privacy is and to what areas of life can a right 
to privacy be extended. Amongst some of the more 
difficult assessments would be:
(i)  whether appearing in public implies some forfei-
ture of privacy;
(ii)  to what extent intrusion into the domestic or other 
environments such as the workplace might under-
mine privacy;
(iii)  whether facts part of a ‘public record’ could still be 
private, given that the way in which these facts are 
disclosed could lead to embarrassment or harm;
(iv)  whether a significant lapse of time affects the pri-
vacy of information;
(v)  whether personal decisions about lifestyle and 
family, including birth control, marriage, domestic 
habits or practices, etc. are privacy issues.
For the researcher, the answers to questions such as 
these may determine whether their attempts to gather 
and collate information about research subjects con-
stitute invasions of privacy. 
As well as these questions about the scope of the con-
cept of privacy we will also need to consider how strong 
the duty to protect privacy should be, and when, if at 
all, it may be overridden by pressing concerns of 
research. 
Confidentiality
The concept of confidentiality is closely related to that 
of privacy, and in particular to the aspect of privacy 
concerning the protection of personal information. 
A basic definition of confidentiality can be given as 
follows.
A owes a (prima facie) duty of confidentiality to B when:
•  B (the subject) discloses to A (the researcher) infor-
mation which B regards as confidential or secret; 
and
•  A undertakes (implicitly or explicitly) not to reveal 
this information to anyone who does not already 
possess it.
Because the duty of confidentiality rests on an undertak-
ing (by A not to reveal B’s secrets), respecting confiden-
tiality can be considered as a kind of promise-keeping or 
contract. However, in many situations (particularly those 
involving interactions between professionals and their 
clients) there is a default assumption that the informa-
tion provided by an individual will be treated as confi-
dential and, as such, the researcher would need explicitly 
to ‘opt out’ of their presumed undertaking in advance 
of receiving the information in order not to be bound 
by a duty of confidentiality. 
Confidentiality is a duty that arises when someone 
has been granted access to information that would 
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otherwise be kept secret. In such circumstances main-
taining confidentiality protects the subject’s interest 
in maintaining control over their personal informa-
tion. A breach of confidentiality will therefore also be 
a violation of this informational aspect of privacy. 
However, not every invasion of privacy is a breach of 
confidentiality, and there are some important differ-
ences between confidentiality and privacy that follow 
from the above definition:
(i)  Confidentiality is related purely to information in 
a way that privacy is not. Only information can be 
confidential, but places (e.g. bedrooms) can be 
private.
(ii)  The duty of confidentiality arises only within the 
context of special relationships or agreements. 
We only have duties of confidentiality where infor-
mation has been given under an agreement or 
understanding that it will not be further disclosed 
without permission. This is not true of the duty to 
respect privacy. The duty to respect others’ privacy 
is a more general duty than that of confidentiality 
because it extends to everyone. Ordinary members 
of the public who are unknown to me have a duty 
to respect my privacy but typically have no duty 
of confidentiality towards me. 
(iii)  Respect for privacy places constraints on the ways 
in which researchers (and others) acquire informa-
tion about their subjects, whereas confidentiality is 
about how they may communicate information 
that they already have. Covert video surveillance is 
an example of a practice that arguably breaches pri-
vacy (although perhaps justifiably in some cases) 
but not confidentiality. Research that involves 
accessing existing confidential data from records 
may breach the record owner’s duty of confidenti-
ality to the provider of the information, and the user 
of the information may commit a breach of privacy 
if the information is of a personal nature. 
As with privacy, there may be circumstances where the 
duty of confidentiality is overridden by other consid-
erations. It is for this reason that confidentiality is char-
acterised as a prima facie rather than an absolute duty 
in the definition above. The most common and widely 
accepted cases for revealing confidential information 
occur where the researcher acquires information that 
he or she has a legal obligation to disclose. These are 
often situations where there is a risk of serious harm to 
others, such as through criminal activity or contagious 
disease. There may also be cases not covered by legis-
lation where there is still a strong ethical obligation to 
reveal information to protect others – or the subject – 
from harm. Judging these situations where there is 
a strong reason for a researcher to reveal information 
but not a strict legal obligation to do so can be extremely 
challenging, depending on the balance of benefits and 
harms as well as principles such as promise-keeping and 
respect for autonomy. Where possible the circum-
stances – when and to whom information will be dis-
closed – should be identified in advance and included 
in the arrangements to which participants consent. 
Another factor is that because confidentiality is about 
respecting the wishes of the person who provides or 
grants access to their personal information, it really cov-
ers only information that a research subject wishes to 
be kept secret. Hence trivial and everyday information 
may not be subject to confidentiality requirements. 
Unfortunately, it is an extremely difficult task for any 
researcher to determine what information is trivial or 
likely to be damaging if revealed. The default position 
should therefore be that all information presented in 
the research setting is to be treated as if it were subject 
to the duty of confidentiality. 
There is a further issue about the identity of the recipi-
ent of the information and the purposes for which it is 
given. Information may be given to an institution (such 
as a hospital), rather than to a specific individual, which 
would mean there would be no breach of confidenti-
ality if the information were disseminated within the 
institution. However, if recipients of the information 
intend to disseminate it in this way then it is important 
that this is made clear to those supplying the informa-
tion; otherwise a patient might, for example, reveal 
information that they expect only to be revealed to 
their health care team, not the whole hospital, or they 
might expect the information to be used only for ther-
apeutic purposes and not for research, or for one spe-
cific research purpose and not for subsequent research 
projects. In these cases, and in the absence of clear 
information to the contrary, the expectations of those 
supplying the information would define the terms on 
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which the information was provided and hence deter-
mine the recipients’ moral obligations concerning its 
dissemination. 
Given the array of different factors that can give rise to 
concerns of privacy and confidentiality, we can now 
look at how they might arise in practical cases. 
 Case Study 4.1
Observational research in an Accident 
and Emergency Department
A psychology researcher wishes to investigate the 
ways in which individuals try to attract attention 
from authority figures. The researcher proposes to 
observe the waiting area in a city hospital Accident 
and Emergency (A & E) Department and record 
the actions of those who attend seeking treatment. 
The time that people first enter the reception area 
will be noted, as will the times at which people see 
relevant hospital employees (medical receptionist, 
triage nurse, attending doctor). Any attempts to 
bring attention to themselves in order to be seen 
before being officially called will be noted, as will 
the nature and outcome of the action. No attempt 
will be made to obtain individuals’ consent to 
participate in this research project, as it is believed 
that the knowledge that they are being observed 
might alter their behaviour and lead to unrepre-
sentative results. As it is only types of behaviour 
and people’s responses to it that are under investi-
gation, there will be no attempt to link behaviour 
to identifiable individuals and hence the research 
results will be entirely anonymous. Permission 
has been granted from the hospital in question to 
carry out the research, although the individual staff 
members have not been asked for their consent 
to participate. It is hoped that the information 
gathered will not only have implications for behav-
ioural psychology but could also be used to train 
hospital staff to deal with potentially inflammatory 
situations in the A & E Department.
Questions
1.  What are the main benefits and ethical 
problems that this research raises?
2.  Does the research place anyone at risk?
3.  Is it an invasion of privacy to observe 
the injured or ill whilst waiting for treatment 
in an A & E waiting room? 
4.  Do the methodological requirements of this 
observational study outweigh any concerns 
about privacy and the fact that subjects have 
not consented to be observed? 
5.  Does anonymous recording of data allay any 
concerns you may have about respect for 
privacy?
6.  Should this research be allowed to proceed 
in its present form? If not, how might it be 
modified to make it more acceptable?
Privacy and the research environment
The research outlined in Case Study 4.1 draws atten-
tion to some of the major tensions that arise in research 
between the collation of information necessary for 
research and the maintenance of privacy for research 
subjects. In order to evaluate such a proposal, consid-
eration should be given to the balance of benefits 
and harms that might arise and whether any non- 
consequentialist norms, such as respect for autonomy 
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or dignity, are violated. In this case, the methodology, 
the environment, and the status of the subjects all raise 
ethical issues that have a particular relevance to privacy 
concerns. 
Questions 1 and 2 focus attention on the benefits and 
risks of the research. Its aims, although not specified 
in detail, involve both advancement of the academic 
field of behavioural psychology and direct benefits to 
staff and patients in hospital emergency departments 
by contributing to better means of dealing with diffi-
cult situations. These are significant benefits, but they 
need to be considered in the light of any ethical prob-
lems raised by the research. As the research is to be con-
ducted by means of passive observation, the risk of 
direct harm to participants seems low. The main ethi-
cal concerns about this research are likely to be about 
the possible breach of privacy and the harms that 
might result from such a breach. 
According to the account given in the previous section, 
privacy involves safeguarding the right of individuals to 
maintain control over physical and mental access to 
themselves and over information about themselves. 
This links the idea of privacy to the cluster of interests 
associated with autonomy and human dignity that it 
is designed to protect, and enables us to assess poten-
tial breaches of privacy by considering whether these 
interests are likely to be damaged.
Observing the activities of anyone for research pur-
poses has the potential to invade their privacy. However, 
ascertaining whether there is actually a breach of pri-
vacy in this case is quite challenging. A key issue, high-
lighted by Question 3, is the environment in which the 
research is carried out. Arguably, people have less enti-
tlement to privacy in a place such as a hospital A & E 
department than they would in their own homes. 
We therefore need to consider to what extent appear-
ing in public places limits the individual’s right to pri-
vacy, and whether the hospital A & E department 
constitutes a public place in the relevant sense. 
The first of these questions has already been high-
lighted as a difficult issue in the application of the con-
cept of privacy. It would be highly unrealistic for anyone 
to expect that they could go unobserved in the course 
of their everyday actions in public places, such as the 
streets, shops, and so forth. However, there are still ele-
ments of privacy that do remain intact even in public 
places, such as control over physical access to one’s self, 
with commonly respected conventions such as allow-
ing everyone a certain amount of ‘personal space’ 
around them that others do not move into uninvited 
being a widely held expectation. Certain public envi-
ronments may change the scope and nature of this 
personal space, as anyone using crowded public trans-
portation will be aware, although even here there are 
strongly expected norms of behaviour and restraint. 
However, the passive observation of someone’s activ-
ity in a public place is unlikely to fall within the scope 
of privacy, as this is not something that one could rea-
sonably expect to control. 
The question of whether an A & E department is a pub-
lic place in the relevant sense is more complicated, as 
not every environment that the public has access to is 
one where there is no reasonable expectation of con-
trol over information or access to one’s self. For exam-
ple, changing rooms in public facilities may be an 
example of a place where stronger elements of privacy 
are in force, albeit not as strongly as in an entirely pri-
vate place such as one’s home (there are, after all, other 
members of the public present who may happen to 
observe you during the course of their normal activity). 
In such a situation, the observing and recording of infor-
mation that could be revealed to other people not 
present could be considered harmful, offensive or 
embarrassing to an individual. Feelings of vulnerability 
or being taken advantage of can easily arise in such sit-
uations. This is why greater limits and restrictions on 
access to information about people in such places is 
expected, such as a ban on filming in the area, even 
though it would be impossible to prevent other mem-
bers of the public from observing you during the course 
of their normal activity. It is this sort of environment – 
one that the public has access to but which also has 
stronger expectations of privacy – which one can con-
sider an A & E Department to be. 
As hospital departments are not places that people 
typically make an unconstrained choice to visit, but 
do so because they are seeking medical aid, the expec-
tation that one completely forfeits a right to privacy in 
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such an environment cannot be as strong as the expec-
tation for an uncontroversially public place. Of course, 
it is certainly true that other people attending or work-
ing in the A & E department will be able to freely 
observe third parties whilst they wait for treatment, 
just as in any other public environment. The more dif-
ficult question to answer in this case is whether the 
presence of a researcher observing the behaviour of 
patients constitutes an unwarranted intrusion into 
people’s private lives. 
A way of explaining the difference between being 
observed by other patients or staff and being observed 
by a researcher is by appeal to the type of observation 
taking place. The observation by other patients can be 
considered incidental, meaning they are not there with 
the aim of observing other emergency patients but 
their inevitable presence does means that they cannot 
avoid observing behaviour. The expectation of anyone 
going to A & E will therefore include this form of inci-
dental observation taking place under these circum-
stances. Although individuals may prefer not to be 
seen in this situation, where they may be in states of 
distress or in states that are publicly embarrassing, it is 
impossible to prevent on a practical level and unlikely 
to have any implications for the individual, particu-
larly as all involved are in a similar position in seeking 
medical attention. 
The observation by a researcher can be treated differ-
ently as it is something more than merely incidental. 
This form of observation only arises as a result of the 
research taking place with a specific purpose to col-
late information about the behaviour of individuals. 
However, whether this makes a substantial ethical dif-
ference in a way that violates those areas that privacy 
is designed to protect is less clear, as there are still 
many similarities to the incidental observation of 
other patients. For example, while there is no oppor-
tunity to opt out of being observed by the research-
ers (except by choosing to forego urgent medical 
treatment), it is also the case that one cannot avoid 
being observed by the other patients. Moreover, 
the observation by a researcher does not, arguably, 
change the nature of care that anyone will receive, 
so there are no immediate negative consequences 
of their presence. 
There may be scope to ethically object to observation 
by researchers on non-consequentialist grounds. The 
importance people place on not allowing others to 
access intimate or important aspects of their lives is 
also a central part of privacy concerns, and granting 
access to people whose sole purpose is to observe 
these aspects of your life is something very different to 
casual observation. Such intense scrutiny can impact 
on one’s freedom, make one feel threatened and place 
pressure on one to act in certain ways. Those with 
strong liberal inclinations therefore might well see this 
sort of observation as a breach of their privacy. 
Alternatively, the ethical concerns in this case could be 
focused on the recording of information. The privacy 
concern is that the subject has no control over how the 
record of his or her actions is used, contrary to the inter-
est in controlling information about oneself. This view, 
although plausible, is not uncontentious as the coun-
ter-argument can be put forward that there is nothing 
to prevent anyone in the A & E environment from 
memorising behaviour of others and making a record 
of their observations afterwards or even writing down 
observations at the time. Greater ethical concern might 
arise if observations were recorded through a medium 
such as video, where patients would be easily identifi-
able. Hence, the concern that arises in this case is the 
potential to link an individual’s identity to particular 
observed behaviour in a specific environment. 
Making such a link would place subjects at much 
greater risk of experiencing harm or negative conse-
quences as a result of any link being made public, in 
cases where the research revealed potentially negative 
behaviour traits or even basic facts about their health 
and welfare. It could also be seen as an affront to peo-
ple’s dignity to be shown in states of distress and even 
seen as a failure to respect their autonomous wishes 
not to be part of any research that involves a connec-
tion to issues with their personal health. Ensuring ano-
nymity of those observed therefore appears to be 
an important consideration if observational research is 
to respect privacy. The use and limitations of ano-
nymisation will be addressed further in the discussion 
of confidentiality following Case Study 4.2.
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Are there grounds for breaching privacy?
Question 4 invites us to consider whether the meth-
odological requirements and benefits of the research 
in Case Study 4.1 might outweigh concerns about pri-
vacy. The basic means of ensuring that potentially pri-
vacy-breaching methods of data collection are ethically 
acceptable is to obtain the consent of those involved. 
In this way, subjects will stay in control of access to and 
information about themselves, by choosing whether to 
agree to the terms stipulated in the research protocol. 
However, as discussed in Chapter 2, obtaining consent 
is not always possible, particularly if – as in this case – 
there are methodological reasons why seeking consent 
would alter the results of the study. In such cases, inva-
sion of privacy can often be one of the most significant 
ethical concerns. Where we draw the line between 
maintaining privacy and allowing it to be overridden 
by important concerns of research can depend upon 
how strong we consider our obligation to protect pri-
vacy to be, and this in turn may depend on the nature 
of the invasion of privacy and the measures that can 
be put in place to minimise its impact. 
One of the most important justifications for breaching 
privacy is that the research cannot be carried out any 
other way. It might require, for example, entering 
a clearly private environment, such as the subject’s 
home, in order to obtain information from them. 
Alternatively, there may be cases where breach of pri-
vacy is less clearly established, such as in the current case 
where people are observed in the A & E waiting area. 
What distinguishes such different cases is how our obli-
gation to protect and maintain privacy would change 
depending upon the environment even if the method-
ological justification was the same in both cases. 
Observing someone in their private home for research 
purposes would be unjustified without their permission, 
regardless of the methodological requirements of the 
research, because of the very strong interests – sup-
ported by legal prohibitions and social conventions – 
we have in maintaining privacy in this environment. The 
same would be true of other intimate areas, such as in 
a medical treatment room. These are areas where the 
right to privacy is most strongly supported on ethical 
grounds. The stress, embarrassment and potential harms 
resulting from the revelation of intimate details gathered 
in such environments are potentially quite severe, as are 
violations of personal dignity and respect for autonomy. 
So even where there is a methodological reason for 
breaching privacy to access information about people, 
this is unlikely to be sufficient to justify it in such cases 
without the consent of the individuals concerned. 
A greater ethical challenge comes from research such 
as that in Case Study  4.1, where the environment 
within which observation takes place is neither obvi-
ously a public place nor clearly a private place. In these 
settings, the obligation to respect privacy may not be 
as strong, given the underlying expectation that other 
people will be able to observe you, and this can influ-
ence whether we take a potential invasion of privacy 
to be ethically justified. Although the justification for 
observing without consent is presented as methodo-
logical, this sort of claim needs to be closely scrutinised 
in cases where access to potentially sensitive informa-
tion about people might be obtained. It is important 
to consider whether the breach of privacy really is nec-
essary for a methodologically sound study, or whether 
it would be possible to obtain consent for the neces-
sary observation. In this case, a strong justification 
would have to be given as to why even the most basic 
attempts to inform the subjects and gain their consent 
would render the study ineffective. 
As well as considering whether the absence of consent 
really is necessary for the study to succeed, it is neces-
sary to consider the value of the proposed research. 
One approach would be to compare the value of the 
research with the amount of harm likely to result from 
a possible breach of privacy. This approach would 
appeal to consequentialists who, rather than seeing 
privacy as a basic (prima facie) principle, would see its 
ethical importance as relating directly to the level of 
harmful consequences that any breach might have, 
balanced against any potential benefits. The relevant 
kinds of consequence would depend upon the nature 
of the breach and of any subsequent information gath-
ered by invading the privacy, as well as the attitudes of 
the subjects upon discovering the breach had taken 
place, together with any additional, subsequent harms 
that arise from failing to safeguard control over impor-
tant aspects of one’s life. A consequentialist might have 
no issues with breach of privacy if the subjects never 
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found out their privacy had been invaded and no 
harmful consequences resulted from the collection 
and dissemination of the information relating to them. 
Those who take privacy to be a fundamental right 
rather than a simple filter for consequences may, by 
contrast, still take potential breaches of privacy very 
seriously, even if they are likely to have no or limited 
harmful consequences. 
One way of dealing with concerns about the conse-
quences that breach of privacy may have in cases of 
valuable research is to consider what steps might be 
taken to minimise the effects of the intrusion. It has 
already been noted that preserving the anonymity of 
the research subjects (as proposed in the case study) 
may be an important way of doing this. However, it 
should also be remembered that one of the reasons 
that privacy is considered important is that people have 
an interest in controlling information about themselves. 
Anonymisation may help protect other privacy-related 
interests but it will not help people feel as if they are 
controlling access to themselves and their lives. 
If obtaining consent prior to the research is impossible, 
then it may be desirable for subjects to be informed 
afterwards. This may allow subjects to choose whether 
or not to be part of the study and to allow the obser-
vations relating to them to be included. Doing so will 
help to limit harmful consequences and allow subjects 
to regain some element of control over how informa-
tion about them is used. However, it will not prevent 
breach of privacy, which will already have taken place, 
and the impact of revealing that an invasion of privacy 
has taken place should be taken into account when 
assessing whether or not to permit the research with 
or without such a debriefing. In some cases obtaining 
consent even after the observations have taken place 
may alter the results by introducing a bias into the study 
(for example if people exhibiting certain kinds of behav-
iour are disproportionately likely to refuse consent). 
Moreover, in certain cases such consent will be impos-
sible, for example where people are likely to leave the 
area before they can be approached, or when dealing 
with people who are unable to give valid consent. This 
might be significant in the A & E case, where people’s 
capacity to consent may be affected by serious medi-
cal conditions or the influence of drugs or alcohol. 
An additional aspect of the privacy concerns in this 
case is the fact that none of the hospital staff in the 
A & E department have been asked for their consent 
to be observed in the research, although their employer 
has agreed it can go ahead. This raises a number of 
interesting ethical concerns. Firstly, the aim of the 
research is to observe not only the behaviour of 
patients seeking to gain the attention of the staff, but 
also the responses of the staff. This makes the staff 
members who deal with patients in the A & E waiting 
area very much part of the research, so it becomes an 
important question as to whether their consent should 
be sought either before or after the observational study 
takes place, in addition to that of their employers.
The researchers may well feel that seeking the consent 
of staff would have a similar effect on their behaviour to 
that which it would have on the patients who are being 
observed. If staff were informed that they were being 
observed then this may change their normal behaviour, 
giving inaccurate results. Moreover, any one member of 
staff refusing consent could have a significant impact on 
the research, as it might be impossible to avoid observ-
ing their behaviour while at the same time observing 
that of other people. Also, because it is their place of 
work, staff may feel they have no real alternative to con-
sent unless provision to work elsewhere or at an alterna-
tive time was made by the hospital. Even this could prove 
to be a significant burden both to the hospital, which 
might need to provide additional staff cover, and to the 
individual whose work patterns would be disrupted. 
A further issue that arises in relation to the position of 
the staff as research subjects is whether observation in 
the workplace counts as an invasion of privacy. What 
has to be determined is whether a workplace, particu-
larly one to which the public has constant access, 
should be considered as a public place. Even if it were 
considered public, there still may be some legitimate 
privacy concerns. Scrutinising the routine actions and 
behaviour of staff in any workplace might well lead to 
feelings of unease amongst staff and inhibit interac-
tions, workplace relationships, and quality of service. 
Moreover, if the research were to take place, before 
commencing the observation a policy would have 
to be agreed about the circumstances in which infor-
mation would be disclosed to the employer or other 
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authorities should any wrongful or illegal activity be 
observed. 
Observing members of staff without seeking their con-
sent has advantages for the research, but also raises eth-
ical concerns. These concerns might be reduced by 
adopting provisions similar to those proposed for 
members of the public. Observations can be recorded 
anonymously (although it should be noted that this 
may be less effective in the case of staff than with mem-
bers of the public at preventing observations being 
linked with particular individuals, as there are likely to 
be fewer of them and their behaviours may be recog-
nisable to colleagues or managers). Consent to the use 
of data may be obtained after the observation has 
taken place (with the same limitations as in the case of 
members of the public). In addition, it may be advisa-
ble in cases such as this to seek agreement from a rep-
resentative of staff members. This would enable any 
concerns about the effects of the research on the work-
force to be fed into the design of the study, including 
such things as how the observations will be reported, 
and under what circumstances observations of wrong-
doing will be disclosed to the management. 
 Case study 4.2
Genetic research into susceptibility 
to respiratory disease in smoky 
environments
A research team is trying to understand the genetic 
basis of respiratory diseases such as asthma, lung 
cancer and emphysema, which are attributed to 
environmental factors. One area they are particu-
larly keen to explore is whether the presence of 
a particular genetic trait significantly increases the 
chances of people developing such a respiratory 
disease when exposed to tobacco smoke. 
Researchers intend to identify families (through 
a clinical referral from children seeking treatment 
for asthma) with a significant incidence of respiratory 
disease, in which several relatives have died from 
asthma or lung cancer in the past. What is crucial 
for the success of this study is obtaining a sufficient 
number of related individuals with or without the 
condition who consent to be evaluated and to have 
blood tested for the genetic trait. A further impor-
tant component is the testing of children and other 
family members who do not themselves smoke but 
who live or were raised in an environment containing 
second-hand smoke. 
Suitable families for the study are rare so the 
researchers propose to study them one at a time 
as they find them over a period of time. One family 
in question is large enough to potentially provide 
sufficient data for the study to be a success. It is 
suspected that those family members who possess 
the genetic trait under scrutiny will be more likely 
to develop a respiratory disease than family mem-
bers who do not possess the gene but who were 
raised in a similarly smoky environment. The first 
indications that a respiratory disease has developed 
usually appear in childhood asthmatic conditions, 
although this may develop later in life. 
Questions
1.  What are the main benefits and ethical 
problems that this research proposal raises?
2.  Is it ethical to take blood samples from affected 
children? What about from the unaffected 
adults and children?
3.  Is it appropriate to withhold results from the 
family on the ground that this is only one small 
part of a study of a complex genetic condition? 
If not, to whom should they be disclosed?
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Privacy and confidentiality
The research described in Case Study  4.2 aims to 
explore a possible link between a genetic trait and seri-
ous respiratory disease. This gives it the potential to 
make an important contribution to genetics and med-
icine, but is also an area that has the potential to cause 
great distress amongst the research subjects. The dis-
covery of a genetic predisposition to develop a serious 
disease could have a major impact on a research sub-
ject’s welfare. The potential for causing distress is 
increased by the fact that the research also relates to 
family environments, children (especially those at 
increased risk of disease as indicated by the referral 
process), and bereavement. 
The potential for causing distress arises primarily as 
a result of the information that the research is likely to 
reveal. This gives rise to concerns about both privacy 
and confidentiality. The privacy concerns are slightly 
different from those raised by the previous case, which 
involved observation of people in a (special kind of) 
public place. Here, the privacy concerns relate largely 
to matters of family life, with potential intrusions into 
subjects’ privacy arising as a result of the researchers’ 
enquiries into family relationships, matters of personal 
lifestyle (e.g. smoking habits) and perhaps obtaining 
direct access into subjects’ homes (e.g. in order to 
obtain or verify information about environmental 
smoke levels).
What stands out in this case, however, is the focus on 
information about individuals and families, both in 
terms of the nature of information that is gathered that 
relates to individual subjects’ genetic predisposition 
to develop serious medical conditions, and in terms 
of the implications that genetic information may have 
for other related family members. 
The importance of maintaining 
confidentiality
We saw in the introduction to this chapter that, since 
confidentiality is predominantly about respecting 
undertakings given (perhaps implicitly) to providers of 
information about how that information will be used 
or disclosed, the obligation to respect confidentiality 
is a species of promise-keeping. As with any form of 
promise-keeping, this involves acting in accordance 
with expectations that have been created in another 
person. Even in the absence of an explicit undertaking, 
providers of information may have reasonable expec-
tations that their information will be kept confidential, 
which researchers, as recipients of that information, 
should respect. This point is particularly relevant in 
health care contexts where there is a convention, 
backed up by professional codes of practice, that infor-
mation given to heath care professionals will be treated 
in confidence. If researchers do not intend to act in 
accordance with the likely assumptions of information 
providers they can make clear how they will use any 
information before it is disclosed to them, but this will 
give rise to another obligation: to keep to the terms of 
the new agreement that the subject has consented to.
The ethical importance of promise-keeping is generally 
considered to stem from the way in which breaking 
promises undermines the autonomy of the person to 
whom the promise has been made. In the case of 
breaches of confidentiality, there is a failure to respect 
autonomy because the information was divulged by 
the subject on the basis of an agreement about how it 
would be used, so to break that agreement would also 
be to ignore the autonomous wishes of the subject. 
Promise-breaking can also be criticised on consequen-
tialist grounds as it is liable to cause harm to the per-
son to whom a promise is broken, and is damaging to 
the social institutions of promising and trust on which 
many social interactions depend. 
The issue of trust is not only an important ethical prin-
ciple to maintain in itself but also has a further signifi-
cance in relation to research. Researchers often need 
access to the kinds of information that people are 
reluctant to disclose. People may be willing to disclose 
such information under conditions of confidentiality, 
but are less likely to do so if they become aware of pre-
vious breaches of confidentiality by researchers. This 
means that if the researchers in Case Study 4.2 delib-
erately or inadvertently revealed sensitive information 
about one family member to another, or to the wider 
public, the potential for researchers to conduct similar 
research in the future may be damaged. The impact 
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can be immediate, as further study with this family will 
be jeopardised and families like them will be consider-
ably less likely to participate in further study in the 
future if it is apparent that the researchers are not to 
be trusted to maintain confidential information. 
Breaches of confidentiality can also lead to a more 
general public loss of trust in researchers. Fostering 
and maintaining trust by maintaining confidentiality 
therefore becomes important to the future viability of 
research itself.
The research in the case study will involve research-
ers discovering personal information about lifestyle 
choices, home environment and medical history. All of 
these are widely considered to be private matters. There 
is therefore likely to be a strong expectation by the 
research subjects that these intimate matters will be 
kept confidential and used only for the agreed research 
purpose. Breaching this confidentiality would be a sig-
nificant betrayal of trust, regardless of any subsequent 
negative consequences it might have for the family. 
It is likely that the family would not only feel that their 
personal information had been divulged without per-
mission, but also that the privacy of their family life and 
medical history had also been unfairly breached (on 
the basis of false expectations) in order to gain this 
information. The family should therefore be informed 
of the various ways that the information will be used, 
and to whom it might be communicated, so that con-
sent is properly obtained for this use and trust and 
confidentiality are clearly perceived to be maintained. 
In genetic studies, a wide range of information about 
an individual can be determined that could have a sig-
nificant impact upon that person’s life. In many cases 
it will be important to that person to control who else 
gains access to that information. For example, genetic 
testing may reveal information about the paternity of 
some family members which they or others might not 
have known about or may wish to keep secret, partic-
ularly from children. Also, if family members are found 
to carry a genetic trait indicating susceptibility to seri-
ous respiratory disease, this may cause distress both to 
the individual and to other family members. Grievances 
between family members might arise, for example, as 
a result of discovering that some with the genetic trait 
were raised in a household with smokers, so increasing 
their chances of developing respiratory disease. 
Alternatively, the discovery that the gene was inherited 
from one side of the family could lead to resentments 
or other strains on family relationships if members of 
that side of the family are perceived as being the cause 
of others’ illnesses. If a genetic susceptibility to illness is 
discovered in the family then those affected may also 
be concerned about whether this information will be 
passed on to their physician. While this might be ben-
eficial to them in facilitating early diagnosis in the 
future, it might also create problems for them if this 
meant that it would also be passed to insurance com-
panies and mortgage lenders. 
The genetic information revealed as a result of agree-
ing to participate in the research could therefore have 
a significant negative impact upon emotional states, 
family relations, and financial status. It is therefore 
important that it is made explicit to family members, 
before they consent to participate, what sorts of infor-
mation might be revealed, what use will be made of the 
information, and to whom it will be communicated. 
As indicated above, a basic ethical reason for maintain-
ing confidentiality is to respect the autonomy of the 
person who has provided or allowed access to infor-
mation on the basis of undertakings or expectations 
about how it will be used. The fact that a subject makes 
an autonomous decision to disclose information to the 
researcher on condition that it is kept confidential may 
provide at least a prima facie reason to maintain con-
fidentiality regardless of the potential consequences 
breaching it. 
The duty to maintain confidentiality can also be 
assessed on the seriousness of the harms that a breach 
of confidentiality might give rise to. Both consequen-
tialists and principlists concerned with the duty of non-
maleficence will view this as an important ethical 
consideration. In practice, however, it is unlikely in 
a case like this that researchers or members of research 
ethics committees would be in a position to judge 
the seriousness of a particular breach in this way, given 
the personal nature of the information and the effects 
of revealing it. It is therefore unlikely that a breach of 
confidentiality could be justified by an assessment of 
its consequences. Moreover, it should be recalled that 
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breaching confidentiality is likely to have negative con-
sequences for society generally by undermining trust 
in researchers. Breaching confidentiality might also be 
considered a more serious violation of respect for 
autonomy than the covert observation proposed in 
Case Study 4.1 since in that case the research involved 
undertaking observation without consulting the sub-
jects, whereas breach of confidentiality involves giving 
an undertaking to subjects in order to gain access to 
information and then violating its terms. 
It should not be forgotten that many countries will also 
have legal requirements relating to confidentiality and 
the revealing of personal information. The provisions 
of data protection Acts can vary from country to coun-
try, (11) but typically concern the processing of any 
information relating to identifiable living individuals 
and the restriction of its use to specific purposes, 
agreed upon by the individual at the time the data was 
recorded. Although this is a legal rather than ethical 
concern, the growing emphasis on data protection 
should mean that it is a standard consideration for all 
researchers. National legislation may also include 
requirements to divulge information as well as to keep 
information confidential. This will be considered below. 
Disclosure of confidential information
Although there are very strong reasons to preserve con-
fidentiality, there are times when it is desirable to make 
confidential information available to people other than 
those to whom it was originally entrusted. This occurs, 
for example, when a piece of research requires the 
use of information that was originally provided confi-
dentially for other purposes, and when information 
provided confidentially to researchers may be used 
to benefit the subject or to prevent a harm. In such 
cases there are two strategies that can be employed to 
preserve confidentiality:
1)  the researcher can seek the consent of the subject, 
 or:
2)  the connection between the information and the 
individual is severed, such as by anonymising the 
information.
Consent and disclosure
As discussed previously, confidentiality can be seen as 
the result of a contract between the researcher and the 
subject. If the subject consents to a particular use of 
information that would, without consent, have been an 
unjustified breach, a new agreement is entered into that 
removes the obligation to maintain confidentiality in 
relation to that use of the information. Although the 
connection with the individual is maintained, a breach 
of confidentiality is avoided by obtaining permission 
from the individual who ‘owns’ the information. This 
strategy might be adopted in Case Study 4.2, if, for 
example, researchers believe that it is in the interests of 
a particular individual for information about their 
genetic status to be disclosed to relevant health care 
practitioners. The individual concerned can then weigh 
the benefits of disclosure against the disadvantages of 
having that information in their medical record, and 
can decide whether or not to agree to the disclosure. 
This strategy, however, cannot be applied in all cases.
The most basic impediment to seeking consent to the 
disclosure of information is that the subject concerned 
may not be competent (or may be for other reasons 
unable) to provide consent. This might apply in the 
case of the children in Case Study 4.2 (although older 
children who understand the concept of secrecy and 
the significance of the information may be competent 
to consent to its disclosure). However, where a child is 
not competent to consent to the release of informa-
tion, then information can be disclosed to relevant 
third parties (e.g. to parents, social workers, etc.) where 
this is in the best interests of the child. The discovery 
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of a genetic trait that increases the likelihood of devel-
oping a serious disease may be a case where release 
of information is warranted in a child’s best interests, 
particularly if it is known that the child is being raised 
in a smoky environment. 
Another difficulty relating to consent that can be seen 
in Case Study 4.2 is that, because it is a genetics study, 
the discovery and revealing of information about one 
person often means discovering or revealing informa-
tion about others. The trouble with revealing this infor-
mation is that there may have been no consent to 
access this information from the other family members 
affected by the disclosure, even if there is consent from 
those whose blood samples were taken for analysis. 
Thus an individual family member might find that 
other family members acquire knowledge of his genetic 
status (or that he acquires unwanted knowledge of 
his genetic status) without having consented to disclo-
sure of his test results and without any formal breach 
of confidentially having occurred. In such cases we 
might conclude that it is unhelpful to think in terms of 
ownership and individual control of information, and 
that attention instead needs to be given to balancing 
the benefits and harms likely to result from particular 
disclosures. Researchers in this case would therefore 
need to be careful in the way they divulged genetic 
information in order to avoid providing additional, pos-
sible distressing, information to individual subjects 
(such as where paternity issues are raised) where it is 
not expected. Information that subjects wish to receive 
might therefore have to be limited in cases where it 
reveals significant information about other subjects in 
the study who have not agreed to share the informa-
tion. (12) Given the potential for discovering such facts 
about subjects and the relative seriousness of the con-
dition, post-research counselling services should be 
made available to family members for whom the results 
of the research have had an impact. 
By carrying out research involving the revealing of 
important and intimate details about medical and fam-
ily life, a good researcher will often develop a strong 
sense of trust between researcher and subject. Whilst 
this has many advantages for both researcher and 
subject, it can also give rise to problems if it leads to 
‘overdisclosure’. This is where the researcher is told more 
than is necessary for the purposes of their research. 
Although this might be a natural consequence of the 
development of trust, the consequences of revealing 
this information can be as damaging as (if not more 
damaging than) revealing information relating to the 
research. All information that is divulged during the 
research should therefore be considered confidential, 
even if it is not directly relevant to the research itself. 
The researcher should also consider how the environ-
ment in which they collect the information can impact 
upon confidentiality issues. There may be a risk of some 
subjects disclosing other subjects’ confidential informa-
tion, such as in focus groups or, in the example of the 
genetics case, in family groups. The concern is that the 
other subjects involved in the research are not bound 
by professional obligations of confidentiality. Whether 
such group environments are appropriate will depend 
upon the nature of the research and the sensitivity of 
the information that may be revealed. 
Case Study 4.2 also raises the possibility that research-
ers will want to study medical records of, or ask family 
members about, deceased relatives. Clearly, this is a case 
in which consent for the disclosure of confidential 
information cannot be obtained. However, this also 
raises a questions about the extent to which obligations 
of privacy and confidentiality extend to the dead. 
Although we cannot be physically harmed once we are 
dead, our reputations can still be damaged by disclo-
sure of information, and we may think that the auton-
omous wishes of a former person still warrant respect 
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(as discussed in Chapter 2 in relation to Case Study 2.2). 
This also raises an issue about the effect that disclosing 
information about the dead may have on living rela-
tives, either as a result of revealing shared genetic prop-
erties or by giving rise to distressing memories or new 
knowledge relating to the deceased person.
More general difficulties with obtaining consent to 
divulge information might arise in different cases where, 
for example, contact details may not be available, espe-
cially where the data was gathered a long time ago. 
In some very large-scale studies, such as those in epide-
miology, the number of subjects involved may be too 
large for contacting them to be practicable. There is still 
an expectation that reasonable efforts will be made to 
contact people whose information is to be used in 
research, but where this is impossible alternative meas-
ures to minimise any potential harms arising from the 
dissemination of this information should be taken. 
Anonymisation and disclosure
This leads to the other major strategy for making con-
fidential data available beyond its original recipients 
– anonymisation. Anonymisation is designed to sever 
the connection between the information and the indi-
vidual, so that the information no longer reveals any-
thing about that person. However, while there are often 
good reasons to apply anonymisation techniques to the 
collation and dissemination of information, in order to 
protect privacy even where confidentiality is not an issue, 
there are limits to the effectiveness of this strategy. 
Initially, somebody has to access the raw data in order 
to perform the anonymisation and if that person is not 
entitled to access it under the terms of confidentiality 
agreed upon by the research subjects then at least 
a small breach will have occurred. Furthermore, even 
after anonymisation has been carried out, this will not 
always mean that the link between individuals and infor-
mation is actually severed. In a localised study, or where 
dealing with rare conditions, individuals may be identi-
fiable in published results even if the data is anonymised. 
If this is so, then confidentiality has been breached. 
Anonymisation may also have implications for future 
uses of data. Total anonymisation makes it harder for 
results to be checked for errors or scientific fraud. It also 
gives rise to an ethical problem where information (e.g. 
that someone has a serious but treatable disease) could 
be used to save someone from serious harm. A com-
promise to avoid these potential pitfalls is to use coded 
data, where identifying information is removed from 
the raw data, but can be linked back to the identifying 
information via a ‘key’. In this case it is important for 
researchers to consider in advance under what circum-
stances the key will be used to link the data back to the 
individual and how securely the key will be stored. 
Ultimately, given the limits to what can be achieved 
by anonymisation and consent, the conflict between 
research objectives that rely on the use of confidential 
data and the principle of respect for autonomy may be 
inescapable. Consideration therefore needs to be given 
to the question of when, if ever, it is justifiable to breach 
confidentiality. Relevant factors might include the 
sensitivity of the confidential information and the level 
of harm liable to result from its disclosure, and the 
importance and quality of the research. The significance 
attached to these factors is likely to differ between 
adherents of the different moral theories discussed in 
Chapter 1.
Breaching confidentiality
Confidentiality is breached when information that 
a researcher has about a person or persons is revealed, 
without the subject’s consent, to a third party who does 
not already have that information. However, there 
remain some situations that may arise in research where, 
despite the expectations of the subject and despite 
consent not having been obtained by the researcher to 
divulge the information, the researcher may be ethically 
required to breach confidentiality and pass on the infor-
mation to relevant third parties. There are two types of 
situation where this occurs – those situations where 
the law requires the breach of confidentiality and those 
situations where breach of confidentiality is legally 
permissible although not obligatory. 
Although legal obligations vary from country to coun-
try, most obligatory breaches occur where there is 
tension between confidentiality and public safety. 
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There are often legal requirements relating to health, 
safety and welfare – for example, public health (such 
as notifiable diseases), abortion, births and deaths, 
suspected child abuse and prevention of terrorism, (13) 
all of which might require mandatory disclosure of 
information obtained through the research. 
Non-obligatory but allowable breaches tend to be the 
cases that involve some weighing up of potential harms 
and interests, for example where there is a clear public 
interest, or where there is information that a subject or 
third parties are at risk of harm or committing a crimi-
nal act. More subtle cases of ethically permissible 
breaches may occur because of the practice of health 
care workers sharing information with colleagues from 
the same institution. This is most readily seen in thera-
peutic medical cases, where doctors have the discretion 
to share this information with other members of their 
health care team for the benefit of the patient. The rea-
sons for sharing this information should usually be made 
clear to the subjects at the outset as part of good prac-
tice in adhering to the demands of confidentiality.
Some kinds of research pose particular problems with 
regard to maintaining confidentiality in relation to con-
flicting legal and ethical duties. For example, there is 
plenty of valuable research that may take place in rela-
tion to illegal activities. In these circumstances, research-
ers need to be absolutely clear as to their legal status in 
regard to reporting findings to the police and to giving 
evidence in court. The ethical requirement to respect 
confidentiality and to inform subjects of its limits should 
still be respected as far as possible. However, there may 
be complicating factors with such research. For exam-
ple, telling a subject who might reveal information 
about criminal activity that this information might have 
to be disclosed to the police is likely to prevent them 
from discussing it. This may, in turn, be against the pub-
lic interest in the longer term because the benefits of 
the research will be lost. As these benefits may be sub-
stantial, such as the prevention of serious harm, we 
might think that there is not necessarily an obligation 
to warn the subjects in such cases. Moreover, there may 
be a conflict between researchers’ moral and legal duties 
if there is a perceived public interest in continuing to 
gather information where there is a legal requirement 
to disclose. 
Further issues
Issues of privacy and confidentiality can arise in all 
forms of research involving human subjects and the 
gathering of information about them. This makes the 
scope for breaches and ethical conflict relating to these 
two areas potentially huge. Many research situations 
where privacy and confidentiality concerns arise can be 
dealt with adequately through appropriate considera-
tions about access, consent, and the proper manage-
ment of data. However, although discussion of the 
cases has covered many of the central concerns, there 
will remain many issues that space precludes from the 
discussion. 
One further issue that is becoming increasingly impor-
tant, which concerns privacy and confidentiality (as 
well as consent and data security), relates to the use of 
databases and biobanks for research. Potential breaches 
of privacy and confidentiality can arise on a large scale 
when databases containing information relating to 
individuals are set up for research purposes, or when 
researchers are given access to databases already set up. 
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The management of databases requires close and con-
stant scrutiny if they are to be used ethically in research. 
The way in which information is collected, the kinds of 
information placed on databases, and the length of 
time information will remain on databases, all need to 
be carefully considered. Subsequent control over the 
access to this information is also crucial, with clear guid-
ance for both subjects giving their details and research-
ers required to establish who can have access to this 
information and for what purposes. 
As the number of databases and their scope continues 
to increase, their value as a research tool also increases. 
However, alongside this the potential for violations 
of  confidentiality and privacy also increases, with 
potentially large numbers of people being affected. 
As databases and biobanks are at the forefront of new 
technologies in research, some of the issues relating to 
them will be explored in Chapter 8, Case Study 8.5.
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Chapter 5    Balancing harms and benefits: 
the case of randomised 
controlled trials 
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Learning outcomes
In this chapter you will develop:
•  An understanding of the main types of benefit that may arise from research involving 
human participants and an ability to reflect on their differing moral significance.
•  An understanding of the main types of harm and risk that may arise from research 
involving human participants and an ability to reflect on their differing moral 
significance.
•  An appreciation of the ethical issues involved in assessing and weighing up benefits, 
harms and risks, including questions about the distribution of harm and benefit 
and the significance of consent, and an ability to recognise the different approaches 
associated with different types of moral theory.
•  An understanding of randomised controlled trial methodology and the ethical prob-
lems arising from the use of controls and placebo. 
•  An understanding of the principle of equipoise and its limitations.
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1.   The case described here is a fictional one which includes elements of real pieces of research. See for example the trial described 
in T.B. Freeman et al., “Use of placebo surgery in controlled trials of a cellular-based therapy for Parkinson’s disease”, New England Journal 
of Medicine 341, no. 13 (1999): 988-91.
Introduction
This chapter addresses two intersecting themes. Firstly, 
it invites readers to consider general ethical issues about 
the benefits and harms produced by research, for exam-
ple what are the main kinds of benefit and harm that 
researchers and research ethics committees need to be 
aware of when designing and reviewing research pro-
posals? How, if at all, should risks and potential benefits 
be traded off against each other when considering 
whether a piece of research is ethically permissible? 
Does research that is expected to have very practical 
(e.g. medical) benefits justify a higher level of risk than 
research that pursues knowledge for its own sake? How 
should very small risks, serious but improbable risks 
and risks with unknown probability be treated? How 
does the distribution of risk and benefit between par-
ticipants, researchers, institutions and society at large, 
or the presence of a valid consent, affect the permissi-
bility of research?
 
Secondly, the chapter examines particular ethical issues 
that arise within randomised controlled trials (RCTs). 
RCTs raise many of the same ethical issues as other 
kinds of research but also give rise to specific problems 
of harm and benefit arising from the use of placebos 
and controls, and from the way in which subjects are 
randomly assigned to treatments. These difficulties are 
compounded by problems of consent, arising from 
poor understanding of the randomisation process and 
the role of experimental treatment as an inducement. 
The principle of equipoise will be considered as a pos-
sible but controversial response to these problems.
A single case study involving a four-arm randomised 
controlled trial is used to explore both the general 
issues about harms and risks in research, and those spe-
cific to RCTs. The major issues raised in the case study 
and subsequent discussion have been encountered, 
though not analysed in detail, in previous chapters. 
Several of the earlier case studies were randomised con-
trolled trials, though not explicitly identified as such, 
and important issues relating to the potential for harm 
to research participants have been discussed, for exam-
ple in relation to breaches of privacy and confidential-
ity. However, whereas the principles of consent and 
respect for autonomy were central to the discussion in 
previous units, the focus here is on the kinds of harm 
that research can give rise to, and how these should 
be restricted and/or balanced against the benefits of 
research.
 Case Study 5.1
Randomised placebo-controlled trial 
to investigate surgical treatments for 
Parkinson’s disease
Parkinson’s disease is a progressive neurodegenera-
tive disorder affecting the patient’s motor function 
and producing symptoms including tremor, rigidity 
and slowness of movement. (1) The impairment 
of motor function is caused by loss of dopamine-
producing cells in the brain.
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Standard treatment for Parkinson’s disease is levo-
dopa, which converts to dopamine in the brain. 
However, this results in further suppression 
of endogenous dopamine production and so 
becomes less effective with prolonged use.
Experiments using rats and non-human primates 
have suggested that implanting fetal neural tissue 
into the brains of affected individuals can improve 
motor function. Several centres have consequently 
developed programmes of fetal tissue transplanta-
tion for the treatment of Parkinson’s disease in 
humans. Some of these have reported significant 
and lasting benefits; however, the possibility that 
these result from a placebo effect or investigator 
bias cannot be ruled out. Moreover, fetal neural 
tissue used for this procedure is in limited supply, 
and the fact that it is derived from aborted human 
fetuses makes this therapy ethically controversial 
and vulnerable to changes in legal or regulatory 
regimes.
A randomised controlled trial is proposed to 
determine the effectiveness and safety of the fetal 
tissue procedure and to compare it to an alterna-
tive (xenotransplantation) therapy using tissue 
derived from pigs. If successful, the latter would 
provide an alternative that could be used by 
patients with a conscientious objection to 
the use of fetal tissue or in jurisdictions where 
the use of such material is not permitted.
All subjects recruited to this trial will be patients 
with a diagnosis of Parkinson’s disease who are 
receiving the standard treatment. They will con-
tinue to receive standard treatment throughout 
the trial, but will in addition be randomly assigned 
to one of the four ‘arms’ of the trial. 
1)  Subjects in this arm will receive implants of 
human fetal tissue taken from a single donor. 
These will be administered by injection into 
the brain after drilling a hole in the skull under 
general anaesthetic.
2)  Subjects in this arm will receive the same 
treatment as those in the first arm, except that 
in this case the implant will consist of material 
taken from multiple donors. Results of animal 
experimentation suggest that implants from 
multiple donors may have a better success rate 
than those from single donors.
3)  Subjects in this arm will receive a similar 
implant, but one consisting of non-human 
tissue in the form of porcine neural cells.
4)  Subjects in this arm will receive a placebo treat-
ment designed to simulate the experience of 
subjects in the active arms of the trial. This will 
include magnetic resonance imaging, anaes-
thesia, a skin incision and partial drilling of the 
skull, but without penetration into the brain.
The trial will be ‘double blinded’ in that neither 
the subject nor those evaluating the results of 
the procedures will know which arm an individual 
is assigned to. The surgeon will know which treat-
ment an individual receives but will have no contact 
with those evaluating the results. 
Subjects will be provided with information about 
all four arms of the trial and will consent to being 
randomly allocated. They will be evaluated every 
three months for two years following the proce-
dure. Subjects will have the right to withdraw 
from the trial at any point, except that those in 
the xenotransplantation arm will be subject to 
ongoing monitoring as a precaution against them 
becoming a vector for the transmission of porcine 
infections into the wider human population. 
The researchers think that this is extremely 
unlikely, as the cells will be taken from pigs raised 
in ‘specified pathogen-free’ herds and subject to 
close monitoring. However, the possibility cannot 
be conclusively ruled out and the researchers 
think that monitoring is necessary to allay public 
concerns. Provision for this will be included in 
the original consent.
Questions
1.  Who are the potential beneficiaries of this 
piece of research and in what ways do they 
stand to benefit? What are the advantages 
of the proposed trial design?
2.  What are the potential harms resulting 
from this trial and who is put at risk by it? 
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Which potential harms do you think are most 
important?
3.  What ethical problems, if any, are raised by 
the use of the placebo control?
4.  Are participants in a position to give valid 
consent? Why (or why not)? What difference 
does this make to your assessment of the trial?
5.  Do you think the trial is ethically acceptable as 
described? Why (or why not)? If you need more 
information to decide, what questions would 
you ask the researcher and what answers would 
satisfy you that the trial was justified? Are there 
any other modifications that would make you 
more likely to approve the proposed trial?
6.  What should happen if a preliminary analysis 
(while the trial is ongoing) gives some indica-
tion (although not conclusive) of differences 
in outcome between those on different arms 
of the trial?
7.  Would a more limited trial consisting of the 
following arms be ethically preferable? If so, 
why?
a.  Arms (1), (2) and (4)
b. Arms (3) and (4)
c.  Arms (1), (2) and (3).
Benefits of research
It has been noted in previous chapters that almost any 
research involving human subjects will involve some 
burden or cost to the participants, for example risk of 
physical or other harm, inconvenience, sacrifice of time 
or monetary expense. One of the ways in which we 
can seek to justify the imposition of such costs is by 
pointing to some corresponding benefit, and in order 
to do this we need to distinguish different types of ben-
efits that research can produce and their differing moral 
significance.
The case study illustrates some of the key issues that 
need to be considered when assessing the benefits 
promised by a particular research proposal. One of 
those key issues, highlighted by Question 1, is the fact 
that different groups of people can benefit in different 
ways from research, and the benefits do not all go to 
the same people who bear the costs. This becomes 
important when we come to weigh up the potential 
benefits of research against its costs and potential 
harms since, as we will see, different ethical frameworks 
and guidelines can give rise to different views about the 
permissibility of trading off costs borne by one group 
of people against benefits to others.
Benefits to future patients
As with most medical research, the trial described in 
the case study is most obviously of benefit to future 
patients. If the research is successful then many future 
patients with Parkinson’s disease should have their 
quality of life improved as a result of the treatments 
being investigated. The research may help practition-
ers by establishing whether the treatments are effec-
tive and safe, which categories of patient can benefit 
from them, and by providing data that will lead to fur-
ther refinements of the treatments. The effectiveness 
and safety data may also be needed in order to allow 
regulators to approve the treatments for use and to 
allow funding bodies to justify allocating resources 
to them. 
Of course the researchers cannot know the outcome 
of the trial in advance, and it could be that the research 
reveals the experimental treatments to be less effective 
or less safe than existing alternatives. Even if this is the 
case, the results may inform further research that will 
lead to the development of new treatments in the 
future. Moreover, a negative trial outcome of this kind 
will benefit future patients by ensuring that they are 
not subjected to dangerous or ineffective treatments. 
This kind of benefit is particularly significant where 
a treatment that is already in routine use is tested and 
found to be unsafe or ineffective; in such cases we may 
even be able to identify people who would have been 
subjected to the treatment if the research had not been 
carried out. However, even in the case of new treat-
ments, rigorous testing is part of a system designed to 
ensure that patients only receive safe and effective 
drugs; the system as a whole is beneficial to future 
patients and negative trial results are a necessary part 
of the system. 
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While the research in the case study aims to enhance 
the quality of life of future patients by demonstrating 
the ability of the experimental treatments to reduce 
the symptoms of their disease, it also has a bearing on 
future patients’ mortality inasmuch as it addresses the 
safety of the experimental treatments. Prevention of 
mortality is of course an even more central concern in 
those areas of medical research where the aim is to 
assess the effectiveness of life-saving or life-prolonging 
treatments. Although the anticipated benefits of medi-
cal research are often very clear, and their value may not 
be in question, quantifying them in order to compare 
the benefits of different pieces of research or to com-
pare the benefits with the burdens and potential harms 
may be harder. This is partly because of uncertainty 
about the results of research that has yet to be carried 
out, and partly because of the difficulty of comparing 
quality of life to mortality and different aspects of 
quality of life to each other. There are tools designed 
to facilitate such comparisons: for example the Quality 
Adjusted Life Year or QALY is a unit of measurement 
of benefit according to which one year of healthy life 
counts as one unit and a unit of less than full health life 
counts as a fraction of a unit (with the fraction being 
determined by the degree of disability or distress 
according to a scale based on research into people’s 
preferences). Thus both extension of life and enhance-
ments in the quality of life can produce a gain in QALYs, 
and information about the number of QALYs pro-
duced by different treatments is used to inform deci-
sions about resource allocation. In general, research 
ethics committees will not have the information 
needed to conduct a QALY analysis but it may never-
theless be useful for them to have some knowledge of 
the fundamental principles of a tool of this kind. 
It should also be noted that medical research is not 
unique in having benefits of these kinds. Social, educa-
tional and criminological research, for example, can 
inform policy in ways which affect both quality of life 
and mortality. In some cases their benefit may be more 
diffuse, affecting broad sections of a population rather 
than individuals, but in other cases they can inform 
specific interventions which can benefit particular iden-
tifiable individuals in the same way that medical 
research can benefit particular identifiable patients. (2) 
The ability of any research to benefit future patients or 
society more generally depends on its results being 
known by those who can make use of it such as prac-
titioners, policy makers and other researchers. This 
applies even to the results of trials that produce nega-
tive results and do not lead to new interventions. 
In general, the wider the availability of the results the 
more likely it is that the benefits of the study will be 
maximised. The case study gives no details of the 
researchers’ publication and dissemination strategy, 
so a research ethics committee might wish to ask for 
information about this and to insist on a commitment 
to publicise and make available the results even if they 
are negative. The ethics of publication will be consid-
ered further in Chapter 7.
Benefits to trial participants
Although future patients are likely to be its main ben-
eficiaries, the research in the case study also has the 
potential to benefit participants in the trial, who may 
similarly have their quality of life improved by the exper-
imental treatments. However, the benefit to each par-
ticipant is very uncertain, both because the treatments 
are as yet unproven and may be in need of refinement, 
and because a proportion of participants will be allo-
cated to the placebo group and will therefore not 
receive either of the experimental treatments. 
In addition to any benefits resulting from the experi-
mental treatments themselves, there is a possibility that 
participants in the trial will benefit from other factors 
associated with participation in research. These might 
include more intensive monitoring and higher levels of 
medical expertise than would be present in an ordinary 
treatment setting – this relates to the so-called ‘trial 
effect’ which will be discussed further below. It is also 
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worth noting that not all medical research offers the 
prospect of these kinds of benefits to participants: for 
example ‘first-in-human’ and Phase 1 drug trials aim to 
establish the toxicity and pharmacological properties 
of an experimental drug rather than to test a treatment 
regime, and are typically carried out on healthy volun-
teers who would not be expected to benefit either 
from the effects of the drugs or from any trial effect. 
Participants may also obtain benefits from their involve-
ment in a trial which are not directly connected either 
with the treatments being investigated or with their 
status as patients, although not all of these apply to the 
case study and some would be more likely to arise in 
other fields of research. These include economic ben-
efits in the case of paid participation, and what may be 
termed a ‘moral benefit’ in the case of participants who 
enter into trials in order to help others and benefit from 
the knowledge that they are doing so. In some kinds of 
research (for example interview-based research involv-
ing prisoners, elderly people or others who may expe-
rience social isolation or boredom) the subjects may 
derive significant benefit from social contact with 
researchers, the opportunity to talk about their opin-
ions and feelings on the matters being researched with 
someone who wants to listen, and engagement in an 
activity outside their normal routine. 
Since these benefits are not directly connected to the 
subject matter of the research, at least some of them 
can be altered in order to achieve a more favourable 
balance of benefits and costs, without affecting its 
methodology. For example, levels of payment may be 
varied, and undertakings may be given to provide par-
ticipants with experimental or other treatments post-
trial. However, in order to avoid inadvertent deception 
it is important not to promise benefits that cannot be 
guaranteed, for example treatments that are depend-
ent on funding or on the outcome of the trial. 
Benefits to researchers and 
research organisations
As well as present and future patients, the research may 
provide intellectual, financial and reputational benefits 
for the researchers and the organisations for which they 
work. The research may also benefit employees and 
shareholders of companies that are involved in the 
research or in the supply of the treatments that may be 
adopted as a result of the research, and this in turn may 
provide social benefits through the taxation system and 
by contributing to economic growth. 
The fact that researchers and others involved in the 
design and implementation of a study stand to benefit 
from it is sometimes viewed by members of research 
ethics committees as problematic. Often this is articu-
lated in terms of the researchers’ motives: for example 
that they are carrying out the research “for the money” 
or “to satisfy their own curiosity” or (in the case of stu-
dent research) “to get a qualification”, rather than for 
the sake of those that the results of the research might 
ultimately help. It is not clear that this should be con-
sidered a valid objection to a research proposal, since 
people often have a variety of motives for what they 
do, self-interested motives are not intrinsically bad, and 
we do not usually consider it morally problematic that 
those who provide important services through their 
jobs are at least partly motivated to provide them by 
the fact that they are paid to do so. However, these 
worries may reflect an underlying concern about pos-
sible conflicts of interests. The worry here is that the 
particular interests of researchers and their sponsors 
may lead to the research being designed and con-
ducted in ways that do not best serve the interests of 
research participants or future patients. This could take 
various forms: some, such as methodological bias or 
fraudulent presentation of results would undermine 
the scientific validity of the study, while others might 
result in a scientifically robust study but one which gives 
inadequate protection to the welfare of research sub-
jects or which answers questions of interest to the 
researcher rather than those of interest to society. 
These are ethical issues, but ones that are better 
addressed by research ethics committees and peer 
reviewers focusing on the substance of the research 
rather than the motivations of the researchers.
Uncertainty and research methodology
By asking about the trial design, Question 1 also 
prompts us to consider how confident we can be that 
the anticipated benefits will in fact be achieved. It has 
already been noted that the potential benefits to 
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research participants are uncertain. It is also uncertain 
whether the research will give rise to treatments that 
will benefit future patients since we cannot know what 
the results of the research will be until it has been con-
ducted, and it might turn out that the experimental 
treatments are no better than placebo. However, if the 
research methodology is robust it should at least give 
us a reliable answer to the question of whether the 
experimental treatments are effective and safe, enabling 
clinicians and regulators to make an informed decision 
about whether they should be offered to patients.
 
The fact that the proposed research is a randomised 
controlled trial is important here, as well-conducted 
RCTs are (for reasons to be discussed below) widely per-
ceived as providing the best possible evidence about 
the efficacy and safety of treatments. It may therefore 
be appropriate for a research ethics committee to give 
more weight to the anticipated benefits of an RCT than 
those of some other types of research. This does not 
mean, however, that other research methodologies 
should be rejected, since RCTs are not appropriate or 
practical for all research topics or questions, and even 
where they are technically possible they could be ethi-
cally unacceptable. This also leaves open the question 
of how well designed the RCT is. A poorly designed 
RCT (for example one with an inadequate sample size 
or which uses an inappropriate control) may fail to pro-
duce a definitive answer to the question it is address-
ing. It is worth noting that what matters here is not only 
whether the research produces results that are objec-
tively reliable but also how the results are received by 
regulatory and funding authorities and practitioners: 
if  regulators and funders are not persuaded by the 
research that the treatment should be approved and 
doctors are not persuaded to prescribe it (or to refrain 
from doing so in the case of a negative result) then the 
intended benefits will not be realised. Thus, although 
the terms of reference of research ethics committees 
often discourage them from directly engaging in assess-
ment of the methodology of the proposals they are 
considering, it seems that they should at least ensure 
that such an assessment has taken place, for example 
by peer review. 
Harm in research
Harm is often defined, following Joel Feinberg, as a set-
back to interests. (3) Since people have many kinds of 
interests this implies that there can be many kinds of 
harm. It is important to note, however, that not every 
setback to an individual’s interests will constitute 
a moral wrong done to that person: there are some bur-
dens or risks of harm that we think can legitimately 
be imposed on individuals for the benefit of society 
(consider for example the burdens and risks involved 
in the taxation and road transport systems); in other 
cases we may think that an individual’s interest in some-
thing to which they have no legitimate expectation 
does not even create a prima facie objection to policies 
that set back that interest (consider the way in which 
the system of ethical review of research thwarts the 
interests of researchers intent on unethical research, 
but also to a lesser extent sets back the interests of 
well-intentioned and competent researchers).
Types of harm
In considering Question 2 we may identify several kinds 
of harm which potentially arise from the research 
described in the case study. Some of these arise from 
the experimental treatments themselves while others 
arise from particular features of the trial or wider social 
factors. 
First and most obviously, there is a risk of physical harm 
to participants as a result of the procedures that they 
will undergo. In this case the possible harms include 
rejection of the transplant by the participant’s immune 
system, increased risk of infection or malignancy due to 
the immunosuppressive drugs needed to prevent rejec-
tion, risk of post-operative infection or other complica-
tions, and risks associated with anaesthesia. Some of 
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these risks are limited to participants in the active arms 
of the trial while others apply also to the placebo group.
One of the risks faced by the active treatment groups 
is that infections will be transmitted from the implanted 
tissue to the research subject. This risk is present for 
the groups receiving transplants of human tissue (and 
greater in the group receiving tissue from multiple 
donors), but is particularly problematic in the case of 
the porcine transplants. There are two reasons for this. 
Firstly, we know less about porcine infections than 
human ones and do not know which ones may survive 
and produce symptoms in humans, so are less able to 
assess the level of risk and to avoid infected sources. 
Secondly, we run the risk of transmitting infectious 
agents that have previously only affected pigs into the 
human population and cannot rule out the possibility 
that these will be transmissible between humans and 
will spread into the wider population. If this happens, 
not only might the aggregate harm be very large but it 
will potentially affect people who have nothing to do 
with the trial and have not consented to this risk.
A second kind of harm to which participants may be 
subject is psychological or emotional harm. For exam-
ple, participants may feel anxiety at undergoing a risky 
experimental procedure. This would apply equally to 
participants in all arms of the trial since they do not 
know which procedure they will undergo. More spe-
cifically, it has been suggested that patients undergoing 
xenotransplantation may suffer psychological distress 
due to the effect on their sense of self of having tissues 
from another species implanted. (4) It should be noted 
that similar claims were made about human-to-human 
heart transplants when the procedure was first intro-
duced and have more recently been made about face 
transplants, and that these sorts of worries often recede 
as the procedures become more established. However, 
the possibility of such effects cannot be ruled out, par-
ticularly where the sense that the procedure is in some 
way ‘unnatural’ is promoted by media commentary or 
social attitudes.
Related to this, participants may be at risk of social harm; 
that is, the way in which they relate to others or their 
position in society may be altered in a detrimental way. 
For example, participants might find themselves 
shunned by others due to a fear of zoonotic infection, 
or disapproval of treatment involving aborted fetuses. 
The loss of liberty resulting from monitoring and other 
restrictions imposed on those who have received 
xenografts in order to guard against the spread of infec-
tions may also be included in this category. More gen-
erally, social harms might include economic disadvantage 
(for example arising from difficulty in obtaining life 
insurance) or reduced employment prospects arising 
from participation in certain kinds of trial. It is often 
these kinds of harms that underpin requirements for 
confidentiality and anonymisation. 
Harm to non-participants
It should be noted that, as with the benefits of research, 
each of the main types of harm identified here can 
affect people other than the research subjects. We have 
already noted the possibility that zoonotic infections 
could be transmitted from research subjects to others, 
resulting in a risk of physical harm first to people who 
come into contact with the research subjects and then 
to the wider public. Non-subjects, especially those who 
come into contact with subjects, may therefore also 
suffer psychological anxiety about the risk of such infec-
tion, and social harms resulting from the perception of 
such a risk by others (and may do so even if the level 
of fear is not justified by the objective level of risk). 
There is also a possibility of harm to non-subjects aris-
ing as a result of the diversion of resources away from 
other areas of medical research and provision; this issue 
of the relationship between research and broader social 
priorities will be explored in Chapter 7. Non-subjects 
could also suffer economic and reputational harms, and 
these sorts of harm could affect institutions as well as 
individuals. For example, both researchers and the insti-
tutions that employ them and fund or host their 
research may suffer reputational and economic loss if 
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the research they carry out is judged by others (for 
example those who fund, regulate or employ them) 
to be dangerous and/or unethical.
Harm and risk
Harms, like benefits, are often difficult to predict with 
certainty. This is especially true in relation to research, 
where we are seeking to investigate patterns of cause 
and effect that are currently unknown. In such cases 
what we are dealing with is a risk of harm. When assess-
ing risks of harm we generally take two things into 
account: the likelihood (or probability) that the harm 
will result, and the magnitude of the potential harm. 
The greater the likelihood of harm occurring as a result 
of some action, and the greater the size of that harm, 
the greater the risk of harm from acting in that way. 
Most of our decisions about how to act are based on 
predicted consequences, so most of the deliberations 
about risk that inform them are really deliberations 
about risk.
The statements that are found in many research ethics 
documents asserting primacy of research subjects’ wel-
fare over other interests suggest a strong commitment 
to the prevention of harm. (5) Given, however, that 
almost any human activity involves some risk of harm, 
an unqualified commitment to its prevention would 
make almost all research impossible. Not only would 
this deprive society generally of the benefits of research, 
but it would also appear to be contrary to the interests 
of most research subjects, since in many cases the ben-
efits of living in a system in which important research 
is able to take place will exceed the risks of participa-
tion in research. This would also be to apply a more 
restrictive standard to research than is applied to other 
activities. In order to avoid these consequences we 
need to give an account of what constitutes an accept-
able level of risk.
There are three ways in which this might be done. First, 
a risk might be considered acceptable when it is con-
sented to by the person or people that it affects. 
By permitting risks that are consented to we respect 
the autonomy of those giving the consent and also 
acknowledge that the acceptability of risk varies from 
person to person and so is best judged by the person 
affected. This view is supported by Mill’s harm princi-
ple, which holds that the only legitimate ground for 
restricting a person’s liberty is to prevent harm to oth-
ers, and not to protect them from harming them-
selves. (6) However, as we have seen in previous 
chapters, valid consent is not always possible (for exam-
ple when dealing with non-competent subjects or cov-
ert research). Moreover, as the case study demonstrates, 
research that is consented to by its subjects may also 
involve risks to a wider population from whom it would 
be impractical to obtain consent. We might think that 
if the risks are small enough such research may still be 
acceptable, but if so, the acceptability of the risks must 
be based on something other than consent. Second, it 
might be considered that a risk can be acceptable (even 
without consent) if it falls below a certain threshold 
level. This gives rise to the concept of ‘minimal risk’, 
which will be discussed below. Third, it might be that 
the level of acceptable risk depends upon the balance 
between the risks and expected benefits of the research. 
This balancing of risks and benefits will be the initial 
focus of the following discussion.
Balancing risk and benefit
Although it is common to refer to the balancing of risk 
and benefit in relation to research ethics, this terminol-
ogy is potentially misleading. (7) A benefit is an actual 
outcome whereas a risk is a probability of a certain 
harm or cost. Benefits may be balanced against harms, 
while risks should be balanced against probabilities 
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of  certain benefits. The balancing undertaken by 
a researcher or ethics committee therefore needs to 
take account of both the magnitude of the potential 
harms and benefits and their probabilities.
Consequentialism and expected utility
One approach to this balancing is suggested by con-
sequentialism. It will be recalled from Chapter 1 that 
consequentialist moral theory in general holds that the 
right action is the one that produces the best available 
consequences and that utilitarianism combines this 
consequentialist principle with the view that all mor-
ally significant outcomes can be evaluated in terms of 
a single measure, referred to as utility and often equated 
with happiness or welfare. Utilitarianism therefore tells 
us to maximise utility. A more sophisticated utilitarian-
ism will recognise that we do not know for certain what 
the utility of a particular action will be, and will tell us 
to maximise expected utility, where the expected util-
ity of an action is understood as the sum of the utilities 
arising from each of its possible outcomes, each multi-
plied by the probability of that outcome. 
In principle this approach offers a clear and determi-
nate answer to the question of how we should balance 
risks against expected benefits in research. Applying this 
model to the case study we would estimate each of the 
potential benefits and costs mentioned in the previous 
sections (perhaps using a tool such as the QALY (8)), 
multiply each by our estimate of its probability, and 
then add them together to obtain the overall expected 
utility of the trial. We would then compare this with 
the expected utility of not conducting the research at 
all or of conducting variants such as those mentioned 
in Question 7, and would choose the course of action 
with the greatest expected utility. In practice, however, 
this would be neither simple nor determinate, in part 
because we rarely have more than a rough idea of 
the probabilities of the relevant harms and benefits, 
but also because of the difficulty of measuring and 
comparing dissimilar benefits and because of the sheer 
number of possible consequences. Moreover, even if 
some of these difficulties could be reduced by making 
simplifying assumptions and adopting a standardised 
model for risk assessment, this approach is vulnerable 
to some standard philosophical objections to conse-
quentialism and conflicts with some widely held moral 
intuitions as well as with the pronouncements of influ-
ential codes of research ethics. 
Interpersonal and individual balancing
In particular, even if expected utility is considered 
a workable tool for comparing beneficial and harmful 
outcomes of research, the idea of trading off benefits 
to one person (or set of persons) against costs to 
another is morally problematic. This is reflected in the 
emphasis found in research ethics codes of practice and 
legislation on the primacy of the interests of the indi-
vidual research subject.
The suggestion that such trade-offs may be exploitative 
will be explored in Chapter 6. For now, however, we 
can note (recalling the discussion in Chapter 1) that 
one of the features that distinguishes deontological 
approaches to ethics from consequentialism is their 
opposition to the general acceptance of such interper-
sonal trade-offs. Deontological approaches hold that 
we have duties to particular individuals that are not to 
be overridden simply because a greater aggregate good 
can be achieved by breaching them. Often this is artic-
ulated in terms of respect for persons and the corre-
sponding idea that we should treat people as ends 
in themselves, and not solely as means to achieving 
the ends of others. According to one well-known for-
mulation of this kind of view, in allowing interpersonal 
trade-offs “utilitarianism does not take seriously the 
separateness of persons”. (9) In principlist approaches, 
such as that of Beauchamp and Childress, the prin-
ciples of non-maleficence and respect for autonomy 
tend to be seen as more pressing than the principle of 
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beneficence (although officially there is no general 
ordering of the principles), so that requirements for 
consent and avoidance of harm will constrain what may 
permissibly be done to research subjects even when 
the expected benefits exceed the expected harms.
Some other, less individualistic, moral theories might 
appear more sympathetic to the idea that individuals 
should bear some risks or burdens for the sake of the 
common good. Communitarianism, for example, is per-
ceived as promoting the common good of the com-
munity over the interests of individuals. Its emphasis, 
however, is not on a trade-off between individual and 
community but on the ways in which the flourishing 
of the individual may depend on, or be ‘constituted’ 
by, the flourishing of society; and this is perhaps more 
plausible in relation to social and cultural interests 
than in relation to risks to life and health.
It should also be noted that deontological and rights-
based approaches need not be absolutist in their oppo-
sition to the balancing of benefits and risks across 
persons. They may hold that while there is a strong 
prima facie objection to imposing risks on some peo-
ple for the benefit of others, which is not to be over-
ridden for a marginal or modest benefit to the 
community as a whole, this objection can be overrid-
den in order to prevent catastrophic harm. Thus, for 
example, they may accept the need for some compro-
mise in the protection of individuals’ interests in the 
event of an urgent need for testing of vaccines to pre-
vent a serious global pandemic. However, while there 
may be debate about what would count as cata-
strophic circumstances, this would probably not apply 
to most cases of medical research, and still less to 
research in many other fields. 
Even from a consequentialist perspective there might 
be reasons to reject or restrict trade-offs between risks 
to individuals and expected benefits to the wider soci-
ety. Some argue that unless people’s important inter-
ests are protected by a system of enforceable rights the 
resulting insecurity will undermine the possibility of 
achieving high levels of utility in society as a whole. If it 
was believed that researchers were in the habit of trad-
ing off risks to individuals against benefits to society 
this could cause significant insecurity, for example 
among those seeking medical treatment, and might 
lead to increased difficulty in recruiting research sub-
jects in future. 
There is thus a variety of reasons, reflected in research 
ethics codes of practice and legislation, for thinking that 
risks to individuals arising from research cannot be jus-
tified simply by balancing them against the expected 
benefits to society as a whole. This leaves open the pos-
sibility of balancing the risks and expected benefits for 
each individual. In this sort of trade-off no individual’s 
overall interests are sacrificed for the good of others. 
In  the case of competent individuals, however, we 
might think that rather than rely on a researcher’s or 
ethics committee’s judgement about how to weigh the 
potential harms and benefits in the light of their vari-
ous probabilities, this is a decision that should be 
made by the person affected and exercised through 
the process of consent. One reason for thinking this is 
that it enables the weighing-up to take account not 
only of the importance that each potential harm 
or benefit has for the individual concerned, but also 
the individual’s willingness to take risks in order to gain 
a chance of some benefit. However, as we have seen, 
consent is not always possible and in these cases it may 
be necessary for someone other than the individual 
concerned to assess the balance of risks and benefits. 
In the case of a non-competent subject this would 
amount to an assessment of whether participation 
in the research is, on balance, in their best interests; 
this is similar to the assessment that would typically 
be made before treating a non-competent patient in 
a clinical context. 
Minimal risk
Further issues arise in determining how to handle par-
ticular categories of risk. One such category concerns 
very small risks. It has already been noted that an 
important element in the justification for exposing 
research subjects to risk is the consent of the subjects, 
but that this justification is not available in the case of 
research involving non-competent subjects, or where 
consent is impossible for methodological reasons. 
It may also be problematic in cases where there is a risk 
of coercion or undue pressure. The concept of minimal 
risk (and sometimes minimal burden) is used to 
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identify cases where it may be permissible to conduct 
research without valid consent, particularly where there 
are no benefits to the subjects that could offset more 
significant risks. (10) In some cases, depending on appli-
cable regulations, it is also used to determine which 
cases may be subject to a process of expedited review 
(e.g. by Chair’s action or by a subcommittee of a full eth-
ics committee). A similar threshold may also be implicit 
in judgements about which risks need to be disclosed 
to subjects in order for their consents to be valid. 
There is no universally agreed definition of minimal risk. 
Most accounts characterise minimal risk as a risk equiv-
alent either to that encountered in everyday life, or to 
that encountered in routine medical examinations. 
These, of course, may not be the same. Moreover, each 
is susceptible to different interpretations. (11) For exam-
ple, either account may be interpreted as an absolute 
standard applicable to all potential research subjects, 
or relative to the individual. A relative standard would 
allow quite significant risks to count as ‘minimal’ for 
individuals who are, perhaps for medical, social or occu-
pational reasons, routinely exposed to above average 
levels of risk, and it would seem unjust to allow such 
individuals to be subjected to higher levels of risk as 
research subjects, without consent, just because of the 
higher risks that they already face. An absolute stand-
ard, on the other hand, would need to be further 
defined: it could refer to the level of risk that a typical 
or average member of the public would encounter 
in everyday life or routine medical examination, or it 
could, more restrictively, refer to a level of risk that every 
member of the public can routinely expect to encoun-
ter. Both of these standards also have the defect that, 
although they take as their reference point risks that 
are typically accepted without a requirement for con-
sent (or at least for written consent), (12) these are risks 
that are often linked with benefits for the person under-
going the risk, so we cannot infer the acceptability 
of similar levels of risk in a research context where the 
subjects do not stand to benefit.
Another point worth noting is that by defining mini-
mal risk in terms of equivalence to some other risk we 
are assuming that different risks can be compared in 
a straightforward quantitative way. This is problematic 
for two reasons. First, it is doubtful whether a researcher 
or research ethics committee could be in a position 
to quantify with any precision either the risks that 
define minimal risk or the risks arising from a proposed 
research project. Secondly, establishing equivalence 
between different risks presumes that the elements of 
the risks can be combined into a single measure. While 
this could in principle be done by multiplying the mag-
nitude of each potential harm by the probability of 
its occurrence, as in calculations of expected utility, 
a further objection to this approach is that it may not 
correspond to the way in which we, collectively or as 
individuals, judge the acceptability of risk. We might, 
for example think that potential harm exceeding a cer-
tain level of seriousness makes a risk unacceptable even 
if its probability is extremely low. 
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The Oviedo Convention offers definitions of minimal risk 
and burden that may avoid these problems. According 
to this account, a risk is deemed minimal if “having 
regard to the nature and scale of the intervention, it is 
to be expected that it will result, at the most, in a very 
slight and temporary negative impact on the health of 
the person concerned”, and correspondingly a burden 
is deemed minimal “if it is to be expected that the dis-
comfort will be, at the most, temporary and very slight 
for the person concerned”. (13) By basing its definition 
on a concrete description rather than an equivalence 
it avoids the immediate need for those trying to apply 
it to quantify and compare risks. It also seems to suggest 
that what matters is the maximum potential impact of 
an intervention, with probability having a relatively mar-
ginal role in determining which impacts count as mini-
mal. However, this definition still leaves considerable 
scope for judgement by ethics committees: what counts 
as a ‘very slight’ impact and what is it for an outcome 
to be ‘expected’ – is this to be understood in terms of 
a threshold level of probability and if so what is the level? 
Large risks
The concept of minimal risk is based on the supposi-
tion that some risks are small enough that people may 
be exposed to them without giving consent. Conversely 
it may be debated whether some risks are too large to 
expose people to even with their consent. We are 
unlikely to make this judgement where participation in 
the research has benefits for the individual that out-
weigh the risks. For example, in the case study one or 
more of the proposed treatments may have high risks 
because of their experimental nature, but they offer 
a prospect of significant improvements in quality of life 
which the treatments currently available to the subjects 
are not able to deliver. Other experimental procedures 
might have even higher risks but, as in medical practice 
outside the research context, still be acceptable if they 
offer the only hope for prolonging life or preventing 
very serious morbidity. However, many research ethics 
committees would hesitate to allow participants who 
do not stand to benefit in these ways to be subjected 
to very large risks, even with their consent. 
There is a temptation in such cases to question the 
competence of a potential participant who wishes 
to consent to something that appears to be strongly 
contrary to their interests. However, as we saw in 
Chapter 3, it is possible for someone to have an unu-
sual set of preferences, leading to decisions that seem 
strange to the majority, without being incompetent. 
Moreover, the reasons that motivate a person to par-
ticipate in highly risky research need not be to do with 
their self-interest. Liberals and libertarians are likely to 
view it as unjustifiably paternalistic, and contrary to 
the  value placed on autonomy in other contexts, 
for an ethics committee either to override an autono-
mous person’s judgement that participation is in their 
best interests or to thwart their wish to participate for 
altruistic reasons. 
However, there may be other reasons for holding that 
there is a limit to the level of risk that can be justified 
by a valid consent. If the same results could be obtained 
by less risky means then consequentialist considerations 
would oppose allowing the risky procedure. Even if 
the risky procedure does generate results that could 
not otherwise be obtained it may be thought that to 
impose high risks on another person, even with their 
consent, is contrary to the duties of the researcher, 
given that these include a duty not to harm as well as 
to respect autonomy. The researcher’s duties might 
relate not only to the subject but to the research insti-
tution, whose reputation may be damaged by associa-
tion with studies that are seen as having excessively high 
risk. The reputation of researchers in general (or in 
a particular discipline) may also be damaged, with con-
sequences for the recruitment of participants in the 
future. Virtue ethicists might add that, even if there 
appears to be a justification for exposing a subject to 
high risks in a case where valid consent has been given, 
to expose the subject to such risks would be to act in 
opposition to the dispositions of character that we wish 
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researchers to exhibit and nurture. This is an issue, then, 
on which different moral perspectives, and even differ-
ent considerations arising within as single perspective, 
are likely to pull us in different directions. 
High magnitude/low probability 
and uncertain risks 
While we have considered risks that are very small or 
very large, a special problem is presented by risks that 
involve a low probability of very serious harm. In prin-
ciple we could deal with such cases by calculating the 
expected costs and comparing them with the expected 
benefits of the procedure, either for each affected indi-
vidual or in the aggregate. However, in many cases the 
probabilities are not known with any precision or are 
disputed, and we might think that some outcomes are 
so bad that we should seek to avoid them even if the 
chances of them happening are so remote as to make 
the expected harm quite low. 
The third arm of the trial described in the case study 
presents such a scenario. One of the potential harms 
arising from xenotransplantation is the transmission of 
infectious agents from the ‘donor’ animal to humans, 
and in the worst case scenario such infections could 
prove to be both seriously harmful to humans and 
readily transmissible from human to human. As critics 
of xenotransplantation have pointed out, this could 
result in a new pandemic akin to AIDS or worse. 
This has led to calls for a precautionary approach to 
be followed, and for the adoption of a moratorium 
on xenotransplantation. (14) 
The precautionary principle originates in policies on 
environmental protection and in that context was 
introduced into the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community in 1992. However, the principle now informs 
policy on a much wider range of subjects: the European 
Commission’s communication on the precautionary 
principle refers, in addition to the environment, to 
potentially dangerous effects on human, animal or plant 
health, (15) and the principle is invoked in relation to 
human health in the regulation on the general princi-
ples and requirements of food law. (16) The precise inter-
pretation of the principle is a matter of some debate, 
to be discussed in Chapter 8, but broadly it asserts 
that  where an activity introduces a risk of serious 
harm, appropriate steps should be taken to prevent or 
limit that harm even though the scientific data does 
not permit a precise assessment of the level of risk.
It should be noted, however, that precautionary action 
is not cost-free. Forgoing or even delaying the investi-
gation of porcine neural implants in the case study may 
deprive many present and future patients of a valuable 
therapy, and more generally a moratorium on 
xenotransplantation might deprive many thousands of 
people of potentially life-saving treatments. Although 
the principle is designed to deal with cases where we 
lack scientifically rigorous evidence about the level of 
risk, it would be unethical to impose these sorts of costs 
merely on a suspicion of risk, without any evidence 
whatsoever. A plausible application of the precaution-
ary principle must therefore take account not only 
of the magnitude of the postulated harm, but of the 
evidence that such a threat really exists and the costs 
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of the proposed precautionary action. In the case of 
xenotransplantation this might lead to the view that 
limited and carefully regulated trials should be allowed 
to proceed, so that evidence about the risks and ben-
efits can be gathered while keeping the risk of disease 
transmission as low as possible.
Risks to researchers
In the discussion so far we have focused on risks to 
research subjects and to the general public. However, 
there is also a question about whether research ethics 
committees should seek to regulate risks that research-
ers impose on themselves, and whether they should 
give the same weight to these as to other risks. In the 
case study, the researchers may, because of their close 
proximity to the research subjects, be among the most 
at risk from zoonotic infections. In other cases research-
ers may more directly impose risks on themselves. 
For example, some kinds of social and criminological 
research may require researchers to associate with dan-
gerous people or to participate in dangerous activities, 
and in medical research self-experimentation may offer 
the only prospect of advancing certain lines of research 
when experimentation on patients or volunteers would 
be considered too dangerous for ethics committee 
approval. (17) One reason why research ethics commit-
tees might treat these risks differently from risks facing 
research subjects or the general public is that research-
ers may be assumed to have a good understanding of 
the risks involved and to have consented to their 
involvement. However, in a large project involving 
a number of staff with different levels of responsibility 
it may not be reasonable to assume understanding 
of the risks amongst all those involved, and the fact 
that they are participating as employees may lead to 
some doubt about whether their consent is fully vol-
untary. Similar considerations may apply in relation to 
researchers who are students. 
Ethics and randomised controlled trials
As well as raising general issues about the relationship 
between harms, benefits and consent, this chapter’s case 
study focuses attention on the specific ethical issues 
that arise in relation to randomised controlled trials. 
Randomised controlled trials are a vitally important 
research tool. They are most widely used in clinical trials, 
but can also be used to assess interventions and prac-
tices in fields other than medicine, such as education, 
social services and the criminal justice system. RCTs 
can be used to test new or existing practices. They can 
provide evidence of an intervention’s effectiveness 
(or ineffectiveness), safety, cost-effectiveness, and of 
the balance of benefits over harms in comparison with 
other treatments.
The last part of Question 1 prompts us to consider the 
nature of RCT methodology and the advantages of 
using this approach to investigate the experimental 
treatments for Parkinson’s disease. The advantages in 
this case will be the same as those of RCTs in general. 
These lie primarily in the ability of RCTs to produce reli-
able results by controlling for ‘confounding factors’. 
In many other kinds of research, the results that are 
obtained can be affected by factors other than the 
experimental intervention whose effects are being 
tested. For example, it may be difficult to separate the 
effects of an experimental treatment from the effects 
of factors such as the natural progression of the disease, 
changes in other treatments that patients may be 
receiving or changes in other aspects of their care, 
dietary or lifestyle changes, or the benefits of closer 
medical supervision resulting from trial participation. 
Two factors that are particularly problematic are ‘inves-
tigator bias’ and the ‘placebo effect’. Investigator bias 
occurs when a researcher consciously or unconsciously 
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behaves in a way which favours a particular answer to 
the research question. For example, a researcher who 
expects or hopes for a positive outcome might, in the 
course of recruiting participants, apply the inclusion 
and exclusion criteria more or less rigorously such that 
they end up with a sample that is more likely than the 
relevant patient population in general to respond 
to the treatment. In measuring and interpreting the 
results of an intervention they may be more inclined 
to classify a patient’s description of symptoms as an 
improvement, or in the case of a quantitative measure-
ment may be more inclined to discard a disappointing 
result as an error and re-measure, in cases where they 
know that the patient has received the experimental 
treatment. The placebo effect occurs where a patient’s 
belief that they are receiving an experimental treatment 
leads to an improvement in their condition independ-
ently of any direct pharmacological or similar effect. 
The main features of RCTs, which enable them to con-
trol for these factors, are illustrated by Case Study 5.1:
•  Participants are divided into one or more groups 
that will receive the experimental treatment(s), and 
a control group. 
•  Allocation of participants between these groups is 
determined by a random process, to ensure that 
the groups are statistically equivalent and are not 
affected by investigator bias. 
•  The control group typically receives either a pla-
cebo, or a standard treatment for the condition. 
In the case study, participants in all groups con-
tinue to receive a standard pharmaceutical treat-
ment while those in the control group undergo 
a placebo procedure.
•  Some RCTs are ‘open’ but the most rigorous are 
‘blinded’. Blinding means depriving one or more of 
the relevant actors of information about who is 
in which group. ‘Single-blinding’ means that the 
subject does not know to which group they have 
been assigned, so that any placebo effects will 
apply equally to all groups; ‘double blinding’ means 
that neither the subject nor the investigator knows. 
In this case the surgeon has to know which group 
his patient is in, but those who measure and assess 
the results are deprived of this knowledge, elimi-
nating the possibility of investigator bias.
Given that the knowledge resulting from research and 
the benefits resulting from this form a vital part of the 
justification for carrying out research on human sub-
jects, the ability of RCTs to provide reliable results, con-
trolling for confounding factors is an important ethical 
consideration in their favour. It also counts in favour of 
RCTs that they are widely perceived as reliable, for exam-
ple by clinicians or others who are expected to employ 
the techniques under investigation, and by the bodies 
that will licence and approve funding for them, making 
it likely that the results of well-designed and well-
conducted RCTs will make a real difference in practice. 
However, as we have seen, most moral theories do not 
view the production of benefits to society as sufficient 
to justify imposing risks of harm on individuals, and this 
is reflected in established codes of research ethics as 
well as in regulatory and legal provisions. The question 
therefore arises of whether, generally or in particular 
cases, the benefits of RCTs involve unacceptable costs 
for individual participants subjected to a regime of 
randomisation, controls and placebos. 
Harm and the therapeutic obligation
Questions 2 and 3 invite reflection on whether being 
allocated to the placebo arm (or more generally the 
control arm) of a trial amounts to being harmed. 
The thought here is that receiving either the ‘standard 
treatment’ or a placebo may be a setback to the sub-
ject’s interests relative to receiving the experimental 
treatment. The case for saying that the subject is 
harmed is stronger in the case of a placebo-controlled 
trial, since in that case the subject may also be disad-
vantaged relative to patients outside the trial who 
receive the standard treatment. 
If there is a harm in either of these cases, the harm con-
sists in an omission to provide the research subject with 
a treatment that could have benefited them. As noted 
above, some moral perspectives view a harm caused 
by omission as morally less significant than one caused 
by an active intervention. In this case, however, the fact 
that the harm results from an omission does not avoid 
the moral problem. This can most readily be seen in the 
case of medical RCTs, such as the one in the case study, 
where the treatment (or placebo) is provided by 
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a health care professional. It is generally held that mem-
bers of the health care professions have a ‘therapeutic 
obligation’: a duty to provide what they believe to 
be the best available treatment for their patients. For 
example, the Word Medical Association’s Declaration 
of Geneva requires physicians to affirm that “The health 
of my patient will be my first consideration”, (18) while 
the International Code of Medical Ethics states that 
“A physician shall act in the patient’s best interest when 
providing medical care”. (19) Both of these inform 
the Declaration of Helsinki’s previously quoted assertion 
of the primacy of the individual research subject. (20)
While these examples refer specifically to the medical 
profession, it is reasonable to suppose that similar obli-
gations will apply to members of other ‘caring profes-
sions’, and even, in more qualified form, to those whose 
roles combine caring with public protection or social 
control. Thus, in any of these contexts, the question arises 
of whether a random assignment of research subjects to 
treatment regimes, including experimental treatments, 
controls and possibly placebos, can be compatible with 
the researcher’s professional obligations. 
Placebos
The concern about subjects being disadvantaged by 
random allocation among treatment options is strong-
est in the case of those assigned to a placebo group. 
A common response to this concern is that placebo-
controlled trials are only justifiable where there is no 
well-established standard treatment, and that where 
an established treatment exists this should be used as 
the control. There are, however, difficulties with this rule.
One type of difficulty concerns the interpretation of 
the rule: what counts as a well-established standard 
treatment? The formulations given by the Declaration 
of Helsinki and the Oviedo Convention permit placebo 
controls to be used in the absence of any “current 
proven intervention” or “methods of proven effective-
ness”. (21) However, for many current treatments that 
pre-date the era of evidence-based medicine there will 
be significant evidence of effectiveness in the form of 
case histories and practitioner experience, which may 
be thought sufficient to generate obligations for prac-
titioners providing treatments to patients, but which 
fall short of full scientific proof. Indeed one reason 
for conducting RCTs is to provide a definitive test of 
the effectiveness of such interventions.
There is also a question about how the rule should be 
applied when a treatment that is known to be effective 
is not available to the population from which the 
research subjects are drawn, for example for economic 
reasons. Where this is the case, a subject in the placebo 
group is no worse off than they would be outside the 
trial, but controversy exists as to whether researchers in 
this situation have an obligation to ensure that their sub-
jects are provided with a level of treatment that would 
be regarded as standard elsewhere. This issue gives rise 
to intense controversy about the ethics of conducting 
placebo-controlled trials in developing countries and 
will be returned to in the following chapter. (22)
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Leaving aside these difficulties of interpretation, strict 
application of the established treatment rule has 
a number of disadvantages, which provide at least 
prima facie grounds for a more permissive approach 
to the use of placebos. Note that while three of the 
following relate to the interests of society in obtaining 
and utilising the results of research, the fourth relates 
to the interests of research subjects, although as 
a group rather than as individuals.
•  In general, placebo-controlled trials are said to pro-
duce more reliable results than trials employing 
established treatments as ‘active controls’. (23) The 
reliability and accuracy of the latter depends on 
the reliability and accuracy of our knowledge of 
the effectiveness and safety of the treatment that 
is being used as a control. Even if the trial shows us 
that the experimental treatment is better than the 
established treatment, in the worst case this could 
mean that both treatments are harmful to patients 
but the experimental treatment is less so.
•  Regulatory bodies may insist upon or be more 
willing to accept placebo- controlled trials than 
those with active controls, making them neces-
sary in order to achieve the intended benefits of 
the research.
•  The results of non-placebo-controlled trials may 
be less convincing to practitioners, reducing the 
likelihood of the trial results translating into real 
benefits for patients. 
•  Placebo-controlled trials may be able to achieve sta-
tistically significant results with fewer participants, 
thus reducing the number of people subjected to 
the risks or burdens of research participation.
The circumstances in which placebo use is permissible 
have been a source of much controversy surrounding 
successive versions of the Declaration of Helsinki. 
The fifth revision (2000) appeared to prohibit placebo 
use where a proven treatment exists, but in 2002 a “note 
of clarification” was issued. This permitted the use of 
placebo controls even if a proven treatment exists, 
where “compelling and scientifically sound methodo-
logical reasons” make their use necessary, or the inves-
tigation concerns a “minor condition and the patients 
who receive placebo will not be subject to any addi-
tional risk of serious or irreversible harm”. In the most 
recent revision (2008) a more moderate departure from 
the established treatment rule (with ‘or’ replaced 
by ‘and’) has been incorporated into the main text, 
permitting use of placebo controls where a proven 
intervention does exist but where “for compelling and 
scientifically sound methodological reasons the use of 
placebo is necessary to determine the efficacy or safety 
of an intervention and the patients who receive pla-
cebo or no treatment will not be subject to any risk of 
serious or irreversible harm”. (24) The Oviedo Convention 
similarly permits placebos where there are methods of 
proven effectiveness but “withdrawal or withholding 
of such methods does not constitute an unacceptable 
risk or burden”. (25)
The effect of these provisions is to qualify the primacy 
of the research subject, allowing them to be allocated 
to treatments that are sub-optimal provided that this 
does not seriously disadvantage them. This allows some 
discretion in determining what counts as an accepta-
ble level of sub-optimality. One factor that is potentially 
relevant to this judgement, although contentious, is the 
claimed tendency – often referred to as the ‘trial effect’ – 
of patients enrolled in RCTs to have better medical 
outcomes than those who are not, even if they are in 
the control arm. (26) There are also features in the design 
of certain trials that can reduce the disadvantage of 
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a trial. Consider a case in which a group of patients have 
consented to take part in a trial. Half of them (group A) 
will be given an experimental treatment. The other half 
(group B) will be given the established treatment, which 
is believed to be moderately effective. There are various 
beliefs that the doctor administering the treatments 
(and others involved in the research) might have about 
their relative merit, for example:
 
a)  The experimental treatment is likely to be more 
effective than the established treatment.
b)  The established treatment is likely to be more effec-
tive than the experimental treatment.
c)  The prospects of success are equally good for both 
treatments.
d)  I just don’t have any view about which will be more 
effective.
If the doctor believes (c) or (d) then the problem does 
not arise, but if she believes (a) or (b) then we are con-
fronted with the problem of treatment preference. 
If she believes (a) then it seems that the therapeutic 
obligation, or just the requirement to prioritise the 
interests of individual patients over those of society, 
requires her to give the experimental treatment to all 
the patients, not just those in group A. If she believes 
(b) then it seems that she has an obligation to provide 
the established treatment to all patients, not just those 
in group B. In the case of a multi-arm study such as the 
case study, it seems that unless the doctor is neutral 
between the treatments in all its arms she will have an 
obligation to provide whichever one she believes best 
to all the patients. This state of neutrality is what is 
referred to as ‘equipoise’. (27) 
The problem here is that it is not clear that researchers 
are ever neutral between the treatments provided in 
different arms of a trial. Although there will not be con-
clusive evidence in advance of a trial, in order to get 
to the RCT stage there will generally have to be some 
reasons to believe the experimental treatment to be 
superior to what is currently available (e.g. more 
those in the placebo arm. For example, in ‘crossover 
trials’ all participants receive a period of active therapy 
as well as a period on the placebo. However, this trial 
design is not possible in all cases and could result in 
all participants being disadvantaged relative to non-
participants who receive uninterrupted access to an 
established treatment. Alternatively an undertaking 
may be given that those assigned to the placebo arm 
will be provided with whichever treatment proves most 
effective at the end of the trial. This, however, may not 
be possible or may not eliminate the disadvantage of 
being assigned to the placebo arm if the treatment is 
time-critical.
 
The research in Case Study 5.1 is less problematic than 
many placebo-controlled trials in that patients are not 
denied the standard (drug) treatment for Parkinson’s 
disease but receive the placebo surgery in addition to 
it. In another respect, however, this trial is more prob-
lematic than typical placebo-controlled trials, because 
placebo surgery poses a greater risk to participants 
than the inactive placebo drugs used in pharmaceuti-
cal RCTs. It should be noted, however, that the general 
risks of surgery add to the consequentialist case for 
the trial, as without the effectiveness data that it gen-
erates we risk imposing the risks of surgery on patients 
unnecessarily. 
Equipoise
Although much of the controversy about RCTs focuses 
on the use of placebos, concerns about the disadvan-
tage that research subjects may suffer, and about pos-
sible violation of the therapeutic obligation, are also 
generated by the random allocation of subjects 
between experimental and control groups more gen-
erally. This has given rise to the doctrine of equipoise. 
The question that the doctrine of equipoise attempts 
to address is whether it is possible to act in the best 
interests of a patient, or other research subject, while 
randomly allocating them between different arms of 
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well-defined. How many people need to reject a pre-
vailing consensus in order for equipoise to exist, and 
does it matter whether they are researchers or clinicians, 
and the extent to which they are specialists in the rel-
evant field? Even if we can agree about the criteria for 
clinical equipoise, does this justify a researcher subject-
ing patients to a treatment that he or she personally 
believes to be sub-optimal? More fundamentally, is 
equipoise necessary to justify RCTs, or is a more impor-
tant consideration the willingness of subjects to con-
sent to random allocation between treatment regimes?
RCTs and consent
The principle of equipoise attempts to identify cir-
cumstances in which trial participants can be assigned 
to a placebo or control treatment without being disad-
vantaged. However, the principle of respect for auton-
omy suggests that we should allow people to make this 
judgement for themselves. One reason for this is that 
what is best for an individual depends not only on clini-
cal effectiveness and safety but on preferences and 
values of the individual concerned, so if the aim is to 
avoid subjecting people to disadvantage then arguably 
the best way to ensure this is to provide them with 
sufficient information (including information about 
differences of opinion within the clinical community) 
and allow them to decide for themselves. Another 
reason is that, in accordance with Mill’s harm principle, 
respecting people’s autonomy may involve allowing 
them to act on their own decisions even when this goes 
against their best interests. Thus, if someone wishes to 
enter a trial that could disadvantage them, either for 
altruistic reasons, or because the values they place on 
the various possible outcomes make it attractive to 
them to gamble on a particular outcome, then it may 
be objectionably paternalistic to prevent them from 
doing so. Arguably, therefore, what matters in assessing 
an RCT is not the indifference between the arms of the 
trial of a clinician or the clinical community, but the will-
ingness of the subject to consent to being randomly 
allocated. (29) 
effective or less risky). And, as Question 6 invites us to 
consider, even if the researcher was in equipoise at the 
beginning of the trial, preliminary results are likely to 
give some indication that one of the treatments is supe-
rior before the trial is completed and before achieving 
the degree of statistical significance necessary for pub-
lication and regulatory approval. In cases where pre-
liminary results give a very strong indication of the 
superiority of one of the treatment arms, trials are ter-
minated. However, if this were to happen every time 
equipoise was lost then RCTs of more than a very short 
duration would become impossible. 
In response to these problems an alternative view of 
equipoise has been proposed by some researchers, 
most notably Freedman. (28) According to this view, 
instead of thinking of equipoise as a psychological state 
of an individual researcher, we should think of it as 
a state of uncertainty of the relevant community. An 
RCT can be justified when there is disagreement within 
the clinical community about which treatment is best, 
and it can be argued that a patient is not disadvantaged 
by random assignment to one of a range of treatments 
as long as each of the treatments is considered best by 
some section of the clinical community and would 
be selected by some clinicians when treating patients 
outside a clinical trial. 
Equipoise in this sense is more likely to exist than a strict 
neutrality in the minds of individual researchers; indeed, 
it is the lack of consensus within the clinical community 
that creates the need to conduct a trial. Moreover, even 
if preliminary trial data gives some reason to prefer one 
treatment over another, it is unlikely that a trial will lead 
to consensus being reached (and therefore to equipoise 
being broken) until statistically significant results have 
been obtained and submitted to peer review. 
There are, however, some difficulties with this version 
of the equipoise doctrine. It is not clear that the 
boundaries of the relevant community, or the extent 
of disagreement necessary for equipoise to exist, are 
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efforts to develop new ways of explaining randomisa-
tion to subjects, and also casts doubt on the possibility 
of obtaining valid consent. (30)
Further issues
Question 7 invites consideration of ethical issues relat-
ing to particular arms of the trial. Some of these are 
issues that have already been discussed above, in con-
nection with the balancing of risks and benefits, while 
others relate to the particular therapies being investi-
gated rather than the means used to investigate them.
A trial involving only arms 1, 2 and 3 would avoid the 
ethical concerns associated with use of placebo but, for 
reasons discussed above, might undermine the actual 
or perceived methodological validity of the trial, lead-
ing to the loss of some or all of its intended benefits. 
Although trials with active controls can sometimes be 
effective, and can avoid the difficulties associated with 
placebos, this depends on the level of effectiveness and 
safety of the control treatment being well-established 
so that it can be used as a reference point for assessing 
the experimental treatments. In the present case, how-
ever, all of the remaining arms of the trial involve exper-
imental treatments whose efficacy and safety are 
unknown. It therefore seems unlikely that such a trial 
could produce useful results. Moreover, in this case the 
argument for avoiding placebo is weakened by the fact 
that patients receiving the placebo will not be deprived 
of treatment but will receive the standard drug treat-
ment as well as the sham surgery. Whether the placebo 
arm is objectionable is likely to depend on how much 
risk is introduced by the sham surgery.
A trial involving only arms 1, 2 and 4 would avoid the 
particular risks arising from xenotransplantation and in 
particular the risk of zoonosis. This is an important 
There are, however, practical limits to the ability of con-
sent to justify use of controls and placebos. First, as in 
other contexts, consent cannot be used to justify risks 
or burdens borne by people who lack the capacity to 
give valid consent, for example young children, incom-
petent adults, or those who are excessively vulnerable 
to manipulation or coercion. Thus, even if it is the case 
that consent is the preferred mode of justification when 
exposing competent subjects to risks, it remains neces-
sary to consider the questions of harm and disadvan-
tage raised by the equipoise debate when considering 
the justifiability of entering non-competent subjects 
into RCTs.
Second, there are features of RCTs that can undermine 
the validity of a consent even when it is given by a gen-
erally competent subject. For example, RCTs often 
involve experimental treatments that are not available 
except through the trial. In some cases, the prospect of 
receiving such a treatment might act as an inducement 
that could undermine the voluntariness of the partici-
pants’ consent. As with other inducements, however, 
it should not be assumed that having a strong reason 
to consent makes it impossible to do so voluntarily, but 
rather we would have to consider whether the incen-
tive provided by the treatment interfered with the 
process of rational deliberation.
 
A more pervasive factor affecting the ability of other-
wise competent subjects to consent to participation in 
an RCT is the difficulty that many have in understand-
ing the nature and implications of RCT methodology. 
Studies have shown that many patients fail to under-
stand a crucial aspect of RCT methodology, believing, 
even after the process of randomisation has been 
explained to them, that they will be assigned a treat-
ment on the basis of their individual therapeutic needs. 
This misunderstanding, known as the ‘therapeutic mis-
conception’, appears to be persistent in the face of 
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consideration since the risk of zoonosis potentially 
affects a large population from whom it would be 
impracticable to obtain consent. Therefore, if the risks 
to the population at large are considered to be above 
the minimal level that can be justified without consent, 
dropping the xenotransplantation arm might shift the 
trial from being unacceptable to being acceptable. 
It would, however, mean that the trial was investigat-
ing only one, rather than two types of treatment, reduc-
ing the potential benefits to future patients. A trial 
without the xenotransplantation arm could also be 
more acceptable to people who object to the harming 
or killing of animals in the course of medical research 
and treatments. Animal welfare is an issue that is not 
usually within the remit of committees that conduct 
ethical review of research involving human participants, 
since it is often subject to separate legal and regulatory 
provision. However, it raises an interesting question 
about the extent to which members’ personal views 
on such matters should influence the decisions made 
by research ethics committees. 
A similar issue arises in relation to the use of fetal tissue 
in arms 1 and 2 of the trial. The moral status of the 
human fetus, like that of non-human animals, is a mat-
ter on which research ethics committee members may 
have strongly divergent views. One difference between 
the two cases is that opposition to the use of fetal tissue 
often has a religious basis, while opposition to the use 
of animals in xenotransplantation typically does not. (31) 
This raises the question of whether religion-based views 
on bioethical issues should be accorded any special sta-
tus different from the status accorded to the secular 
judgements of individuals. The significance of different 
views on the moral status of the fetus will be consid-
ered further in Chapter 8, alongside other ethical issues 
arising from the content of what is being researched 
rather than the research process itself.

Chapter 6   Justice in research 
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Learning outcomes
You will develop an understanding of ethical issues about justice and the related concepts 
of exploitation and discrimination in research. Specifically you will acquire:
•  Knowledge of the definition and ethical significance of exploitation.
•  An understanding of the relation of exploitation to other phenomena such as inequality, 
vulnerability and consent.
•  An ability to reflect on the ethical significance of background inequalities which form 
the context for research but are beyond the control of the researchers.
•  An understanding of the ethical problems associated with exclusion from research 
participation.
•  An understanding of the definition and ethical significance of discrimination, including 
the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination.
•  An ability to assess and distinguish between justifiable and discriminatory inclusion 
and exclusion criteria.
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Introduction
This chapter examines concerns about justice and 
injustice as they relate to research. The principle of 
justice was identified in Chapter 1 as one of the ‘four 
principles’ that are commonly taken to cover the range 
of ethical issues arising in biomedical contexts, and is 
the only one of the four principles not yet to have been 
explored in this textbook. The issues to be addressed 
in this chapter fall into two broad categories: 
•  concerns about researchers unfairly taking advan-
tage of research subjects and imposing unfair bur-
dens on them for the sake of benefits to themselves 
or others; and 
•  concerns about unfair exclusion of particular 
groups from participation in research and the ben-
efits that may attach to research participation. 
The former is broadly about the exploitation of research 
subjects while the latter is broadly about discrimination. 
Exploitation is a common theme in criticisms of par-
ticular research projects, particularly those that involve 
paying inducements to participants, and research con-
ducted in developing countries. However, since there 
is no agreed definition of ‘exploitation’, it is not always 
clear what these criticisms amount to. Hence, in order 
to assess both the general usefulness of the concept 
of exploitation and its application to particular cases, 
we need to consider what exploitation is and what is 
wrong with it.
Although exploitation of research participants contin-
ues to be a concern for researchers and research ethics 
committees, there has in recent years been an increasing 
awareness that excluding groups of people from par-
ticipation in research, even when this is done out of 
a wish to avoid exploiting or harming members of vul-
nerable groups, can itself lead to injustice and harm. (1) 
Such exclusions may harm members of the excluded 
groups both by depriving them of the direct benefits 
of research participation and by reducing the evidence 
base relating to the treatment of those groups. 
The issues addressed in this chapter connect in various 
ways with the major themes previously discussed in this 
textbook. Justice, in the sense addressed here, is about 
the distribution of benefits and burdens, and so relates 
to issues discussed in Chapter 5. Consent arises in rela-
tion both to exploitation and to exclusion from trials. 
And the analysis of exploitation will show that it is 
closely related to the notion of vulnerability.
To avoid confusion it should be noted that the term 
‘justice’ is used in different ways. In a wide sense, it is 
used to refer to that part of ethics that concerns rights 
or obligations (or is enforceable), while narrower senses 
include distributive justice (which relates to fairness in 
the distribution of benefits and burdens), retributive 
justice (the infliction of punishment), rectificatory and 
restorative justice (compensating or otherwise making 
amends for previous injustices) and procedural justice 
(use of fair procedures for decision-making). This chap-
ter is concerned with distributive, and, to a lesser extent, 
procedural justice.
The chapter includes three case studies. Two of these 
are intended primarily to focus discussion on issues of 
exploitation while the third is intended to focus dis-
cussion on the issues of exclusion and discrimination 
in relation to access to trials. 
122
E U R O P E A N  T E X T B O O K  O N  E T H I C S  I N  R E S E A R C H
2.   This case shares some features with the recruitment practices reported in Laurie P Cohen, “To screen new drugs for safety, Lilly pays 
homeless alcoholics: it’s ‘quick cash’ to habitues of Indianapolis shelters; it vanishes quickly, too”, Wall Street Journal (Eastern Ed.) 
(November 14, 1996): A1, A10.
 Case Study 6.1
Recruiting homeless participants 
to Phase 1 trials
A large pharmaceutical company conducts Phase 1 
trials of its products at a specialist trials unit in 
a major European city. (2) These are trials conducted 
using ‘healthy volunteer’ subjects and designed to 
test the safety and pharmacological effects of new 
drugs, and to establish maximum tolerated dose 
levels. The products being tested have all under-
gone prior testing on animals, and in some cases 
there will have been previous trials in humans. 
Volunteers typically spend between a few days 
and several weeks in the unit. After completing 
a questionnaire and undergoing initial health checks 
and baseline measurements, they will receive one 
or more doses of the product under investigation, 
while being subject to regular monitoring and 
assessment. Volunteers are required to report any 
adverse effects, and medical staff are on hand 
in case treatment is needed. 
Because subjects participating in Phase 1 trials 
receive no therapeutic benefit it is usual for them 
to be paid. The unit’s recruitment materials (leaflets 
and posters, which volunteers are encouraged to 
take away and distribute) state that “compensation 
for time and inconvenience” will be paid “according 
to the length and nature of the trial”. In addition, 
the leaflets highlight the fact that meals and 
accommodation are provided free for the duration 
of the trial, and that entertainment and recreational 
facilities are provided. 
In the past the company has had little difficulty in 
getting its trials approved by the research ethics 
committee, and it has a good safety record. 
However a new REC member has questioned the 
level of payments offered to volunteers and discov-
ered that these are much lower than those typically 
offered by other pharmaceutical companies. 
Further investigation reveals that a large proportion 
of the volunteers are long-term unemployed and 
homeless (most of the addresses supplied on the 
initial questionnaire are for local hostels for the 
homeless or other temporary accommodation). 
Many are thought to be alcoholics or drug addicts, 
although they have to declare themselves ‘clean’ at 
the time of registering for a trial and will be unable 
to consume alcohol or drugs (other than the 
investigational product) while in the unit. It is also 
evident that, despite an absence of high-profile 
advertising, the unit is widely known, with many 
volunteers travelling long distances to participate 
in trials. Many have participated in trials for this or 
other companies on several previous occasions, and 
although the eligibility criteria specify a minimum 
of three months between trials there is some evidence 
of volunteers falsifying their identity to overcome 
this restriction. 
The company is unapologetic about its low payment 
levels or the socioeconomic groups from which 
its subjects are drawn. It argues that the ease 
with which it recruits volunteers demonstrates 
that the benefits to participants are substantial, 
and that higher payments might amount to undue 
inducement. It also points out that the number 
of participants withdrawing from trials is very low, 
as is the number of complaints received.
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Questions
1.  What advantages does the pharmaceutical 
company gain by recruiting from a disadvan-
taged sector of society, and what benefits 
do the volunteers gain from participation 
in the trials?
2.  What disadvantages or risks does this method 
of recruitment have for the company and for 
the volunteers?
3.  Are there grounds for considering the company’s 
recruitment practice to be exploitative? If so what 
are they, and do you agree that it is exploitative?
4.  What changes, if any, would the company need 
to make in order to persuade you that its 
recruitment practice was morally acceptable?
Benefit and risk
The first two questions in this case study relate to the 
discussion of harm and benefit in the previous chapter, 
but also have a bearing on the questions of whether 
the research described in the case study is exploitative, 
and if so what the moral force of this fact is. 
Although the real case on which this case study is loosely 
based has generated a large amount of hostile comment, 
that hostility may be difficult to justify if the way in which 
participants are recruited benefits all parties. In the case 
study it appears that the company’s recruitment prac-
tices do have the potential to benefit both the company 
and the participants. Benefits to the company include:
•  the lower level of payment necessary to attract 
volunteers; 
•  the fact that recruitment by word of mouth avoids 
the need for expensive advertising; 
•  the fact that participants for whom the payment 
is an important consideration and who hope to 
participate in future trials may be less likely than 
more affluent volunteers to withdraw part way 
through a trial, and, if adverse events occur, less 
inclined to seek legal redress and more willing to 
accept lower levels of compensation. 
Benefits to the participants include:
•  payment (which even if relatively low may be very 
significant to individuals with few economic 
resources to draw on);
•  food and accommodation (which may be an 
important benefit for impoverished and homeless 
volunteers); 
•  recreational and entertainment facilities;
•  the opportunity to be in a safe, medically super-
vised environment free from alcohol and illicit drugs.
The fact that both parties stand to gain from the 
arrangement suggests that there may be a consequen-
tialist case in favour of it, although to establish this it 
would be necessary to compare the effects of the 
recruitment practices described in the case study with 
alternative practices in which, for example, the com-
pany had greater costs, but the participants (drawn 
from a less disadvantaged population) received higher 
payments and, when necessary, higher compensation 
for adverse outcomes. 
One reason for thinking that recruitment from the dis-
advantaged group would be supported by consequen-
tialism (or more specifically utilitarianism) is that 
although utilitarianism tells us simply to maximise the 
amount of welfare resulting from our choices and is 
neutral about how that welfare is distributed, in prac-
tice it tends to favour redistribution of resources 
towards the more disadvantaged because of the phe-
nomenon of diminishing marginal returns. This refers 
to the fact that a given amount of resources made avail-
able to someone who has very little will tend to pro-
duce more benefit for that person than the same 
amount of resources made available to someone who 
is better off to start with. In relation to the case study, 
this means that even though the company benefits by 
paying less to its recruits than other pharmaceutical 
companies do, the recruits themselves may gain as 
much or more benefit than better-off recruits would 
gain from larger payments. 
This, however, does not establish a conclusive utilitar-
ian case for the company’s recruitment practices. 
Utilitarianism tells us to compare all the available 
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alternatives and choose the one that produces the 
most welfare. The available alternatives in this case 
would include arrangements in which disadvantaged 
people were recruited as subjects but paid (and if nec-
essary compensated for adverse outcomes) at a much 
higher rate than the company is choosing to pay. This 
might be worse for the company but would be better 
for the recruits, and might plausibly produce more 
overall benefit.
Perhaps more importantly, given the discussion in the 
previous chapter, the fact that both parties stand to 
gain from the company’s recruitment policy will tend 
to undermine deontological objections to the recruit-
ment policy, based on the wrongness of sacrificing one 
party’s interests for the benefit of another. If the 
arrangement is mutually beneficial, then no such sacri-
fice occurs. 
These arguments, however, ignore the risks arising 
from way in which participants are recruited. Risks to 
the company include reputational damage arising 
from the fact that it appears to be acting exploitatively 
(the appearance matters here since reputational dam-
age may be suffered even if the company’s practices 
are not actually exploitative). The company may also 
be harmed (as may future patients treated with its 
products) if the scientific quality of its trials is com-
promised by participants lying about their drug use or 
medical history in order to get into the trials, or con-
cealing adverse reactions for fear of being removed 
from the trials. This may be a significant risk, given that 
recruits are already motivated to accept lower than 
normal levels of payment, and in some cases to falsify 
their identity in order to evade the waiting period 
between trials. The fact that such falsification has been 
found to occur may suggest that the company’s pro-
cedures for verification of claims made by its recruits 
are inadequate. 
The concealment of relevant information may also put 
the participants at increased risk of harm, and, while 
the risks to the company (and to future patients) may 
undermine the utilitarian case for its recruitment prac-
tices, risks to the participants may undermine both the 
utilitarian case and the claim that nobody’s interests 
are sacrificed for the benefit of others by the compa-
ny’s decision to recruit from a disadvantaged section 
of society. These counterarguments, however, depend 
on how the risks weigh up against the benefits. The fact 
that the participants choose, apparently with some 
enthusiasm, to participate indicates that they them-
selves believe the risks to be outweighed by the bene-
fits. There may, however, be concerns about the validity 
of their consent, especially in cases where they conceal 
risk factors and therefore cannot be fully informed 
about the level of risk that they face, or where alcohol 
or drug addiction interfere with their ability to make 
autonomous choices.
Exploitation
Question 3 invites us to identify the features of the 
company’s practice in virtue of which it could be con-
sidered exploitative, and to assess whether in fact it is 
a case of exploitation. ‘Exploitation’ has both a moral 
and a non-moral sense. We employ the term in the 
non-moral sense when we speak of exploiting a natu-
ral resource, an opportunity, or our own talents, locu-
tions which imply no moral condemnation. When we 
speak of exploiting a person, however, we typically 
employ the term in its moral sense. In both cases, to 
exploit something or someone means, roughly, to use 
or take advantage of it or them, but in the moral case 
it implies using or taking advantage in a way that is at 
least prima facie morally wrong. Exploitation in the 
moral sense is also thought of as a form of injustice: to 
exploit someone is, amongst other things, to treat them 
unfairly. These elements are captured by Wertheimer’s 
working definition of exploitation as taking unfair 
advantage of someone. (3) 
The concept of exploitation is often employed in eco-
nomic contexts, particularly in relation to the exploita-
tion of workers by employers. Economic exploitation 
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is often characterised in terms of an unequal exchange, 
in which “the exploited party gets less than the exploit-
ing party, who does better at the exploited party’s 
expense”. (4) Unequal exchange cannot, however, be 
a sufficient condition for exploitation, since we would 
not normally consider a freely given gift, a discount 
offered to a friend by a tradesperson, or an altruistic deci-
sion to participate in research, to be a case of exploita-
tion. There must, therefore, be some other defining 
feature(s) present in those cases of unequal exchange 
that we do consider to be exploitative. However, even 
if we assume (for now) that the additional feature(s) 
necessary for exploitation are present in the case study, 
the account of exploitation as unequal exchange does 
not provide grounds for thinking that the research 
described in the case study is exploitative. 
The most obvious cases of unequal exchange would 
be transactions from which the exploiter benefits while 
the exploited person is harmed. This relates to a distinc-
tion made by Wertheimer between harmful and mutu-
ally beneficial exploitation. (5) Mutually beneficial 
exploitation is, as Wertheimer notes, the more interest-
ing category, because transactions that impose harm 
on one party will usually be unethical independently 
of whether they are judged to be exploitative. (6) From 
a research ethics perspective the interesting question is 
whether being exploitative can make a piece of research 
unethical in cases that are not already rendered unethi-
cal by other principles such as non-maleficence or non-
violation of basic rights.
Relating this distinction to the case study, it appears 
that the transaction between the company and the 
volunteers may well be mutually beneficial. There are 
risks to participants (particularly if they conceal risk fac-
tors when being admitted to a trial), but the potential 
benefits are quite considerable and appear to be judged 
so by the participants themselves. Moreover, it is not 
clear that the gains to the research participants are 
smaller than those to the company. In monetary terms 
the benefits to the participants (payments plus cost of 
accommodation, food, etc.) may be smaller than the 
benefits to the company (proportion of expected prof-
its attributable to the contribution of the participants), 
but in terms of effects on welfare, and taking into 
account the phenomenon of diminishing marginal 
returns, the participants may gain more than the 
employees and/or shareholders of the company. 
Indeed, it is because the benefits of participation make 
such a difference to the participants’ welfare that they 
are so easily recruited despite the low payment levels.
Does the absence of an unequal exchange (in the sense 
of the company gaining more from the transaction 
than the participants) show that the relationship 
between the company and the participants in the case 
study is non-exploitative? One reason why we might 
reject this conclusion is that the company can be char-
acterised as exploiting the participants not only on its 
own behalf but on behalf of the future users of its 
medicinal products. In this case the combined benefits 
to the company and future users may be much larger 
than those gained by the company alone, and may 
exceed those gained by the participants. (7) A more fun-
damental reason is that unequal exchange in this sense 
is not a necessary feature of exploitation. Wertheimer 
illustrates this point with the example of a doctor who 
charges several times the usual fee for a life-saving treat-
ment, knowing that the patient is desperate and has 
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no cheaper alternative available. (8) Most people will 
intuitively judge such an action to be exploitative even 
though the treatment is worth more to the patient 
than the inflated fee is to the doctor.
This example points to a different kind of asymmetry 
in the relationship between the company and research 
participants in the case study. Like the exploitative doc-
tor, the company in the case study enters into what we 
are assuming to be a mutually beneficial transaction, 
but on terms that are more favourable to it and less 
favourable to the other party than the established 
norm for that kind of transaction. Thus, while the sub-
ordinate party may be better off as a result of the trans-
action than they would be by rejecting it, they may 
nevertheless be disadvantaged relative to some other 
way in which the transaction could have been conducted. 
This will only be morally significant, however, if the 
baseline against which the subordinate party is disad-
vantaged is itself morally significant. 
This idea is captured by Wolff ’s suggestion that, while 
exploitation need not make the exploited person 
“worse off than they would have been without the 
exploitative arrangement”, it does require that they are 
made worse off in some sense, and that the best 
account of this is “that the person is made worse off 
than they ought to be”. (9) The difficulty with this 
account lies in defining the morally relevant baseline. 
Taking the established norm as the baseline would 
make the notion of exploitation excessively relativistic, 
as the customary level of payment may be inappropri-
ately high or low, so that a departure from it represents 
a move towards rather than away from a fair exchange.
In the case study we are allowing that the recruits may 
benefit overall from participation in the trial, and that 
they may benefit more than the company from their 
participation. The implication of the view discussed in 
the last two paragraphs is that they may nevertheless 
be exploited insofar as they benefit less from the trans-
action than they ought to. The question then is how 
much they ought to benefit. How much is the com-
pany obliged to improve the benefits that it offers to 
participants in order to meet the requirements of jus-
tice? One way of attempting to answer this question is 
by focusing not directly on the benefits received by 
each party but on the conditions under which the par-
ties agree to the package of benefits and burdens. 
In both the exploitative doctor case and the case study, 
the dominant party uses its bargaining power to 
achieve an arrangement that is more favourable to it 
and less favourable to the subordinate party than might 
otherwise have been agreed. In both cases what leads 
the subordinate party to agree such terms is the lack of 
preferable alternatives. In the exploitative doctor case 
the patient has no cheaper way of securing the life-
saving treatment that she needs, and in the case study 
the participants are likely to have few, if any, alternative 
ways of obtaining money, food, shelter, etc. The partici-
pants are not coerced into entering the trial by the 
company, since the company uses no force and issues 
no threats (in particular, there is no suggestion that any-
body who refuses the company’s offer will be worse off 
than if the offer had not been made). What leads them 
to accept the offer is the disadvantaged position that 
they are in prior to the offer being made. The subordi-
nate party may thus be said to be disadvantaged not 
relative to their situation before entering into the trans-
action but relative to the position that they would have 
been in had they negotiated the terms of the transac-
tion from a less disadvantaged starting point.
This analysis of the case study is consistent with the 
view that exploitation, in the moral sense, consists in 
taking unfair advantage of someone, and with Wood’s 
more specific suggestion that exploitation (of persons) 
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consists in “using something about the [exploited] per-
son for the exploiter’s ends by playing on some weak-
ness or vulnerability in that person”. (10) On this analysis 
the way in which the company takes unfair advantage 
of the research participants is by using the imbalance 
of power between it and the research participants, 
stemming from the latter’s disadvantaged situation and 
consequent limited range of alternatives, to press its 
own advantage. 
The moral force of exploitation
In order to decide how to respond to the case study 
we need to consider what is wrong with the kind of 
exploitation that appears to be present in it. 
We have seen that exploitation is not always harmful 
to the exploited person and does not always involve 
the exploited person receiving less benefit than he or 
she provides to the exploiter. We have also seen that 
exploitation is not necessarily coercive. It might be 
thought that the validity of exploited people’s consent 
is undermined by the limited range of alternatives avail-
able to them. However, this view is problematic given 
that we accept the possibility of a patient validly con-
senting to a life-saving operation even when the sole 
alternative is death. 
An alternative explanation of the wrongness of exploi-
tation is that it involves a failure to comply with the 
principle of respect for persons. Wood, for example, 
writes that:
Proper respect for others is violated when we treat 
their vulnerabilities as opportunities to advance our 
own interests or projects. It is degrading to have your 
weaknesses taken advantage of, and dishonorable 
to use the weaknesses of others for your ends. (11)
Interpreting this in Kantian terms (12) we may note that 
since exploitation involves using or taking advantage of 
others, it necessarily involves treating them as means. 
According to Kant’s categorical imperative it is permis-
sible to treat people as means provided we simultane-
ously treat them with the respect that they are due 
as agents or ends in themselves. Arguably, however, by 
taking advantage of another person’s vulnerability 
to get a better deal for himself, an exploiter places too 
much weight on the exploited person’s value as a means 
to his own ends and too little on their intrinsic value as 
an end in themselves. 
Although a Kantian notion of respect for persons is 
often associated with absolute moral constraints, it 
does not follow from the account given here that 
exploitation is always wrong or that people should 
always be prevented from entering into exploitative 
relationships. One reason for this is that respect for per-
sons is often taken to involve respecting their auton-
omy, and this suggests that people should be allowed 
to enter into exploitative relationships if they do so on 
the basis of valid consent. It might also be the case that 
prohibiting a disadvantaged person from engaging in 
an exploitative but non-harmful relationship would 
leave them more vulnerable to other, more serious 
forms of exploitation. (13) For example, the participants 
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in the case study, if prevented from enrolling in the tri-
als, might turn instead to drug-trafficking, prostitution 
or illegal sweatshop employment in order to raise 
money. A concern to avoid people being treated in dis-
respectful, degrading or harmful ways might then lead 
us to permit the less serious cases of exploitation in 
order to avoid the worse cases. 
Turning to Question 4, there are two kinds of change 
that the company could make, or that an ethics com-
mittee could insist on, to avoid the research being 
exploitative. Firstly, the company could choose not to 
recruit from vulnerable sectors of the population. This 
would avoid the company exploiting them but could 
leave them open to greater exploitation from other 
sources as it would reduce the range of options open 
to them. It is also arguable that it would fail to uphold 
the principle of respect for persons if it meant prevent-
ing vulnerable but competent persons from acting on 
their autonomous choices.
There could also be a consequence-based argument 
against this course of action, as it would mean divert-
ing resources from more needy to less needy individu-
als. However, if the involvement of vulnerable people, 
who are tempted to conceal medical factors relevant 
to the research, undermines the scientific rigour of the 
trial then consequence-based considerations relating 
to the wellbeing of future consumers of the investiga-
tional products would favour the use of less vulnerable 
participants.
Secondly, the company could continue to recruit from 
the vulnerable population but improve the levels of 
payment and compensation. It would then avoid tak-
ing advantage of their vulnerability and would increase 
rather than reduce the resources available to the disad-
vantaged group. A disadvantage of this policy is that it 
would increase the incentive that potential participants 
have to conceal medical conditions or other factors 
that might lead to their exclusion from the trial, 
although it might be possible to counter this by more 
rigorous screening and verification. 
 Case Study 6.2
Tuberculosis vaccine research 
in a developing country
Tuberculosis (TB) is a major cause of morbidity and 
mortality, with nearly nine million new infections 
and two million deaths per year worldwide. 
Incidence of the disease is highest in developing 
countries, particularly in Africa, but it is also 
a problem in developed countries, some of which 
have seen a resurgence of the disease after earlier 
falls, as a result of antibiotic resistance, reduced 
immune response due to HIV infection and migra-
tion from parts of the world in which the disease 
is rife. The most commonly used vaccine against 
TB is Bacile Calmette-Guérin (BCG). However, while 
this is effective in young children, its effectiveness 
is more variable in adolescents and young adults, 
and it is not recommended for patients with 
impaired immune systems. In addition to problems 
of antibiotic resistance, drug treatments have had 
limited impact in developing countries due to 
cost and poor compliance.
Development of new, more effective vaccines 
appears to be the most promising strategy for 
controlling and eventually eradicating TB. Several 
potential vaccines have been developed as a result 
of advances in understanding the genome of the 
infectious agent (Mycobacterium tuberculosis). 
Some of these have undergone Phase 1 testing in 
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Europe, and now European researchers working on 
a Modified Vaccina Ankara (MVA) vaccine wish to 
carry out further trials in various countries including 
Mozambique, a country classified by the United 
Nations as one of the world’s least developed and 
with prevalence rates among the highest in the 
world for HIV and TB.
The proposed trial in Mozambique is designed to 
test the effectiveness of the new vaccine when 
used post-infection and in conjunction with BCG. 
It will run for five years and will involve the 
following arms:
1)  BCG only in adult males not known to have 
HIV;
2)  BCG plus MVA in adult males not known to 
have HIV;
3)  BCG only in adolescent males not known to 
have HIV;
4)  BCG plus MVA (lower dose) in adolescent 
males not known to have HIV;
5)  BCG only in subjects in the early stages of HIV;
6)  BCG plus MVA in subjects in the early stages 
of HIV.
Participants will be subject to monthly health 
checks, which will include monitoring of weight, 
blood tests and sputum tests. They will be given 
advice on healthy eating and where necessary 
provided with the resources to maintain a healthy 
diet (for themselves and their families). Consent 
will be obtained in the standard way.
Costs will be lower than if the trial was conducted 
in Europe, and the high prevalence of TB should 
make recruitment of subjects relatively quick and 
easy. The researchers argue that it is important to 
test the vaccine in populations similar to those 
in which it is intended to be used. However, some 
members of the research ethics committee question 
the affordability of the vaccine for a country as 
impoverished as Mozambique and contend that, 
while it may be affordable for richer African 
countries, such as South Africa, the primary use is 
likely to be in those developed countries that are 
experiencing an increase in TB infection. 
Questions
1.  What ethical problems are raised by this case?
2.  In what ways might the trial be considered 
exploitative?
3.  How might the researchers respond to accusa-
tions of exploitation? Would they be right to 
reject such accusations?
4.  Would it be acceptable to include placebo 
control arms in the trial if the region in which it 
is carried out is one in which BCG is not usually 
available?
5.  Should the trial be allowed to go ahead as it 
stands? If not, are there any modifications that 
could be undertaken to make it ethically 
acceptable?
Research in developing countries
Although charges of exploitation in research are made 
in a variety of contexts, one of the most common is 
in  relation to developing countries. Case Study 6.2 
allows us to extend the discussion of exploitation to this 
context and more generally to consider some of the 
ethical problems that arise when research is conducted 
in developing countries.
Question 1 provides an opportunity to consider the 
range of ethical issues raised by this case. As with all 
research involving human participants, one of the key 
issues is the acceptability of the risks and burdens to 
which the participants are subjected. 
In any trial of a medical intervention one of the main 
risks is likely to be that of adverse effects from the inter-
ventions being tested. Given that the experimental vac-
cine (MVA) is relatively untested, while the BCG vaccine 
is widely used in many parts of the world, we might 
expect the former to be the main source of such risks. 
This would mean that participants in the control 
groups – who receive BCG only – would be subject to 
little risk and likely to benefit overall from an interven-
tion that is generally safe, somewhat effective (although 
less so in the age groups on which it is being tested than 
in younger patients), and which might not otherwise 
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be accessible to the participants given relatively low 
immunisation rates in developing countries like 
Mozambique. It should be noted, however, that the 
researchers propose to test BCG – both alone and in 
combination with MVA – in HIV positive individuals, 
despite the fact that it is not usually recommended for 
use in people with compromised immune systems due 
to increased risk of ‘BCG disease’ (which is caused by 
the bovine bacterium in the vaccine). In addition, the 
risks from both interventions may be higher than they 
would be if the research was conducted in a developed 
country, because of factors such as the nutritional sta-
tus and general health of participants and the less 
developed medical system and infrastructure. 
Although a research ethics committee in the research-
ers’ home country should be able to identify these risk 
factors, a problem faced by many research ethics com-
mittees is that they lack the resources or expertise to 
undertake an independent assessment of the risks 
caused by the research they review. In the case of 
research carried out in a distant location, and particu-
larly one that is very different from the country in which 
the committee is based, this is likely to be exacerbated 
by a lack of detailed knowledge of the location where 
the research is to be carried out. This may make the 
research ethics committee somewhat dependent on 
the researchers’ assessment of the risks, and in order to 
ensure that this is as robust as possible they may wish 
to ensure that this assessment is based on a thorough 
review of the available evidence and has (with the rest 
of the proposal) been subjected to peer review. In the 
case of research to be carried out in a different country 
the involvement of a local ethics committee may also 
provide important evidence confirming or supple-
menting the risk assessment made by the researchers. 
In addition to the risks from the experimental and con-
trol interventions, participants may also face risks and 
burdens attached to the monitoring process – for 
example risks associated with blood tests and burdens 
associated with the loss of time and possibly of associ-
ated income. These are likely to be small but should be 
considered as part of the overall balance of benefit and 
risk. The research might also place burdens upon the 
local infrastructure, for example by taking up the time 
of health care workers or using facilities and equipment. 
On the other hand, research in developing countries 
can benefit the local health care or research infrastruc-
ture. For example the researchers in the case study 
might pay local health care or research institutions for 
services or use of facilities, provide training to locally 
employed staff in research methods or skills related to 
vaccination programmes, or build facilities and provide 
equipment that will remain in place after the trial has 
ended. As with the risks to individual participants, some 
input from the host community could help a ‘home’ 
ethics committee to assess the true extent and signifi-
cance of these infrastructural benefits and burdens.
A research ethics committee examining this proposal 
would also need to consider whether the vulnerabil-
ity of some or all of the research participants creates 
a need for additional protections or safeguards, and 
whether it places them at risk of exploitation. The ado-
lescent participants may be vulnerable in terms of their 
capacity to give valid consent. Some will have the 
understanding necessary to make an informed decision 
about whether to participate but others will not, so the 
researchers need to specify how competence will be 
assessed and what alternative or additional forms of 
authorisation will be sought for those unable to give 
valid consent, taking account of local legislation. There 
may also be a more general problem with consent due 
to low literacy levels. Although in principle it should be 
possible to overcome this by providing information in 
other forms, it may be difficult for researchers without 
local knowledge and language skills to ensure that the 
information is provided and understood unless they 
have considerable local support, and even with that 
support literacy and cultural issues may exacerbate 
the risk of therapeutic misconception. 
Other participants may be vulnerable in ways that do 
not undermine their capacity to consent but do make 
them liable to harm or exploitation. Participants with 
HIV may be vulnerable because of their medical needs 
(which might lead them to participate in the trial in the 
hope of receiving medical attention for that condition, 
even though that is not what the trial is about) and the 
sensitivity of information about HIV status. The latter 
makes it necessary for the researchers to pay attention 
to confidentiality and information security, taking 
account of both moral principles and any relevant 
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local laws. The level of poverty that requires some 
participants to be provided with resources to maintain 
a healthy diet for the duration of the trial is another 
source of vulnerability, as is the combination of an 
under-resourced health care system and participants 
with TB, some of whom may not be able to receive any 
vaccination or other treatment outside the trial.
Questions 2 and 3 invite us to consider the ways in 
which the research described in the case study might 
be exploitative. In the discussion of the previous case 
study, exploitation was characterised as taking advan-
tage of some vulnerability or weakness in order to 
further the exploiter’s goals. Potentially any of the forms 
of vulnerability described above could give rise to 
exploitation. For example lack of understanding by 
participants (whether due to immaturity or literacy 
and language difficulties) could be exploited to gain 
agreement to participate in the trial, and threats to 
reveal information about HIV status could be used to 
coerce participants into signing up or continuing their 
participation. These actions, however, would be clearly 
unethical, and as in the previous case it is the possibil-
ity of consensual exploitation that creates the more 
challenging ethical problems. 
The most likely sources of consensual exploitation in 
this case are the lack of a well-resourced health care 
system and the general poverty of at least some of the 
participants. Given these circumstances, the prospect 
of receiving medical treatment and/or resources to pro-
vide food for one’s family might make it rational to 
choose to participate even though the balance of ben-
efits and risks within the trial is one that a less disad-
vantaged individual, for example a typical inhabitant of 
a more developed country with a reasonable income 
and access to a well-functioning health care system, 
would be unlikely to accept. Whether or not the trial 
is exploitative will depend on whether the researchers 
take advantage of this vulnerability to further their own 
goals. For example, most people would judge the trial 
to be exploitative if the sole reason for conducting it in 
Mozambique was to enable it to be carried out more 
cheaply than could be done in the researchers’ home 
country. (14) In the description of the case study, how-
ever, it appears that there are reasons other than cost-
saving for conducting the trial in Mozambique: in 
particular, if Mozambique is one of the countries in 
which it is hoped that the vaccine will be used, there 
may be good methodological reasons for testing it in 
that population. The fact that similar trials are planned 
for a number of countries, following Phase 1 testing in 
Europe, suggests that the researchers are aiming to test 
the efficacy and safety of the vaccine in a range of pop-
ulations representative of its intended end use. 
Even if reducing the costs of the trial is not what moti-
vates the researchers to locate it in a developing coun-
try, the trial could still be exploitative if the researchers 
unfairly take advantage of the participants’ vulnerability 
to reduce the costs of the trial. Our judgement about 
this is likely to depend on whether the participants 
receive a fair level of benefit in relation to the risks and 
burdens of participation. However, what counts as a fair 
level of benefit is likely to be harder to determine in a case 
like this than in research within a developed country. 
In the discussion of Case Study 6.1 it was suggested 
that one way of establishing a fair level of benefit 
would be to consider what a less disadvantaged par-
ticipant would be likely to accept. Even in that case it 
was unclear what level of disadvantage (or lack of it) 
should be taken as the benchmark, but in international 
research this is even less clear, since benefits that are 
relatively cheap to provide to participants in a develop-
ing country might nevertheless be much more signifi-
cant to those participants than the benefits that would 
be accepted by participants in a wealthier country. 
Providing very large benefits in relation to local stand-
ards of living might also provoke social tensions or other 
problems. One way of addressing this concern would 
be to ensure that the balance of benefits and risks for 
individuals is reasonable in relation to the standards of 
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the country in which they live, but also to consider 
whether the benefits to the community as a whole are 
sufficient in the light of the contribution that it makes 
towards the research. This raises the issue of whether 
communities, as well as individuals, can be exploited. 
Community exploitation
Gbadegesin and Wendler suggest that a community 
(rather than merely some of its members) should be 
considered to be involved in research if the research 
relies on the community’s resources, focuses on its 
customs, traditions or practices, or focuses on a health 
feature of the community; and that in order not to be 
exploited the community must receive a fair level of 
benefits in relation both to its contribution and to the 
benefits obtained by others. (15) One reason for consid-
ering the balance of benefits and burdens at a commu-
nity level, rather than just in relation to individual 
participants, is that the impact of burdens placed by 
research on a community’s infrastructure may not be 
confined to research participants, and where this is the 
case it may not be possible to identify the particular 
individuals affected. 
We have already noted some of the ways in which the 
community’s health care system or research infrastruc-
ture might be burdened by, or conversely might ben-
efit from, involvement in the research in the case study. 
However, a factor that may be much more significant 
in determining the balance of benefits between the 
community in which research takes place and others is 
the end use of the intervention being investigated. 
If the research is primarily expected to benefit people 
outside the community in which it takes place but 
the decision is made to conduct the trial within the 
community, because of methodological, practical or 
financial advantages of doing so, then there is likely to 
be a concern that the community is being exploited 
for the benefit of others. In order to address this sort 
of concern it is sometimes suggested that a necessary 
ethical requirement for carrying out trials in develop-
ing countries is that if the tested interventions prove 
effective they will be made “reasonably available” to the 
host communities. For example CIOMS’ International 
Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving 
Human Subjects state that: 
Before undertaking research in a population or com-
munity with limited resources, the sponsor and the 
investigator must make every effort to ensure that:
•  the research is responsive to the health needs and 
the priorities of the population or community in 
which it is to be carried out; and
•  any intervention or product developed, or know-
ledge generated, will be made reasonably available 
for the benefit of that population or community. (16)
However, even leaving aside the vagueness of the 
term “reasonably available”, this requirement presents 
a number of problems. 
First, provision of the investigational product is not the 
only way in which the host community can be bene-
fited. There could be cases in which there are strong 
practical or methodological reasons for basing research 
in a particular disadvantaged community, even though 
the targeted health need is not a priority for that com-
munity, and the community is no more likely than oth-
ers to benefit from the intervention being tested. 
In such cases it might be possible to avoid exploiting 
the community by providing benefits other than avail-
ability of the tested intervention. 
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Second, satisfaction of this requirement does not guar-
antee that the host community receives fair benefits in 
relation to the burdens the research places on it. Even 
if the research is successful, targets a health need that 
is a priority within the community, and the product is 
made available to members of the host community, 
the research may be exploitative if the community is 
just one of a number to benefit but has borne a dispro-
portionate share of the burdens. 
Third, unless the requirement is interpreted in a very 
narrow way (e.g. as requiring availability of the product 
for a limited period for research participants only) it will 
often not be possible for researchers to guarantee that 
it is satisfied. Enforcing the requirement would there-
fore mean that valuable research, much of which would 
benefit the host community, could not be done. 
The research in the case study addresses a health prob-
lem that is important in Mozambique and other devel-
oping countries, and, as we have seen, the researchers 
can plausibly claim that their reason for conducting 
trials in such countries is to ensure that the vaccine they 
are testing will be effective and safe under the condi-
tions prevailing there. As noted in the case study, 
however, there is a concern that the cost of the vaccine 
will prevent it from being used in countries as poor as 
Mozambique, and that, irrespective of the researchers’ 
intentions, it will end up being of benefit mainly to TB 
sufferers in more developed countries. Questions about 
future availability depend on political and economic 
factors that may be inherently unpredictable and which 
medical researchers and research ethics committees 
are unlikely to have expertise in. There are, however, 
things that can be done to minimise the chances of 
a disadvantaged host community ending up with an 
unacceptable balance of benefits and burdens. 
First, it can be ensured that the host community 
receives benefits other than future use of the tested 
intervention, so that even if the latter fails to material-
ise, the community will still gain sufficient benefit to 
offset any costs. 
Second, there should be consultation with represent-
atives of the host community, so that the assessment 
of likely benefits takes account of the community’s view 
about such things as the importance to the commu-
nity of the intervention being researched, the likelihood 
of resources being available to provide it for members 
of the community in the event that it proves effective, 
and the likelihood and significance of any adverse 
impacts on the community. In the course of such con-
sultations it would be important for the researchers to 
provide realistic predictions of the likely outcomes of 
the trial, and of the likely costs of any resulting inter-
vention. It should be noted, however, that agreement 
to a trial by representatives of the host community 
does not on its own justify the trial. Firstly, it is neces-
sary to consider whether the autonomy and interests 
of individuals are adequately protected; secondly there 
may be questions about whether the representatives 
truly represent the wishes of the community and 
whether they have the expertise and experience to 
judge whether a proposed trial offers a fair balance of 
benefits and burdens; and thirdly, if the community as 
a whole is in a weak negotiating position (for example 
due to a desperate need for the benefits foreign scien-
tific investment can bring) then as with vulnerable indi-
viduals it may be rational for its representatives to agree 
to a mutually beneficial but exploitative arrangement.
Placebo controls in developing countries
We have seen that one important cause of vulnerabil-
ity among research subjects in developing countries is 
the absence of treatment options that would be avail-
able to patients in countries with more developed 
health care systems. Question 4 raises a much-debated 
question about whether this lack of options can make 
it morally acceptable to conduct placebo-controlled 
research in developing countries which would be 
unethical if conducted in a country with better health 
care provision. We will consider this issue with reference 
to controversial trials of treatments for the reduction of 
perinatal transmission of HIV in developing countries.
Trials concluded in the US and France in 1994 estab-
lished that mother-to-child transmission of HIV could 
be substantially reduced by treating the mother with 
the antiviral drug AZT during the last trimester of preg-
nancy and during delivery, and the newborn child for 
six weeks following birth. However, the cost of this 
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treatment was prohibitive for many developing coun-
tries, including those in sub-Saharan Africa, the region 
of the world worst affected by HIV. It was therefore 
important to establish whether shorter, more afforda-
ble courses of AZT would provide worthwhile reduc-
tions in HIV transmission. The short course was tested 
against a placebo control in a number of developing 
countries where the standard care for HIV-infected 
pregnancy did not include use of antiviral drugs. 
Critics of the trials (17) argued that the use of placebo 
was unethical. One strand of this argument held that 
the use of placebo violated the principle of equipoise. 
Whether this is true depends on how the notion of 
equipoise is interpreted, since the evidence from trials 
of the longer course of treatment gave some reason 
to expect that a short course of AZT would provide 
a worthwhile benefit, but not enough to achieve 
consensus among the clinical community. However, 
if equipoise is understood to be violated by evidence 
short of that which is necessary to achieve commu-
nity consensus then it is also violated by the ‘equiva-
lence trials’ advocated by the critics of placebo use. 
These would compare the short course of AZT to the 
longer course and measure how much less effective 
the short course was. In such a trial nobody is denied 
treatment, but there is reason to expect better results 
from the established long course than the experimen-
tal short course.
A further problem with equivalence trials concerns 
their methodological validity. The theory is that by 
measuring how much less effective the short course is 
than the long course we can establish whether the 
short course is effective enough to be worth funding. 
However, as well as being more statistically complex 
this method assumes that we know the effectiveness 
of the long course, and although the earlier trials pro-
vided information about the effectiveness of the long 
course in developed countries, it is likely that its 
effectiveness would differ under developing country 
conditions. It is therefore arguable that only a placebo-
controlled trial could yield the information that is 
sought. If this is right then equivalence trials could not 
be an ethical alternative. On its own this would not 
show that placebo-controlled trials were justified but 
would show that if they cannot be justified then there 
is no ethical way of obtaining the desired information 
about the efficacy of the short course of treatment.
Another strand of the argument asserted that placebo 
use was unethical as it deprived patients in the control 
group of a treatment from which they could have ben-
efited. While supporters of placebo use could argue 
that, since AZT was not available as part of perinatal 
care in the countries where the trials were conducted, 
nobody was made worse off by being allocated to 
a placebo group, opponents held that there should be 
a single, universal ‘standard of care’, which research par-
ticipants are entitled to receive, and that it is unethical 
to measure the acceptability of placebo against a lower 
standard in developing countries. This argument was 
linked to the Helsinki Declaration, which (in the version 
current at the time) stated that participants “should be 
assured of the best proven diagnostic and therapeutic 
method”. (18) It should be noted, however, that defin-
ing a universal standard of care is not straightforward, 
since even in developed countries patients outside tri-
als are not always guaranteed the ‘best proven meth-
ods’. Moreover, the Helsinki Declaration’s view is not 
universally shared, and other influential guidelines 
and  documents have allowed that the availability 
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of treatments in the trial location can in some circum-
stances be the appropriate standard against which to 
assess the permissibility of placebo use. (19)
The ongoing disagreement on this issue reflects the 
fact that it involves a conflict between two different 
principles. Supporters of the AZT trials can argue that 
use of placebo does not violate the principle of non-
maleficence if those who are assigned to the placebo 
group would not have received an effective treatment 
outside the trial. However, it might be argued that it 
violates the principle of beneficence by failing to pro-
vide the placebo group with a benefit that it is within 
the researchers’ power to provide. (20) Supporters of 
placebo have argued that it is not the responsibility of 
researchers to rectify existing international injustices 
or to make up for the failure of governments to pro-
vide adequate health care; nevertheless, it could be 
argued that researchers incur some positive duties 
towards their subjects in return for their participation 
or as a result of engaging with them in a partly thera-
peutic context. 
The concept of exploitation might help us to concep-
tualise this, even if it does not provide a clear resolution 
to the disagreement. We have seen that exploitation 
need not be harmful but involves unfairly taking advan-
tage of another person’s vulnerability to further one’s 
goals, typically by shifting the balance of benefits and 
burdens in a way that would not be acceptable to a less 
vulnerable person. In the case of the AZT trials, it is the 
participants’ inability to access treatments outside 
the trial that makes it rational for them to enter a trial 
in which they may be assigned to a placebo arm, 
so there is a sense in which the researchers do take 
advantage of their weakness. The question is whether 
they do so unfairly. Our judgement about this may 
depend on several factors, mainly relating to the con-
sequences of not doing so. If the decision to employ 
a placebo control was taken solely for personal gain, 
or to boost pharmaceutical company profits by avoid-
ing a more costly but nevertheless affordable form of 
trial, then this may be considered a case of unfair advan-
tage-taking on the grounds that the researchers are 
treating the vital interests of the participants as less 
important than the relatively trivial interests of them-
selves and their organisations. If, however, recruiting 
vulnerable patients into a placebo-controlled trial is 
the only reliable way of obtaining knowledge that is 
required in order to benefit other patients who are at 
least as badly off as those recruited to the trial, then 
a charge of unfairness will be harder to sustain and it is 
arguable that the transaction should not be considered 
exploitative provided that the participants consent and 
are not harmed. This then tends to support the view 
that placebo use in cases of  local non-availability 
of established treatments should be permitted where 
there is also a compelling methodological case for 
a placebo-controlled trial, an important research ques-
tion, valid consent, and where participants are not 
worse off than they would be outside the trial. 
In the case of the TB vaccines trial in Case Study 6.2, 
assigning participants to a placebo group would deprive 
them of a treatment that is available elsewhere but not 
locally, in the same way as the AZT trials (albeit in the TB 
case a treatment whose effectiveness is questionable in 
the age groups from which the participants are drawn). 
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However, it is less clear in the TB case than in the AZT 
case that there is a strong methodological reason for 
placebo-controlled trials. BCG is widely (though not uni-
formly) used in developing countries, and the aim of the 
trial is not to establish whether MVA plus BCG is better 
than nothing, but whether the combination is better 
than BCG alone. It is likely that this can be achieved with 
an equivalence trial, and while adding a placebo arm 
might provide some additional information it is not 
clear that this fulfils any sufficiently important interest 
to justify not benefiting control group members by 
providing them with the widely used and inexpensive 
BCG vaccine. 
 Case Study 6.3
Nicotine replacement therapy 
for pregnant smokers
Children of mothers who smoke during pregnancy 
are at increased risk of miscarriage and stillbirth, 
pre-term birth and low birth weight, neonatal 
mortality, sudden infant death syndrome, asthma, 
attention deficit and learning problems. (21) 
Over a quarter of pregnant women smoke and 
most of these continue to smoke throughout 
their pregnancy.
It is known that, in non-pregnant smokers, drug 
therapies to treat the symptoms of nicotine 
withdrawal can increase smoking cessation rates 
beyond what can be achieved by behavioural 
support alone. However, there has been a reluc-
tance to use drug therapies in pregnant smokers 
because of the risk of fetal damage. Consequently, 
little is known about the safety or effectiveness of 
using medications to treat pregnant smokers.
The proposed research involves the testing of 
nicotine replacement therapy (NRT) for pregnant 
smokers. The aims of the trial are to establish the 
safety and effectiveness of NRT plus behavioural 
support, compared with behavioural support alone, 
and to determine which subjects benefit most from 
NRT during pregnancy. Researchers have chosen 
to investigate NRT rather than other drug-based 
anti-smoking interventions as it is considered 
ethically problematic to introduce untested 
drugs that would not otherwise be present into 
pregnant women. 
Subjects will be recruited at a prenatal clinic in an 
English university hospital that serves an ethnically 
mixed, mainly low-income population. Women 
who agree to participate will be asked to complete 
a questionnaire to establish that they meet the 
eligibility conditions, and those who meet the 
criteria will be randomly assigned to receive either 
smoking cessation behavioural counselling plus an 
8-week course of nicotine patches or the same 
counselling plus a similar course of placebo 
patches. The outcomes to be measured include 
self-reported smoking abstinence and cessation 
rates, biochemical measures of tobacco exposure, 
birth weight, gestational age at birth, fetal death 
and neonatal mortality.
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Recruitment will be subject to the following 
inclusion and exclusion criteria.
Inclusion:
(a) maternal age 16-50 years;
(b) gestational age 12-24 weeks;
(c) patient is able to speak English;
(d) patient intends to carry to term;
(e) patient has a stable residence;
(f)  patient currently smokes five or more cigarettes 
per day and has exhaled carbon monoxide 
reading of at least 8 parts per million.
Exclusion:
(a)  cardiovascular and other medical conditions 
established as contraindications to the use 
of NRT;
(b) known sensitivity to nicotine patches; 
(c) psychiatric disorder;
(d) drug or alcohol dependence;
(e) inability to give informed consent;
(f) known congenital abnormality in the fetus;
(g) multiple gestation.
Questions
1.  What ethical issues are raised by the decision 
to carry out trials of medications in pregnant 
women? Can the use of pregnant women as 
subjects be justified in the case of NRT?
2.  What justifications might be given for each of 
the inclusion and exclusion criteria? Based on 
the information available are there any groups 
who appear to be unnecessarily or wrongfully 
excluded by these criteria? 
3.  If there are any unnecessary exclusions what 
ethical issues does this raise? Are there any 
individuals or groups who could claim to be 
discriminated against by this proposal?
Access to trials
Like much of the debate about justice in research, the 
last two case studies have focused on concerns about 
the exploitation of vulnerable research subjects. One 
response to such concerns, as well as to concerns about 
harm, is to exclude those thought to be at particular risk 
of harm or exploitation from participation in research. 
But while this can help to avoid unjust imposition of the 
burdens of research, justice is also about the distribution 
of benefits and it is increasingly recognised that exclud-
ing categories of people from research participation can 
itself lead to injustice, by depriving excluded individuals 
and groups of the direct and indirect benefits arising 
from participation in research. (22) It may also place an 
undue burden upon those sections of the population 
not considered in need of special protection (often 
young males) to furnish the results of research upon 
which the rest of the population is treated.
Question 1 invites us to consider the ethical issues raised 
by the participation of pregnant women in medical 
research. Before considering the nicotine replacement 
therapy study (Case Study 6.3), it is worth noting that 
in  two of previous studies pregnant women were 
excluded from participation. Case Study 2.1 (Space Flight 
Simulation on Healthy Female Volunteers) recruited 
women, but (because of the researchers’ concerns about 
fetal damage) the women were required to declare 
that they were not pregnant, to undergo a pregnancy 
test before the start of the experiment, and to promise 
to take steps to avoid pregnancy for three years after 
the end of the trial. The focus of that case was on issues 
of consent, but it also raises the question of whether such 
an exclusion is justified. In Case Study 6.2, the treatment 
groups were defined in such a way as to exclude women 
(whether pregnant or not) from participating in the trial.
Women, particularly those of child-bearing age, have 
often been excluded from participation in research out 
of a well-intentioned concern to avoid causing harm 
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to unborn fetuses. This can be viewed as a precaution-
ary approach in response to an uncertain risk of harm, 
but as with other such cases it is necessary to consider 
the costs of the precautionary measures and to ensure 
that they are proportionate to the risks that they aim 
to reduce. In the case of the TB trial the restriction of 
the trial to male participants could mean that some 
women in the developing world are deprived of the 
only opportunity they would have had to receive vac-
cination against TB. As well as disadvantaging the par-
ticular women who could have benefited from 
participation in the trial, such exclusions result in a lack 
of data about the safety and effectiveness of the inves-
tigational treatment in women. 
Similar concerns have been raised about other com-
mon exclusions. For example children have often been 
excluded from drug trials because of concerns about 
harm and the possibility of exploitation due to their 
dependence on adults and inability to give consent, but 
this has led to a lack of data about appropriate dosages 
for children. Many trials also have upper age limits, 
which limit the access of elderly populations to the 
goods associated with research participation.
One way of thinking about what might be wrong with 
applying blanket exclusion criteria based on factors 
thought to be correlated with heightened risk of harm 
or exploitation relates to the concept of consent. While 
the risks associated with participation in a particular 
trial may be correlated to some degree with general cri-
teria such as age or sex, the seriousness of those risks 
for an individual will also depend on that individual’s 
priorities and preferences, as will the importance of 
benefits such as access to experimental treatments or 
payments. We might therefore think that exclusion on 
grounds of risk should be judged on a case-by-case 
basis, and that in most cases the decision is best made 
by the participants themselves. 
This argument will, of course, not apply to young chil-
dren and others who cannot give valid consent. There 
is also a case for not making the participation of preg-
nant women a matter of individual consent, since the 
reason for considering exclusion relates not primarily 
to the welfare of the woman but of the fetus. However, 
it should be noted that in relation to other influences 
on fetal welfare, such as smoking and alcohol consump-
tion, we usually provide information and advice, but 
allow the mother to decide how to respond. Views 
about the exclusion of pregnant women from trials may 
relate to the contentious question of the fetus’s moral 
status and the relative weights given to fetal and mater-
nal interests. These issues will be considered further in 
Chapter 8. However, they are less significant here, as the 
main concern is not the destruction of fetuses but the 
possibility of causing damage that will persist after birth 
and beyond the point where the fetus uncontrover-
sially has full moral status. 
A further issue raised in particular by Case Study 6.2 is 
the breadth of the exclusion criteria. Even in cases where 
the consent argument does not apply, the variability of 
risks according to individual factors (both biological 
factors and preferences) suggests that exclusion criteria 
need to be carefully drawn in order not to unfairly 
exclude people whose likelihood of suffering harm is 
not particularly high. Excluding all women on the 
grounds of potential risk to a fetus looks like a clear case 
of an excessively broad exclusion criterion. Although 
it  may be reasonable to take some precautionary 
measures against the possibility of women entering 
a potentially harmful trial without realising that they 
are pregnant, excluding all women seems unnecessarily 
restrictive. Women who are not fertile, or are not hetero-
sexually active, might reasonably consider their exclusion 
from the benefits of research participation to be unjust 
and discriminatory. A range of less restrictive precau-
tionary measures is possible, and depending on the 
nature and risk of the proposed research it might be suf-
ficient to ask potential participants about their menstrual 
cycle or to require pregnancy tests and undertakings to 
use contraception. 
In addition to concerns about the risks of harm faced 
by particular participant groups, there might be sound 
methodological reasons for applying exclusion criteria 
based on such factors as sex, age or race to trial partici-
pation. Ensuring that the participants in a given trial are 
as alike as possible increases the likelihood that any dif-
ferences observed between arms are attributable to the 
different treatment regimes in each arm. Trials that are 
characterised by a relatively ‘uniform’ participant pop-
ulation may produce scientifically sound results with 
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fewer subjects, thus minimising the risk associated with 
the research. This has to be offset against the limitations 
that the research will then have when applied to a pop-
ulation outside the world of the trial, which is not uni-
form in this way. So the consequentialist reasons for 
limiting participation on the basis of age, sex or race 
might be neutralised by the goal of producing research 
findings that are of maximal relevance and use in the 
clinical context. (23) Whether consequentialist concerns 
tell in favour of blanket exclusion criteria in the context 
of a particular trial might depend upon factors such as 
the particular risks associated with the treatment being 
tested, the likelihood of it being used outside the trial 
to treat the groups that it is proposed to exclude from 
the trial, and the availability of other treatment options 
for those groups.
Case Study 6.3 presents a scenario in which women 
who are known to be pregnant are deliberately 
recruited as research subjects. In this case there is a clear 
metholological reason for including them – the research 
concerns the effects of an intervention in pregnant 
women on the fetus, so cannot be conducted in any 
other group of subjects. The risk of harm to fetuses is 
minimised by the choice of intervention to be tested 
– nicotine replacement therapy, unlike some other 
smoking cessation treatments, only exposes the fetus 
to a drug that it would also be exposed to outside the 
trial. This is supported by inclusion criterion (f), which 
ensures that only women whose fetuses are already 
exposed to a significant level of nicotine are recruited. 
It is also relevant that in this case any risks may be bal-
anced against potential benefits to the fetus itself and 
not just to the mother. 
Questions 2 and 3 call for evaluation of the inclusion 
and exclusion criteria in the study. Several of these fall 
under the two broad types of justification for exclu-
sions already discussed: those concerned with the pro-
tection of vulnerable individuals, and those concerned 
with methodology. For example, among the exclusion 
criteria (a) and (b) are clearly intended to protect those 
who would be at high risk of harm from the study, while 
(d) is probably intended to avoid the potentially con-
founding effects of interactions between addictions to 
nicotine and other substances. The latter could, how-
ever, restrict the generalisability of the results in the way 
described above, especially if dependence on alcohol 
and other drugs is common among women who 
smoke in pregnancy. Exclusion criteria (f) and (g) could 
also have a methodological rationale, as they might 
affect measured outcomes such as birth weight, gesta-
tional age at birth, fetal death and neonatal mortality. 
Some of the inclusion and exclusion criteria might have 
a more practical effect on the success of the study. 
Participants with a psychiatric disorder, inability to 
speak English or lacking a stable residence might be 
more likely than others to fail to comply with the pro-
tocol or to drop out of the trial, threatening its statisti-
cal validity. 
Among the inclusion criteria, (b), (d) and (f) are neces-
sary for the proposed intervention to be applicable, 
while (f) could also have the fetal safety rationale sug-
gested above (not introducing nicotine where it is not 
already present). Inclusion criterion (a) limits the trial 
to women aged 16-50. Although this will cover most 
pregnant women it is not clear why those outside this 
age range are excluded. If it is thought that older or 
younger women might respond differently to the nic-
otine patches and thus make the results less clear 
then it follows that excluding them will limit the appli-
cability of the results to women within the specified 
age range. 
Arguments against exclusion may be similarly catego-
rised: methodological considerations can oppose exclu-
sions where these would skew the results or make them 
generalisable only to a certain section of the popula-
tion, and harm-based arguments come into play where 
individuals are deprived of the benefits of participation 
or society is deprived of knowledge of how treatments 
perform in the excluded groups. 
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As well as limiting the generalisability of the results the 
exclusions could disadvantage individuals (women and 
their fetuses) who could have benefited from the coun-
selling and supervised use of nicotine patches. Although 
the purpose of the research is not to benefit individu-
als but to generate knowledge, exclusion from the ben-
efits of participation becomes problematic where there 
is no good research-based reason for the exclusion, or 
where there is a reason but one that could be overcome 
with additional resources. For example, the inability of 
non-English speakers to consent, communicate with 
research staff and participate in the smoking cessation 
counselling could be overcome by provision of trans-
lated materials and an interpreter. The question then 
arises of whether researchers have an obligation to bear 
this cost even if this restricts the amount of worthwhile 
research that can be done. 
Question 3 invites identification of exclusion criteria 
that could be considered discriminatory. Like ‘exploi-
tation’, ‘discrimination’ has both a non-moral and 
a moral use. In its non-moral sense it means distin-
guishing different things and treating them differently. 
Discrimination in this sense is an essential part of many 
research activities – for example discriminating 
between those sub-types of a disease that are most 
likely to respond to one treatment and those that are 
most likely to respond to another, or between popula-
tion groups that are likely to benefit from participation 
in a screening programme and those that are not. In its 
moral sense, ‘discrimination’ refers to unfair or unjust 
discrimination. What makes a case of discrimination 
unfair is that it involves treating some people less 
favourably than others in the absence of a good reason 
for doing so. Typically when people talk about discrim-
ination they are referring to one of three types of case: 
treating a group of people less favourably than others 
on account of some perceived characteristic that does 
not in fact exist; treating a group of people less favour-
ably than others on account of a characteristic pos-
sessed by only some members of that group; and 
treating a group of people less favourably than others 
on account of some difference that does exist but does 
not justify the difference in treatment. 
An example of the first type would be excluding 
women from pharmaceutical trials on the grounds that 
they are the ‘weaker sex’ and more likely to suffer 
adverse reactions from experimental drugs. This unfairly 
excludes women, individually and as a group, from 
the direct and indirect benefits of trial participation 
on account of a perceived difference for which there is 
no evidence.
An example of the second type occurs where the rea-
sons for exclusion apply only to some members of the 
excluded group, and it would be possible to exclude 
those to whom the reasons apply without excluding 
the whole group. Thus, those to whom the reasons do 
not apply are excluded on the basis of characteristics 
that they do not possess. This relates to the earlier dis-
cussion of broad exclusions. For example, it is a form of 
discrimination of this kind if all women are excluded 
from a trial that they could benefit from participating 
in on grounds of fetal safety, when only a small minor-
ity are pregnant at any given time and these could 
easily be excluded without excluding the non-pregnant 
majority. Similarly, the exclusion of all people with 
a psychiatric disorder on grounds of vulnerability or 
inability to comply with the research protocol could be 
discriminatory if it fails to take account of differences 
in type and severity of psychiatric disorder.
An example of the third type might be the exclusion 
from the NRT trial of older or younger women, and those 
who cannot consent. The women who are excluded 
by these criteria do indeed have the relevant charac-
teristics, but it is not clear that they provide any meth-
odological or harm-based justification for exclusion. 
A distinction is often made between direct and indi-
rect discrimination. A group is directly discriminated 
against when its members are treated less favourably 
than others either because of membership of the group 
itself (as when women are excluded from a trial). 
A group is indirectly discriminated against when it is 
treated less favourably on the basis of some criterion 
which is not necessarily associated with membership 
of the group but happens to impact more heavily on 
that group than others. An example from outside 
research would be a minimum height requirement 
for certain jobs – this makes women and members of 
certain racial groups less likely to qualify than others, 
and will constitute indirect discrimination if there is no 
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genuine occupational reason for requiring a minimum 
height. In research, requiring an ability to speak or read 
a particular language might constitute indirect dis-
crimination against certain ethnic groups, and limiting 
participation to those who can give valid consent 
might indirectly discriminate against children (assum-
ing in both cases that there is no sound justification 
for the exclusion). 
Another possible type of discrimination is what we 
might call passive discrimination. This occurs when, 
rather than actively treating some people less favour-
ably than others, some people are allowed to be disad-
vantaged by not treating them differently when some 
special treatment is called for. So whereas active dis-
crimination involves treating people differently when 
there is no justification for doing so, passive discrimi-
nation involves treating people the same when there 
is a reason to treat them differently. Outside the field 
of research, passive discrimination often arises in rela-
tion to disability. Legislation in some countries requires 
businesses and other organisations to make ‘reasona-
ble adjustments’ to enable people with disabilities 
to access their services or obtain employment, and 
a  failure to do so would be passive discrimination. 
Similar considerations can arise within research – for 
example, a person with a visual impairment might 
require participant information sheets and other infor-
mation to be made available in Braille or audio form in 
order to be able to participate in a trial, and a failure 
to provide this could be considered discriminatory. 
In the NRT trial some of the inclusion and exclusion 
criteria that appear to be justified by the inability of 
the excluded groups to engage with elements of the 
trial could be examples of passive discrimination if 
there are measures that could be taken to enable them 
to apply. For example, patients with a psychiatric dis-
order might be able to follow the treatment protocol 
and engage with the smoking cessation counselling if 
they were provided with additional support, and non-
English speakers might be able to participate if trans-
lation services were available. Whether we count the 
non-provision of such services as unfair and therefore 
discriminatory may depend on the costs involved, both 
financially and in terms of risk to the research objec-
tives. In many cases, therefore, whether something 
counts as a case of passive discrimination will be a mat-
ter of judgement. In making this judgement, however, 
it should be recalled that while inclusion might in 
some cases jeopardise the viability of the research 
by making it more costly or methodologically com-
plex, exclusion can undermine the value of its results 
by limiting their relevance and applicability to real 
world problems. 
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Learning outcomes
In this chapter you will develop: 
•  An understanding of the way in which society and societal considerations may be 
ethically relevant for the kind of research that is permissible within that society.
•  An understanding of the problems that moral difference raises for decisions about 
the ethics of research both within and across national boundaries.
•  An understanding of the distinctive practical and theoretical ethical challenges 
presented by research that spans cultures or societies.
•  An appreciation of the ethical issues involved in assessing and weighing up benefits 
and risks associated with dual use research.
•  An appreciation of the responsibilities of researchers in the conduct of research with 
particular emphasis on responsibilities for the use of the research, publication, academic 
integrity and the avoidance of conflicts of interest. 
•  An understanding of the ethical issues involved in pharmacogenetic research with 
particular focus on the issues related to the social impact of this research.
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Introduction
This chapter examines the ethical issues that arise out 
of the broader relationship of research and researchers 
to the society in which they operate. 
In the first part of the chapter we examine some key 
issues in this broader relationship in an attempt to 
become clearer about the context, and specifically the 
European context, of science and society. From this 
examination we derive four themes that will permeate 
discussion of the case studies in the rest of this chapter 
and the next.
The issues raised in this first part of the chapter are ini-
tially explored through a case study in which the treat-
ment that researchers propose to test is likely to place 
a significant burden on a country’s health care resources. 
This case begins to consider the extent to which the 
collective interests of society should determine what 
research it allows to be conducted. From this starting 
point readers are asked to consider the broader relations 
between social concerns and the ethics of research.
The second part of the chapter looks at ethical issues 
that may arise across societies or cultures. It raises prac-
tical questions about research taking place across 
national and cultural borders and about the role of 
cultural sensitivity and tolerance in research ethics. 
Finally this part considers the more theoretical issue 
of ‘relativism’ and its significance for the process of 
ethical review.
The final part of the chapter looks at the obligations 
and responsibilities of researchers to the society that 
facilitates their research. This part begins with a case 
study examining the issues surrounding possible mis-
use of the knowledge generated by research. It asks 
readers to consider the ways in which society might 
deal with the possibility of such misuse and, in particu-
lar, researchers’ responsibilities for the uses to which the 
products of their research are put. The final case study 
in this chapter brings together questions about the 
proper role of social distinctions in research and ques-
tions about the researchers’ responsibilities in the con-
duct of research. It considers the relevance of social 
concepts such as race and ethnicity to particular kinds 
of research and the responsibilities of the researcher 
to  uphold academic integrity and avoid conflicts 
of interests.
The case studies and associated questions are designed 
to prompt readers to consider these issues by begin-
ning with a specific practical problem and progressing 
to the more general societal considerations. It should 
also be noted that there is likely to be significant over-
lap between the discussions arising from the three 
cases. So, for example, although Case Study 7.3 intro-
duces issues surrounding the dual use of biotechnol-
ogy, some of the other cases will raise similar issues.
Science and society
This chapter and the next raise some very important 
general issues about the relationship between science 
and society, particularly as they relate to research eth-
ics and the governance of research. It is within this 
broad context that the specific issues targeted by each 
of the cases are located. 
The first and most basic question to consider here is: 
should science and scientific research be accountable 
to society? The most obvious answer to this question 
is ‘yes’ but it is worth pausing to examine the reasons 
for and against, since these may help to determine the 
appropriate level and form of this accountability. One 
argument in favour of accountability is a funding or 
‘resourcing’ one: society provides the resources for 
science and scientific research to take place and so is 
entitled to have a say in the direction that such research 
takes. Society has and ought to have an interest in sci-
entific research because it is supported by, and for the 
good of, society. Additionally, we might think that the 
products of scientific research, because of their poten-
tial to change society and the lives of its members, con-
stitute a force (or more negatively, a threat) that society 
should control as a protective measure. A second, per-
haps related, argument involves society’s obligations 
concerning the welfare and protection from harm 
of its members. On this view (familiar from Chapter 1) 
scientific research (and particularly medical research) 
is justified by its ability to promote the welfare of mem-
bers of society and protect them against harm. 
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We might, however, think that both of these arguments 
are somewhat simplistic. On the one hand, we might 
query whether it makes sense to think of society as 
being in a position to decide whether or not to engage 
with scientific research. It is not as though scientific 
endeavour is completely isolated from society – the 
institutions of science are societal institutions and the 
individuals who participate in the processes of science 
are members of society. All are products of the histo-
ries, traditions and cultures of each society and as such 
are a part of its fabric. 
On the other hand, we might, in the tradition of liber-
tarianism, think that society provides the resources that 
enable freedom of choice and that some individuals 
choose to engage in science. So the trends and direc-
tions of development in science are best left to the free 
choices of individuals and/or markets, rather than being 
subject to the controlling influence of the larger group. 
On this view, scientific research is the product of the 
freedoms that exist in society, and it is the duty of soci-
ety (in the form of its institutions) to intervene as little 
as possible and only to protect individuals from harms 
and infringements of their liberties. 
Finally, we might think that the welfare and harms argu-
ment actual plays out differently. That is, it might turn 
out that more benefits will accrue to society if science 
is left to determine its own direction with a minimum 
of interference. 
Without wishing to presume the ways in which a full 
discussion of these issues might play out, it is reason-
able to adopt something like a social contract model 
of the accountability of scientific research or one cen-
tred on the responsibility of society to provide for the 
welfare and protection of its members. That is, science 
and scientific research should be accountable to soci-
ety because it is supported by society for the benefit 
of society and its members.
Having considered very briefly the question of whether 
science should be accountable to society, we turn our 
attention to the ways in which this accountability 
might be established and maintained.
The relationship between science and society
The products of science – like technology and medi-
cine – are increasingly important in our lives and we 
are increasingly reliant upon them. However, there is 
growing suspicion about the direction of much of the 
scientific research that takes place within our society, 
about who is in control of it and what their motivations 
are. The tension between these two competing pres-
sures means that the relationship between science and 
society is, at least, difficult. 
Within this situation a number of trends can be dis-
cerned. First, there is increased scope for scientific 
developments to have a global impact as well as to 
impact on fundamental aspects of human biological 
and social life. Second, there is an increased level of 
commercial involvement in scientific research and in 
bringing the products of that research to the broader 
population. Finally, and perhaps as a result of the first 
two trends, there is increased concern about the nature 
of the choices being made about the direction of sci-
entific research and the possibility of exercising control 
over this direction.
Given these trends, it is natural that political and aca-
demic interest should focus on the relationship between 
science and governance – it is, after all, through the 
mechanisms of science governance, broadly under-
stood, that the forms of accountability can be explored. 
Biotechnology, particularly in its medical applications, 
provides a useful focus for consideration of the govern-
ance of science for three reasons. First, in this arena there 
is potential both for significant social benefit and 
for social harm, or at least controversial social change. 
Thus the potential effects of research in this area seem 
to warrant social control or regulation. Second, because 
of the wide range of potential benefits and harms, the 
issues here are complex and diffuse, involving a diverse 
range of players and affecting the full spectrum of soci-
ety’s groups and individual members. Finally, in this 
arena the relationship between policy makers, experts 
from a range of disciplines and the public matters 
a good deal. This relationship and its policy outcomes 
influence the way in which research is done, how it 
is  applied, as well as the spread and magnitude of 
the benefits.
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Ethics and law
A natural place to look, given this focus on science and 
governance, is to the legal and ethical regulatory struc-
tures in place for oversight and scrutiny of research. 
The European Commission Expert Group on Science 
and Governance (1) argues that there has been a shift 
towards the legalisation of ethics in the governance 
of research, which may undermine the processes of 
ethics in society. This legalisation has taken place 
largely through the rise of institutional ethics and can 
be seen as the product of a number of the trends 
described above.
The Expert Group suggests that there has been a shift 
to non-binding governance or ‘soft law’ – codes of 
practice, guidance, and reporting measures – which has 
been dictated in part by the pace of development and 
the relative inflexibility of ‘hard law’. At the same time, 
increased pressures in the direction of openness and 
involvement, perhaps arising from increasing public 
unease with science, have also been important in shap-
ing the forms of institutional ethics currently in place 
in Europe. The Expert Group suggests that, as a result, 
research ethics governance in Europe has become 
dominated by a kind of technological, ethical and legal-
istic expertise. Elements of this shift have been well-
documented elsewhere and lend support to these 
suggestions. (2)
Ethics has been institutionalised in Europe through 
the creation of expert committees. Some important 
questions thus remain unanswered: whether ethical 
decisions may take place beyond the rule of law; 
if ethics may appropriately be seen as just a matter 
of expertise; and how, as is claimed by the EC, such 
expert committees may convincingly represent “the 
values of all Europeans”. (3)
There are a number of points to bear in mind here. Most 
importantly, the question of expertise and, in particular, 
ethical expertise is one that is fraught with difficulty. On 
the one hand some argue that those who study applied 
moral arguments and moral (philosophical) theory are 
moral experts in the sense that they have an under-
standing of the argumentative terrain that comes with 
this kind of training and experience. (4) Others see the 
theoretical and argumentative training as useful for 
teaching and encouraging others faced with difficult 
ethical decisions but not for the purpose of making con-
crete normative judgements on behalf of those others.
What matters most here is the distinction between, on 
the one hand, individuals or institutions who take on 
(or who are given) the position of ethical authority, and, 
on the other hand, good ethical reasoning and argu-
ment. It is plausible to suppose that the proper form of 
discussion about ethical concerns is one that appropri-
ately involves the society as a whole and is in some 
sense democratic, but that even so, the authority of the 
democratic process should be mediated by considera-
tions of sound ethical reasoning and argument.
Individual and collective responsibility
An important set of issues relating to the relationship 
between science and society is the changing way in 
which we think of and ascribe responsibility to indi-
viduals and collectives. Arguably, the forces that are 
changing (or at least challenging) the relationship 
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between science and society are also changing the ways 
in which individual responsibility can feature in the con-
sideration of the ethics of research. If it is becoming 
more difficult to separate out and ascribe individual 
responsibilities, and if such ascriptions seem to over-
simplify the ethical terrain, then this raises a question 
about the usefulness of contemporary ethical theories 
that deal primarily with ethics at the individual level. (5) 
It is not clear that these changes are beyond the scope 
of contemporary ethical theories. It does, however, 
mean that they must be extended in such a way as 
to be able to cope not only with the challenges of the 
changing connection between science and society 
but also with the challenges posed by the complex set 
of roles and responsibilities that are features of the 
evolving society. (6) 
Models of engagement
Arguably the standard model of governance and over-
sight (in the sense of supervision and/or management) 
of research is ill-equipped to deal with the ethics of 
research in the light of the trends described above. 
Perhaps the most notable difficulty is the ability of this 
kind of system to take account of different perspec-
tives on the problems being addressed by the research 
and the forms that potential solutions should take. 
In addition, such a system of governance will have 
difficulty coping with the breadth of influence of the 
new  biotechnological developments. It is useful, 
therefore, to consider various models of engagement 
that can assist with the broader research governance 
issues associated with the relationship between science 
and society.
The report of the Expert Group on Science and 
Governance describes the development of the rela-
tionship between science and society in this context. (7) 
The first step in this development, a reaction to the 
early recognition of social unease with science, was 
a move towards the education of the public. In general 
terms the public’s unease was diagnosed as being due 
to a lack of understanding of scientific research and the 
benefits that it would bring. This emphasis on public 
understanding and education presumed:
(i)  that if the public understood the science they 
would then see and accept the benefits that such 
research promised; and 
(ii)  that the idea of the public good or societal bene-
fits was something determined by and within the 
institutions of science and policy making. (8)
Evidence that this approach was unsuccessful led to 
a more complex view of dialogue and engagement 
which is now the dominant approach. Within this 
approach, however, is contained a variety of models, 
each of which interpret involvement, participation and 
engagement in different ways. Each model involves or 
embeds citizens or interested groups in the processes 
of research in a different way. These models include:
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public consultation exercises of different formats, 
from citizen panels to consensus conferences, to more 
long-term engagement between research and parts 
of publics such as patients’ associations in medical 
research. (9)
 
There are a number of complications associated with 
these public engagement strategies that should be 
noted. First, the terms employed in referring to those 
whose ‘engagement’ is sought have importantly differ-
ent senses and so different implications for the nature 
of the engagement. The idea of engaging with ‘stake-
holders’, for example, presumes that a clear account can 
be given of what is at stake and who has an interest in 
it. The term ‘citizen’ does not have this connotation but 
may presuppose a particular view of the role of the indi-
vidual in society which is different from that of a pri-
vate individual. Deciding about an issue as a citizen of 
a particular society or as a member of a collective is 
arguably different from deciding as an individual. 
Second, there are important complexities surrounding 
the idea of representation or representativeness. 
Who should represent the public in a particular con-
text? How should individual participants understand 
their representativeness: as individual (private) mem-
bers of the public; as concerned, impartial citizens; or 
as user advocates? In each of these cases the kind of 
perspective to be adopted is different and so the mode 
of representation (and public engagement) is also 
different. (10) 
General themes for consideration
These general considerations about the complex and 
evolving relationship between science and society give 
rise to a number of themes that will be referred to 
throughout the discussion of the case studies in this 
chapter and the next. 
(1)  The first of these involves the nature of and extent 
of the forms of public engagement and stakeholder 
involvement in research. The kind of questions to 
bear in mind include: what are relevant forms 
that engagement and involvement can and should 
take for this research?; who are the relevant group 
or groups with which to engage? 
(2)  Second, these considerations raise important issues 
about the role and value of consensus in decision-
making: how should the consideration of ethical 
issues incorporate disagreement and when is con-
sensus required?; how is disagreement about the 
acceptability of a piece of research to be reconciled 
with inclusiveness? 
(3)  Third, as we have seen, there are increasingly com-
plex issues surrounding the roles and responsi-
bilities that individuals occupy. In the context of 
evolving patterns of involvement it is important to 
ask: how, in particular cases, are we to distinguish 
the actions of individual agents from those of the 
collective?; and how does moral responsibility track 
this distinction in this context? 
(4)  Finally, each of these themes and their develop-
ment has more specific ramifications for the way 
in which research ethics governance is best struc-
tured. So with this in mind: how should research 
ethics governance be structured to ensure proper 
review, engagement and involvement?; how does 
such a process avoid becoming overly legalistic or 
bureaucratic? 
As has been mentioned, each of the cases in this chap-
ter and the next deals with its own specific set of ethi-
cal issues and also provide important opportunities 
to further explore these themes.
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  Case Study 7.1
Enzyme replacement therapy 
for Pompe’s disease
A large multinational pharmaceutical company 
has begun to develop an enzyme replacement 
treatment for Pompe’s disease. The drug is about 
to enter Phase 3 trials. Pompe’s disease is a rare 
metabolic disorder also known as Glycogen Storage 
Disease Type II or Acid Maltase Deficiency. In the 
early onset form of the disease, affected children 
do not usually live longer than two years. The late 
onset form of the disease is milder but nevertheless 
does lead to premature death. There is currently 
no curative treatment available. However, research 
done in the Netherlands in the mid-1990s on 
enzyme replacement therapies was very positive. 
This research has led to the development of other 
reasonably successful enzyme replacement therapies 
for other conditions. 
These drugs are likely to be extraordinarily 
expensive when they reach the market, with 
costs reportedly running at about EUR 650K per 
person per year over the course of the patient’s life. 
Despite the small numbers of sufferers, funding 
this drug after the trial is completed will put 
a serious burden on the health resources of 
individual countries. Moreover, there are many 
more drugs of this kind currently in development 
that are likely to cost still more and so further 
burden health resources.
Questions
1.  Would the sufferers of Pompe’s disease (or their 
parents or guardians) be able to validly consent 
to participate in the trial?
2.  Should this Phase 3 trial go ahead? Why?
3.  Should research involving very expensive 
treatments be permitted in countries where 
there are significant budgetary constraints or 
where the treatment is unlikely to be funded 
off-trial?
4.  What role should broader social concerns 
(like cost) play in limiting or guiding the kind 
of research that is conducted?
Discussion
This case draws together two sets of considerations: 
research-ethics-related questions such as consent and 
voluntariness as well as questions about the proper role 
of broader social considerations in determining the 
kind of research that is funded. In answering the ques-
tions it is useful to concentrate on the former issues ini-
tially so as to be clear about the point at which the 
resource question becomes relevant. The case raises 
questions about consent in cases of ‘last resort’ – that 
is, research that involves conditions for which there is 
no established treatment, leaving the research popula-
tion with seemingly no other choice but to participate. 
This links with the discussion of voluntariness in 
Chapters 2 and 3.
Post-research provision
An initial issue that arises in the discussion of this case 
is the ethical imperative to continue to fund treatment 
(if it is shown to be beneficial) once the research has 
been completed. There is a common presupposition 
that trial participants should be entitled to continue 
to receive beneficial treatments that were being tested 
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on them. (11) This presupposition may come from 
a concern to avoid the exploitation or abandonment 
of research subjects. On the other hand, it might be 
argued that appropriately informed consent can justify 
research in situations where for reasons of cost (as in 
this case) or impracticality the treatment in question 
cannot be provided post-trial. The thought here is that 
as long as the participants are fully informed of the fact 
that once the trial is completed the treatment will no 
longer be provided (or that there is no guarantee that 
the treatment will continue to be provided), not pro-
viding the treatment is acceptable. A possible interme-
diate option is not to require ongoing funding or 
provision of the trial treatment but to require a clearly 
articulated exit or post-trial treatment plan. Clearly, 
however, this option is only intermediate if such a plan 
involves some post-trial provision.
Social concerns and research
The case study asks us to consider the relationship 
between the ethical issues involved in research and 
broader ethical concerns of society. At its most general, 
the case is designed to raise questions about the role 
of society in facilitating, guiding or constraining 
research. As was discussed above, one of the reasons 
for thinking that society is entitled to control or limit 
the types of research that are conducted is that it pro-
vides funding and other resources to support it. In the 
case study we are not told whether the research is pub-
licly funded. If the research is funded by non-state 
sources, to what extent should these sources or their 
institutional representatives control or limit research? 
Should society have less control in the case of non-pub-
licly funded research? One thing to note here is that 
even if the research in the case study is funded com-
mercially, this is likely to be on the basis that the invest-
ment can be recouped in part at least from future sales 
to publicly funded health care systems.
The specific tension in this case is between the require-
ments (and autonomy) of research and researchers 
and ongoing budgetary constraints arising from social 
decisions about the allocation of resources. Particularly 
in countries with socialised health care systems, some 
decisions are required about the kind of ongoing sup-
port that can be afforded. The type of treatment 
described in this case has the potential to place a sig-
nificant burden on any health system. If the research is 
not permitted, then demand on resources from future 
users of these expensive treatments and, in particular, 
from those coming off the clinical trials, will be avoided. 
Do these concerns constitute reasonable grounds on 
which to base decisions about what kinds of research 
will be permitted?
The relevance of resources questions to research can 
be seen as a specific example of a broader issue. In these 
resource questions it is the prior social values, reflected 
in the resource framework, that are largely responsible 
for the dilemma. For example, if more resources 
(whether taken from other areas of health provision, 
education or defence) were earmarked for funding 
current and future enzyme replacement therapies, this 
particular problem would be solved. This means that 
social values can matter for the kinds of research that 
can and ought to take place in a given society. Two sets 
of questions arise from this:
(i)  Other social values: What other social values, 
beyond those reflected in the allocation of 
resources, should play a role in determining, limit-
ing or constraining the kind of research that takes 
place within a society? Is there research that is 
unethical because its outcomes have the potential 
to undermine social values? This question looks 
forward to Case Study 7.4 and to Chapter 8.
152
E U R O P E A N  T E X T B O O K  O N  E T H I C S  I N  R E S E A R C H
12.  This case is based upon research described in Joseph M. Mfutso-Bengu and Terrie E. Taylor, “Ethical jurisdictions in biomedical research”, 
Trends in Parasitology 18, no. 5 (2002): 231-4.
(ii)  Including social values: This question is a more prac-
tical one about the process of research ethics 
review. If there is a role for the values of society 
informing decisions about research, how can they 
be included in ethical decision-making processes? 
How might the review process be conducted to 
take account of, for example, the public’s views on 
future funding priorities?
Looking beyond the resources issues, this case raises 
two of the general themes arising from the previous 
discussion of the relation between science and society. 
First, the relevance of resource-based considerations 
suggests that research governance structures should 
not be independent of broader political debates about 
funding priorities. If we should broaden the forms of 
stakeholder involvement, it would seem plausible to 
include those responsible for ongoing resource alloca-
tion in the processes of governance. Second, in connec-
tion with the final theme, this case raises the question 
of how the experience and expertise associated with 
resource allocation decisions might be best incorpo-
rated into the governance process.
  Case Study 7.2
International research on the 
diagnosis and treatment of malaria
For a research project examining the pathological 
symptoms of fatal cerebral malaria, a group of 
researchers from a European university wanted 
to remove the eyes of deceased children. (12) 
Good indications exist that the degree of damage 
to the retina caused by malaria will provide a useful 
clinical marker that could improve diagnosis and 
optimise treatment. In the African country where 
the research is to take place, malaria accounts for 
one-third of all child deaths and hospital admissions.
The participant information sheet that will be 
given to parents of the deceased children states: 
“Although the research will involve cutting and 
then stitching the body, we will replace any parts 
that we have taken with natural appearing material, 
and you will not see any marks or changes on the 
face.” No specific information about removing the 
eyes is included in the information sheet, but such 
information will be provided if parents ask.
 
An African bioethics committee has approved 
the study, considering that the expected benefits 
justify providing partial information to the parents. 
In addition, they felt that the information sheet 
provides sufficient information for parents to make 
an informed choice, whilst also acknowledging the 
cultural sensitivities surrounding autopsy. An ethics 
committee in the researchers’ home country, 
however, did not approve the study, because only 
partial information was supplied and the consent 
form was found to be euphemistic and misleading.
Questions
1.  Given the account above, is the information 
given about the nature of the study detailed 
enough for appropriately informed consent?
2.  Do the expected benefits that may be pro-
duced by the study justify the amount of 
information provided to potential participants?
3.  Should the study proceed? Why or why not?
4.  Who should have the final decision about the 
research? Why?
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Discussion
The first three questions raise familiar issues in research 
ethics, discussed in previous chapters, about the impor-
tance of consent and the trade-off between it and the 
benefits associated with the study. The difference in this 
case is the international setting of the research, and 
in this context the first three questions are designed 
to lead on to the last question and to more theoreti-
cal issues associated with governance of international 
research.
International research tends to emphasise (and perhaps 
exacerbate) the key ethical tensions in research. This 
case revisits issues from Chapters 2 and 5 by raising 
questions about the nature and adequacy of the 
consent as well as the balance of risks and benefits. 
The international context also raises similar concerns 
to those raised in Chapter 6 about the possibility 
of exploitation, in this case arising primarily from the 
differing standards for consent. 
Relativism, tolerance and cultural sensitivity 
An important theoretical issue raised by this case 
involves cultural sensitivity, tolerance and relativism. 
The final two questions call for us to consider the 
standard of consent that should be required as a con-
dition for approval of the research. A range of answers 
may be given to these questions. One approach would 
be to insist on a particular standard, either that of the 
‘home’ or the ‘foreign’ committee. It is important to be 
clear about whether such an answer is the result of 
a view about the importance of consent when weighed 
against the expected benefits of the research or is 
a product of a view about who should decide. So, for 
example, we might think that the study should pro-
ceed because the standard that should be adopted is 
that of the culture in which the research is taking place. 
On the other hand we may think that the study should 
proceed because the African committee has got the 
balance correct between expected benefits and 
appropriate levels of information provision. The former 
seems to indicate acknowledgment of and respect 
for moral diversity, whereas the latter is consistent with 
a more objective view of the ethical judgements 
concerned.
There are two kinds of consideration that are raised by 
recognition of the divergence in ethical judgements in 
cases like this. First, there is a theoretical question about 
the status of ethical judgements and the possibility 
of there being a fact of the matter, a ‘genuinely’ right 
answer. This is the question of moral relativism. Second, 
there is a more practical question about the circum-
stances under which we should tolerate significant 
difference in ethical assessment and respect cultural 
differences. A great deal has been written about each 
of these and we will briefly consider some of the perti-
nent issues.
Moral difference
A cursory glance at various moral systems and cultures 
is enough to suggest that there is widespread diver-
gence in moral values and judgements between the 
peoples of the world, both currently and across time. 
In spite of this variation some have suggested that there 
are basic moral principles that are common to all soci-
eties because they form the basis on which society can 
exist. (13) However, we need to be careful about how 
these rules are specified. In particular, if they are speci-
fied too broadly then it might look trivial to say that 
they are shared by all cultures – for example, all cultures 
might have rules relating to some concept of respect 
without this implying any substantive agreement.
This all presumes that cultures are fixed, separate enti-
ties. The reality of course is that cultures and cultural 
values are fluid and lack clear boundaries, and so it is 
not clear what it means for some moral judgement to 
be ‘true in that culture’. However, we might draw an 
analogy here with languages. Like cultures, languages 
are difficult to define and yet we have no difficulty 
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understanding the properties of languages and the dif-
ferences between them. (14) On this analogy, it makes 
sense to make judgements about the moral values of 
a culture or sub-culture as long as we are careful that 
they are properly qualified and supportable.
Moral relativism
Moral relativists think that we observe something fun-
damental about the nature of morality when we see 
these differences in moral judgements and the disagree-
ment they often precipitate. Most commonly, moral 
relativists think that there really is no universally right 
answer to moral questions because morality is relative 
to culture or society. The particular moral values that 
people hold depend on the culture in which they live 
or were raised. The initial attractiveness of moral rela-
tivism can be characterised as questioning the idea of 
moral authority. When we reflect on the widespread 
difference in moral values, we may feel uneasy about 
our moral convictions and question our grounds 
for judging those with whom we differ – ‘their moral 
values are as good as ours’.
Tolerance
Our obligation to be tolerant of those whose views, 
ways and customs are not like ours is often taken to be 
an important feature of moral relativism. If our moral 
judgements cannot be privileged over others – our 
judgements and values are no more right than others 
– we have no grounds on which to judge those whose 
moral views are different from ours. Given this, it is 
natural to think that we ought always to be tolerant of 
others. But it appears contradictory for the relativist to 
assert this. The relativist seems to be making a univer-
sal moral claim of precisely the kind that is supposed 
not to exist. The moral relativist cannot claim both that 
people should always be tolerant and that there are no 
universal moral truths.
David Wong argues that relativists need not be com-
mitted to such a strong tolerance claim. He argues that 
tolerance is best thought of as a feature of our own cul-
turally influenced (i.e. western liberal) moral values. (15) 
So the requirement to be tolerant is not a universal one 
that applies to all, but rather – as a key part of our own 
cultural viewpoint – is one that applies specifically 
to us. Though tolerance is required of us, we cannot 
impose it on others. 
We might also suggest that although tolerance is an 
important value (within our culture), it is not absolute. 
For example when confronted with cases of genocide 
or slavery we are likely to think that being tolerant is 
less important than acting to prevent the violations of 
individual freedoms and rights that these acts involve. 
Importantly, the relativist is neither precluded from 
asserting the value of tolerance nor committed to an 
extreme degree of tolerance. In relation to the case 
study it remains an open question how the relativist will 
balance respect for the local standards against the high 
value that ‘we’ place on individual autonomy. 
Relativism and objectivism
Moral relativism is a view about the relation of moral-
ity to culture that most often rejects the idea of moral 
truth and justification. Objectivists, by contrast, believe 
that there are moral truths and that these truths give 
us the appropriate authority or justification for our 
judgements. 
We can develop a moderate relativist position, which 
maintains the claim that there is no universal morality 
but makes fewer claims about tolerance and perhaps 
some claims of correctness. (16) So while acknowledg-
ing that there are many ways in which a culture can 
regulate conflict between people – arguably a central 
function of morality – we might also allow that some 
systems can fail to do this and so be false: a culture that, 
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for example, has no variant of the idea of respect might 
fail in important ways to manage conflict between 
individuals.
Alternatively, we might suggest a similarly moderate 
objectivist position. This might explain moral difference 
by pointing out that, even if there are genuinely right 
answers to disputed moral claims, those answers might 
be hard to discover particularly when – as in the case 
study – they relate to what ought to be done in a cultural 
context that is not our own. On this sort of account the 
existence of stark cultural disagreements need not 
undermine our belief that there is a right answer to be 
found (or at least sought), though it might give us rea-
son to be less confident that our own view is the cor-
rect one, and hence to be tolerant of the views of others. 
As with moderate relativism, though, this does not 
entail an absolute commitment to tolerance. 
A moderate objectivism can acknowledge that there 
may be situations where the differences between cul-
tures are too great for one side to convince the other 
or for agreement to be reached. (17) However, Wiggins 
suggests that even where such disagreement exists there 
may be situations where progress can be made through 
perseverance. The thought is that by uncovering the 
‘deep’ differences of perspective, one or both sides can 
come to see or understand the other’s standpoint. 
Whether such a strategy works can depend on the indi-
viduals concerned and the circumstances of their 
involvement. In the enterprise of trying to understand 
one another, egos, temperament, claims of authority 
and attitudes of superiority can get in the way. (18)
Dealing with variations in ethical judgement
When we consider moral differences and the variability 
of moral judgement in the context of research ethics, 
two questions are raised. First and most immediately, in 
situations of disagreement, to what standard should 
researchers be held? Is research ethics the kind of arena 
in which perseverance can be successful in reaching 
consensus? The second question that arises here con-
cerns whether and to what extent variation between 
committees, whether international or intra-national, 
is a bad thing. If some variation and disagreement is to 
be expected, then some difference in views between 
committees is also. Moreover, if we adopt either of 
the moderate positions described above, we are in 
a position to accept variation as a natural by-product 
of different ways of making sense of morality. Practically, 
however, variation can be very difficult to handle – mul-
tiple committees applying different standards and 
coming to different conclusions makes getting approval 
an onerous task. (19) 
Again, the broader themes of the relationship between 
science and society come into play in this case when 
considering the practical consequences of variations 
in ethical judgement. On the one hand, variation may 
signify an appropriately local consideration of social 
and moral values. It may signify just the right kind of 
inclusion and recognition of the range of perspectives 
and values at the social level. On the other hand, vari-
ation may represent the misfiring of processes that are 
intended to give consistency and fairness in the ethical 
consideration of research. Thus the line of reasoning 
developed in the section on science and society has 
important points of contact with the theoretical issues 
involved with moral relativism.
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  Case Study 7.3
Research on a ‘trust’ drug
Oxytocin is a natural hormone produced in the 
hypothalamus in response to stimuli including 
social interaction, sex, breast-feeding and childbirth. 
It has an important role in the formation and 
maintenance of social bonds including those 
between sexual partners and between parents 
and their offspring. The mechanisms by which it 
functions are not fully understood, but it is known 
that oxytocin makes people more trusting. In one 
study, participants who had received oxytocin via 
a nasal spray were more willing to hand money to 
a trustee knowing that the trustee could choose not 
to return it to them, and were less likely to modify 
this behaviour after having their trust betrayed. (20) 
Research has suggested that deficiency of oxytocin 
may be associated with a range of neuropsychiatric 
conditions including autism, social anxiety disorder, 
and borderline personality disorders resulting from 
childhood neglect. Studies using nasally administered 
oxytocin have given strong indications that the hor-
mone may have important therapeutic potential 
for some of these conditions. (21) 
An obstacle to the development of such therapies 
is the short half-life of nasally-administered oxytocin. 
Response to the drug peaks in about 50 minutes 
and wears off about 2 hours after administration. 
In order to overcome this limitation a group of 
researchers wish to trial a slow-release version 
of the hormone with a significantly longer half-life. 
They hope that an appropriate form of the hormone 
can be of widespread assistance to those suffering 
from autism and other disorders.
Speculation has been rife about alternative uses 
of this kind of product. Worries have included 
its (mis)use in the interrogation of terrorists or 
combatants or for the indoctrination of new 
recruits to fanatical sects. Finally, it has also been 
suggested that such a drug would add significantly 
to currently available drugs to form a new form 
of date rape cocktail.
Questions
1.  What are the risks associated with this 
research?
2.  Do the risks associated with the research and 
with the misuse of the knowledge generated 
by this research outweigh the potential benefits 
of the research?
3.  Is there anything that the researchers can or 
should do to prevent misuse?
4.  What are the researchers’ responsibilities 
in relation to the possible misuse of their 
findings?
5.  Who (if not the researchers) should be 
responsible for preventing misuse?
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Discussion
This case study is about the risks associated with 
research, but focuses on a different kind of risk from 
those considered in earlier chapters – the risk of mis-
use. In answering the first two questions we can sepa-
rate those risks that are associated with the research 
itself (for example the risk of harm to research par-
ticipants) from those that are connected to misuse of 
its results. 
Dual use
The main purpose of the case is to introduce the prob-
lem of dual use. Dual use problems arise when the 
knowledge generated by research has the potential to 
be put to both good and bad uses. This applies to some 
degree to most if not all research, but the problem 
has  arisen and received attention in a number of 
more extreme situations. What makes many dual-use 
cases noteworthy is the magnitude of the harm that 
the misuse could cause. 
An important function of this case is to raise questions 
about the assumption, easily made in the context of 
medical research, that the research will benefit people. 
In Chapter 1 we considered the benefits as providing 
a necessary moral argument for conducting research 
involving human subjects. In the case of medical 
research this argument was at its most powerful when it 
involved direct benefit to patients. In the non-medical 
context the question of the benefits of research (or the 
justification of research) is not always so readily appar-
ent. In either medical or non-medical cases, the possi-
bility of significant misuse can force us to pay closer 
attention to the justification of the research. So, a piece 
of proposed research that investigates an important 
part of human physiology might need further scrutiny 
if there are serious dual-use possibilities.
A central question posed by the dual-use problem is: 
how do we balance the risks associated with the pos-
sibility of misuse of the knowledge generated by a piece 
of research against the potential of the research to ben-
efit society? This raises issues about both the responsi-
bilities of researchers and the governance of research. 
In general we can divide dual-use cases into three 
categories: 
(i)   those in which certain research should not be con-
ducted because the risks are too great; 
(ii)   those in which research should not be published 
or be allowed to enter the public domain; and 
(iii)  those in which various methods of oversight of the 
research and its application might be appropriate.
Dual-use problems are often associated with research 
that has a potential military application. However, there 
are some important distinctions to be made here. (22) 
First, we should distinguish good/harmful uses of 
a technology from military/non-military uses, noting 
that, as in the case study, only some of the potential 
uses that give rise to dual use concerns are of a military 
nature. Within the category of military uses we should 
distinguish offensive and defensive uses. Separating 
these helps to question the assumption that military 
uses are harmful or bad ones and also enables us to see 
how closely connected the harmful and beneficial uses 
may be. For example, we might think that research on 
the effects of exposure to a particular pathogen that 
may be used in chemical weapons may provide ways 
of reducing the harmful effects of such a weapon. 
However the same research may answer some practi-
cal questions about how to make the weaponised form 
of the pathogen more effective. Both are military uses: 
the former is a defensive one and, on the face of it, war-
ranted; the latter is an offensive military use and likely 
to be unwarranted.
It is also important to distinguish two kinds of purpose: 
primary and secondary. In the example above, the pri-
mary purpose is a defensive military one and the con-
cern lies with the secondary offensive purposes. 
Similarly, in the case study the primary purpose appears 
to be a legitimate one and the concern arises about 
secondary purposes to which the research might be 
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put. This distinction is important because blame is usu-
ally attached to agents on the basis of their intentions 
and motivations. In dual-use cases the secondary pur-
poses may not feature at all in the intentions or moti-
vations of the researchers, yet we may want to say that 
the research is unjustified because of its potential mis-
use. This raises the issue, addressed in Questions 3-5, 
of where responsibility for preventing misuse lies.
A second tension inherent in dual-use cases is between 
security on the one hand and academic freedom and 
scientific progress on the other. The force of the secu-
rity concerns all involve the estimation and weighing 
up of the risk of harm associated with the bad uses 
of the research. Some of these risks can be managed 
by adjusting the levels and form of security in place 
– clearly greater security will lessen the risk of harm. 
In some cases the security measures are ‘physical’ ones 
that need not interfere with the research itself: physi-
cal and data protection systems to prevent theft as 
well as various security processes to ensure, for 
instance, that only those with the relevant clearances 
can access the research and its objects. In others, the 
security measures involve restrictions on the research 
that may be conducted or the ways in which it may 
be disseminated.
Opposing security measures that limit the research and 
its dissemination are the claims of academic freedom 
and scientific progress. Freedom to pursue one’s own 
direction of research might reasonably be linked to 
broader intellectual freedoms such as the freedom of 
thought and speech, and is considered an important 
feature of educational and research institutions such as 
universities. Curtailing these freedoms undermines an 
important tenet of society. Part of the justification for 
academic and intellectual freedom is connected to the 
idea of progress in science: by being permissive about 
the scope of research and allowing access and dissemi-
nation to all, we allow new research to be built on the 
full range of knowledge generated by research already 
completed.
Overall, decisions about whether to limit research or 
restrict dissemination will involve balancing the risks 
involved in the particular case (along with the extent 
to which they can be mitigated) against the value of 
academic freedom and scientific progress. In both cases 
there is important room for compromise. Policies may 
be available which will reduce, if not eliminate, risks 
of misuse while imposing only limited restrictions on 
intellectual freedom. In the case at hand, one possibil-
ity may be to restrict or prevent the publication of the 
method used in extending the half-life of oxytocin.
Responsibility and security
The direct link between Case Study 7.3 and the broad 
science and society themes of this chapter is through 
the distinction between individual and collective 
responsibility. It was noted earlier that shifting trends 
in the relationship between science and society mean 
that it has become increasingly difficult and complex 
for responsibility to be straightforwardly attributed 
to  individuals. Dual use dilemmas provide a very 
good example of precisely this issue. Consideration of 
societal responsibility and institutional response is 
a crucial element of these cases. At the same time, 
though, questions still arise from the perspective of the 
individual researcher. Thus it is important to attend 
to the individual researcher’s responsibility as well as 
the responsibilities of social institutions. 
What are the researchers’ responsibilities?
The question of what can be done by researchers is 
an important one that will vary with the context. One 
possibility will always be to refrain from doing the 
research. Other possibilities include reporting that 
the research is taking place to a relevant authority, not 
publishing the research at all or in publicly accessible 
places, and modifying the research (or its published 
form) so as to make the possibility of misuse lower.
The issue here centres on the obligations that the 
researcher has to conduct research in a responsible way 
and very clearly recalls the justifications of the scientific 
endeavour discussed in the first section. It might be 
argued, for example, that since the researcher is con-
ducting research for the benefit of the society and/or 
funded by the society, researchers should take adequate 
measures to ensure that the research findings are not 
misused. Given publication, there may not always be 
much that the researcher can do, but such things as 
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alerting the relevant authority to the research and its 
potential misuse may be appropriate. This view makes 
the obligation to take steps to prevent misuse part of 
the researcher’s responsibility. It might also be suggested 
that the researcher is both researcher and citizen at the 
same time. As researcher the obligation is to conduct 
research that is effective in generating new knowledge. 
However, as citizen the obligation is to act so as not 
to endanger society. This means that the obligations of 
the researcher and the researcher-citizen can conflict 
and require balancing, perhaps on a case-by-case basis. 
A final view is that the researcher’s responsibilities are 
only concerned with conducting optimal scientific 
research; if there are responsibilities concerning the 
use or misuses of the research, these are not the busi-
ness of the researcher but of the broader social insti-
tutions involved in the oversight of the application of 
the research.
Who (if not solely the researcher) should be 
responsible for preventing misuse?
From the perspective of the relevant governance insti-
tutions, the questions are the extent to which research 
should be overseen, the nature of this oversight and the 
form that any restriction should take. It is useful to iso-
late in each particular context – national, European or 
international – the relevant organisations and institu-
tions. These may include (but are not limited to) 
research ethics committees, research funding bodies, 
professional associations, governments and interna-
tional Non Governmental Organisations. 
The ideas discussed in the opening section of this chap-
ter about the need for collective responsibility suggest 
that society as a whole should consider the appropri-
ate policy and institutional responses to these cases. 
Miller and Selgelid provide an excellent list of the broad 
range of policy alternatives available. First they give six 
techniques for controlling the various elements of the 
dual-use situation. These are:
•  distinguishing permissible and impermissible research; 
•  mandatory physical safety and security regulation;
•  licensing of dual-use technologies;
•  mandatory education and training;
•  mandatory personnel security regulation;
•  censorship or constraints on dissemination of research 
methods or findings.
Clearly there are various ways of enforcing these tech-
niques as well as different levels of control over the sci-
entists involved. Miller and Selgelid categorise them in 
the following way:
•  complete autonomy of the individual scientist;
•  institutional control;
•  a dual system of institutional and governmental 
control;
• control by an independent authority;
• governmental control.
The ways in which these forms can and should be uti-
lised will vary from situation to situation. However in 
the policy context, whether at the national, European 
or international level, it is important to consider the 
ways in which these forms of response can be brought 
together in an overall system of response and oversight 
covering all cases.
  Case Study 7.4
Pharmacogenetics research
Two researchers are collaborating with an interna-
tional drug company to develop drugs that are 
targeted at particular genetically related sub-groups 
within the European community. Their first project 
involves Europeans of African descent. The idea 
is to produce versions of heart disease drugs that 
counteract genetic variants that are known to be 
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present in this population and may reduce 
the effectiveness of anti-inflammatory drugs. 
The research program will draw on established 
work on the genetic variation between various 
groups of different origin. It will then link this 
genetic variation to drug response. As with other 
pharmacogenetic research of this kind, it has the 
potential to make drugs safer and more effective 
for the relevant population. It is hoped that 
this research will lead to progress on personal, 
tailor-made drugs based on an individual’s entire 
genetic profile.
However, questions have been raised about racial 
and ethnic discrimination which might follow 
from such research. 
For commercial reasons, the drug company has 
insisted that the research can only be published 
if it is successful and after the drugs in question 
have passed all of the relevant approval stages. 
Questions
1.  What are the benefits of this research?
2.  How might discrimination follow from this 
kind of research?
3.  Should concepts like race feature in this kind 
of research? Is there any (medical) research 
for which these concepts are relevant?
4.  What are the ethical issues associated with 
personal, genetically-based medicine?
5.  Is the company’s stipulation ethically 
acceptable?
6.  Do the researchers have an obligation 
to publish their research?
Discussion
Pharmacogenetics research brings together our under-
standing of genetics with the study of our responses to 
drugs. As such, it raises important questions about the 
ability of science to change the way in which medicine 
proceeds in ways that may have profound social conse-
quences. Of particular note here is the way in which 
social categories like race and ethnicity, already ostensi-
bly connected to genetic heritage, can be linked in a sys-
tematic manner to particular drug response differences, 
which may in turn reinforce the social categories.
 
There are a number of links to be made between this 
case and issues discussed in previous chapters. The 
introduction of personalised medicines may raise ques-
tions about access to confidential (genetic) information 
– specific genetic-related issues will be considered in 
Chapter 8. There are also justice-related concerns about 
access to the new drugs and to the genetic testing 
required in order to take advantage of them. Finally, 
this case relates to issues surrounding discrimination 
that were considered in Chapter 6.
Pharmacogenetics and ethics
Pharmacogenetics is the study of how genetic variation 
affects our response to drugs. More specifically, 
pharmacogenetics 
takes the patient’s genetic information of drug trans-
porters, drug metabolizing enzymes and drug recep-
tors into account to allow for an individualized drug 
therapy leading to optimal choice and dose of the 
drugs in question. (23)
This kind of research brings with it the possibility of 
a number of significant benefits. Most obviously, groups 
of patients and, in the future, individual patients will be 
prescribed drugs that will be more effective for them 
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or will have a lower risk of side-effects. It has also been 
suggested that developments in pharmacogenetics 
will enable clinical trials to become much safer for par-
ticipants by using the knowledge of drug response to 
exclude those at greatest risk. (24)
Many of the concerns about the development of phar-
macogenetics are justice-related. By tailoring drugs to 
particular groups it has the potential to create new 
health inequalities or to reinforce existing ones. One 
such concern involves the way in which access to drugs 
will vary between those for whom pharmacogenetic 
knowledge makes tailor-made drugs possible and those 
who are not so fortunate. One possibility is that phar-
macogenetics creates a new class of ‘orphan groups’ 
– groups for whom it is uneconomical to develop tai-
lored drugs and who are consequently forced to rely 
on lesser ‘one-size-fits-all’ medicines. (25)
This could also lead to the exacerbation of existing 
socio-economic inequalities. If there are significant 
pharmacogenetic variations that overlap with socio-
economic status then it is possible that poorer sections 
of society will be the ones passed over in the develop-
ment of targeted drugs, or alternatively that by being 
so targeted they become the victims of stigmatisation. 
This of course may not come to pass, but as we shall see 
below it is important to be careful about the ways in 
which the scientific distinctions that we make between 
groups of people match up with social distinctions.
Social categories in research
A key issue raised by Case Study 7.4 concerns concepts 
of race and their relationship to genetics. The scientific 
characteristics of interest that influence the body’s 
response to particular medicines are genetic character-
istics. However the social categories that we tend to 
use to classify people are most often related to appear-
ance, behaviour, traditions and lineage. 
The main problem that is raised here is the relationship 
between the genetic characteristics that are the basis 
of the pharmacogenetic research and the socially based 
categories of race and ethnicity. The pharmacogenetic 
interactions operate exclusively at the genetic level and 
the groupings associated with them may not match 
the social groupings. So, not all members of a particular 
social group, in this case Europeans of African descent, 
will possess the genetic variants for which the drug has 
been developed. This is the familiar issue of needing to 
be careful that the group on which the drug is tested 
is the group that will use that drug.
Further, social groupings like race and ethnicity are 
often subject to stereotyped views about the behav-
iours, traits and characteristics of their members, views 
that are more often than not influenced by historical 
prejudice and generalisation. If the identification of 
genetic differences is associated with racial and ethnic 
groupings, there is a risk that this will reinforce preju-
dice and stereotyping. It is therefore important to be 
clear about the distinction between these two kinds of 
groupings – the genetic and the social. 
On the other hand and in spite of this, early pharma-
cogenetics has used racial or ethnic distinctions as 
a broad marker for particular kinds of predispositions. 
In some cases there does seem to be an important cor-
relation between the phenotypic features associated 
with particular races and ethnicities and, for example, 
predispositions to certain conditions or reactions to 
treatments. These correlations are at work in the case 
under discussion.
The issue in the background here involves the genetic 
underpinnings of race. One side of this debate insists 
that because race is an ethically loaded social construc-
tion it has no place in science. This side points out that 
there is a vast amount of genetic variation within those 
who consider themselves to be of a particular race or 
162
E U R O P E A N  T E X T B O O K  O N  E T H I C S  I N  R E S E A R C H
26.  Troy Duster, “Medicine – race and reification in science”, Science 307 (2005): 1050-1.
27.  Søren Holm, “Pharmacogenetics, race and global injustice”, Developing World Bioethics 8, no. 2 (2008): 82-8.
28.  Frank R. Lichtenberg, “The impact of new drug launches on longevity: Evidence from longitudinal, disease-level data from 52 countries, 
1982-2001”, in NBER Working Papers 9754 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 2003).
29.  Frank R. Lichtenberg and Suchin Virabhak, “Pharmaceutical-embodied technical progress, longevity, and quality of life: Drugs as ‘equipment 
for your health’”, in NBER Working Papers 9351 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 2002): 2.
30.  Frank R. Lichtenberg, “The impact of new laboratory procedures and other medical innovations on the health of Americans, 1990-2003: 
Evidence from longitudinal, disease-level data”, in NBER Working Papers 12120 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Inc., 2006).
ethnicity. (26) The other side relies on the relationship 
between historical origins and genetics, and the increas-
ingly understood connections between genetics and 
dispositions to behaviour. According to this side, genet-
ics and behavioural research is relevant to how we 
understand such social categories as race. 
In relating this debate to pharmacogenetics, Holm 
argues that the link between genetics and race is not 
robust enough to make the pharmacogenetic testing 
of individuals redundant. That is, there is enough rel-
evant genetic variation within the socially observed 
categories of race for it to fail as an adequate pharma-
cogenetic proxy. (27) Even if this is right, however, the 
broad correlations that appear to exist between race 
and drug response may be enough to create social 
problems: if it is perceived – rightly or wrongly – that 
some racial or ethnic groups are benefiting more than 
others from the development of targeted medicines, 
then this has the potential to create or exacerbate inter-
racial or inter-ethnic tensions and resentments. What 
this means, effectively, is that the development of 
targeted drugs creates a new arena for concerns about 
distributive justice to be played out.
Commercial interests in research
The general issue raised by Question 5 concerns the 
balance between the commercial involvements 
required to enable the continued and effective progres-
sion of medical science and the dangers associated with 
involving the profit motive in medical research. The 
tension arises largely because of a worry about the way 
in which the (excessive) involvement of a profit motive 
can skew the practice of medicine and medical research.
 
In considering these tensions we should recognise the 
benefits that can result from a market driven medical 
research industry. For example, a 2003 study argues that 
of the 2 years of life expectancy gained over the period 
from 1986 to 2000, 10 months can be attributed to new 
chemical entities. (28) An earlier study showed “that 
people who used newer drugs had better post-treat-
ment health than people using older drugs for the same 
condition, controlling for pre-treatment health, age, sex, 
race, marital status, education, income, and insurance 
coverage: they were more likely to survive, their per-
ceived health status was higher, and they experienced 
fewer activity, social, and physical limitations”. (29) 
In a more recent study, it is shown that “the more med-
ical innovation there is related to a medical condition, 
the greater the improvement in the average health of 
people with that condition”. (30) These studies are use-
ful reminders of the benefits that can be associated 
with the pharmaceutical industry. Since the industry 
functions more effectively as a result of market forces, 
society as a whole has a vested interest in ensuring that 
the industry remains competitive. The ability to bring 
a new product to market faster than one’s industry 
competitors is crucial to a company’s ability to main-
tain competitiveness. 
At the same time there are genuine concerns associ-
ated with excessive commercial motivation in health 
care. In the context of research we might worry about 
the temptation to cut methodological corners or to 
‘fudge’ results. In the worst kind of case we may be 
concerned that financial incentives might lead to the 
fabrication of results. The practice of medicine and 
medical research can survive a good deal of commer-
cialisation, but it is easy to find cases where the profit 
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motive wrongly intervenes in the processes of medi-
cine – we might think this is true in the case study, 
where the restrictions on publication, presumably 
driven by the desire for competitive advantage, prevent 
the full dissemination of knowledge. The goals (and 
hence the motivations) associated with medicine and 
medical research are essentially related to the benefit 
of patients, whether immediate or future, whereas com-
mercial interests can easily run contrary to these.
There have been a number of steps taken at the inter-
national level in recent years to protect against harms 
associated with commercial interests. These include 
public registration of clinical trials and the disclosure of 
results. Of particular note are the recommendations 
made by the International Committee of Medical 
Journal Editors (31) and the WHO. (32) Both of these sets 
of guidance require that information about medically 
related trials is publicly available. For example, the WHO 
suggests that all phases of all clinical trials involving 
human beings be registered on their International 
Clinical Trials Registry Platform. An important function 
of these recommendations is to increase the transpar-
ency and accountability of research conducted by the 
pharmaceutical companies. The disclosures required by 
the International Clinical Trials Registry open up the 
activities of commercial research in an effort to protect 
society from those with an over-eager commercial 
interest. (33) 
Publication ethics, conflicts of interest 
and academic integrity
In ethical terms it is quite clear that researchers should 
conduct their research with integrity – they should 
not falsify their data, cut corners in research design or 
plagiarise the work of others. The falsification of data 
and of findings, like each of the elements of research 
integrity, is a violation not only of the general moral 
norm of truthfulness but also of the project of research 
itself. This links the issue of research integrity back to 
the discussion earlier in the chapter about the relation-
ship between science and society.
Methodological shortcuts and falsification of results 
will undermine the benefits that science can bring to 
society. The extent to which scientific research gener-
ally is justified by the benefits it will produce for society 
is therefore closely tied to the obligation on research-
ers to conduct their research with integrity. This also 
has consequences for the publication and dissemina-
tion of results, since the benefits of scientific research 
are more likely to be realised if work is published and 
read as widely as is relevant. The obligations of research-
ers to publish and accurately present findings follow on 
from the public benefit arguments for the justification 
of research. An interesting part of this involves the pub-
lication of ‘negative research’ – for example, research 
which is unsuccessful in showing that a particular drug 
benefits the relevant patient group. It is easy to be 
excited by the successes of research and to fail to rec-
ognise the knowledge gained by learning about what 
does not work. Systematic reviews and meta-analyses 
are important parts of scientific research and can be 
more thoroughly conducted with all of the evidence.
The ICMJE document, “Uniform Requirements for 
Manuscripts Submitted to Biomedical Journals: Writing 
and Editing for Biomedical Publication”, is a useful 
resource in this regard. (34) It includes statements about 
the publication of negative results and about the accu-
racy of the presentation of research but it also requires 
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potential conflicts of interests to be declared. Clearly 
the commercial conflict of interest worries raised above 
involve researchers (and indeed governance arrange-
ments) being motivated by financially related self-inter-
est rather than a concern to develop medical products 
that benefit patients. There are, however, other very 
powerful motivations that similarly can draw the 
researcher away from the central goals of medical 
research. These include the academic pressures to pub-
lish, to attract funding and to receive the attention of 
the academic community or the public. These too can 
lead to similar kinds of misconduct mentioned in the 
context of commercial interests, such as cutting corners 
and the fabrication of results. Although there is 
very good reason for having processes in place for dis-
closure of such conflicts of interests, it is important to 
recognise that researchers can act with integrity despite 
these pressures and that the appearance of a conflict of 
interest is not necessarily an indicator of wrong-doing.
In all of this the questions concerning science and 
society are very much present. Commercial interests 
are crucial to the functioning of European society 
and more specifically to health care in Europe. At the 
same time (and like all other sectors of society) the 
motives and orientation of commercial organisations 
are not always the same as those of society as a whole 
or elements of it such as health care, and should there-
fore be handled with care. When thinking about 
the form and structure of research ethics governance 
across Europe these considerations needed to be 
carefully balanced.
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Chapter 8    Ethical issues in the new 
biotechnologies 
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Learning outcomes
In this chapter you will develop: 
•  An understanding of the research-specific ethical issues involved in reproductive and 
reproductive-related technology, disability, nanotechnology and genetics. 
•  An understanding of the more general ethical issues involved in reproductive and 
reproductive-related technology, disability, nanotechnology and genetics. 
•  An appreciation of the challenges to the processes of ethical review posed by research 
on reproductive and reproductive-related technology, disability, nanotechnology 
and genetics. 
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Introduction
This chapter examines a range of issues that arise in the 
context of new biotechnological developments. 
Broadly it looks at issues in reproductive and reproduc-
tive-related technology, disability, nanotechnology and 
genetics. Each of these technologies is introduced 
through a case study which raises a specific set of ethi-
cal considerations that connect with and apply the 
discussions of earlier chapters. The most significant 
connection, however, is to Chapter 7. There, the focus 
of the introductory section was on the relationship 
between science and society. Four themes were intro-
duced and discussed throughout the chapter: 
(i)   the forms of public engagement and stakeholder 
involvement; 
(ii)   the role of consensus in decision-making; 
(iii)  the distinction between individual and collective 
responsibility; and 
(iv)  the form and structure of research ethics govern-
ance. The case studies in this chapter extend and 
develop these themes.
The case studies below raise two kinds of ethical issue. 
First, they present specific challenges for the process of 
ethical review – difficulties, for example, associated 
with obtaining consent, protecting confidentiality and 
assessing risks and benefits. As such, they invite the 
reader to look forward and to consider the ways in 
which the system of ethics review and the contempo-
rary approach to research ethics will be able to cope 
with the biotechnological developments of the future. 
This first kind of issue draws on the discussions of the 
earlier chapters in order to consider future problems 
confronting those involved in research and research 
ethics review.
The second kind of issue raised by these cases is more 
closely connected to the nature and permissibility of 
the technology itself (as distinct from issues arising spe-
cifically from the research process). The four broad top-
ics considered in the cases each encapsulate new 
challenges to our understanding of ethics generally and 
quite apart from the research context. As such they 
represent challenges to the way we think about ethics 
and society. The first case looks at the ethical challenges 
raised by new reproductive technologies, including 
the moral status of embryos and the acceptability and 
limits of interventions in the reproductive process. The 
second case examines the status of disability and the 
proper responses to it in the light of new possibilities 
for biotechnological interventions. The third case raises 
questions about decisions under conditions of uncer-
tainty and the adequacy of the precautionary principle 
in dealing with nanotechnology. The final case study 
looks more closely at the use of genetics, and in partic-
ular at the global use of human genetic data in the con-
text of genetic biobanks. 
In discussing each of the cases it is useful to separate 
these two kinds of considerations initially and then 
to consider the ways in which the latter, more general 
ethical issues might affect the former, more specific, 
research related questions.
 Case Study 8.1
Germ-line gene therapy
A clinical geneticist, Corinne, working with colleagues 
in an IVF facility, has developed a technique for 
manipulating the genetic structure of implantable 
embryos. If successful this will have the advantage 
over embryo selection of allowing couples to have 
a child free from an inherited defect in cases where 
all of their available embryos are affected (for example 
in cases where one of the couple is unable to produce 
further gametes following illness).
One couple attending the IVF facility, Anna and 
Boris, has a history of serious, genetically related 
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renal failure. Several of their closely related family 
members have suffered very significantly from 
kidney problems over the course of their lives. 
Although both Anna and Boris possess the relevant 
genes, they have not been expressed in either of 
them to a serious extent. The particular condition 
itself is too complex to address using this method 
of gene manipulation. It may however be possible 
to use Corinne’s technique to address one of 
the key symptoms of the condition.
Individuals who suffer from this kind of renal 
problem are very often anaemic – lacking sufficient 
red blood cells to carry oxygen through the body. 
Corinne’s procedure would induce a genetic poly-
morphism in the embryo that would increase the 
resultant child’s sensitivity to erythropoietin (EPO). 
Erythropoietin is a protein that stimulates bone 
marrow to make more red blood cells. It is thought 
that increasing the sensitivity to erythropoietin will 
compensate for the reduced levels of the protein 
(and hence the anaemia) caused by the renal 
problems. Artificially produced erythropoietin is 
sometimes given (off-label) to those with severe 
kidney disorders for precisely this reason and has 
also, more controversially, been used by athletes 
to enhance their performance by increasing the 
amount of oxygen carried by the blood. Moreover, 
in the 1970s, Finnish cross-country skier and dual 
Olympic gold-medal winner, Eero Mäntyranta was 
found to have this genetic polymorphism naturally. 
It enabled him to produce between 25 % and 50 % 
more red-blood cells than normal people and 
greatly improved his endurance capabilities.
Another couple at the clinic, Dana and Eddie, are 
very committed to an active, athletic lifestyle. Eddie 
competes at a high level in a number of endurance 
sports but has always suspected that there is 
a connection between his inability to ‘make it’ at 
the highest level and his genetic inheritance. Dana 
and Eddie would very much like to avoid this being 
the case for their children. Together with Corinne 
they have enthusiastically discussed the possibility 
of using her gene therapy technique to increase 
the endurance capabilities of their child. Thus, if it 
turns out that the child is interested in competitive 
sport, there will be no concerns about endurance.
Both couples understand very clearly: 
(i)  that this technique has not been tested in 
humans and that the success seen in animals 
may not translate to humans; 
(ii)  that if the resulting child (in Anna and Boris’ 
case) has kidney problems, this therapy will not 
solve all of them – it is only intended to address 
the problems related to anaemia; 
(iii)  that if the resulting child does not have kidney 
problems, this therapy will mean that the child 
will have enhanced levels of erythropoietin 
(this is true for both couples); 
(iv)  that if the resulting child has no kidney problems 
and enhanced levels of erythropoietin, there may 
be a slightly increased chance of stroke; and 
(v)  that because these alterations are taking place 
at the embryonic level it is likely that they will 
be carried on in future generations.
Questions
1.  Is the use of Corinne’s technique on Anna and 
Boris’s embryos treatment or research?
2.  What are the ethical considerations raised by 
the use of this technique (whether it is research 
or treatment)?
3.  Is this kind of treatment of embryos permissible? 
If so why? If not, why not?
4.  In the case of each couple, is the use of 
Corinne’s technique on the embryos therapy 
or enhancement? How does this affect 
the ethics of the prospective interventions?
5.  Do the couples have the right to decide 
whether or not to go ahead with this proce-
dure? If we assume that the resultant child will 
benefit from the intervention, do the couples 
have an obligation to go ahead with this proce-
dure? How much depends on the assumption 
of benefit to the prospective child?
6.  Should there be special regulation or oversight 
of this kind of activity?
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7.  Are there any special ethical issues raised by the 
fact that these interventions may, if successful, 
affect future generations?
Discussion
This case introduces ethical issues surrounding new 
reproductive technologies as well as issues specific 
to the research process. It is useful to consider the 
research-specific issues both before and after the dis-
cussion of the more controversial ‘enhancement’ and 
reproductive technology-related considerations. 
By separating ethical issues raised by the specific nature 
of the techniques to be investigated from more general 
research ethics issues, readers will be better placed 
to assess the particular research ethics problems raised 
by controversial technologies. 
An initial survey of the research-specific issues yields 
some important connections with the discussions of 
previous chapters. In particular, the case raises issues of 
consent and harm relating to the severity of the poten-
tial effects on the resulting offspring, the ability of indi-
viduals to understand and consent to risks when there 
is very little evidence to go on, and the right of parents 
to consent to risks that will be borne by their future chil-
dren. These issues connect with Chapters 2, 3 and 5.
The distinction between research 
and treatment 
Before considering the research ethics issues associated 
with this case, we need to establish whether the pro-
posed intervention counts as research. As was dis-
cussed in Chapter 1, this is not always an easy question 
to answer. 
On the one hand this has the appearance of research: 
it is clearly experimental since the clinician is not work-
ing on the basis of sufficient, previously established 
evidence of the efficacy of her intervention, and is 
attempting to expand her understanding and to 
develop the technique further. On the other hand, the 
application and testing of the new technique appear 
to be on a small scale (rather than in large trials), involv-
ing individuals with suitable circumstances who are 
willing (and perhaps desperate) to participate in order 
to find a solution to a particular problem. This means 
that the kind of data that this experimentation can 
yield will be very specific and any conclusions will be 
a long way from being generally established. 
If the intervention is classified as research its justifica-
tion may be questionable given that, even if it is suc-
cessful, there may be relatively little (if any) generalisable 
knowledge produced. Alternatively it might be argued 
that this case and others in clinical genetics provide 
an interesting challenge to our understanding of the 
nature of research and its relationship to clinical prac-
tice. (1) It is quite often the case in clinical genetics that 
specific mutations require investigation and explora-
tion. In such cases, one-off responses to the needs of 
a patient help to build up the geneticist’s ‘library’ of 
mutations and conditions, and so contribute to expe-
riential or clinical knowledge rather than more general, 
‘publishable’ research. 
If this is the way in which knowledge progresses in clin-
ical genetics, requiring large-scale trials of the kind that 
can generate secure, generalisable knowledge in other 
fields might simply be inappropriate for these sorts of 
technologies. This still leaves the question of how the 
intervention is to be justified. One way would be to 
show that this sort of piecemeal approach can bring 
real benefits in terms of the growth of knowledge and 
the prospects for future treatments; another would 
be to argue that if the intervention is understood 
as  ‘tailor-made’ treatment its justification need not 
be research focused at all but can be based on the 
benefits to and consent of the patients. 
On the other hand it may be thought that however this 
case and others like it are classified, they still require 
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scrutiny of the kind that research ethics committees 
provide. Even if this kind of experimentation is classified 
as treatment, because of the risks involved and the fact 
that the clinician may have other aims in addition to 
the welfare of the patients, there may be some need for 
regulation and oversight beyond that which is required 
for more conventional forms of clinical practice. 
Research-specific issues
Putting these questions aside for the moment and 
assuming that the case does count as research, it raises 
a number of ethical issues. (2)
The first set of issues is connected to the harm-benefit 
ratio presented by this research. Given the experimen-
tal nature of the proposed intervention, the potential 
for harm may be quite significant and the justification 
of the research may therefore be restricted to the pre-
vention of severe conditions rather than production 
of the benefits associated with enhancements. If the 
embryo would, without intervention, be likely to 
develop into a normal child, then the risks associated 
with this intervention seem likely to outweigh its ben-
efits. Moreover, if we are judging this case according to 
the standards commonly applied to research, there may 
be some hesitation in exposing vulnerable subjects 
(embryos) to significant risks in the absence of clear 
benefits. These arguments involve two contestable 
assumptions. First, that the embryo can be counted as 
a research subject. This relates to wider debates about 
the moral status of the embryo which will be consid-
ered below. Second, it is assumed that there is a mor-
ally significant difference between therapy (in the case 
of Anna and Boris) and enhancement (in the case of 
Dana and Eddie). This also will be considered below. 
For germ-line modifications like this one, we might 
want research to provide us with evidence not only of 
the effect in the immediate generation of children born 
using this technique but also its effects on future gen-
erations. This means that studies like this one would be 
significantly more complex and take considerably 
longer to achieve the required knowledge. Surviving 
subjects would need to be followed over the course of 
their lives in the attempt to map out the consequences 
of the intervention. The burdens of consent related 
to these issues would be significant: not only would 
consent have to be sought from the parents, but also 
from the direct subjects over the course of their lives 
and potentially from their children too.
Finally, there are some issues about how treatments 
such as these might become part of general clinical pro-
vision. In particular, given the nature of the interven-
tions and the likely circumstances of their use, how safe 
and successful would the intervention need to be in 
order to be made generally clinically available? Does the 
safety level and the success rate for this kind of inter-
vention need to be the same as is required for other 
kinds of intervention?
The moral status of the embryo 
Clearly the case study raises issues about the proper 
treatment and moral status of embryos. Four common 
accounts may be discussed and applied to the research 
context. According to these, moral status is: 
(i)   attached to the continuous human organism; 
(ii)   attached to persons; 
(iii)  attached to persons and potential people; or 
(iv)  conferred by agents. 
In what follows we will briefly sketch each of these 
views before continuing to consider the role that they 
may play in the ethical consideration of research.
First, however, we need to be a little clearer about what 
is meant by ‘moral status’. On one view an entity has 
moral status, or is ‘morally considerable’, when it has 
interests that are morally significant in themselves and 
not just because they further the interests of some 
other morally considerable entity. Many people would 
hold that all sentient creatures are morally considerable 
in this sense. This does not, however, imply that the 
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interests of such creatures have any particular weight. 
On another view, to have moral status is to have inter-
ests that warrant a particular, very high level of protec-
tion, of the sort that we typically claim for ourselves 
and recognise for other human beings – for example 
by attributing rights to them or seeing our treatment 
of them as being governed by strong deontological 
constraints. These need not be absolute but are usually 
seen as being defeasible only under extreme circum-
stances. To avoid confusion, this is sometimes referred 
to as having ‘full’ moral status.
The four common views about the kinds of entity 
that have full moral status, or something close to it, are 
as follows. 
(i)  Moral status is attached to the continuous 
human organism. This view attributes full moral 
status to the continuous human organism from 
conception. The thought here is that there are no 
morally relevant dividing lines apart from the point 
at which the process begins, namely, conception. 
One variant of this view is that what matters mor-
ally is the point at which the embryo becomes 
a unique human organism and to thus require that 
full moral status is attributed only after the possi-
bility of embryo division (resulting in twins, for 
example) has past (usually taken to be at 14 days).
 
  The main challenge to this view comes from 
a demand for consistency with common and widely 
accepted practices. (Of course, rejecting those 
practices as unethical is an alternative option here.) 
Clearly, if the human organism has full moral sta-
tus from conception then abortion at any time in 
pregnancy is very problematic – this, of course, 
runs contrary to practice in many countries. 
Further, it has been argued that if we take this view 
of the moral status of the embryo, then the most 
significant human moral tragedy is going largely 
unnoticed in the form of spontaneous and natural 
early embryo loss. (3)
(ii)  Moral status is attached to persons. Partly per-
haps in response to the problems faced by the 
continuous human organism view, this position 
distinguishes between ‘humans’ and ‘persons’, and 
attributes full moral status only to the latter. The 
idea is that ‘human being’ is a biological category 
rather than one that captures the morally signifi-
cant features that makes members of that species 
morally distinct from other species. The concept 
of personhood is then applied to those who pos-
sess these morally significant characteristics, which 
are typically said to include sentience, reasons, 
capacity to communicate, self-awareness and moral 
agency. (4)
  The main challenge to this view is the implication 
that those individuals who do not satisfy the rele-
vant conception of a person (often including young 
children and the mentally incapacitated) lack full 
moral status and may be treated accordingly.
(iii)  Moral status is attached to persons and potential 
persons. This view takes on board the distinction 
between persons and human beings but attributes 
moral status to embryos (and children too young 
to have the defining characteristics of persons) in 
virtue of their being potential persons. As distinct 
from the first view, this one allows that embryos 
may have less than full moral status, as non-persons, 
but, in virtue of their potentiality, some (non-trivial) 
moral status which protects them from certain 
kinds of harms and interferences.
  The main challenge to this view is to defend the 
idea that potentiality is of moral significance. 
Against this it may be argued that a sperm and an 
egg also have the potential to become human 
beings and so consistency would require that they 
too should be attributed moral status. This view 
also, fails to attribute moral status to severely men-
tally incapacitated humans who will never acquire 
the characteristics associated with personhood.
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(iv)  Moral status is conferred. This view moves away 
from the idea that moral status is determined by 
the properties of the bearer of moral status. Instead, 
it is conferred by agents or their behaviour. On this 
account, an entity has moral status when it is 
treated as if it has moral status, for example when 
particular kinds of behaviour or language express-
ing ‘commitment to value’ are used in connection 
with the bearer. For example, we might say that 
an embryo has moral status when the pregnant 
woman decides to have the child or otherwise 
acts in such a way as to treat the embryo as having 
moral status.
  The main difficulty with this view is that it seems 
to make the judgement of moral status, and in 
this case the judgement of the moral status of 
the embryo, too arbitrary and subjective. On this 
view moral status seems to depend on the whim 
of individuals.
These general ethical positions provide a basis for con-
sideration of the nature and extent of the limits of per-
missible research on embryos. How, in particular, should 
the moral status of the embryo be balanced against 
the value of important research? The answer to this 
question will depend on the particular view of the 
embryo’s moral status. If the embryo is understood to 
have full moral status from conception then it is diffi-
cult to see how even very valuable and pressing 
research will be permitted when it involves the destruc-
tion of embryos. A more moderate position might 
allow research on embryos but will depend on a differ-
ent view of the moral status of the embryo. 
The divergence of views on the moral status of the 
embryo raises the question (first addressed in 
Chapter 1) of how regulators and those involved in eth-
ical review should respond to moral differences, espe-
cially where – as is often the case in relation to the 
status of embryos – they are associated with different 
religious perspectives. The extent to which individuals 
with diverging views are prepared to compromise 
to reach a workable decision or policy is likely to heav-
ily influence the functionality of regulatory bodies. 
In the context of an ethics or policy committee, having 
a clearly defined remit helps to concentrate attention 
on issues which those with differing views can agree 
upon. However, this raises the further question of how 
the remit of such committees should be defined.
Treatments and enhancements 
The different motivations of the two couples in Case 
Study 8.1 enable us to compare the moral significance 
of using a technology to treat a symptom of a condi-
tion and using it for enhancement. The questions raised 
by this comparison are whether there is a morally rele-
vant distinction between treatment (or therapy) and 
enhancement, and under what conditions, if any, 
research into human enhancement might be justified. 
In what follows we will consider various issues associ-
ated with these questions.
We first consider the distinction between treatment 
and enhancement. Both couples want access to the 
same intervention but for different reasons. It is note-
worthy that if Anna and Boris’s child does not have 
the kidney condition (if the genes are not ‘expressed’) 
then the child will have increased sensitivity to EPO and 
so will also have increased endurance capabilities. Thus, 
despite the difference in the couples’ intentions, the 
outcomes may be the same.
A common way to draw the distinction between 
treatment and enhancement is via the idea of species-
typical or normal human functioning. (5) A treatment 
is an intervention that is designed to improve or 
restore health to the level of normal human function-
ing. An enhancement is an intervention that is designed 
to improve on an element of normal human function-
ing. This distinction is often taken to be a morally 
relevant one with interventions classed as treatments 
being permissible (or obligatory) and those classed as 
enhancements being impermissible.
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A number of objections can be made against this 
account. Some of these objections deal with the dis-
tinction itself but most involve the moral significance 
attached to it. We permit (and perhaps encourage) 
mothers to eat special diets and maintain a healthy life-
style during pregnancy. We allow parents to spend large 
sums of money to get their children the best education 
or to push their children, often in very extreme ways, 
to excel in intellectual, artistic or sporting endeavours. 
In such cases, the parents’ decisions are usually made 
with a view to enhancing the child’s prospects beyond 
what is ‘normal’ or ‘typical’. An argument from consist-
ency suggests that these values are precisely the ones 
in operation for Dana and Eddie, and calls on oppo-
nents of biotechnological enhancement to give an 
account of the morally relevant difference between the 
types of enhancement that they reject and these more 
widely accepted practices. 
One response to this is to be careful about the moral 
work that the distinction between treatment and 
enhancement can be expected to do. Instead of expect-
ing it to yield a firm moral boundary, we might suggest 
that classifying an intervention as an enhancement 
gives us a ‘moral warning flag’ – alerting us, for example, 
to the possibility that, as discussed above, the benefits 
of enhancement may be less likely than the benefits 
of treatment to outweigh the risks of an experimental 
procedure. (6) It is worth noting, however, that the dis-
tinction between treatment and enhancement is not 
a reliable indicator of risk/benefit ratio: major enhance-
ments might, for the same level of risk, produce more 
benefit than the treatment of minor conditions. 
Procreative liberty and the harm principle
This case study also raises important questions about 
the obligations and rights of prospective parents to 
decide about the kinds of children that they have. This 
issue has been widely discussed in the bioethics litera-
ture. Here we consider the general shape of the debate 
and the way in which it might apply to the case study. 
The general ethical issue here is whether there is some-
thing wrong with allowing parents to choose the kind 
of child they will have. (7)
Perhaps the most common argument in favour of 
allowing couples to choose the kind of child they have 
involves the right to reproductive autonomy and the 
harm principle. These two principles provide a frame-
work for dealing with the reasons that people have 
for procreating and the kinds of interventions by third 
parties that are justified. 
The right to reproductive autonomy can be thought 
of as related to the general right to privacy and family 
life. (8) In terms of broad moral principles it is connected 
to the principle of respect for autonomy. The central 
idea here is that individuals are understood to have 
the right to determine when, where and with whom 
to reproduce. There are a number of ways of under-
standing this principle and it is important to be careful 
about what reproductive decisions we take this right 
to include. (9)
The harm principle, introduced in Chapter 1, constrains 
this right. In this context the question becomes whether 
particular reproductive choices will result in harm to 
others. If parents’ reasons for having a child affect the 
way in which the child’s life goes then we want parents 
to have good reasons rather than bad ones.
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The first observation to make here is that prospective 
parents usually have a large number of variously impor-
tant reasons for having a child. This makes it difficult 
to  connect any particular procreative reason with 
child welfare.
Second, we might worry that a child created to fulfil 
certain parental ambitions is being treated as a mere 
means, exploited or ‘commodified’. On the face of it, 
Dana and Eddie’s reason for employing the gene ther-
apy technique reason is one which ‘instrumentalises’ 
the resulting child, but it is unclear that this amounts 
to viewing the child as a mere means or that there is 
anything wrong with this degree of instrumentalisation. 
Because parents’ reasons for having children and ways 
of valuing them are complex and varied, we cannot 
conclude from Dana and Eddie’s desire to enhance their 
child’s prospects of sporting success that the child is 
less likely to be valued for its own sake. 
There are similar difficulties associated with concerns 
about psychological harms to the child that might fol-
low from using technologies like this one. For example 
we might worry that the child will feel inadequate if it 
fails to ‘live up to its genetics’. Again, the primary diffi-
culty lies in demonstrating that genetic enhancement 
techniques are more likely to lead to such feelings than 
other manifestations of parental ambition that we do 
not attempt to prohibit.
While the harm principle focuses on harms to particu-
lar individuals as a reason to limit people’s choices, some 
have argued that the potential impact of enhancement 
technologies on social institutions and values requires 
parental choices to be carefully regulated. It might be 
argued, for example, that society may in the long term 
be damaged by a loss of genetic diversity, or alternatively 
that the emergence of enhanced elites may undermine 
commitment to values such as equality and solidarity. 
Sometimes such claims are linked with the idea (dis-
cussed below) of enhancement as an interference with 
nature. (10) 
Procreative beneficence
A related set of approaches to reproductive choice con-
centrates more on the benefits associated with paren-
tal action. A consequentialist argument along these 
lines is that if people are allowed to choose for them-
selves what kind of children to have, this will make the 
world a better place because they will generally choose 
to avoid ill-health and in favour of characteristics such 
as intelligence and a disposition to happiness. There are 
both connections and important differences between 
this and the arguments proposed by the eugenics 
movement of the twentieth century. (11) 
We might further claim that it is the responsibility of 
parents to give their children the best chance at the 
best life. This has been called the principle of procrea-
tive beneficence:
Couples (or single reproducers) should select the 
child, of the possible children they could have, who 
is expected to have the best life, or at least as good 
a life as others, based on the relevant available 
information. (12) 
The initial plausibility of this principle can be seen using 
a simple example. A couple wish to have a child but 
because there is currently a serious viral epidemic there 
is a high chance that the resultant child would be seri-
ously adversely affected. If, however, the couple wait 
until the epidemic has passed (say, several months) 
then the risk associated with this viral infection will be 
negligible. Here the timing of the conception of the 
child will clearly affect the welfare of the child that will 
be born and it seems morally unproblematic to claim 
that the couple should wait. That is, the couple should 
have the later of the two possible children because that 
later child has a better chance of a better life.
From this example, we can see the force of the princi-
ple. Such a principle would tend to support research of 
the type described in the case study, as it offers the 
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prospect of enabling parents to have children with 
better life chances in the future.
On the other hand, what makes this principle a con-
troversial one is that a requirement to have the best 
possible children is potentially very demanding and 
may conflict with other moral considerations such as 
the welfare of the parents or other family members. 
Procreative beneficence may therefore best be thought 
of as a prima facie duty capable of being overridden by 
other considerations, or, alternatively, not as an obliga-
tion to have the child with the best possible life chances 
but to have a child whose life chances are good 
enough. (13) This might suggest that there is strong rea-
son to pursue experimental treatments in cases like that 
of Anna and Boris, where it has the potential to prevent 
children from being born with conditions that signifi-
cantly undermine their prospects of living a happy life, 
but less reason in cases like that of Dana and Eddie. (14) 
Interfering with nature
One common response to technological develop-
ments affecting the more fundamental aspects of life 
is to claim that such developments are ‘unnatural’, con-
stitute an ‘interference with nature’, or involve human 
beings ‘playing God’. Claims like these are made by 
Sandel, Kass, Habermas and others in response to the 
challenges posed by arguments in favour of enhance-
ment. (15) The intuition that lies behind these claims is 
extremely common and often quite strong. Michael 
Sandel has observed, “When science moves faster than 
moral understanding, as it does today, men and women 
struggle to articulate their unease.” (16) 
‘Interfering with nature’ claims should be distinguished 
from claims about ‘playing God’. Claims about playing 
God are focused more on the character of the agents 
involved, whether it is a particular clinician or a legisla-
ture enacting policy, and therefore have an affinity with 
virtue ethics. The ‘playing God’ claim suggests that the 
agents in question are assuming a role or making deci-
sions that are beyond their proper authority or ‘above 
their station’. There are some cases where we might 
think the ‘playing God’ claim applies but ‘unnatural-
ness’ does not (or not as readily). For example, it makes 
sense to say that a clinician who decides against putting 
a patient on a life-support machine is playing God but 
not that he is interfering with nature. In spite of this, for 
the most part the contexts of application of playing 
God and interfering with nature are quite close. (17) 
A first step in understanding interfering with nature 
claims is to examine what we mean by ‘nature’. The 
problem here is that if we understand nature as that 
which is not human or of human origin, then all human 
action would seem to be unnatural. If humanity and 
human action is understood to be a part of nature then 
everything we do counts as natural. (18) It is difficult, 
either way, to distinguish ‘natural’ from ‘unnatural’ in 
a way that matches our intuitions about good and bad 
actions. Moreover, even if we can distinguish the natu-
ral from the unnatural in a coherent way, we will still 
confront the problem of why what is natural is good 
and what is unnatural is bad. (19) 
In spite of these difficulties we might think that there 
remains a possibility of understanding ‘nature’ in a way 
that gives it some moral force. (20) Whether or not this 
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is so, attempts to make sense of the intuitions that give 
rise to claims about unnaturalness and playing God 
may be important in understanding and responding 
to public reactions to biological enhancements and 
related forms of biotechnology. 
Germ-line and somatic gene therapy
The final question asks us to consider the moral signifi-
cance of interventions that are likely to directly affect 
members of generations beyond the one at which they 
are aimed. This introduces the distinction between 
germ line and somatic gene therapy. Germ-line inter-
ventions affect the cells that will eventually produce 
viable eggs or spermatozoa, whereas somatic gene 
therapies do not. 
Issues that may arise in this context include the lack of 
consent on the part of the ‘future generations’ and the 
degree of risk and level of uncertainty involved. From 
the perspective of consent, the central concern is that 
these interventions will necessarily be made without 
consulting those who will be affected by them. On the 
face of it this worry looks misguided. There are many 
things that may affect the lives of future generations but 
which do not seem problematic because those affected 
cannot be consulted. This worry is better thought of 
as arising because of the overall level of risk and uncer-
tainty. This links with the discussion of the precaution-
ary principle in relation to Case Study 8.3. The general 
concern here is that because, in the case of germ-line 
interventions, the alterations may be passed on from 
generation to generation we need to be significantly 
more careful about the changes we instigate. (21)
Gene therapy is controversial because it manipulates 
the ‘building blocks’ of life. As a result it very much 
becomes the focus of the worries about interfering with 
nature discussed above. The social and regulatory reac-
tion to gene therapy technologies has been cautious, 
particularly after Jesse Gelsinger, an 18-year-old man 
with ornithine transcarbamylase deficiency, died 4 days 
after taking part in a gene therapy trial in 1999. (22) Since 
then, countries around the world have put in place 
regulatory processes to approve gene therapy research. 
A good deal of variation exists between countries in 
their approaches to gene therapy, with some countries 
(e.g. The Netherlands) actively seeking to facilitate gene 
therapy research by streamlining the different national 
review processes. (23) 
Science and society
The questions raised by this case and discussed above 
have important connections to the broader issues 
about governance and the relationship between sci-
ence and society discussed in Chapter 7. Indeed, the 
controversies associated with these new reproductive 
technologies can be taken to represent a paradigm case 
of the tensions within the science/society relationship. 
These issues illustrate the power of science that under-
lies much of our current (medical) reliance on the 
achievements of research. At the same time, the direc-
tion that some of this research is taking has given rise 
to serious unease among a significant portion of the 
population outside of (and in some cases within) the 
scientific community.
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As a result, these issues exhibit each of the four themes 
from Chapter 7. In order to address public unease, there 
may be a case for broadening the forms of public 
engagement and rethinking the way in which the pub-
lic’s concerns are examined and addressed in making 
decisions about the directions in which research should 
proceed. Because these issues are deeply contested, 
consideration should be given to the role of consensus 
in decision-making about the development of this kind 
of research. The tensions between the rights of prospec-
tive parents, their duties to the children they create and 
society’s interest in protecting both its members and 
its values and institutions raise questions about where 
responsibility for procreative choices should lie. These 
value differences and questions of responsibility also 
put pressure on the systems and institutions of science 
governance to encompass the range of relevant inter-
ests and views.
Research involving stem cells, admixed 
human embryos and cloning
Human embryonic stem cells are stem cells that are 
derived from the developing human embryo. They are 
most useful in research because of their ability to 
change into any type of cell, tissue or organ in the 
human body – that is, their pluripotency. As such they 
can be used in the treatment of a very large number of 
conditions. The main ethical issues arise from their 
source – donated embryos, most often left over from 
the IVF process. (24)
Non-embryonic stem cells are stem cells that are not 
derived from an embryo. Two examples of these are 
cord-blood stem cells and induced pluripotent stem 
cells. Because they are not derived from embryos there 
is substantially less moral controversy about the use of 
these stems cells in research. However, there are limits 
to the use of non-embryonic stem cells. First, for all but 
induced pluripotent stem cells, other stem cells are not 
as versatile as the embryonic version and so they can-
not give rise to the same range of human cells; and 
second, they do not help with research that is aimed 
at understanding the developmental mechanisms 
involved in these processes. (25)
Admixed human embryos are a range of ‘combined’ 
human-animal embryonic cells. The most commonly 
used in research are ‘cybrids’. Cybrids are made by 
inserting the nucleus of a human cell into an animal 
egg from which the nucleus has been removed. They 
are useful in research because they are an easy way to 
create embryos so that the understanding and control 
of human embryos and development can be under-
stood. Chimeras are usually formed by merging human 
and animal embryos whilst hybrids have human and 
animal chromosomes. The most common objection 
to these techniques involves claims about interfering 
with nature – by creating ‘half-human, half-animals’. 
A further objection points to the lack of dignity asso-
ciated with the creation of these embryos. Such an 
objection relies on a particular conception of the moral 
status of the embryo. (26) 
Therapeutic cloning is cloning that is aimed at pro-
ducing stem cells, tissue or organs for the therapeutic 
use of the individual from whom they are cloned. The 
advantage of therapeutic cloning is that the stem cells 
or other tissue created will have matched DNA to the 
recipient and so there will be little risk of tissue rejection. 
The main ethical issue associated with therapeutic 
cloning is that it requires the creation and destruction 
of an embryo, which on some views on the moral status 
of embryos is wrong. (27)
24.  International Society for Stem Cell Research, Guidelines for the Conduct of Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research (2006). 
http://www.isscr.org/guidelines/index.htm. The Hinxton Group, Consensus Statement: Science, Ethics and Policy Challenges of Pluripotent 
Stem Cell-Derived Gametes (2008). http://www.hinxtongroup.org/Consensus_HG08_FINAL.pdf 
25.  David Cyranoski, “5 things to know before jumping on the iPS bandwagon”, Nature 452 (2008): 406-8.
26.  International Society for Science and Religion, Cybrids and Chimeras: a statement from the International Society for Science and Religion 
(2008). http://www.issr.org.uk/cybrids-chimeras.asp 
27. Robert Sparrow, “Therapeutic cloning and reproductive liberty”, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 33 (2009): 1-17.
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Reproductive cloning is cloning that is aimed at repro-
duction. As such, it is another form of assisted repro-
duction for individuals or couples who are unable to 
have a genetically related child either naturally or using 
other artificial techniques. This reproductive technique 
is very widely condemned, perhaps in part due to 
the perceived possible motivations behind its use. (28) 
Our view of those who would clone themselves tends 
involve selfishness and egocentrism. However, given 
the impact of environmental factors and consequent 
variability of gene expression, the extent to which 
the cloned individual will end up being like the par-
ent is likely to be on a par with normal parent-child 
similarities. (29)
 Case Study 8.2
Research into cochlear implants
A consortium of researchers including develop-
mental psychologists and cochlear implant surgeons 
has proposed research that will attempt to assess 
the developmental differences between children 
with new, improved cochlear implants and those 
without. (30) Part of their general research interest 
includes claims made by the Deaf community that 
deaf children are better off deaf when they are 
a part of the Deaf community. 
The proposed research involves a small scale cohort 
study looking at the differences in development 
between four groups of children: 
(i)   deaf children without cochlear implants and 
living in the Deaf community; 
(ii)   children with cochlear implants who are a part 
of the Deaf community; 
(iii)  children with cochlear implants who are not 
a part of the Deaf community; and 
(iv)  children who are not deaf and are not a part 
of the Deaf community. 
Ideally they would have liked to include a fifth 
category – children who are congenitally deaf, 
without cochlear implants and not a part of the 
Deaf community – however due to the widespread 
uptake of cochlear implants in the region, the team 
has not been able to identify a significant number 
of potential participants. 
The research will involve a series of detailed semi-
structured interviews with the parents (beginning 
before the child is born) as well as simple testing 
and observation of the child over the course of 
its early years of development. At this stage they 
hope to gather some initial data about the range of 
developmental concerns, with a view to developing 
an instrument that can be usefully applied in a much 
larger international study.
Through various academic contacts, they have 
approached a number of couples in the Deaf 
community to assess their attitudes to the use 
of cochlear implants to enable their child to hear. 
They have found a number of couples within the 
Deaf community who are prepared to have their 
children undergo the implant surgery as well as 
a number who are not. They have also identified 
a number of couples with a history of congenital 
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deafness in the family who would choose to undergo 
the implant surgery should their child turn out to 
be deaf. These couples are happy to participate in 
the study even if their child is not deaf.
A member of your committee is disabled (though 
not deaf) and, at the meeting, strongly objects to 
this research on two grounds: (1) that the tools and 
measures that will be used by the researchers are 
biased in favour of the hearing; and (2), that the 
researchers are clearly pursuing a ‘paternalistic’, 
anti-disability agenda. In the former case the 
committee member explains that the usual devel-
opmental milestones are keyed to expressive and 
responsive measures related to linguistic capability. 
In the latter case, it is clear any future research of 
this kind is likely to receive a similar appraisal from 
this committee member, particularly if it involves 
any of the members of this consortium.
Questions
1.  Putting aside the committee member’s objec-
tions, what ethical issues arise in this piece of 
research?
2.  How should the committee respond to the first 
of the individual member’s objections, about 
the research methodology?
3.  How should the committee respond to the 
second of the individual member’s objections, 
about the researchers’ political agenda?
4.  In the light of the individual committee 
member’s objections should this research 
go ahead in any form? If so what changes 
are required?
5.  In terms of the general conduct of research 
ethics committee business, how should this 
kind of objection be handled? What can be 
required of individual committee members 
in this regard?
Discussion
This case raises issues about the nature of disability, dis-
crimination and the use of technological developments 
with respect to disability. The important tension that 
arises from the views of the disabled committee mem-
ber is between the conception of the Deaf community 
as a culture and the conception of deaf individuals 
as disabled because they are without full or normal 
human functioning. This in turn raises ethical issues 
about diversity and representation within the ethics 
review process.
The main connections with topics from previous chap-
ters are the involvement of children (Chapter 3) and 
the issue of discrimination (Chapter 6). From the former 
perspective the proposed research might look rather 
straightforward: parental consent can be obtained, with 
some input, where relevant, from the child as this 
becomes appropriate. However, we will see that issues 
arising from the case study raise difficult questions 
about the limits of standard justifications for parental 
decision-making on behalf of children.
Questions 2, 3 and 4 lead the discussion towards these 
questions through the analysis of the disabled com-
mittee member’s objections. Question 2 focuses on 
the more methodological aspects of the tension. The 
issue is whether the tools and methods used by the 
researchers to measure ‘normal’ development presup-
pose the second view of what it is to be deaf. It might 
be that in order to make this judgement more infor-
mation would be needed about the criteria used by 
the researchers, but even with this information the 
committee might need to consider issues about the 
nature of deafness, and more generally disability, in 
order to assess the significance of this for the value of 
the research. Question 3 focuses more on the overtly 
political aspect of the disabled committee member’s 
objections. To what extent, for instance, is it appropri-
ate to think of the researchers’ project as something 
approaching ‘cultural paternalism’ or ‘imperialism’? 
These political issues tie closely to the social model of 
disability. In relation to both questions it may be 
claimed that the values underpinning the researchers’ 
criteria for ‘success’ in child development are not 
shared by the Deaf community and so the criteria 
182
E U R O P E A N  T E X T B O O K  O N  E T H I C S  I N  R E S E A R C H
31.  Neil Levy, “Reconsidering cochlear implants: the lessons of Martha’s Vineyard,” Bioethics 16 (2002): 134-53.
32.  Although this idea is connected to Daniels, his own view seems to be more subtle than that sketched here. Norman Daniels, “Normal 
functioning and the treatment enhancement distinction”, Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 9, no. 3 (2000): 309-22.
33.  Robert Sparrow, “Defending deaf culture: the case of cochlear implants”, The Journal of Political Philosophy 13, no. 2 (2005): 135-52. 
34.  Nora Ellen Groce, Everyone Here Spoke Sign Language: Hereditary Deafness on Martha's Vineyard (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1985).
are not ones against which members of that commu-
nity should be compared.
The final question calls for consideration of how this 
issue should be resolved in the specific committee con-
text, as well as having a more general relevance. Perhaps 
the most significant point to consider in answering this 
question concerns the way in which ethics committees 
should handle strongly held, perhaps dogmatic, minor-
ity views. Disability thus provides a challenge to the 
institutions of governance and ethics governance in 
particular. Theme 2 from Chapter 7 raises the question 
of consensus in a way that is directly relevant here. 
In the context of disability and given the views of the 
committee member in the case, how can the institu-
tions and processes of society strike the right balance 
between the acceptance of difference and the recogni-
tion that decisions must be made. 
The nature of disability
The objections to the research raised by the disabled 
committee member give us reason to consider the main 
alternative accounts of the nature of disability. (31) 
One view of what might count as a disability is that it 
is a significant deviation from ‘normal species function-
ing’. So we might develop an account of the character-
istics that normally functioning human beings have 
and suppose that someone lacking in one or more has 
a disability in that respect. (32) Clearly this kind of 
approach is problematic. When thinking about disabil-
ity we do not look at all human characteristics and 
count as disabled anyone who falls outside the normal 
range for any one. Rather, we consider a narrower range 
of characteristics, and the characteristics that make it 
onto the list will depend on the kind of people we 
regard as normal – so if this included deaf people and 
excluded redheads, having red hair would be a disabil-
ity and being deaf would not.
A more productive route might be to consider the 
ways in which some people are disadvantaged by not 
possessing particular ‘normal’ human characteristics. 
This is a way of identifying those characteristics in 
respect of which a departure from normality amounts 
to a disability: lacking a certain characteristic counts as 
having a disability when this lack causes disadvantages. 
(So having red hair, for the most part, does not lead to 
disadvantage.) There are undoubtedly significant 
respects in which being deaf can result in very signifi-
cant disadvantages. The issue between those who hold 
the ‘social model’ and the ‘medical model’ of disability 
is best understood as concerning the nature of this 
disadvantage. 
On the social model of disability, the disadvantages 
faced by deaf and other ‘disabled’ individuals have social 
or institutional causes. Moreover, these causes could 
be eradicated if the social situation were changed. So if 
everyone switched to text messaging from telephones, 
deaf people would not be excluded from these modes 
of remote communication. (33) These claims made by 
proponents of the social model are nicely illustrated 
by  the example of Martha’s Vineyard, an island on 
which hereditary deafness was so common that the use 
of sign language became almost universal, with the 
result that deaf people were fully integrated into 
the community. (34) 
The medical model claims that there are natural or 
environmental disadvantages that exist independently 
of any social causes, and which underpin the concept 
of disability and show it not to be a wholly social con-
struction. These involve the importance of auditory 
cues alerting people of danger – deaf people are disad-
vantaged because they cannot respond to these cues. 
Using sound has an advantage over vision, for example, 
because it does not rely on the individual looking in 
the right direction.
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Levy suggests a position that combines elements of 
both. He suggests that in order for a disability to count 
as socially caused:
(i) it must be the case that social arrangements could 
be altered so as to remove the disadvantage and; 
(ii) there must be no compelling reason why social 
arrangements could not be so altered. (35) 
So, according to Levy, wheelchair users count as socially 
disabled by the lack of ramps (we could have more 
ramps and there is no compelling reason why we should 
use stairs), but they are not socially disabled by their 
inability to participate in activities like hiking (here 
although we could all give up these activities and so 
remove the social disadvantage, their intrinsic value 
gives us reason not to do so). This second example high-
lights a difficulty with this approach: it is hard to be clear 
about what is to count as a compelling reason. Someone 
who thinks that the disadvantages of being in a wheel-
chair are socially caused is likely to dispute the idea that 
the intrinsic value of hiking provides a compelling rea-
son and in general to set a much higher standard for 
what counts as a compelling reason not to alter social 
arrangements than someone who does not. 
Deaf culture, parents and the state
One of the key issues raised in the context of research 
on children is the relative responsibility of the parents 
and the state with respect to the child. The claims of 
the Deaf community can be taken to challenge the 
limits of parental control in various ways. 
A central point to consider here is the basis of parents’ 
freedom to determine the course of their child’s life. 
One obvious basis for parental freedom lies in the lib-
eral idea that people should be free to live according 
to their own conception of the good life. The value of 
this individual freedom to determine how one’s life 
goes extends to one’s children and the family is gener-
ally seen to be the locus of individual ‘experiments in 
living’. This connects with the idea of the family as an 
arena of privacy, as discussed in Chapter 4. Consequently, 
we think it is appropriate that parents shape their chil-
dren through their choices. This extends to schooling, 
values, religion, diet and discipline, although increas-
ingly there is recognition that society may limit this 
parental choice where there is broad consensus and 
evidence of harmful effects on children. 
In medical contexts, the situation is slightly different. 
This may be a result partly of the immediacy and mag-
nitude of the potential harms arising from medical deci-
sions, compared with those arising from more general 
social decisions, and partly of the fact that health care 
professionals are explicitly tasked with looking after the 
child and have specialist expertise in the area. Although 
parents retain a good deal of authority to decide for 
their child in medical contexts, there are perhaps more 
defined limits. Thus, how we understand disability – as 
social or medical – can make a difference to how we 
view the extent of parental authority.
This takes us to the question of culture and the plural-
ity of conceptions of the good. If being a member of 
the Deaf community constitutes being a member of 
a distinct culture then arguably we should view the par-
ent’s decision about cochlear implants in the same way 
as we view other culturally based or intra-familial value 
decisions and authority should rest with the parents.
On the face of it, there is a good reason for thinking that 
the Deaf community does constitute a distinct culture. 
Deaf individuals have consistently written about their 
experiences of Deaf culture and of the benefits of their 
way of life. There is some evidence of strong attachment 
to their condition and a sizeable proportion who would 
not wish to hear even if it were possible. 
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Levy suggests that, amongst other things, cultures 
should “hold values that differentiate them from the 
members of other cultures”, these values should be 
“expressed in some material form” and the “members 
of the culture must engage in activities which are partly 
constitutive of that culture”. The Deaf community qual-
ifies on each of these counts: the existence and almost 
exclusive use of sign language ensures that the deaf 
community engages in activities together as well as hav-
ing a means for developing and expressing its values. 
Finally, the existence of Deaf literature as well as sign 
poetry and theatre demonstrate ample modes of mate-
rial expression of Deaf culture.
Settling the ethical issues in the case study requires 
balancing the liberties (and benefits) associated with 
allowing ‘experiments in living’ against the potential 
disadvantages associated with the condition. A conse-
quence of recognising the Deaf community as a culture 
is the acknowledgement of a set of values and concep-
tions of the good internal to that culture, the signifi-
cance of which it may be hard for outsiders to appreciate. 
This makes it less likely that health care professionals or 
other people in positions of authority or influence will 
be able to justify overriding parental decisions on the 
grounds that they know better than the parents what 
is in the best interests of their children. 
While we might think that it is therefore up to the par-
ents to decide whether or not their child should receive 
the cochlear implant, the argument for this has been 
based on an assumption that these parents will be part 
of the Deaf community and so will see the value of 
membership of that community for their children. 
However, one complication is that approximately 
ninety percent of deaf children are born to hearing 
parents. (36) This makes a difference because hearing 
parents will have little reason to risk their child being 
disadvantaged for the sake of a culture about which 
they know little. This may explain the researchers’ ina-
bility to find potential research subjects in their fifth 
category. More generally, it is likely that allowing paren-
tal choice in this context (that is, a context in which 
most deaf children have hearing parents and biotech-
nology increasingly provides opportunities to restore 
those children’s hearing) will result in the end of Deaf 
culture. The question of state interference is thus 
turned on its head, and the question arises of whether 
the state should intervene to enable Deaf culture to 
continue to exist, requiring particular children to forego 
cochlear implants against their parents’ wishes in order 
to allow this to happen.
Another complication is that current-edition cochlear 
implants are not very effective in establishing full hear-
ing. As a result there is a significant danger that children 
who undergo the implant procedure will both fail to 
learn sign language early enough to avoid developmen-
tal delays and will not be able to hear well enough to 
learn spoken language. There is, therefore, a risk that 
greater developmental harm will occur than if the child 
does not receive the implant. Hearing parents who 
choose the implant for their children may be both 
overestimating the effectiveness of the implant and 
underestimating the benefits of inclusion in Deaf cul-
ture, and may therefore not be well placed to judge the 
best interests of their children. This may be less appli-
cable to the research in the case study, since this is test-
ing an improved implant. However, given that the 
research is being conducted precisely to assess the 
effects on child development of the improved implants, 
it cannot be known in advance how much more effec-
tive they will be.
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 Case Study 8.3
Research using gold nanoparticles
A team of researchers at a leading cancer research 
institute has recently become interested in the use 
of nanotechnology. The team has put together 
a programme of research that involves two differ-
ent uses of gold nanoparticles in the treatment 
of cancer. 
The first process used is called ‘nanophotothermo-
lysis’ – using nanotechnology to generate enough 
heat to break down a substance to its constituent 
components. Directed laser energy is used to heat 
up the nanoparticles until they explode, in the 
aftermath of which localised cancer cells get 
destroyed without damaging healthy cells nearby. 
Several after-effects contribute to the destruction 
of cancer cells using nanoparticles. These include 
acoustic shock waves from the explosion, optical 
plasma and particle fragmentation. In the second 
process, the gold nanoparticles carry an anti-cancer 
drug and can seek out the tumour within the body. 
Once the nanoparticles have surrounded the target 
cells, infrared light is used to heat the nanoparticles 
so that they release the drug. 
In order for the therapy to work, the nanoparticles 
must target only cancerous cells and avoid healthy 
cells. The property that identifies a cell as being 
cancerous is a protein known as epidermal growth 
factor receptor (EGFR). This protein surrounds the 
cancerous cell, but is not found in such abundant 
quantities in the healthy cells. The nanoparticles 
attach themselves to the antibody for the EGFR 
and then destroy the cancer cell without damaging 
healthy tissue. Both processes have been success-
fully used in animal models but there is some 
concern about the scale-related differences – that 
is, how the different volume of nanoparticles may 
influence the effects both on the individual and 
on the external environment.
In both cases the use of these particles promises 
to be a very effective way of targeting particular 
cancer cells but very little is known about the 
consequences of the accumulation of nanoparticles 
in the body or the environment. Because of their 
size, nanoparticles are able to move through 
normal barriers easily and possibly interact with 
other parts of the body. There is some concern that 
the remaining particles may translocate to other 
organs causing toxicity (for example, neuronal 
uptake in the brain). Another possibility is that 
these particles will interact together in the outside 
environment in ways that could be harmful, partic-
ularly if there is significant use of this technology. 
Some researchers at the institute (not working on 
this project) are uncomfortable about the current 
volume of nanoparticles in use. They are concerned 
that enough of these particles might become ‘nui-
sance dusts’ and produce serious adverse health 
affects to those in the vicinity. Some even worry that 
because so little is known about nanoparticles, they 
may turn out to be the asbestos of the 21st century.
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Questions
1.  What immediate ethical problems will the 
researchers face as they try to build a series 
of research proposals designed to test their 
treatments?
2.  Given the level of uncertainty associated with 
the use of nanotechnology and the potential 
dangers involved, what level of precaution 
administered either by the REC, regulation 
or alternate oversight ought to be in place?
3.  What level of precaution should be adopted 
to guard against the possible harmful conse-
quences of the overuse of nanotechnology?
Discussion
The main focus of this case study is on issues related to 
risk, particularly in cases where there is significant 
uncertainty about the nature and magnitude of the risk. 
Like Case Study 8.1, this case raises questions about the 
risk of harm and the possibility of subjects consenting 
to research when very little is known about the risks 
they will face. More general questions about dealing 
with risks that are unknown or difficult to quantify lead 
directly to consideration of the precautionary principle. 
It is also worth pausing to consider various methodo-
logical and research design questions that arise about 
the best way to proceed in gathering knowledge about 
the potential of these technologies.
Nanotechnology and ethics
Nanosciences and nanotechnologies research is defined 
by the European Commission as encompassing “all 
research activities dealing with matter at the nano-
metric scale (1 to 100 nm)”. (37) At this scale ordinary 
materials can behave in very unusual ways and exhibit 
properties that can be harnessed for particular pur-
poses. The case study provides us with one example 
of the use of this kind of technology.
There is some dispute about whether nanotechnol-
ogies raise any new ethical issues, and so whether 
‘nanoethics’ is a distinct discipline. Søren Holm suggests 
that a new technology might require “its own ethics” 
when it “either raises ethical issues that are not raised 
by other kinds of technologies, or … raises ethical issues 
of a different (i.e., larger) magnitude than other tech-
nologies”. (38) Thinking along these lines we might say 
that some of the potential uses of nanotechnology, for 
example to produce super-small surveillance devices, 
raise familiar privacy concerns, and that the use of 
super-strong carbon nanotubes that will not decay may 
cause environmental waste problems in much the same 
way as Styrofoam or nuclear waste. (39) It is unclear, 
however, whether we should think of these and other 
problems associated with nanotechnology as suffi-
ciently different in magnitude from those raised by 
other technologies to require a distinct nanoethics.
Either way, nanotechnological developments provide 
a very good vehicle for consideration of the ethical 
issues raised by new biotechnologies. The kinds of ethi-
cal issue that arise in relation to nanotechnology 
research include environmental health and safety 
impacts, privacy, human enhancement, and dual use, 
as well as justice and equality issues. (40) We will focus 
on the first of these issues in relation to the precaution-
ary principle, but the others relate to issues that have 
been considered elsewhere in this textbook. 
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Nanosciences and nanotechnologies research raises 
important questions about the relationship between 
science and society. Again some of these questions are 
closely linked to the precautionary principle and deci-
sion-making under conditions of uncertainty. Recent 
research on public views about nanotechnology used 
a convergence seminar technique to “gather advice and 
recommendations from the public that may be useful 
for future decisions on nanobiotechnology”. (41) In 
terms of ethical issues, they found that participants 
were concerned about the focusing of research priori-
ties (largely on medicine and the problems of develop-
ing countries), access to and distribution of the benefits 
of the research, managing the involvement of commer-
cial interests, and privacy and freedom of choice 
(in choosing to engage with the technology or not). 
This research and its piloted methodology may be 
a step in the right direction in terms of public involve-
ment and engagement in the difficult policy decisions 
associated with nanotechnology research and other 
new biotechnological developments. (42) 
The precautionary principle
The introduction to the precautionary principle in 
Chapter 5 highlighted its origins in environmental pro-
tection, its incorporation into European law and the 
range of areas to which it is now applied. The inclusion 
of the principle in European (and international) law 
may be taken as evidence of an emerging consensus 
reflecting underlying social values that can be applied 
more generally in situations of risk and uncertainty. 
However, it should be noted that the precautionary 
principle remains controversial and in part this results 
from disagreements about how it should be interpreted 
and applied.
The broad thrust of the principle is the assertion that 
where an activity introduces a risk of serious harm, 
appropriate steps should be taken to prevent or limit 
that harm even though the scientific data does not 
permit a precise assessment of the level of risk. As 
Allhoff puts it, the motivation for the precautionary 
principle is:
to recognize the potential for dramatic and irrevers-
ible damage in complex systems and to appreciate 
the limited epistemic situations in which we are likely 
to find ourselves in regards to those systems. (43) 
Among the more prominent internationally recognised 
formulations of the precautionary principle are the 
following.
1.  Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environ-
ment and Development:
In order to protect the environment, the precau-
tionary approach shall be widely applied by States 
according to their capabilities. Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of 
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason 
for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation. (44) 
2.  The Wingspread Statement of 1998: 
Where an activity raises threats of harm to the envi-
ronment or human health, precautionary measures 
should be taken even if some cause and effect rela-
tionships are not fully established scientifically. (45) 
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Philosophy 27, no. 3 (2002): 355-68.
3.  The European Commission’s Communication on 
the Precautionary Principle (2000):
The precautionary principle applies where scientific 
evidence is insufficient, inconclusive or uncertain and 
preliminary scientific evaluation indicates that there 
are reasonable grounds for concern that the poten-
tially dangerous effects on the environment, human, 
animal or plant health may be inconsistent with the 
high level of protection chosen by the EU. (46) 
Hughes suggests that what many formulations of 
the precautionary principle have in common is several 
structural components. First, there is a set of trigger 
conditions which determine the kind of circumstances 
under which the principle is operational. These con-
ditions include a specified level of evidence (E) that is 
required that a particular harm will be caused and 
a measure of the severity of that harm (S). The second 
component spells out the type of action to be taken 
(A). These are combined as follows:
If there is evidence stronger than E that an activity 
will cause harm more serious than S, then take 
action of type A. (47) 
How strong or weak, conservative or liberal, a particu-
lar formulation of the principle is will depend on the 
values of each of the three variables – low evidence 
requirements and/or less serious harm correspond 
to an easier set of trigger conditions which make the 
principle conservative along one axis. Harsh regulatory 
action in response to the trigger conditions would make 
the principle more conservative along a second axis.
The strength of the formulation matters because, as 
critics point out, excessively strong versions will stifle 
innovation. For some formulations this may give rise 
to what has been called the “paradox of precaution” 
– the idea that by restricting the development or 
application of new technologies the principle actually 
causes more harm that it avoids. (48) Another problem 
with very strong interpretations of the precautionary 
principle is that they might prevent us from doing the 
research that is necessary for a properly informed view 
of the benefits and risks of the technology in question. 
On the other hand weaker forms may look trivial, since 
if the evidential threshold is set too high, the practical 
upshot of the principle may be indistinguishable from 
standard assessment tools such as cost-benefit analysis, 
and it will fail in its intended function of providing 
a basis for action in cases where our knowledge of the 
likelihood of harm is too slight to allow a proper appli-
cation of such tools. The difficulty is to specify the pre-
cautionary principle in a way that avoids both extremes. 
This may be impossible to do in a precise but generic 
way, and we might have to see the principle as provid-
ing general framework for decisions that have to be 
made on a case-by-case basis. However, in order to 
avoid arbitrary or discriminatory decisions it is impor-
tant that the principle is applied in a consistent way, 
and in order to minimise the negative effects of the 
principle, described above, it is important that the trig-
ger conditions are based on genuine evidence of the 
potential for significant harm (rather than mere spec-
ulation) and that the precautionary action taken is pro-
portionate to the potential harm that it is intended 
to avert. It is important to note that precautionary 
action need not mean prohibiting a technology but 
can involve more limited restrictions or safeguards 
which may reduce the risks while enabling research 
to continue. This is implied, for example, in the Rio 
Declaration’s reference to “cost effective” measures, 
while the European Commission’s Statement on the 
Precautionary Principle states that “In some cases a total 
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ban may not be a proportional response to a potential 
risk”, and that “Risk reduction measures should include 
less restrictive alternatives … such as appropriate treat-
ment, reduction of exposure, tightening of controls, 
adoption of provisional limits, recommendations for 
populations at risk, etc.”
It is also important to be clear about the role of the 
precautionary principle in the overall process of assess-
ing and managing risk. The principle does not call on 
scientists to adjust their normal standards of evidence 
when reaching conclusions about the risks produced 
by a new technology. It might call for the commission-
ing of additional research in order to provide a better 
evidence base for future decisions, but essentially the 
precautionary principle is concerned with the actions 
that should be taken on the basis of whatever evidence 
is available, that is, with risk management. (49) As such, 
it is a moral and political principle whose interpreta-
tion and application will depend on value judgements 
about our willingness as a society to accept certain 
costs (e.g., but not exclusively, economic) in order to 
avoid certain types of risk. This suggests that the prin-
ciple should not be seen as fixed but may evolve as 
social values change, and that some engagement with 
the public may be appropriate in considering how to 
apply it in particular cases.
 Case Study 8.4
Genetic information and biobanks
Kurt is a teacher in a city in north-eastern Europe. 
He has been asked to join a large research project 
that is looking at the genetics of cardiovascular 
disease. This will involve giving a DNA sample, 
answering a questionnaire and allowing details 
of his treatment to be given to the researchers. 
This study will directly help clinicians decide which 
drug to give to those patients who are enrolled in 
the study. Researchers at the local hospital where 
Kurt is being treated, in collaboration with a team 
of researchers from a southern European university 
and a medical sciences institute in China, are 
conducting the study.
Kurt has been asked to give a broad consent that 
will allow the researchers to keep the DNA sample 
and information for use in suitably approved future 
research projects. This will save them the expense 
of coming back for consent for each new research 
project. He can choose whether researchers are 
allowed to come back to him to ask further ques-
tions. The DNA will be processed in China and then 
sent to southern Europe for analysis. All of the 
direct identifiers (such as his name and address) 
will be removed before the samples are sent to 
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China. The samples will, however, be given a code 
which will remain in a secure location at Kurt’s 
hospital. 
The samples and information collected from Kurt 
will then be put in a biobank that can be accessed 
by many other researchers for many years into the 
future. It is anticipated that when the technology 
is cheaper, whole genome scans will be carried out 
on some of the samples and these will be put on 
the web for other researchers to use.
Questions
1.  Is it acceptable to obtain consent to the use of 
the samples and information for many different 
research projects into the future (broad 
consent)?
2.  Does the coding of samples and information 
mean that it is not necessary to ask for Kurt’s 
consent for future research projects?
3.  Is it necessary to tell Kurt that the DNA sam-
ples will be processed in China and will leave 
the European Union?
4.  The researchers discover that people with 
Kurt’s genetic predisposition are more likely 
to die if they are treated with a drug that is 
commonly used for heart conditions in that 
part of north-eastern Europe. Should they 
tell Kurt?
5.  Do the researchers need to go back to Kurt 
to get permission for his whole genome scan 
to be put on the web?
Discussion
This case study raises general issues about consent and 
its role in the developing context of global research and 
global access to data. It also points to questions that 
are more specific to genetics and our relationship to 
and control of genetic information. In turn, these lead 
to further consideration of questions, raised initially 
in Chapter 7, about the form and context of research 
governance and the relationship between science 
and society. The issues raised by this case study draw 
upon the discussions of earlier chapters, in particular 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4.
The increasingly international and collaborative nature 
of medical research and, in particular, of population 
and epidemiological research, means greater access 
to data by a range of researchers doing varying kinds of 
research will be needed to continue the development 
of these areas of research. This, when combined with 
the advances in the processing and analysis of large-
scale genetic information, will have profound effects on 
the way in which research is conducted as well as the 
progress that can be made in understanding medical 
illness and treatment. The benefits of large-scale inter-
national collections of tissue and data are likely to be 
significant. Being able to facilitate such research argu-
ably requires a significant shift in the way in which we 
think of patient and public involvement in research.
Biobanks are repositories for various kinds of collections 
of human biological material. They can contain a broad 
range of such material, including DNA, tissue, tumour 
samples and blood. They are also likely to include linked 
clinical and/or phenotypic data on the donors of the 
samples so that the potential for useful, patient-related 
research is maximised. Though their specific purposes 
can vary widely, the general purpose of biobanks is to 
house and facilitate ongoing research on samples that 
have already been collected. Important policy issues for 
biobanks include how much access non-depositors 
have to the collections, the relationship that the 
biobank has (or might have) to industry and commer-
cial interests, and the nature of any connections with 
other national or international biobanks. 
Broad consent
On the usual model of consent (discussed in Chapter 2), 
consent is very specifically related to a particular piece 
of research. It typically involves being given detailed 
information about the nature of the research and of the 
participant’s involvement in it, who will be conducting 
it and what the anticipated outputs are. Applying this 
model to biobanks would require a fresh consent to 
be sought from donors every time their samples were 
used by a different group of researchers or for a differ-
ent purpose. Given the number of donors who might 
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be involved, this would be costly and impractical and 
so would seriously limit the usefulness of the biobanks 
as a resource for researchers. The broad consent model 
used in biobanking attempts to facilitate as much 
research as possible, consistent with the principles 
governing the establishment of the biobank. Each of 
the questions accompanying the case raises a different 
kind of consideration about broad consent, its limits 
and closely related ethical concerns.
Broad consent, like the more specific forms of consent 
used in other areas of research, involves the participant 
authorising or giving the researcher permission to do 
something, based on information and deliberation. 
However, because the samples contained in a biobank 
are designed to support multiple research projects, 
some of them conducted long after the samples have 
been collected, the nature of the information provided 
is of a different sort. Broad consent is usually distin-
guished from ‘open’ or ‘blanket’ consent. (50) The latter 
is understood as consent to the unrestricted use of 
a sample, while broad consent is consent to a wide, 
but  specified range of uses. Thus, broad consent 
involves the research participant agreeing for their sam-
ple or data to be used in a variety of different research 
projects, sometimes by different researchers and some-
times in very different contexts. This means that unlike 
open consent, broad consent is based on information 
about the kinds of research that will be conducted, 
based on the policies in place for the biobank. 
This model of consent is typically justified by reference 
to the potential benefits brought by the research it will 
facilitate, the low level of risk involved (provided ade-
quate measures are in place to protect privacy and con-
fidentiality), and by respect for autonomy. On the one 
hand it might be argued that respect for autonomy 
requires that competent people should be allowed to 
consent to whatever arrangements they please, pro-
vided they do not harm others, and that this includes 
broad, or even open consent to the use of samples. 
On the other hand it might be suggested that the lack 
of specific information about particular uses of the 
samples means that such consent cannot be fully 
autonomous. Broad consent might have an advantage 
over open consent here, in that the range of uses is lim-
ited, so informed decisions will not rely so much on the 
donor’s ability to imagine the range of possible future 
uses. However, it might still be thought that broad con-
sent lacks the moral authority of more specific consents 
based on fuller information. If so, then just as when 
dealing with non-competent subjects in more conven-
tional research situations, more responsibility may fall 
on the researchers to protect the subjects from harm.
A number of ethical objections have been raised 
against the reliance of biobanks on broad consent. (51) 
First, in regular consent to research there is the impor-
tant possibility of withdrawing from the research, but 
in broad consent for biobanks this can be difficult. 
The samples and data may have been used in various 
different research projects and be scattered in various 
labs and research reports. In response, it should be 
noted that in the usual case of consent to participate 
in a particular research project, withdrawal cannot 
undo the research that has already been done. It is not 
always possible retrospectively to remove a participant 
or to undo an experimental procedure. The same is true 
for biobanks; however, samples and data can, as long 
as they are adequately tracked, be withdrawn from 
inclusion in future research if the donor so wishes. 
Second, there may be concerns about the protection 
of privacy and confidentiality. One worry here concerns 
straightforward breaches of security. It is important on 
grounds of privacy and welfare that adequate security 
measures are in place, and important to the validity of 
the broad consent given by donors that the security 
measures described at the time of consenting are 
maintained. 
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Further concerns arise from the reliance on anonymi-
sation as a means of protecting privacy and confiden-
tiality and preventing harm. Question 2 suggests that 
the anonymisation of the samples and data might 
contribute to the justification of broad consent. The 
thought here is that by severing the connection 
between the sample or data and the individual donor, 
the risk of harm is reduced so that it is no longer nec-
essary for the donor to protect his or her own interests 
by controlling the particular uses to which the sample 
or data is put. However, as noted in Chapter 4, there 
may be situations in which even anonymous data can 
be linked back to the individual in such a way as to 
breach privacy or confidentiality. A possible example 
of this in the case study is the publication of Kurt’s com-
plete genome scan, which could enable people with 
knowledge of Kurt or his family to identify its source. 
It is also possible that such identification will become 
easier in the future as more genetic information about 
individuals is available to more people. For these rea-
sons it might be thought that this step requires a spe-
cific consent at the time of publication rather than 
relying on broad consent given at an earlier date. 
Finally, as indicated by Question 4, there are issues relat-
ing to feedback of, in particular, incidental findings. 
Some kinds of research, and particularly genetic 
research, can inadvertently reveal clinical predisposi-
tions or other information with important implications 
for the donor. There should, therefore, be some policy 
conveyed on the consent form about how such find-
ings will be handled. If the samples were fully ano-
nymised (i.e. with no coding to enable them to be 
linked to their source) this would block the possibility 
of providing feedback to the donor and hence avoid 
the moral dilemma at the level of the individual find-
ing. However, clinically oriented researchers often feel 
uncomfortable with not being able to feed back impor-
tant information, particularly where it concerns a seri-
ous but treatable condition. This might provide a reason 
(in addition to others mentioned in Chapter 4) not 
to fully anonymise the samples but to code them as 
described in the case study. It then becomes important 
to include in the broad consent an account of the cir-
cumstances in which the code will be used to allow 
feedback of findings. As mentioned in Chapter 4, a com-
mon kind of incidental finding mentioned in the con-
text of genetics is non-paternity, and although there are 
varying accounts of how common such findings are, 
it does highlight the deep practical dilemmas that 
this kind of research can involve.
Research governance
Perhaps the best way to understand broad consent, 
at least as it applies in cases like this one, is as consent 
to a particular kind of governance arrangement. (52) That 
is, when an individual gives ‘broad consent’ to the use of 
their sample or data in future research they are giving 
permission for someone else, usually in the form of the 
governing body of the biobank, to decide how to use 
that sample or data. Given this, the question of govern-
ance becomes important again, as does the disclosure 
of the governance arrangements to the participant.
There is a range of policies and arrangements that can 
be clearly articulated independently of the specific kind 
of research that will be conducted. These can form 
both the organisational principles of the biobank and 
the terms of the consent. Such terms should include:
•  Governance arrangements and structures. (53) 
The consent should be clear about the role, remit 
and make-up of the biobank’s managing and gov-
erning bodies. Ideally the governing body should 
be independent of those with a research stake in 
the biobank, its operations and decisions should 
be transparent and accountable to all stakeholders 
and it should include significant patient and pub-
lic representation and involvement. (54) 
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•  Arrangements for the secure safe-keeping and 
storage of samples and data. Potential donors 
should be informed of the processes in place to 
ensure the protection of confidential data and 
samples. 
•  General policies on commercial involvement, 
commercial access and intellectual property 
rights. It should be clear how the biobank plans to 
manage relations with external bodies including 
other national and international biobanks and 
research consortiums, and commercial interests. 
Clearly the involvement of, for example, pharma-
ceutical companies, may be of great use to par-
ticular biobanks and enhance the prospects of 
translating research findings into medical practice, 
but as we saw in Chapter 7, the profit motive brings 
particular dangers. (55) 
•  Overall principles governing the standards, aims 
and usefulness of research done using the sam-
ples/data from the biobanks. Although there may 
be limits to what can be said about the precise 
nature of the future research that will take place 
using the biobank’s resources, a good deal could 
be laid down about the broad principles that will 
inform the decisions of the governing body of the 
biobank about which projects to admit and which 
to reject.
•  Feedback mechanisms and donor involvement. 
Details should be provided about how donors and 
the public generally can be involved in the proc-
esses of the biobank. In addition, it is important to 
have procedures through which these groups can 
be kept informed of the research being undertaken 
and the progress being made.
•  Policies for handling incidental findings. As men-
tioned above, it is important for there to be a clear 
policy about how patient feedback and incidental 
findings will be handled. The range of possibilities 
include: allowing the donor to choose from a list 
of alternatives (stating what they do and do not 
want to know about), stipulating that feedback will 
take place through the donor’s general practitioner, 
or stipulating that there will be no feedback.
This case also raises issues about the global governance 
of research. The involvement of international partners 
with research spanning national boundaries means 
that some consideration is needed about the form 
of oversight in these contexts. One possibility is to 
establish an international committee to examine such 
research; another is to require that specific standards 
and processes are put in place in each of the participat-
ing countries. 
The issues associated with the governance of biobanks 
and the increasingly global nature of research resonates 
with some of the themes from Chapter 7. The global 
context of research invites questions about how best 
to ensure that the global community has the appropri-
ate voice in the progress and dissemination of the prod-
ucts of science and technological research. And again, 
it raises questions about governance and control of sci-
ence by society. In particular, how do the governance 
arrangements in place for biobanks take into account 
the interests, concerns and values of the public and 
society as well as the researchers and donors?
Genetic exceptionalism
Question 5 of the case study considers the acceptabil-
ity of broad consent in the context of broadening 
access to an individual’s genetic information. However, 
it is also important to notice the possible involvement 
of others in this sort of disclosure. Genetic information 
is (as noted in the discussion of Case Study 4.2, Genetic 
research into susceptibility to respiratory disease in 
smoky environments) shared between (extended) 
family members and so information about one person 
is also information about a number of others. This leads 
to numerous confidentiality and privacy issues. To what 
extent does this mean that genetic information and 
genetic research should be treated differently from 
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56.  For guidance on genetic research more generally, see Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine Concerning 
Biomedical Research (Strasbourg, 25.I.2005), Articles 11 and 12. http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/healthbioethic/Activities/02_Biomedical_
research_en/195%20Protocole%20recherche%20biomedicale%20e.pdf
57.  Michael Parker and Anneke M. Lucassen, “Genetic information: a joint account?”, British Medical Journal 329 (2004): 165; S. Matthew Liao, 
“Is there a duty to share genetic information?”, Journal of Medical Ethics 35 (2009): 306-9.
other patient or participant medical information? Are 
these differences enough to mean that different rules 
apply in the case of genetics? (56) 
There are two plausible ways in which we might under-
stand genetic information to be relevantly different 
from other information. First, we might think that 
genetic information is more intimate, personal or pri-
vate than other medical information. Part of the reason 
for this extra significance comes from the idea that 
this information, in some sense, defines ‘who we are’. 
So, according to this argument, it is partly because 
genetic information gets at something basic, essential 
or unchangeable about us that it is worthy of special 
protection. The main response to this common version 
of genetic exceptionalism is to examine actual kinds of 
medical information in comparison with genetic infor-
mation to see whether it is on the whole more personal, 
intimate or private. 
A second version of genetic exceptionalism might point 
to the shared nature of information referred to above 
and argue that, precisely because genetic information 
is not only information about one individual, it is dis-
tinctive and should be treated as such. On this view 
genetic information is better understood as being 
jointly owned information requiring different standards 
of confidentiality and disclosure. (57) Putting Kurt’s 
genome on display will also involve disclosing (perhaps 
sensitive) information about his relatives. Whether it is 
appropriate for only Kurt to give his consent, whether 
family members also need to be involved, or whether 
the complexity of these issues effectively rules out the 
public display of his genome will in large part depend 
on the extent to which genetic information is special 
and the weight that we give to his family’s stake in that 
information.
Conclusion
Chapters 7 and 8 have been noticeably different from 
the previous chapters. They have set out to achieve 
two broad aims. First, the chapters set out to introduce 
a range of different ethical issues that arise in the devel-
oping areas of biotechnological research. These ethical 
issues sit alongside the direct, research ethics issues 
as unfolding issues in the progress of research in the 
21st century. Second, the cases and discussions have 
included elements of the complex and difficult con-
temporary relationship between science and society. 
We saw at the outset of Chapter 7, from a theoretical 
perspective, how ethics is (unsurprisingly) embroiled 
in questions about the governance of science and its 
interactions with society generally. We outlined and 
then began to explore four general themes within this 
relationship through the case studies. 
These aims, delivered across these last two chapters, 
bring together various elements of each of the other 
chapters and enable the reader to utilise what has been 
covered in the context of the developing issues sur-
rounding new biotechnologies.
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Absolutism. An ethical approach that treats ethical 
norms as unbreakable rules.
Advance directive or advance statement. A state-
ment made by a person while competent about how 
they wish to be treated in the future if they become 
incompetent.
Anonymisation. The modification of information to 
remove reference to the individuals from whom the 
information was gathered. Sometimes, the anonymisa-
tion process can involve a ‘key’ so that the link between 
information and individuals can be restored under 
certain circumstances.
Autonomy. The capacity of a person to govern him or 
herself, on the basis of reasoned decisions and free from 
controlling influences by others. Autonomy is widely 
held to involve the capacity for reason and understand-
ing, a degree of self-control, and freedom from coercion 
and manipulation. 
Beneficence. The obligation to bring about benefits or 
to prevent or remove harms to others. 
Biobank. An institution that holds a collection of bio-
logical samples with or without related clinical, patho-
logical or epidemiological data. The bank processes, 
stores, and/or distributes samples for future clinical or 
research use. In the case of human tissue the bank 
may hold body parts, organs, tissues, skin, bone and 
stem cells. Biobanks may also implement conditions 
of use and impose safeguards to protect the identity 
of donors.
Biochemical. Relating to chemical compounds and 
processes occurring within living organisms. 
Biotechnology. This has been defined as “The appli-
cation of science and technology to living organisms, 
as well as parts, products and models thereof, to alter 
living or non-living materials for the production of 
knowledge, goods and services.” (1) Examples of bio-
technologies include: gene therapy, nanotechnologies, 
assisted reproduction technologies as well as fermen-
tation using yeast and the production of penicillin 
from certain fungi.
Blind. (1) A randomised controlled trial is blind if the 
participants do not know which treatment or control 
arm they are assigned to. It is double blind if neither 
the participants nor the researcher know which arm 
the participants are assigned to. (2) In psychological 
research, questions that will not be analysed but are 
included in a questionnaire to conceal the true nature 
of the research from the participants.
Categorical imperative. An action-guiding principle 
that applies to all agents irrespective of their goals or 
motivations. In Kant’s ethics the categorical imperative 
is the basis for morality and has various formulations 
including the principle of ends. (Compare hypothet-
ical imperative.)
Cochlear implant. An electronic microphone and 
receiver device, part of which is surgically implanted 
into the skull of a deaf patient (often a child) in order 
that they can hear.
Coercion. To coerce is to threaten. We coerce some-
one into doing something when we threaten to make 
them worse off if they don’t do it. Although coercion 
is (arguably) not always wrong, the absence of coercion 
is standardly thought to be a part of valid consent. 
Consent may not be sufficiently voluntary (and hence 
invalid) if it results from coercion. (See voluntariness.)
Communitarianism. An ethical approach that empha-
sises people’s embeddedness within a community and 
focuses on the good of the community as a key con-
sideration for ethical decision-making.
1.  Organisation for Econonic Co-Operation and Development, “Statistical definition of biotechnology” (2005).  
http://www.oecd.org/document/42/0,3343,en_2649_34537_1933994_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
See also http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/biotechnology/what-is-biotechnology/definition/index_en.htm 
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Competence. The ability to validly consent to a deci-
sion. Competence is usually taken to involve the ability 
to understand relevant information, to evaluate that 
information and make a reasoned decision, and to 
communicate consent or refusal.
Confidentiality. A concept closely related to that of 
privacy, confidentiality is that part of privacy that gov-
erns the requirement not to reveal information about 
another person without their permission.
Confounding factor. A variable, other than those being 
investigated in a study, that can affect its outcomes and 
result in mistaken or misleading conclusions. A con-
founding factor may mask an actual association 
between the variables being investigated or produce 
the appearance of an association where none exists. 
Consent. Some actions are only morally acceptable if 
the person concerned (e.g., patient, research subject, 
sexual partner) provides valid consent. To consent is to 
authorise or give permission. Valid consent (as opposed 
to mere consent) can occur only when three main con-
ditions are met: (1) the consenter must be competent 
give consent; (2) the consenter must be provided with 
adequate information in a suitable form and with 
sufficient opportunities for deliberation and under-
standing to occur; (3) the consent must be voluntary. 
(See competence, voluntariness.)
Consequentialism. An ethical theory that evaluates 
actions according to their consequences. A common 
form of consequentialism is utilitarianism.
Contractual right. A right that is derived from an agree-
ment. (Compare natural right.)
Crossover trial (or crossover study). A research trial in 
which each group of participants receives each of the 
treatments being tested (which may include a placebo 
treatment) in a random order.
Defeasibilism. An ethical approach that treats ethical 
norms as being able to be over-ruled by other norms.
Deontology. An ethical theory that judges actions 
according to rules, principles or duties requiring or pro-
scribing certain types of action. 
Discourse ethics. An ethical theory that claims that 
moral norms can only be derived via discourse of the 
parties affected by the decision.
Distributive justice. The part of justice concerned with 
the fair distribution of benefits and burdens. Distributive 
justice is contrasted with rectificatory and restorative 
justice, which are concerned with compensating or 
making amends for previous injustices, and procedural 
justice, which is concerned with the use of fair proce-
dures for decision-making.
Dual use. A dual-use dilemma arises in cases where 
a piece of research has the potential to be used for 
both good and bad ends.
Duty-based ethics. See deontology. 
Enhancement. See human enhancement.
Eudaimonia. An ancient Greek term, widely used in 
virtue ethics to refer to the state of wellbeing or human 
flourishing achieved by a virtuous person. The term is 
sometimes translated as ‘happiness’, but should be dis-
tinguished from pleasure and other subjective accounts 
of wellbeing.
Ethical review. The review of a piece of research by 
a research ethics committee.
Ethics of care. An ethical theory that focuses on the 
ethical importance of relationships and emotions such 
as sympathy and solidarity. The ethics of care tends to 
see moral decisions as highly contextual rather than 
being based on general rules or principles. 
Expected utility. The amount of utility predicted to be 
produced by an action or policy, based on the utility 
and probability of each possible outcome. 
Extrinsic value. Value that something has only because 
it leads to other things that are of value. (Compare 
intrinsic value.)
First-in-human trials (or Phase 0 trials). Preliminary 
testing of drugs on human subjects in advance of 
Phase 1 trials. First-in-human trials typically involve low 
doses and small numbers of subjects.
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Flourishing. See eudaimonia.
Focus group. A group of research subjects, brought 
together to discuss a particular issue. They are often 
used in qualitative research as a means of gaining infor-
mation about the views, attitudes and behaviour of par-
ticular groups towards a topic.
Four principles approach. An influential form of prin-
ciplism, based on the principles of respect for auton-
omy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice.
Gene therapy. A method of treating illness and disease 
by inserting genes into a patient’s cells in such a way as 
to change the functioning of the cell. Germ line gene 
therapy achieves this end by targeting cells that are 
involved in inheritance (such as cells involved in mak-
ing gametes) thus enabling the changes to be passed 
on to future generations. Somatic gene therapy targets 
cells that are not involved in inheritance and thus 
affects only the individual who is treated. 
Genetic exceptionalism. The view that genetic infor-
mation has unique features that require it to be treated 
differently from other information.
Genetic polymorphism. The existence of two or more 
clearly different phenotypes within the same population.
Genotype. In the context of genetics, the underlying 
genetic makeup of an organism. (Compare phenotype.)
Germ line gene therapy. See gene therapy.
Harm. To be harmed is to have one’s interests set back 
or to be made worse off than one would otherwise 
have been. Harms can relate to any aspect of an indi-
vidual’s welfare, for example physical, psychological or 
social. Institutions can also be harmed insofar as they 
can be thought of as having interests distinct from 
those of their members.
Human enhancement. Any attempt to alter the prop-
erties, dispositions, characteristics or abilities of human 
beings in a way that is thought to be an improvement 
on their normal or typical state. The term is often con-
trasted with ‘treatment’ or ‘therapy’, which is taken 
to correct or remedy some deficiency in the target 
individual or group. The central distinction here is 
the comparison between ‘restoring to the norm’ in 
the case of therapy and ‘improving on the norm’ in the 
case of human enhancement.
Human tissue banking. Storage of human tissues for 
future clinical or research use. See biobank.
Hypothetical imperative. An action-guiding principle 
that is conditional on a motive or desire. A hypotheti-
cal imperative indicates the action required to achieve 
a particular goal. (Compare categorical imperative.)
Inducement. An inducement is a payment or reward 
that encourages a particular sort of behaviour; it need 
not be monetary. Not all inducements are wrong, 
although undue inducements (especially where these 
are very large and/or in exchange for doing something 
very dangerous or unpleasant) may render a consent 
invalid. (See also voluntariness.)
Intrinsic value. Value that something has for its own 
sake. (Compare extrinsic value.)
Investigator bias. A distorting effect in a study result-
ing from the presence, actions, expectations or beliefs 
of the researcher.
Justice. The part of ethics concerned with fairness, 
especially in the distribution of benefits and burdens. 
The obligation to treat people fairly.
Liberalism. An ethical and political theory that claims 
that we ought generally to avoid interference in peo-
ple’s lives unless they are causing harm to others. 
Manipulation. You manipulate someone when you 
(attempt to) get them to do what you want by taking 
advantage of some aspect of their character or psycho-
logical makeup through means other than rational 
argument. Manipulation often involves deception but 
need not do so. Although manipulation is (arguably) 
not always wrong, its absence is standardly thought to 
be a part of valid consent. Consent may not be suffi-
ciently voluntary (and hence invalid) if it results from 
manipulation. (See voluntariness.)
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Meta-analysis. A statistical technique for combining 
and analysing the results of a number of different stud-
ies on the same topic to enable identification of trends 
and patterns and more accurate estimation of signifi-
cant effects.
Methodological rigour. A piece of research is method-
ologically rigorous if it is well constructed scientifically 
and able to answer the research question that is posed.
Minimal risk. Minimal risk is often defined either as 
a risk no greater than that encountered in everyday life 
or a risk no greater than that encountered in routine 
medical examination. The concept is typically used to 
identify a level of risk that may be permissible in research 
where there is neither a valid consent nor a benefit to 
the participants.
Moral difference. The existence within a society or 
between societies of a variety of competing moral views.
Moral objectivism. Moral objectivism is the view that 
some sense can be made of the idea that there are gen-
uinely true moral judgements. Most forms of moral 
objectivism present more or less developed views 
about what the truth of moral judgements could be 
and how we could come to know them. (Compare 
moral relativism.)
Moral relativism. Moral relativism is the view that there 
are no genuinely right or correct answers to moral ques-
tions because, for instance, morality is a matter for indi-
viduals, culture or society. Moral relativism involves 
a claim about the nature of morality and moral truth. 
It claims that morality is best understood in such a way 
as to make moral judgements not the kinds of things 
that can be true or false. (Compare moral objectivism.)
Moral status. An entity is said to have moral status 
when its interests are morally significant in themselves 
and not just because they further the interests of some 
other entity. On some views the term ‘moral status’ (or 
‘full moral status’) is reserved for entities whose inter-
ests warrant a very high level of protection comparable 
to that accorded to persons. 
Nanoscience. Research which investigates, manipulates 
and constructs objects or processes that take place at 
the nano-scale (1 to 100 nanometres).
Natural right. A right which does not depend on laws, 
customs or agreements but is possessed by all humans 
in virtue of their human nature. (Compare contractual 
right.)
Negative right. A right that establishes obligations on 
others only to refrain from certain actions. (Compare 
positive right.)
Non-maleficence. The obligation not to inflict harm 
on others. 
Non-therapeutic research. Research that does not 
involve testing a treatment on patients who have the 
condition that is the intended target of the treatment. 
(Compare therapeutic research.)
Objectivism. See moral objectivism.
Observational research. A method of research which 
involves no interaction between researcher and 
research subject, other than the observation of the sub-
ject. Observational research can be carried out overtly, 
with the knowledge and consent of the subject, or cov-
ertly, without their knowledge or consent.
Off-label use. The use of a drug for a purpose (i.e. to 
treat a condition) outside that for which it has been 
approved.
Participant information sheet. An information leaflet 
provided to research participants prior to their agree-
ing to be involved in the research.
Participant. A person on whom research is carried out; 
a person that researchers study. Also referred to as 
a subject. 
Paternalism. Interference in a person’s life, for example 
by restricting their freedom or interfering with their 
choices, for that person’s own good.
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Pharmacogenetics. The study of the way in which 
genes and genetic variation affect the ways in which 
patients respond to drugs.
Phase 0 trials. See first-in-human trials.
Phase 1 trials. The testing of drugs on human subjects, 
usually healthy volunteers, in order to gain information 
about the drugs’ toxicity and pharmacological proper-
ties. Phase 1 trials may also be used to determine appro-
priate therapeutic dose levels.
Phase 2 trials. Drug trials designed to demonstrate 
a drug’s safety and activity in a group of patients who 
have the condition that the drug is intended to treat. 
Phase 2 trials may be designed as randomised control-
led trials but involve fewer subjects than Phase 3 trials.
Phase 3 trials. Phase 3 drug trials are randomised con-
trolled trials conducted on large groups of patients, 
usually in multiple locations, and aimed at being the 
definitive assessment of the drug’s effectiveness. 
Because of their size and duration, Phase 3 trials are the 
most expensive, time-consuming and difficult trials 
to design and run.
Phenotype. In the context of genetics, the observable 
characteristics (such as behaviour, appearance or 
physiological properties) of an organism. (Compare 
genotype.)
Placebo effect. A beneficial effect in a patient that is 
caused by the patient’s expectation that the treatment 
will help rather than by the treatment itself.
Pluralism. The existence of multiple defensible 
approaches to ethical decision- making. 
Positive right. A right that establishes obligations 
on others to act in fulfilment of the right. (Compare 
negative right.)
Precautionary principle. A principle employed in eth-
ics and law advocating that steps should be taken to 
limit or prevent harm even where scientific data does 
not permit a precise assessment of risk. 
Principle of ends. An ethical principle that states that 
people should always be treated as ends-in-themselves 
and never merely as means. The principle of ends is 
associated with Kant’s ethics, in which it is presented 
as a formulation of the categorical imperative.
Principlism. An ethical theory based on a set of prin-
ciples that must be balanced against each other. 
The best known example is the four principles.
Privacy. An ethical and legal concept, often considered 
a right, which safeguards a cluster of related interests. 
Generally, privacy is the protection of: (i) control over 
information about oneself, (ii) control over access to 
oneself, both physical and mental, and (iii) control over 
one’s ability to make important decisions about family 
and lifestyle in order to be self-expressive and to 
develop varied relationships.
Procreative beneficence. The principle that prospec-
tive parents should choose, from among the possible 
children that they could have, the one that is expected 
to have the best life.
Randomised controlled trial (RCT). A research 
method, widely used in medical research but applica-
ble to other areas, in which participants are randomly 
allocated between two or more groups. Those in the 
control group receive an established treatment or pla-
cebo while those in the other group(s) receive the 
treatment(s) under investigation.
Rational agency. A rational agent is a person whose 
actions are guided by reason. In economics and some 
philosophical thought this is understood as doing what 
will satisfy one’s preferences to the maximum possible 
extent. In Kant’s philosophy, however, the idea of the 
categorical imperative implies that reason can require 
an agent to perform or refrain from performing certain 
actions irrespective of the agent’s preferences.
Relativism. See moral relativism.
Research ethics committee (REC). A committee 
whose job is to conduct ethical review of research.
203
G L O S S A R Y
Research governance. The regulations, standards and 
procedures through which research is controlled or 
managed. Most research governance systems include 
a requirement for ethical review of research involving 
human subjects and some constraints on how this 
should be conducted. 
Respect for autonomy. The duty to respect the deci-
sions of autonomous persons, or to support autono-
mous decision-making.
Right. (1) To have a right is to have a justified claim on 
others that they should act or refrain from acting in 
certain ways. Rights typically protect important inter-
ests or liberties and are often considered to override 
other moral considerations. (Compare positive right, 
negative right.) (2) An action is right if it ought to be 
performed.
Rigour. See methodological rigour.
Somatic gene therapy. See gene therapy.
Subject. See participant. 
Therapeutic misconception. Failure by patients 
enrolled in clinical research trials to appreciate the dif-
ferences between therapeutic and research methodol-
ogies. The therapeutic misconception can undermine 
the validity of consent.
Therapeutic research. Research in which an experi-
mental or unproven treatment is tested using as sub-
jects patients who have the condition that the 
treatment aims to treat. Therapeutic research can 
therefore offer a possibility of therapeutic benefit to the 
research subjects.
Tissue banking. See human tissue banking.
Utilitarianism. An ethical theory according to which 
the right action to perform in any situation is the 
one  that produces the most happiness or utility. 
Utilitarianism is thus a type of consequentialism, dis-
tinguished from other types by the view that the only 
consequence of an action that matters morally is its 
propensity to increase or decrease utility.
Utility. A term used within utilitarian and consequen-
tialist moral theory to refer to the welfare or happiness 
produced by an action or policy.
Virtue ethics. An ethical approach that treats charac-
ter as the primary focus of ethical evaluation. Virtue 
ethics typically takes the virtues to be character traits 
that are elements of human flourishing and evaluates 
actions according to what they reveal about the virtues 
of the agent. 
Voluntariness. One of the elements of valid consent. 
In order to be voluntary (and valid) consent must not 
result from coercion or from manipulation. Undue 
inducements may also render consent involuntary 
although arguably only when some kind of coercion 
or manipulation is involved.
Xenograft. Living cells, tissues or organs transplanted 
between organisms of different species. 
Xenotransplantation. Transplantation of living cells, tis-
sues or organs between organisms of different species. 
Zoonosis (or zoonotic infection). An infectious disease 
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